during infancy, where there shall not be any new consideration for such promise or ratification after full age."

It will be seen that the first section of this Act excepts "necessaries," which are generally defined to be food, drink, apparel, lodging, and education; but much depends on the fortune and position of the infant, and proof of such fortune, &c., lies on the plaintiff. (Ryder v. Wombwell, L. R. 4 Ex. 32, Ex. Ch., reversing decision in S. C. in the Exchequer.) Dinners, fruit, and confectionery supplied to an undergraduate out of college are not primâ facie necessaries as coming under the head of "meat." Matters of mere ornament, such as gold rings, betting-books, &c., are not within the rule as to necessaries suitable to one's condition. Mere luxuries, such as cigars, are not, in the absence of special circumstances, to be regarded as necessaries. (Bryant v. Richardson, L. R. 3 Ex. 93 n., and see Ryder v. Wombwell, supra.)

Necessaries for an infant's wife are on the same footing as those for himself. (Turner v. Tresby, 1 Str. 168.)

It is no defence to an action for necessaries that the infant had an allowance sufficient to buy all necessaries with ready money. (Burghart v. Hall, 4 M. & W. 727.) Nor is evidence admissible to show that the infant had a sufficient supply of necessaries. (Ryder v. Wombwell, L. R. 3 Ex. 90, Bramwell, B., dissentiente.)

Before the passing of 37 & 38 Vict. c. 62, above referred to, it was held that an infant was not liable on an account stated even for necessaries, and that such account was not admissible as an admission that necessaries to the amount shown had been supplied (Ingledew v. Douglas, 2 Stark. 36); nor at law for money lent, though laid out in purchasing necessaries (Robart v. Knouth, 2 Esp. 28), though in equity it might be otherwise (Chitty on Contracts, p. 148); nor on a bill of exchange for amount of necessaries. (Williamson v. Watts, 1 Camp. 552.) Though the above Act excepts contracts, &c., for necessaries from its operation, yet as it does not expressly alter the former state of the law, but only provides that such contracts are not within the enactment, these decisions do not seem to be disturbed.

A person is liable on a bill accepted by him after attaining his majority, though drawn before. (Stevens v. Jackson, 4 Camp. 164.) But where goods not necessaries ordered by an infant are delivered to a carrier for him before majority, but do not reach him until after, he is not liable. (Griffin v. Langfield, 3 Camp. 254.)

A promise to marry is within the 37 & 38 Vict. c. 62, and a defendant is not liable for a promise to marry made while he was an infant though he ratified it upon attaining his majority. Where a promise after the age of twenty-one is proved it will be a question for the jury whether the promise was a mere ratification of the promise made during infancy or a new promise. (See Coxhead v. Mullis, 3 C. P. D. 439; Northcote v. Doughty, 4 C. P. D. 385; Ditcham v. Worrall, 5 C. P. D. 410.)

An infant is liable for all torts committed by him. And where an action, though in form ex contractu, is in fact founded on tort, as where an infant is sued for money had and received in a case where such money has been fraudulently appropriated or embezzled by him, infancy is no defence. (Bristow v. Eastman, 1 Esp. 172; Burnard v. Haggis, 32 L. J. C. P. 189.) But if the action is for a fraudulent misrepresentation, infancy is a defence. (Liverpool Adelphi v. Fairhurst, 9 Ex. 422.) An infant is not liable upon a warranty given by him. (Howlett v. Haswell, 4 Camp. 118.)

It is no answer to a plea of infancy that the defendant fraudulently represented himself to be of full age. (Bartlett v. Wells, 31 L. J. Q. B. 57.) But in an action against an infant who had obtained a lease of a furnished house on an implied representation that he was of full age, it was held that the lease must be declared void and the possession given

Infants (a).

Wardship of Infants and Care of Infants' Estate.

1. By will dated August 10, 1882, A. devised Whiteacre and £10,000 to defendant, on trust for plaintiff.

2. On August 15, 1882, A. died.

up, and that the defendant should be restrained by injunction from parting with the furniture, but that he was not liable for use and occupation. (Lempriere v. Lange, 12 Ch. D. 675.) It is not competent to a plaintiff to treat a breach of contract as a tort for the purpose of suing the infant upon it. (Jennings v. Randall, 8 T. R. 335.)

ship and custody of infants.

(a) In default of any sufficient protection, the Chancery Division has Guardianjurisdiction to appoint a guardian to any infant, but this jurisdiction is not exercised unless the infant is possessed of some property. By statute 36 Vict. c. 12, jurisdiction is conferred upon the Court to allow a mother as against the father the custody of her children up to the age of 16 years. The same statute validates agreements contained in separation deeds for giving the custody of children to the mother, unless the Court sees that the agreement is against the interest of the children. As to the nature and extent of a father's right to the custody of his children, see In re Goldsworthy, 2 Q. B. Div. 75; In re Besant, 11 Ch. Div. 508; In re Agar-Ellis, 10 Ch. Div. 49.

