Connors vs. The State. ney General and John L. Erdall, Assistant Attorney General, and oral argument by Mr. Erdall. NEWMAN, J. The more important of the errors alleged is the receipt of evidence of the alleged admissions, or, as it is called, confession of the plaintiff in error. It is claimed that it was not shown to have been a free and voluntary confession. It appears that the trial court made preliminary inquiry on this point, and adjudged it to be voluntary. This determination of the trial court is controlling, unless it shall be made to appear satisfactorily that the determination is clearly against the evidence. 19 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 629. Such consideration is due to the judgment of the trial court. The admissions do not seem to have been voluntary, in the sense that they were volunteered or spontaneous. They were elicited by questions. But all that is required in that regard is that they shall be made freely, without compulsion, and voluntarily, without promise or persuasion. It does not appear that the alleged assault upon the plaintiff in error was made in furtherance of any scheme to procure admissions from him him by fear. On the contrary, it seems to have been made in the lawful purpose of disarming him, in order to prevent him from injuring another. There was no allusion to the burglary at the time, and the admissions were not made until after an interval. Nor does it appear that any inducement whatever to a confession was held out or offered. He was not told that it would be better for him to confess or to tell the truth, or anything of that import. He was not asked to confess, or threatened with consequences of a failure to confess. None of these things are seriously claimed. The absence of them quite clearly appeared. The testimony of the chief of police was quite well corroborated, both as to the admissions themselves, and as to the incidents preceding. There is no real ground for questioning the correctness of the ruling of the trial court that Chicago & Northwestern R. Co. vs. Forest County and others. the admissions were free and voluntary in every legal sense. Error in the charge to the jury is alleged. The court said, "The state has sought to prove the defendant's guilt by introducing certain alleged confessions and admissions, and by showing that he was seen, after the burglary, carrying something under his coat." It is said that the testimony conflicts as to whether the plaintiff in error was seen, after the burglary, carrying something under his coat. It is claimed that this instruction took the question from the jury. It is said to be equivalent to an instruction that he was seen. A very simple analysis will clearly show that this is not the effect of the instruction. The phrase "has sought to prove by showing," very clearly, is not equivalent, either grammatically or in the common usage of the language, to the phrase "has shown" or "has proved." And it should not, naturally, be so understood by the jury. The other alleged errors do not require treatment at length. By the Court.-The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed. CHICAGO & NORTHWESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY, Plaintiff, vs. December 22, 1896-January 12, 1897. Assessment and collection of taxes: Special law limiting taxation: Constitutional law: Equity: Seizure of personal property of railroad to satisfy tax. 1. The restriction of subd. 6, sec. 31, art. IV, Const., against the enactment of special legislation “for the assessment and collection of taxes or for extending the time for the collection thereof" embraces all the proceedings for raising money by the exercise of the taxing power from the inception of the proceeding to its conclusion, Chicago & Northwestern R. Co. vs. Forest County and others. and took from the legislature all power, past, present, and future, of special legislation on the subject. Laws, therefore, limiting the amount which it shall be lawful for a certain county and the several towns therein to raise and expend for the various purposes for which taxes may be levied, are unconstitutional and void. [Whether such laws are in violation of sec. 23, art. IV, Const., providing for a uniform system of town and county government, not determined.] 2. The objection that a town tax was void because the resolution authorizing it failed to specify the specific purposes for which it was to be expended is not available in an action in equity to set aside the tax and enjoin its collection. 