with a pretence at once-for bringing in merchant vessels, was nothing less than a declaration of war.

He should be glad to know the description of war in which we were likely to be engaged. There was one, which, if he could draw any conclusion from what fell from the noble lord, was a war of aggression against Buonaparté for the sake of replacing the Bourbons on the throne. He did not wish to say a single word at present against the Bourbons; they were under misfortune, and had a greater claim than ever on the protection of this country. His mouth would be sealed in silence on account of that misfortune, which was now, he believed, irretrievable; and if not irretrievable, would certainly be so by the steps which the noble lord was proposing to take for restoring them to the throne. He had no hesitation in saying, that a war of aggression against France ought to be resisted by this country. If Louis the 18th had been attacked, this would have been a signal for war. But things had so instantaneously changed. It was not five weeks ago, since he had in that House talked of Buonaparte's being wished for by some part of the people of this country; and he was convinced that some persons were actually clamorous for war, because they considered it would serve their interests. It was not long ago that the noble lord had told them that they ought to consider that France was always France, and that they ought to lay their account with the existence of ambition under the present as well as under former governments. One of the most witty and eloquent men that ever sat in that House (Mr. Sheridan) had said, that one half of our national debt had been contracted in endeavouring to suppress the power of the Bourbons, and the other half in endeavouring to restore them to power. We ought to recollect that the Bourbons had not always been the friends of this country, but on the contrary, almost always our most inveterate enemies. He did think that before the late great event, we might have done with an establishment consider. ably less than what had been announced -an establishment of 19 millions! The Netherlands were to be strengthened for the sake of protecting the flank on that side of France, according to the noble lord. The powers of Austria and Prussia were considered as every thing, and all the other States were to be hashed up, as it were, in one cauldron, and dealt out in

such a way as should be most conducive to the strengthening these two powers, and the strengthening the flanks on the different sides of France. For this purpose we were to keep a large army on the Continent. We were to reconstruct all the dilapidated fortresses of Belgium. If we put ourselves into an attitude of precaution, we ought to take into considera. tion what additional precautions we take now, to those we should have taken had the Bourbons continued on the throne of France. It would seem from the language of the noble lord, that he considered it a good reason for going to war at present, because Buonaparte was weak and we were strong. He appealed to the House if he did not tell them of his weakness, and of the salutary effect which timely aggression might have-that the question of war was a matter of expediency, and not of morality-that having violated the Treaty, they were justified in going to war, and if a timely blow could be struck, it might be proper to consider how far such a measure might be considered expedient. And all the difficulty that he (Mr. W.) felt on this occasion was, that they would receive no information from the noble lord, before that in which he condescended to tell them the blow was already struck. Such was the paralysis which the Congress of Vienna had given rise to, that they would find there never would be a time when the different Sovereigns were so little disengaged from the care of keeping their subjects in order as to be at liberty to go to war. The noble lord had said that the Allies were entitled to go the whole length in disposing of Saxony; but that the mea. sure would have been so disgusting to the people of Germany, that that country was only partially divided. Did the noble lord think that Saxony on the present occasion would be any advantage to the public weal? Did he think that the Saxons would enter cordially into any war at present, and that they would not rather take the first moment of Prussia's weakness to emancipate themselves? Did he think that Venice would be a source of strength? He had talked of the vested rights of Austria in Venice, forgetting the rights of the people; and that Austria had no other right to that state, than the having received a transfer of it from the hands of a robber who had no right, and who could not make the rights of any other power better than his own. Such was the situa tion of Venice, and such was the morality

