Claim in an Action for Maliciously Swearing Articles of the 1. On the 15th of April, 1880, the defendant falsely and maliciously and without reasonable and probable cause, made information on oath before two justices of the peace for the borough of B. that the plaintiff had threatened to assault him and commit a breach of the peace, and that he was afraid that the plaintiff would do him some grievous bodily harm, and by means of such false information he induced the said justices to order that the plaintiff should enter into recognisances with sureties to keep the peace for six months or be imprisoned for the said period. 2. The plaintiff, who was unable to find sureties, was arrested and imprisoned for six months under the said order. The plaintiff claims £250 damages. Defence. 1. The defendant denies that in swearing the said information he acted maliciously and without reasonable and probable cause. 2. The plaintiff did threaten him as alleged, and the defendant was in fear that grievous bodily harm would be inflicted upon him by the plaintiff. Owner of a market may claim damages or an in. junction. Market (a). Claim for an Obstruction of a Market and for Tolls. 1. The plaintiffs are the owners of a certain market holden in the borough of P., on Thursdays and Saturdays in each week, (a) Persons entitled to the franchise of a market by grant or by immemorial user from which a grant can be presumed may bring an action for its disturbance, and in a proper case they may get an injunction to restrain any interference with it. But the mere grant of a market does not of itself confer the right to prevent persons from selling on market days in their private houses, though within the town or manor where the market may be held (Mayor of Macclesfield v. Chapman, 12 M. & W. 18; Mayor of Penryn v. Best, 3 Exch. Div. 294), though even such a right as this may be acquired by immemorial enjoyment. (Ibid.) In Card v. Ford (2 Wms. Saunders, 6 ed. 172) it was held that a new market for the buying and selling of flesh meat, together with tolls, stallages, and other profits to that market appertaining, and all persons selling flesh meat on Thursdays and Saturdays within the said borough ought of right to sell the same only on paying to the plaintiffs the said tolls, stallages, and other profits of the said market. 2. On Saturday, the 4th of December, 1875, and from that day on each Saturday until the commencement of this action, the defendant exposed for sale in a shop within the limits of the said borough flesh meat, and refused to pay the plaintiffs any of the said tolls, stallages, or other perquisites and profits of the said market, and thereby disturbed the plaintiffs' market. The plaintiffs claim : (1.) £100, damages for the disturbance of the said market. (2.) £1 for tolls. Medical Man ("). 1. Claim by a Physician for his Fees. The plaintiff's claim is for £50 for medical attendance upon the defendant and his family between the 1st of May, 1880, and the 3rd of August, 1881. may be a nuisance, though it is holden on another day, and in Elwes v. Payne (12 Ch. Div. 408) the late Master of the Rolls held that a rival market on Monday was, primâ facie, an injury to an ancient market held on Thursday. In the last case his lordship went so far as to grant an interlocutory injunction restraining the defendants from continuing to hold their market on Monday: but the Court of Appeal held that upon the defendant undertaking to keep an account of the profits he made, no injunction ought to be granted until the hearing of the action. (a) At common law a physician could not maintain an action for his fees, not even for his travelling expenses (Veitch v. Russell, 3 Q. B. 928), unless there was a special contract, proved by unambiguous evidence and not by mere letters acknowledging a debt or an account in vague general terms. (lb., and Attorney-General v. Royal College of Surgeons, 30 L. J. Ch. 757.) When in. junction granted. By the 21 & 22 Vict. c. 90, s. 31 (amended in some few particulars by Statutory 22 & 23 Vict. c. 21, and 23 Vict. c. 7), persons registered pursuant to these provisions Acts are entitled to practise medicine or surgery, or both, according to allowing their qualifications, in any part of the Queen's dominions, and to demand medical and recover in any Court of law, with full costs of suit, their reasonable practicharges for professional aid, advice, and visits, and the cost of any medi- tioners to cines or other medical or surgical appliances rendered or supplied to recover fees. Medical practi tioners must be registered under Act. Medical Register, how far evidence of registration. Provisions of 55 Geo. 3, c. 194, as to apothecaries. Registration must be proved though not disputed. Bye-law of Full particulars of the said claim were delivered before action brought. The plaintiff claims £50. their patients. By force of the words "according to their qualification," it has been held that where the plaintiff's qualification is to practise surgery only he cannot recover for attendance on a medical case, as he is not within the section and therefore is under the common law disability in this respect; and with regard to medicine supplied by him during such attendance, he is within the Apothecaries Act (55 Geo. 3, c. 194), s. 21, cited infra. (Allison v. Haydon, 4 Bing. 619; Leman v. Fletcher, L. R. 8 Q. B. 319.) He may, however, recover for medicines supplied as ancillary to a surgical case. (Ib.) Under this section it has been held that a registered physician may maintain the action without proof of any express contract or implied understanding that he should be paid. (Gibbon v. Budd, 32 L. J. Ex. 182; 2 H. & C. 92.) By sect. 32, as amended by 23 Vict. c. 7, no person shall be entitled to recover any charge in a Court of law for medical or surgical advice, and attendance, or for the performance of any operation or for medicine