sonable price under natural and competitive conditions. See also supra, § 479.

The court said in the City of Atlanta case that the plain intent was to compensate the person injured and that the enlargement of compensation by the provision for trebling the amount of damages did not constitute the action a penal action within the meaning of section 1047 R. S., U. S. The other sections of the act were penal, but the 7th section was distinctly compensa. tory.

§ 485. The act as a defense in suits by alleged illegal combinations. There is no provision in the Anti-Trust Act such as is contained in some state anti-trust statutes making the fact of membership of a vendor in an illegal combination a defense by a vendee in a suit for goods purchased; and where a contract of purchase is wholly collateral to and independent of the agreement under which the combination is made, the fact of the combination constitutes no defense in a suit for the purchase price by the vendor.

Connolly v. Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U. S. 540, 46 L. Ed. 679 (1902).

In this case it was held that the illegality of common law of a combination formed in restraint of trade did not prevent it from recovering the purchase price of goods sold in the course of business, and that a violation of the Anti-Trust Act by the formation of an illegal combination in restraint of trade did not preclude such a company from recovering on collateral contracts for the purchase price of goods, and also that a recovery of the treble damages under section 7 could only be had by direct action and not by way of set-off.

In Continental Wall Paper Co. v. Voight, 212 U. S. 227, 53 L. Ed. 486 (1909), the court, affirming 148 Fed. 930, sustained the defense set up by the answer in an action for goods sold and delivered that plaintiff was a selling agent of a combination of wall paper manufacturers offending against the act, and that in carrying out the combination defendants were compelled to sign a shipper's agreement which in effect bound them to buy from the plaintiff all wall paper needed in their business at certain fixed prices, and that these prices were unreasonable. Justices Holmes, Brewer, White and Peckham dissenting. The prevail

ing opinion distinguished the case from the Connolly case, as there the contract of purchase was wholly collateral to and independent of the agreement under which the combination was made, while in this case, as admitted by the demurrer, the count sued on was made up in execution of the agreement and thus constituted a part of it.

The principle was also laid down in Bement v. New York Harrow Co., 186 U. S. p. 70, 46 L. Ed. 1058 (1902), that the defense that a contract is in violation of an act of congress against unlawful restraints of monopolies making illegal every contract violative of its provisions may be set up by private individuals when sued thereon, and if proved constitutes a good defense to the action. In this case it was also held that conditions imposed by the patentee in a license which keep up the monopoly of fixed prices did not violate the act of congress. See supra, § 452. See also: American Soda Fountain v. Green, 69 Fed. 333 (C. C. E. D. of Pa., 1895); Columbia Wire Co. v. Freeman Wire Co., 71 Fed. 302 (1895).

It is no objection to the enforcement of a contract, in the consideration of which nothing illegal inheres, that it may incidentally aid one of the parties in exacting and violating the AntiTrust statute. This was held in Ingraham v. Nat'l Salt Co., 130 Fed. 676 (1904, C. C. A. second circuit), reversing, 122 Fed. 40, where the action was to recover the amount of certificates created by defendant, in payment of stock of another company, the certificates in payment of the stock purchasing being held to have been lawfully issued in exercise of the defendant's implied power to incur indebtedness.

§ 486. No recovery under act for violation of interstate commerce act. The anti-trust law does not give any right of action for damages sustained by the payment of excessive, unjust, or unreasonable rates to interstate carriers alleged to have been induced by a conspiracy between interstate railroads, as relief therefor as provided by the Interstate Commerce Act.

See Meeker v. Lehigh Valley R. R. Co., 162 Fed. 354, circuit court, southern district New York (1908).

The Anti-Trust Act and the Interstate Commerce Act are separate and independent acts, not germane in character and purpose. See United States v. A., T. & S. F. R. R. Co., 142 Fed. 176 (1905).

§ 487. Limitations.-There is no limitation fixed under this statute for the bringing of private actions. It was held by the supreme court, in the Atlanta case, that the limitation of five years in R. S. 1047 for suits upon penalty under the laws of the United States, did not apply, as an action under section 7 was not an action for penalty within the meaning of that statute. The matter of limitation was therefore left to the local law in which the action is brought by the silence of the statutes of the United States. Thus, in the City of Atlanta case the action was held to be controlled by the law of Tennessee; and under the construction of that statute by the courts of Tennessee the action was held to be controlled by the ten year statute of that state.