of the Congress. Did the noble lord think that Italy would concur with the Allies? The noble lord had lately told them that the French government was so popular in Italy, that when the French armies were all withdrawn from that country and in the peninsula, the Italians would not rise to throw off the French yoke, and made no effort for that purpose. Had the noble lord reconciled the Genoese? Had he not rather given to Austria and Prussia elements of discord within themselves? and would not all their troops be consequently wanted to quell the disturbances among their new subjects? What had their conduct been to the King of Naples, after pledging themselves as strongly to him as it was possible for men to do, and after, on the faith of such pledge, he had performed his part? What would the situation of the South of Italy be? These were the circumstances which ought to be taken into consideration, if they were to have a war of aggression against France. What would be the situation of things within France itself? The noble lord had said that, from what information he was possessed of, he believed the greatest part of the population of France was in favour of the Bourbons. Now, from what he (Mr. W.) had learned, he had no doubt this was not the case. He believed that there might be many thousands who were sorry the Bourbons were dethroned and Buonaparté restored; but the very first act of aggression on the part of the Allies would have the effect of consolidating all these parties; and if, therefore, we were to have a war carried on for the dethronement and extermination of one man, all the population of France would rally round him, and after all the horrors and massacres which would take place the matter would end in the army of aggression being expelled. Even in case of the death or defeat of Buonaparté, did the noble lord think that the Bourbons could ever be restored? Would not some other chief be elected, or some other government be appointed, either that of a collective body, or of one man? The French had had an experience of the Bourbons; and whatever their virtues in other respects might be, he was strongly of opinion that they were not persons who could maintain themselves on the throne of France. If the war was to be a war of aggression, it was his thorough conviction we should be foiled in our purpose. It would be impossible for the noble lord to keep the (VOL. XXX. )

coalition together unless it was "cemented by English money; and in this case the fate of it would be the same as before, and England would be left in the lurch, and obliged to make a disgraceful peace either with Buonaparté, or some other person in his place. What reason was there for not making a peace with him now, which was not equally powerful when we were ready to conclude a Treaty at Chatillon? All his most insane and unprincipled acts were done before that period. And yet the noble lord then, with all the confe derated Powers, were willing to negociate a peace with Napoleon Buonaparte. What the terms then offered were would never, however, be known by the House, unless they were published by some other Government. If at the end of a war the country had been told that Napoleon Buonaparte was confined within the limits of the Treaty of Paris, which he was now willing to keep, would not this communi cation have been received by the whole nation with acclamation? If in that case there was not one person who would not have subscribed to those terms, and if within those limits France was now placed, what motive could there now be for not being contented with what was then considered as sufficient? If France stepped beyond these limits, then France would be the aggressor, and that would give us a title to repel the aggression. He implored his right hon. friend (Mr. Ponsonby), and his other friends on his side of the House, to reflect, that if they agreed to the Address without any amendment, they would give an instrument to ministers which would enable them to commit the country in a war of aggression, without their having any opportunity of expressing themselves on the propriety or impropriety of such a war. He could not help thinking that the daily publications which were at present such strenuous advocates for a war for the extermination of Buonaparte, were carrying the matter a little too far for their own interest, which was so often very different from the true interests of the country. They ought to consider, that if Buonaparte should be exterminated, it would be as flat for them as when he was at Elba. He knew that the return of Buonaparté had thrown a number of persons in this country into the most serious state of alarm and apprehension. He implored those persons to beware lest by premature measures they increased the danger of which they were apprehensive. He wished (2 G)

therefore to submit an amendment to the Address, limiting the means entrusted to ministers to means of defence, and taking from them the means of aggression. He was willing to see the country in a sufficient attitude of defence till the danger should be past; but beyond this he could not with propriety go. The hon. gentle man concluded with moving an amendment to the Address, in the following words:" And that at the same time we earnestly implore his royal highness the Prince Regent, that he would be graciously pleased to exert his most strenuous endeavours to secure to this country the continuance of peace, so long as it can be maintained consistently with the honour of his Majesty's Crown, the security of his dominions, and the faith to be preserved with his Majesty's Allies."

Mr. Frederick Douglas alluded to the decree of Buonaparté for the abolition of the Slave Trade. From all he had been able to learn, it was a mistaken idea amongst the people of France, that the abolition would be injurious to them if suddenly effected. Thus Louis 18, attending to the feelings of the people, gained time for the termination of a traffick which his rival, on coming to power, had, without any regard for their feelings, abolished at once. Respecting the prospect before us, there was an essential principle in the government of France, which must necessarily be repugnant to the tranquillity of the Continent. The change that had taken place had been effected by the army, and not by the sense of the people. The real voice of the people was to be found in the towns where they were not overawed by the military. It was the natural consequence of any invasion, that in the first moments the people would lie by and not declare their sentiments. He would not contend that the voice of the people had been declared against Buonaparté; but, when it was asserted that their voice was in favour of him, he must say that such an assertion was totally fallacious. Buonaparte was stimulated by revenge against all the nations of Europe. His landing, therefore, was not so much ‘an invasion of France, as an invasion of all Europe. It must be obvious to all who had any knowledge of human nature, and who reflected on the extraordinary character of this man, that he could have no intention of remaining at peace; but even if he had, it was perfectly out of his power; for the soldiers under him were anxious to be called back