Wide powers for the management of the land of infants, and for the receipt and application of the income thereof, have been conferred on trustees by the Conveyancing and Law of Property Act, 1881, sect. 42, and by sect. 43 of the same Act

(1) Where any property is held by trustees in trust for an infant, either for life or for any greater interest, and whether absolutely or contingently on his attaining the age of 21 years, or on the occurrence of any event before his attaining that age, the trustees may, at their sole discretion, pay to the infant's parent or guardian, if any, or otherwise apply for or towards the infant's maintenance, education, or benefit the income of that property, or any part thereof, whether there is any other fund applicable to the same purpose, or any person bound by law to provide for the infant's maintenance or education or not.

(2) The trustees shall accumulate all the residue of that income in the way of compound interest, by investing the same and the resulting income thereof from time to time on securities on which they are by the settlement, if any, or by law authorised to invest trust money, and shall hold those accumulations for the benefit of the person who ultimately becomes entitled to the property from which the same arise; but so that the trustees may at any time, if they think fit, apply those accumulations or any part thereof, as if the same were income arising in the then current year.

(3) This section applies only if and as far as a contrary intention is not expressed in the instrument under which the interest of the infant arises, and shall have effect subject to the terms of that instrument, and to the provisions therein contained.

(4) This section applies whether that instrument comes into operation before or after the commencement of this Act.

If the vesting of the property is postponed until the infant attains the age of 21 years, this section does not apply.

The Court has jurisdiction to charge reversionary property of infants with money required for their maintenance, even where none of the

Powers of trustees for infants.

3. On August 30, 1882, probate was granted to the defendant, the sole executor.

4. The plaintiff is an infant 12 years old.

The plaintiff claims :—

(1.) That the plaintiff may become a ward of Court;

(2.) Administration of the trusts of the will of A. so far as necessary.

When

infants become wards of Court.

The marriage of wards.

Innkeepers insurers at

common Jaw.

Innkeeper (a).

1. Claim against an Innkeeper for Loss of Guest's Luggage.

1. The plaintiff has suffered damage by the defendant, who is a common innkeeper at Wycombe, failing to keep

infants for whose benefit the money is raised may ultimately become entitled in possession to the property charged (De Witte v. Palin, L. R. 14 Eq. 241.) As to the circumstances under which the Court will make an order for an allowance for past maintenance, see Brown v. Smith, 10 Ch. Div. 377. An order for the maintenance of an infant without suit constitutes the infant a ward of Court (Re Graham, L. R. 10 Eq. 530). In a later case, De Penda v. De Mancha, 19 Ch. Div. 451, the payment of moneys into Court in an administration action to the separate account of the infant was held sufficient to constitute the infant a ward of Court, although she was not a party to the administration action.

The Court watches over the marriages of its wards with jealousy. An improper marriage will be restrained by injunction, and to marry a ward of Court without the consent of the Court is a high contempt of Court, which it punishes by imprisonment, and by insisting on a proper settlement being made. The parties seeing the marriage of a ward of Court should always petition for the approval of the Court, which, if the match on inquiry be found suitable, will be given and a settlement directed.

By statutes 18 & 19 Vict. c. 43, and 23 & 24 Vict. c. 83, male infants of the age of 20 years and female infants of the age of 17 years are enabled, with the approbation of the Court, to make binding marriage settlements of their property.

(a) At common law an innkeeper seems to be under a greater liability for loss of or injury to the goods of guests than an ordinary bailee for hire. Whether he is an absolute insurer of the safe custody of the goods, in the same sense that a common carrier is an insurer, is perhaps not altogether free from doubt, but the better opinion seems to be that his common law liability must be placed as high as this. On the one hand, in the case of Dawson v. Chamney, 5 Q. B. 164, the Court was disposed to place the liability of an innkeeper upon the ground of negligence merely; but in the later case of Morgan v. Ravey, 6 H. & N. 265, it was laid down generally that an innkeeper, though guilty of no negligence, is liable for the loss of or injury to goods of his guest where such loss is not due to the act of God or the Queen's enemies, or the contributory negligence of the guest himself.

