mendable desire on the part of the husband to make some provision for his wife and child. The policy was taken out in January, 1892, and transferred March 1, 1894, at which date the insured died. At most, his creditors are injured if the transfer is upheld by the amount of premium paid for two years. The amount might have been ascertained in the proceedings which appellant was ordered by the court below to institute, to determine the ownership of the insurance policy in question, which order of court he failed to obey. In our opinion, the transfer of the policy was valid and not in fraud of creditors. Upon the effect of the setting aside of the order made on the agreed statement of facts to pay the widow the balance of the proceeds of the insurance policy, after the special administrator had paid to the widow under said order said balance, we deem it only necessary to say that trustees, acting under orders of the court having jurisdiction of the subject matter will be protected thereby. If, by reason of such order or decree, money is paid to one not entitled thereto, the protection afforded to the trustee is not extended to the person so paid. In such cases, the party really entitled to the money, if not a party to the previous suit and bound by the decree, may have suit against the person to whom the money is paid.

679 We find no error for which the judgment of the court below should be reversed.

Judgment affirmed.

INSURANCE-LIFE-CHANGE OF BENEFICIARY.-A change in beneficiaries cannot be made except by a substantial compliance with the regulations of the society, and yet courts of equity recognize exceptions to this general principle. Equity does not demand impossible things, and will consider as done that which should have been done, and when a member has complied with all the requirements within his power, he has done all that a court of equity de mands: Jory v. Supreme Council, 105 Cal. 20; 45 Am. St. Rep. 17; Rollins v. McHatton, 16 Colo. 203; 25 Am. St. Rep. 260; Monographic note to Lake v. Minnesota etc. Assn., 52 Am. St. Rep. 562.

INSURANCE-LIFE-ASSIGNMENT OF POLICY-VALIDITY OF.-Insurance policies are choses in action for the payment of money, and their assignment is authorized in Maryland: New York Life Ins. Co. v. Flack, 3 Md. 341; 56 Am. Dec. 742, and monographic note. A husband may orally assign a policy of insurance on his own life to his wife: Chapman v. Mcllwrath, 77 Mo. 38; 46 Am. Rep. 1. Of course, if a policy of insurance expressly stipulates that no assignment shall be valid without the consent of the company, an assignment without such consent is without effect: Monographic note to Lake v. Minnesota etc. Assn., 52 Am. St. Rep. 566.

INSURANCE-ASSIGNMENT OF POLICY-WHEN VOID AS IN FRAUD OF CREDITORS.-It has been frequently held that as against creditors, one's assignment, when insolvent, of insurance policies on his own life, to or for the benefit of wife or children, or either, constitutes a fraudulent transfer within the statute, and this

even though the debtor may have no deliberate intention of depriving bis creditors of a fund to which they were entitled, because his act has in point of fact withdrawn such fund from them and dealt with it by way of bounty: Monographic note to Hise v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 29 Am. St. Rep. 360. See Appeal of Elliott, 50 Pa. St. 75; 88 Am. Dec. 525, and extended note.

EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS-SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR-POWERS OF.-The powers of a special administrator under the Iowa Revised Laws of 1843 are limited to the preservation of personal property of the decedent until a regular administrator can be appointed, and an order of the probate court directing a sale of real estate by a special administrator would, under such statute, be without authority of law and vold: Long v. Burnett, 13 Iowa, 28; 81 Am. Dec. 420. See Fisk v. Norvel, 9 Tex. 13; 58 Am. Dec. 128.

CASES

IN THE

SUPREME COURT

OF

IOWA.

KLOTZ V. JAMES.

[96 IOWA, 1.]

EVIDENCE-FRAUD-CROSS-EXAMINATION.-If,

in an action to recover attached property under a claim of purchase before attachment, the original owner gives evidence tending to show good faith in the sale, it is proper to allow full cross-examination on all the circumstances bearing on good faith.

SALES-FRAUD-RETURN ON ATTACHMENT AS EVIDENCE.-If, in an action to recover attached property under a claim of purchase before attachment, the attachment is defended on the ground that the purchase was fraudulent and the jury so finds, it is, harmless error to admit in evidence the return on attachment tending to show that the attachment levy was defective, as, under the finding, the plaintiff is not entitled to the property, and his rights cannot be made to depend on whether the levy was valid or not. WITNESSES-IMPEACHMENT-PRIOR TESTIMONY.-The evidence of a witness taken on a prior examination may be used to contradict his subsequent evidence, when his attention is called to his prior testimony before his later examination, and the stenographer who took the first testimony testifies that he took it correctly, reduced it to writing, and that he can, and by a reference to his notes does, state such testimony as given.