§ 488. Self incriminating testimony.-The subject of immunity of witnesses who give self-incriminating testimony, particularly in relation to governmental prosecutions, civil or criminal, under the other sections of this act, has been the subject of extensive discussion. Prior to the act of February 25, 1903, it had been held, in Foote v. Buchanan, 113 Fed. 156 (1902), that the act of congress of February 11, 1893, supra, p. 443, did not apply to the Anti-Trust Act, and that the fifth amendment of the constitution did apply thereto, so that self-incriminating testimony could not be enforced until this act of February 25, 1903, which was a provision of the legislative, executive and judicial appropriation act of that year (supra, § 347), providing that no person should be prosecuted and subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any transaction matter or thing, concerning which he may testify or produce evidence, documentary or otherwise, in any preceding suit or prosecution under said acts. (The Interstate Commerce Act or the Anti-Trust Act). Provided further that no person so testifying shall be exempted from prosecution or punishment for perjury committed in so testifying.

By the act of June 30, 1906, it was provided that this immunity should extend only to a natural person who, in obedience to a subpoena, gives testimony on oath or gives testimony, documentary or otherwise, under oath. As to the construction of this Immunity Act in relation to corporations and natural persons, see supro, pp. 446 and 448.

489. Section 8 of the act.

SECTION 8.

§ 489 (348). "Person" or "persons" defined.-SEC. 8. That the word "person," or "persons," wherever used in this act shall be deemed to include corporations and associations existing under or authorized by the laws of either the United States, the laws of any of the Territories, the laws of any state, or the laws of any foreign country.

This statutory inclusion of the corporations and associations in the term "person" is not contained in the Interstate Commerce Act. The general rule however is well established that the term "person" as well as the term "citizen" is to be construed as including corporations unless there be something beyond the mere use of the word to indicate the intent on the part of congress to include them. United States v. Amedy, 11 Wheat. 329, 6 L. Ed. 502; Ramsey v. Tacoma Land Co., 196 U. S. 360, 49 L. Ed. 513.

A municipal corporation is entitled to sue for damages under the 7th section by express direction of this section, see supra, § 479.

THE EXPEDITION ACT.

490. The Expedition Act.

491. The judicial application of the act.

492. The amendment of 1910.

493. The construction of the statute.

§ 490. The Expedition Act.

AN ACT To expedite the hearing and determination of suits in equity pending or hereafter brought under the act of July second, eighteen hundred and ninety, entitled "An Act to protect trade and commerce against unlawful restraints and monopolies," "An Act to regu late commerce," approved Feuruary fourth, eighteen hundred and eighty-seven, or any other Acts Laving a like purpose that may be hereafter enacted.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, Sec. 1. (As amended June 25, 1910.) That in any suit in equity pending or

[Expedition of cases.]

hereafter brought in any circuit court of the United States under the Act entitled "An Act to protect trade and commerce against unlawful restraints and monopolies," approved July second, eighteen hundred and ninety, "An Act to regulate commerce,' approved February fourth, eighteen hundred and eighty-seven, or any other Acts having a like purpose that hereafter may be enacted, wherein the United States is complainant, the AttorneyGeneral may file with the clerk of such court a certificate that, in his opinion, the case is of general public importance, a copy of which shall be immediately furnished by such clerk to each of the circuit judges of the circuit in which the case is pending. Thereupon such case shall be given precedence over others and in every way expedited, and be assigned for hearing at the

[Hearing before three Judges.]

earliest practicable day, before not less than three of the circuit judges of said court, if there be three or more; and if there be not more than two circuit judges, then before them and such district judge as they may select or, in case the full court shall not at any time be made up by reason of the necessary absence or disqualification of one or more of the said circuit judges, the justice of the Supreme Court assigned to that circuit or the other circuit judge or judges may designate a district judge or judges within the circuit who shall be competent to sit in said court at the hearing of said suit. In the event the judges sitting in such case shall be equally divided in opinion as to the decision