§ 476. Section 6 of the act. SECTION 6. 477. Enforcement of seizure of goods under section 6. § 476 (336). Seizure and condemnation of property.-SEC. 6. Any property owned under any contract or by any combination, or pursuant to any conspiracy (and being the subject thereof) mentioned in section one of this act, and being in the course of transportation from one State to another, or to a foreign country, shall be forfeited to the United States, and may be seized and condemned by like proceedings as those provided by law for the forfeiture, seizure, and condemnation of property imported into the United States contrary to law. 8 477 (337). Enforcement of seizure of goods under section 6. The seizure of goods authorized under section 6 can be enforced only by the procedure like to that provided by sections 3309-3391 R. S. U. S. for the forfeiture of goods under the customs laws, and with trial by jury. There is no reported case of such proceeding under this section. The seizure cannot be enforced in an equity suit by the United States under section 4. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 29 C. C. A. 141, 85 Fed. 271, 1890. It was said in this case by Taft, J., that the only remedy which can be afforded under section 4 is a decree of injunction. 478. Section 7 of the act. SECTION 7. 479. The section construed by the supreme court. 480. Plaintiff must show injury. 481. State is not a "person or corporation" under this section. 482. Pleadings under section 7. 483. Danbury Hat case. 484. Measure of damages under the section. 485. The act as a defense in suits by alleged illegal combinations. 486. No recovery under act for violation of Interstate Commerce Act. 487. Limitations. 488. Self-incriminating testimony under the act. § 478 (338). Persons injured may recover threefold damages and attorney's fee.-SEC. 7. Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by any other person or corporation by reason of anything forbidden or declared to be unlawful by this act, may sue therefor in any circuit court of the United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the costs of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee. 8 479 (339). The section construed by the supreme court.This section was construed by the supreme court in Montague v. Lowry, supra, affirming the judgment of the circuit court of appeals for the ninth circuit, 115 Fed. 27, and of the circuit court (N. Dist. of Cal.) 106 Fed. 38, for treble damages and attorney's fees in favor of a firm which had endeavored to procure tiles for the purposes of their business from the tile manufacturers, members of the association, who refused to deal with them because they, the plaintiffs, were not members of the association. Plaintiffs were not eligible to membership in the association, because they did not always carry stock worth $3,000, which was made a condition of eligibility to membership. It was claimed that this provision had not been enforced. But the court said there was nothing to prevent its enforcement at any time, if an application was made by any one who did not fill the condition. The proof showed that by reason of the formation of the association plaintiffs had been injured in their business, because they were unable to procure tiles from the man ufacturers at any price or from the dealers at San Francisco at less than the list price which was more than fifty per cent above the price at which members of the association could purchase the same. In this case the jury found a verdict for $500 and judgment was rendered for treble this amount, and in addition thereto the court allowed $750 for attorney's fees. The trial lasted five days. The court said that the amount of the attorney's fees was within the discretion of the trial court reasonably exercised, and that the discretion was not abused. The section was also construed by the supreme court in the case of Chattanooga Foundry Works v. Atlanta, 203 U. S. 390, 51 L. Ed. 241 (1906), affirming the circuit court of appeals, sixth circuit, 127 Fed. 25. In this case three-fold damages were recovered by the city of Atlanta, Ga., in the circuit court of Tennessee against two Tennessee corporations which were members of the combination held unlawful in the Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. case. See supra, § 84. The plaintiff was engaged in conducting a system of waterworks, and it was held entitled to recover the difference between the price paid and the fair price the city would have had to pay under natural conditions for water pipe, together with attorney's fee; and the judgment trebled the damages allowed by the jury. The court said there was no doubt that congress had power to authorize a recovery for the damage, although the latter was suffered wholly within the boundaries of one state, and that it was immaterial that there was no direct contract between plaintiff and the defendants. § 480 (340). Plaintiff must show injury.