again to their employments of plunder and peculation; and this would impel him to go to war. But it was said that we had no legitimate grounds for going to war. The hon. gentleman who spoke last, however, had viewed the Treaty of Fontainbleau on very fallacious grounds. The hon. gentleman here entered into a view of the conditions of the Treaty with Buonaparté, which gave him the sovereignty of Elba, and contended that by his return he had broken his faith with the Allied Powers, which justified them in joining to expel him. If he went to war at the present moment, he must proceed by the common means of taxation, loans, and credit; but these were things which were quite unknown in France. He therefore was not able to put his forces immediately into activity, which was the true reason for all his professions of moderation. The noble lord had spoken of the unanimity which prevailed on the subject of opposing Buonaparté on the part of the Allies. Recollecting as he did the events of the last twenty years, he felt anxious to take advantage of this unanimity, before Buonaparté should be able to destroy it. He had no hesitation in saying, that the French army being the active power which supported Buonaparté, it was absolutely necessary for the restoration of tranquillity, that this army should be extirpated! [Cries of Hear, hear!] He did not mean the extirpation of the individuals, but the extirpation of their existence in the shape of an army. Their restless agitation, their unparalleled fearlessness of death, and their unconquerable passion for glory, formed their very excellence; and this would ever render them the enemies of the tranquillity of the world. The hon. gentleman, after a few more remarks on the peculiar crisis at which we had arrived, concluded with giving his assent to the Address.

Sir John Newport declared, that in giving his vote he should look at the question divested of all the commentaries he had heard upon it. He should not vote for it under the same view as the hon. gentle. man had taken of it, who had advised the extermination of the whole French army; because such an idea was absurd, and if the project was attempted, it would cer tainly be the most unwise crusade that had ever been heard of. He would go as far as the noble lord had gone, but no farther. Instead of entertaining any abstruse question of peace or war, he should wait till

the point was decided, and should then deliver his opinion, however painful it might be to his feelings. At present the question did not bind any member to support any proceedings that would involve this country in a war so wild and unjust as to attempt to dictate to any nation what form of government it should adopt. It was advisable that this country should be put in a state of preparation for the worst, and to take such measures as should best enable us to act in concert with our Allies, for the security of all Europe. He trusted, however, that nothing but circumstances of absolute compulsion would induce us to enter into a new war; and believing that this would be our line of conduct, he should support the Address. He dissented, nevertheless, with reluctance, from the amendment of his hon. friend, not because he thought that those words did not convey a proper feeling, but because he did not ⚫ think that this was a fit opportunity for the House to pronounce their judgment, when no information was before them. He would give his vote for the Address, because he saw no reason for withholding his confidence from ministers in the present instance.

Mr. Croker said, he rose merely to speak to a matter of fact. The hon. gentleman opposite had been pleased to say that a French vessel had been brought in by his Majesty's cruisers under an ambiguous understanding. This statement was totally unfounded. He had not officially heard that any such capture had been made. He had heard a report that a French ship had been sent in; but whether she was navigated under the Imperial flag of France he could not say. If he were to judge from the statements of some merchants of London, he should believe that the detention had been made under the Hovering Act, and that the ship bore the white flag. But neither directly nor indirectly had any orders been given which would justify any officer to interfere even with the tri-coloured flag of France. The ship by which the French vessel was said to to have been captured, had sailed three weeks ago for a specific purpose; and it was scarcely possible that her commander, in obedience to his orders, could have deemed himself authorized to interfere with the flag of France, of whatever colour it might be. He had been thus explicit, in order that it might not be supposed that this country had shown any bad faith.