APPELLATE PRACTICE-OBJECTION NOT RAISED BELOW.-An objection that a money judgment in replevin includes property not taken under the writ cannot be first made on appeal. APPELLATE PRACTICE-GENERAL ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR.-An assignment of error on appeal that "the court erred in rendering judgment for the defendant" is too general to be considered; it should point out the specific error objected to.

C. A. Irwin, for the appellants.

Mack & Deland and A. D. Bailie, for the appellee.

2 GRANGER, J. 1. The defendant is sheriff of Buena Vista county, and as such seized, by virtue of certain writs of attachment, a store building, stock of goods, and other personal property, as belonging to one Henry Boese. The plaintiff brings this action to recover the property, claiming to be the owner by

virtue of a purchase thereof from Boese before the levy of the attachments. The answer puts in issue the validity of the sale, and avers it to be fraudulent as to creditors. The plaintiff used Henry Boese as a witness to identify the bill of sale as signed by him, which is dated August 18, 1893; also, to show that he owned the goods up to the date of the sale to the plaintiff, and 3 that, when the defendant came to take the property by virtue of the writs of attachment, he told him that he had sold the property to the plaintiff. On cross-examination, the court permitted a full examination into the particulars of the transaction as bearing on its bona fides. We think that there was no error in the holding, in view of the evidence given on the direct examination. The effect of the direct examination was to show, or justify a conclusion by the jury, that there had been a valid or good faith sale of the property. If so, it was proper, on crossexamination, to disclose the circumstances of the transaction when fraud was pleaded.

2. The defendant offered in evidence the returns of the several writs by which he held the property. Plaintiff objected to the evidence for the reason that the returns did not show that notice had been served on the attachment defendant, or on any person in possession of the property. The same question was presented in other ways, by questions and offers to show that no such notice had been served. The returns were admitted in evidence, and the court denied a motion to strike the writs and returns from the evidence because of the want of such a notice. Plaintiff complains of the action of the court in this respect. Reliance is placed on the code, section 2967, which provides the mode of attachment, as follows: "By giving the defendant in the action, if found within the county, and also the person occupying or in possession of the property, if it be in the hands of a third person, notice of attachment." Reliance is also placed on authorities like the following: Crawford v. Newell, 23 Iowa, 453; Phillips v. Germon, 43 Iowa, 101; First Nat. Bank of Newton v. Jasper County Bank, 71 Iowa, 488; Sioux Valley etc. Bank v. Kellog, 81 Iowa, 124; Commercial Nat. Bank v. Farmers' etc. Nat. Bank, 82 Iowa, 198. 4 These authorities clearly sustain the rule that, to constitute a valid levy, the requirement of the statute must be observed. But is the rule applicable to this case? The property was in the possession of the defendant by virtue of the attachments, whether legally so or otherwise. The plaintiff's claim to the possession is not because the possession of defendant was illegal, for want of a valid levy of the writs, but

because he owned the property; and his right of recovery was as perfect and complete if the levy had been attended with a notice as without it. His right of action is in no way based on a defective levy. The answer is in two divisions, the first being based on the fact of the holding under the writs; and the second on allegations that the plaintiff is not the owner of the property, because of fraud in the attempted sale of it to him. The jury returned a special finding that the sale was fraudulent. That is a judicial determination that he does not own the property, and has no right to the possession. If plaintiff is not the owner, and hence has no interest in the property, he is in no position to question the validity of defendant's possession. If he is entitled to the possession of the property, it is because he owns it, and not because defendant's possession is illegal. It is for those who have rights in the property to question defendant's holding. As to the finding of fraud, it must have been the same, regardless of the rulings of the court as to the notice, for the fact of notice could in no way affect the conclusion as to fraud. Inasmuch as the plaintiff was entitled to the possession of the property, if he owned it-that is, if the sale was valid-regardless of the validity of the levy, we do not see how the question of its validity was material, under the issues presented in the second division of the answer. What might have been the situation without the second division of the answer and the special finding, we need not consider. The record makes it conclusive that the ruling was without prejudice, if not technically correct.

3. Certain witnesses were used to prove the value of the stock of goods and of the building. It is urged that they were not shown competent; but we think that, while in some cases the showing of knowledge was meager, there was no prejudice, with an opportunity to cross-examine and show the real value of the testimony.

4. At an examination before Judge Thomas, some time before the trial, Henry Boese was examined, and his testimony was reduced to writing, in shorthand, by Mrs. Wedgwood. Boese was also a witness on the trial of this case, as we have before noticed, and his testimony on both examinations was as to the sale of this property. Mrs. Wedgwood was a witness in this case for the defendant, and after testifying that she reduced the testimony of Boese before Judge Thomas to writing, and stating that she took the testimony correctly, and could state his testimony as then given, she was permitted, against objections, to examine the notes and state his testimony. The object was to contradict his