3. Property of a railroad company, such as coal and tools for use in repairing the tracks, necessarily used in operating the road, is not liable to seizure and sale on execution to satisfy a tax, and an injunction may properly be issued to prevent such seizure and sale. Hill v. L. C. & M. R. Co. 11 Wis. 223, and Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Ft. Howard, 21 Wis. 44, overruled. APPEALS from a judgment of the circuit court for Forest county: JOHN GOODLAND, Circuit Judge. Affirmed. This is an action to set aside and enjoin the collection of certain county taxes and of town and school taxes in the town of Crandon, Forest county, for the year 1895, on the ground that they were levied greatly in excess of the limits imposed by ch. 270, Laws of 1887, as amended by ch. 505, Laws of 1889, and ch. 39, Laws of 1891, as extended by ch. 283, Laws of 1893, and ch. 338, Laws of 1895; plaintiff being a large owner of real estate in the said town of Crandon. The complaint alleged certain irregularities in the levying of the taxes, and asked that the defendants be enjoined from collecting such portion thereof as was claimed to be illegal and inequitable. Forest county was organized by ch. 436, Laws of 1885; and by ch. 270, Laws of 1887, the amount of taxes which the county and which its towns might raise in any one year was limited, and succeeding statutes enlarged the limitations, until, in 1895, the limit of county taxes was $1,500 for county roads, and $10,500 for other county pur VOL. 95-6 Chicago & Northwestern R. Co. vs. Forest County and others. poses, and of town taxes in Crandon, $3,500 for town and $550 for school purposes. Nevertheless, for that year, the county voted a tax, no part of which was for roads, of $21,137.84, and the town a tax of $2,500 for town and $3,000 for school purposes. These taxes, in due proportion, were extended on the plaintiff's lands to the amount of $6,098. The plaintiff affirms, and the defendants deny, that the limitations are constitutional, and on this question depends the validity of the taxes in excess of the amounts thus limited. The town meeting voted the town tax of $2,500 "for all town purposes," and the plaintiff claims that this tax is void, because not voted for any specified, authorized purpose. The court, after trial, held that the taxes were valid, and plaintiff appealed from the part of the judgment which sustains the taxes, and the defendants appealed from the part of said judgment which enjoined and restrained the collection of said taxes from and out of certain personal property at Monico Junction, belonging to the plaintiff, namely, twelve coal buckets, one shovel, all coal in the shed, four lamps, one pick, and two scoop shovels; and two hand cars, one push car, and five coal buckets at Pratt Junction, which property had been seized for the payment of said taxes. And it was alleged that it was necessarily used, and necessary for use, in operating said railroad and carrying the mail, and in the performance of the plaintiff's duties as public carrier, and to the exercise of its franchise to operate said railroad; that, unless plaintiff could continue to use the same, its said business of transportation and carrying the mail would be seriously interrupted, and the running of its trains would be disarranged and confused; that the coal buckets, chains, and coal shovels are part of the plaintiff's hoisting apparatus and machinery, necessary at all times for handling said coal, and the use and running of locomotives; that said cars and tools and other property were necessary to Chicago & Northwestern R. Co. vs. Forest County and others. maintain the track of said road in safe condition, and their seizure and sale would endanger life and property in the business of such transportation. George G. Greene, for the plaintiff, contended, inter alia, that the limitation of sec. 31, art. IV, Const., does not apply to the laws limiting the amount of taxes which might be raised or expended in towns of Forest county. Had they limited the power to vote taxes, they plainly would not have been within the constitutional prohibition. To vote taxes is to determine their purpose and amount. It is by the legislature directly, or by its delegates. When voted or determined, the taxes must be assessed — apportioned to the taxables of the district for which they were voted. The word 'assessment" sometimes includes the listing and valuation of taxables; sometimes only their valuation; never the act of voting the tax. Under every meaning — legal, literary, and statutory" assessment" presupposes an existing tax, and is the manner of imposing it on persons or property. Cooley, Taxation, 324, 332, 351, 352; 25 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 199, note 2; People v. Weaver, 100 U. S. 539. A law cannot be said to be for assessment or collection of taxes, or special as to them, when it leaves them to be made under existing general laws precisely as every tax in every town and county in the state is assessed and collected. Many hundreds of special laws, enacted since sec. 31 was adopted, regulate the power to tax, by directing, authorizing, or limiting taxes, and thereby affect their amounts. Such laws are not "for the assessment or collection of taxes." Simon v. Northup, 27 Oreg. 487; State ex rel. Williams v. Fogus, 19 Nev. 247; Binkert v. Jensen, 94 Ill. 283; Harrison v. Milwaukee Co. 51 Wis. 658, 659. An intent to forbid all special laws affecting taxes would have been expressed quite otherwise than by the words of subd. 6. The prohibition would have been against such laws on the subject of taxation, or for voting or levying taxes, as well as for assessing and collecting them. It is certain there are laws on the subject of |