This extended responsibility has, however, been much cut down by the legislature. By the 26 & 27 Vict, c. 41, s. 1, no innkeeper shall be liable

safely a portmanteau containing wearing apparel, brought by the plaintiff into the defendant's inn while he was a guest there.

to make good to any guest any loss of or injury to property brought to the inn (not being a horse or other live animal, or any gear appertaining thereto, or any carriage), to a greater amount than £30, except in the following cases :-(1) Where the property shall have been stolen, lost, or injured through the wilful act, default, or neglect of the innkeeper, or any servant in his employ. (2) Where the property shall have been Statutory deposited expressly for safe custody with the innkeeper; provided that protection in case of such deposit the innkeeper may require as a condition of his of innliability that the property be deposited in a box or other receptacle keeper. fastened and sealed by the person depositing it. By sect. 2, if an innkeeper shall refuse to receive for safe custody any property of his guest, or if the guest shall, through any default of the innkeeper, be unable to deposit his property, the innkeeper shall not be entitled to the benefit of the Act in respect of such property. By sect. 3, every innkeeper is bound to cause at least one copy of sect. 1 of the Act, printed in plain type, to be exhibited in a conspicuous part of the hall or entrance of his inn, and is to be entitled to the benefit of the Act in respect of such property only as shall be brought to his inn while such copy is so exhibited. An "inn means under the Act any hotel, inn, tavern, public-house, or other place of refreshment the keeper of which is by law responsible for the property of his guests (sect. 4).

It has been held that the word wilful in the words "wilful act, default, or neglect in the 1st section, must be read with "act" only, and not with "default" or 66 neglect." (Squire v. Wheeler, 16 L. T. N. S. 93, per

Byles, J.)

A mere verbal error in the copy of sect. 1 of the Act will not vitiate the notice so as to make it ineffectual, provided the notice states correctly the provisions of the Act; but the omission of a material portion of the How it statute will render the notice ineffectual to protect the innkeeper. may be (Spice v. Bacon, 2 Ex. Div. 463; 46 L. J. 713, App.) And the accidental lost. omission of the word "act" in the recital of the first section of the Act was held to be a material omission. (Ib.)

An innkeeper is bound at common law to receive persons who present themselves as guests at any hour of the day or night, provided they offer themselves in a proper condition to be received into the inn and are ready to pay for the accommodation, and provided there is room to accommodate them; but he is at liberty to set up an inn for the reception of a particular class of persons, and in such a case he is only bound to do what he publicly professes to do. (See per Parke, B., in Johnson v. Midland Railway Co., 4 Ex. 373.) Coffee-house keepers who do not Who are profess to lodge guests, boarding-house keepers, lodging-house keepers, innkeepers. and the owners of public-houses who do not let bed-rooms, are not innkeepers at common law. To constitute a person an innkeeper, he must profess to entertain and lodge all travellers. A refreshment bar is not an inn (Reg. v. Rymer, 2 Q. B. D. 136); nor a refreshment room at a station (Strauss v. Carlisle County Hotel Co., W. N. 1883, p. 192).

The innkeeper is the person liable, and not a manager in whose name the licenses have been taken out. (Dixon v. Birch, L. R. 8 Ex. 135.) The plaintiff, in order to recover against the innkeeper on his common law liability, must prove that he was a guest in the inn at the time the loss happened. But a man may be a guest, though he is only in the inn for temporary refreshment (Bennett v. Mellor, 5 T. R. 273), and it is not essential that he should lodge in the inn for a single night.

If the loss of the goods has been brought about by the contributory

The innkeeper's lien and right of sale under it.

2. In the alternative, the said portmanteau was stolen by reason of the negligence of the defendant in failing to provide proper bolts and bars for the door of the plaintiff's bedroom at the said inn.

Particulars of damage :

[Here set out articles in portmanteau, and their value.]

The plaintiff claims £80 damages.

Defence.

1. The plaintiff was never received into the defendant's inn as a guest, and he was not a guest therein at the time of the alleged loss of the portmanteau.

2. The defendant does not admit that the said portmanteau was stolen.

3. The defendant denies that he was guilty of any negligence in connection with the custody of the said portmanteau.

4. The said portmanteau and its contents were property brought to the defendant's inn within the provisions of the 26 & 27 Vict. c. 41, section 1 of which Act, at the time when the plaintiff says he was received as a guest into the defendant's inn, was exhibited in a conspicuous part of the hall thereof.

2. Claim against an Innkeeper for Injury to Goods.

1. On the 8th of September, 1880, the plaintiff became a guest at the defendant's inn at Barnet.

2. While he was a guest certain of the defendant's servants burnt and much injured several valuable maps, plans and

negligence of the plaintiff, he cannot recover from the defendant, as where in a case where a lock and key were provided the plaintiff went to bed without locking the door, and left his money in his trousers pockets on a chair by his bedside. (Oppenheim v. The White Lion Hotel Co., 40 L. J. C. P. 231; L. R. 6 C. P. 515.)

An innkeeper has a lien for his charges upon all goods brought by the guest to his inn; but until recently he could merely retain the goods until payment. He might not sell them and satisfy his debt. However, by the 41 & 42 Vict. c. 38, which came into operation on the 8th August, 1878, an innkeeper may sell the goods on which he has a lien, provided (1) he keeps them six weeks before doing so, and (2) advertises the sale as directed by the Act a month before the sale. An innkeeper retaining the goods of his guest by virtue of his lien is not bound to use greater care in their custody than he uses as to his own goods of a similar description. (Angus v. McLachlan, 23 Ch. D. 330.)