- Mr. Bankes gave his full concurrence to

the motion. He took a view of what had been said by the different speakers, and added, as his own opinion, that so far from thinking the Message and Address to be too pacific, his only fear was that they were too warlike. He nevertheless saw nothing objectionable in the wording of either, as they were applicable either to peace or war. But it was impossible not to be a little alarmed at the Declaration which bore besides the signatures of the ministers of the Allied Powers, those of four British ministers. If this document were authentic, all doubts must be at an end; for war remained not to be deliberated about, but was actually resolved on. Yet from the tone of the noble lord that day, so far from this being the case, it would appear that the subject was still open for discussion. He would agree, that under the present circumstances of France, the contravention of the Treaty by Buonaparté was a sufficient cause for war, and the revolution ought not wholly to prevent the interference of foreign nations; but it became a prudential consideration what steps ought to be taken; and before it was resolved upon, it might be hoped there would be full time for discussion. He would defer his opinion till he heard what line of conduct was decided upon. The Declaration of the Allies certainly confined the war to a much more simple object than that of his hon. friend who had contended for the extinction of the whole French army; as the object of the Allies could only be the deposing of that particular man, who, by his conduct, they declared had put himself out of the pale of civil society. He should be happy if he could entertain the sanguine belief of his noble friend, that a large proportion of the people of France were adverse to the dominion of Buonaparté; but it looked rather suspicious, that with only a handful of armed men, he should be able to make his way, unmolested, almost from `one extremity of the kingdom to the other. He feared, Jest the appearance of a foreign force on the frontiers of France, coming with professions of revenge and ruin, might have the effect of uniting the people even though a great proportion of them were hostile to Buonaparté, and thus might throw much greater obstacles in the way of peace. Whatever might be the real intentions of Buonaparté, it was much safer for him to hold out professions of moderation than to adopt any other course. On the whole, he must admit that he could

Lord Althorp said, the main question to be decided was, whether, if war was to take place, it was to be a war of defence or of aggression? In 1793 the experiment of forcing a government on France had been tried and had failed, and he thought such an attempt now would be attended with a much less probable degree of success than then. Under all the circumstances, therefore, he was favourable to the amendment.

Mr. Abercrombie took a view of the nature of the Address, and declared that he should have liked to have heard the question more fully discussed than it had been. He would reserve his opinion as to whether this country was justified in going to war; but with respect to the necessity of precautionary measures, he trusted there could not be a dissentient voice. He could have wished that no amendment had been proposed; as the tone of ministers was certainly less high than that of the Declaration of the Allied Powers. As the House was not in a situation of offering any advice to the Crown, there was no resource but in leaving the whole subject to the responsibility of ministers. It was impossible for him, however, to vote against the words of his hon. friend's amendment, because the noble lord might derive great advantage from the amendment being negatived, and the opinions of all those who did negative it might be subject to a degree of misconstruction.

at present known even to ministers. Placed in this situation, till further information could be given, they ought not to take upon themselves to decide on a subject of such importance. The Address, he was of opinion, went to bind the House to nothing to which they could hesitate to give their sanction.

Mr. Tierney stated it to be his intention to vote in favour of the Amendment. His object was to arm ministers with the powers for which they called; but at the same time he wished to have some guard on their conduct, as from the speech of the noble lord he could not bat consider them disposed to consult the security of this country, not in a state of peace, but* of war.

He wished the House to remember how often the British Parliament bad been accused in foreign countries of stirring up wars; and he thought this idea would be strengthened, if, on the present occasion, they came to a vote which would almost amount to a direct declaration in favour of a renewal of war. He had heard that treaties of subsidy had already been negociated. He shuddered at the expenses which a new war must throw on the country; but if the state of the world should seem to make this necessary, he should consider he did his duty to his country in consenting to such an increase of the public expenditure. If it was thought that peace could not be attained but by dethroning Buonaparté, the prospect now before the country appalled him to the heart. Great exertions had been made by England within the last two years; but no man, at all acquainted with the state of our finances, could say, that at the end of the next two years the country would be in a situation to support a new contest, if the people were not united in their sentiments, and had not their affairs conducted by an administration which possessed their confidence. object was to make the war a just and necessary one. The Amendment pro

His

this object; and he was of opinion it did not go too far. He trusted he should not be considered as the defender of Buonaparté, or as one who wished to throw impediments in the way of his own govern