-The fact of an illegal combination in an industry does not establish a right of private action for damages, unless plaintiff shows injury directly accruing to himself by reason of the illegal combination; but an allegation that plaintiff is in the business affected by the combination, and by reason thereof is unable to make purchases and suffers loss thereby, is sufficient. Gibbs v. McNeeley, 102 Fed. 594, reversed in 55 C. C. A. 70, 118 Fed. 120, 60 L. R. A. 152 (1902). It is not necessary that plaintiff should be engaged himself in the business of interstate commerce if he has suffered injury in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden by the act. See City of Atlanta Case, supra. The stockholder or creditor of a corporation, which has been made bankrupt by reason of an unlawful combination violative of this act, has no right of action therefore for damages under this section, as the right of action in such case belongs to the corporation or its trustee in bankruptcy. See Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Company (C. C. A., third circuit 1910), 183 Fed. 704; Ames v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co. (infra), 166 Fed. 820 (1909). See also section 4, supra. § 481 (341). A state is not a "person or corporation” under section 7.-In Lowenstein v. Evans, 69 Fed. 908 (1895), a demurrer was sustained to a suit filed by a liquor dealer in South Carolina under the seventh section of the act against the members of the State Board of Control of the liquor traffic, under the State Dispensary law, alleging that the state monopoly of the liquor business was in violation of the act. The court said that a state is not a "person" or "corporation" within the meaning of the section. § 482. Pleadings under section 7.-It is not sufficient to frame a complaint in the language of the statute, but the nature and substance of the contracts alleged to be illegal and the substantive facts constituting a monopoly, must be set out. Cilley v. U. S. Machinery Co., 152 Fed. 726, C. C. Mass. (1907). A complaint was also held bad on demurrer in Rice v. Standard Oil Co., 134 Fed. 464 (Dist. N. J., 1905), where the court said that the plaintiff must not only show facts showing the combination to be unlawful, but also facts showing that by reason of such unlawful action he had been injured in his business or property; and that the act made a distinction between a contract and a combination or conspiracy, and the two should not be confused in a pleading in a civil case any more than in indictment in a criminal proceeding. As to complaint held sufficient for submission to a jury, see Gibbs v. McNeeley, supra. The complaint in Loewe v. Lawlor, supra (the Danbury Hat Case), was held by the supreme court sufficient on demurrer to show a cause of action under this section charging interference with the manufacturer's business by an unlawful combination in violation of the act. § 483. The Danbury Hat case.-In the case of Loewe v. Lawlor the petition was held good on demurrer by the supreme court, supra, § 92, and on trial in the circuit court plaintiff recovered judgment under the direction of court for $74,000.00, which amount was trebled by the court under this section of the statute. The circuit court of appeals second circuit, 187 Fed. 522 (1911), reversed this judgment and held that the circuit court erred in withdrawing the question of liability from the jury when there was conflicting evidence as to the knowledge of defendants of the acts of the organizations; and the court said that the mere fact that a person was a member of the United Hatters Association, did not make him the principal of any and all agents who might be employed by its officers in carrying out its objects and responsible as principal if such agents used illegal methods or caused illegal methods to be used in undertaking to carry out such objects. The court held further that it was for the jury to determine from the entire body of proof that was the intent of the individuals who made up the combination or what they must have known to be the necessarily inevitable consequences of their acts; and also that it was erroneous to admit evidence of the payment of their dues to the unions by the individual defendants after the complaint was served; as such was not competent as showing ratification and should have been excluded. The testimony of plaintiff's salesmen, that customers told them of threats of boycott made by persons claiming to represent the defendant organizations, was held incompetent as hearsay. The court said that there was no error in admitting the constitution of the association, or its action at its meetings, or its published lectures, or what it did with reference to the plaintiffs; but it said that all these matters were for the consideration of the jury to draw proper inferences therefrom. The cause was therefore, remanded for new trial. § 484 (343). Measure of damages under section 7.-The measure of damages which a party is entitled to recover in such an action is the difference between the price paid and the rea |