or other medical or surgical appliances which he shall have both prescribed and supplied, unless he shall prove at the trial that he is registered under the Act (21 & 22 Vict. c. 90). By sect. 28, a copy of the Medical Register directed to be printed and published by the general council formed under the Act purporting to be so printed and published, shall be evidence that the persons therein specified are registered according to the Act; and the absence of the name of any person from such copy shall be evidence until the contrary appear that he is not so registered, provided in this case that a certified copy under the hand of the registrar of the General Council or of any branch council of the entry of the name on the general or local register shall be evidence of registration. By sect. 55, the Act is not to affect the lawful occupation, trade, or business of chemists and druggists, and dentists, so far as selling, compounding, or dispensing medicines. With regard to apothecaries, the 55 Geo. 3, c. 194, s. 21, provides that no person shall be allowed to recover any charges claimed by him in a Court of law, unless he can prove at the trial that he has obtained a certificate from the Court of Examiners of the Apothecaries' Company. The provisions of sect. 32 of the Medical Act (21 & 22 Vict. c. 90), above cited, are not confined in their application to actions against patients themselves, but extend to cases where a third person has guaranteed payment for medical attendance, or is primarily liable for it as supplied on his credit. (Roscoe's Evidence, Nisi Prius, 13th ed. 486.) Defences.] -1st. Non-registration of plaintiff pursuant to the Medical Act, as amended. (See ante.) The practitioner must be qualified and registered at the time the services were rendered, and it is not enough that he is registered at the time of action brought. (Leman v. Houseley, L. R. 10 Q. B. 66.) It would seem that even if a defendant admits the allegation that plaintiff was duly qualified and registered, this does not dispense with the necessary proof of qualification (i.e. registration) on the trial, or deprive the defendant of the benefit of the plaintiff failing to prove it, as by the language of sect. 32 of 21 & 22 Vict. c. 90, registration is made a condition precedent to the plaintiff recovering. (Wagstaffe v. Sharpe, 3 M. & W. 521.) 2nd. That by a bye-law of a College of Physicians, to which the plaintiff belongs, it was provided that no member or fellow thereof Defence. 1. The defendant says that the plaintiff is a physician and a fellow of the Royal College of Physicians of London, and by the bye-laws of the said college he is forbidden to sue for any fees for medical attendance. 2. The plaintiff's charges herein are exorbitant and unreasonable. Reply. The plaintiff joins issue upon the statement of defence. 2. Claim by the Executrices of a Dentist to recover Charges for Supplying and Fitting Artificial Teeth. 1. The plaintiffs are the executrices of the last will of E. S., deceased, surgeon-dentist. 2. The said E. S. in his lifetime professionally attended the defendant, and supplied him with a set of artificial teeth, and a gold plate, for which his reasonable charge was £31. The plaintiffs claim £31. Defence. 1. The said E. S., deceased, agreed with the plaintiff that he would charge him for the materials of the said artificial teeth. only, and that the cost to the defendant should in no event exceed £5. should be entitled to sue for his fees, &c. It seems that the College of A medical practitioner is liable for injuries caused through want of due care and skill. But it is not enough to render him liable that he has shown a less degree of skill than other medical men may have shown, or a less degree of care than he himself might have bestowed; nor is it enough that he has himself acknowledged some degree of want of care; there must have been a want of competent skill and ordinary care, and to such a degree as to have led to a bad result. Physicians against fellows, &c., suing. No benefit, owing to plaintiff's want of skill. Medical practitioners, when liable for want of skill and care. 2. The teeth which the said E. S. did supply were not properly fitted, and were made of bad material, and they became wholly worthless, and of no use to the defendant. 3. The defendant brings into Court the sum of £5, and says that the same is sufficient to satisfy the plaintiff's claim herein. 3. Claim by an Infant through her next Friend against the Surgeons of a Hospital for Negligence. 1. The plaintiff is an infant. The defendant A. B. is an operating surgeon to the N. E. Hospital for Children at H., and the defendant C. D. is house surgeon to the same hospital. 2. In the month of October, 1880, the plaintiff was a patient in the said hospital, where the defendants so negligently and unskilfully performed a surgical operation on the knee of the plaintiff, that she has sustained permanent bodily harm. The plaintiff claims £100 damages. Defence. 1. The defendants deny that they were guilty of any negligence or want of skill in the performance of the said operation. 2. The plaintiff has not sustained permanent bodily harm. The action of deceit. Misrepresentation (a). 1. Claim for a Fraudulent Representation as to the Quality of a Thing sold. 1. On the 1st of November, 1880, the defendant sold to the plaintiff a jewel for the sum of £100, which he paid. (a) "A false affirmation made by the defendant with intent to defraud the plaintiff, whereby the plaintiff receives damage, is the ground of an action upon the case in the nature of deceit. In such an action it is not necessary that the defendant should be benefited by the deceit, or that he should collude with the person who is." (Pasley v. Freeman, 3 T. R. 51; 2 Smith's Leading Cases, 7th ed. 64.) For many years there was much doubt whether, in order to maintain this action, it was necessary to |