be deduced from the fact of its execution and delivery through a third person to whom the money was paid, neither her immediate nor any subsequent grantee having ever had any communication with her upon the subject. This suit was brought by said Rowena M. Mason against the said husband and children of Nora Daniels to remove the cloud supposed to be cast upon plaintiff's title by the assertion of a claim to said land through said deed to Nora Daniels upon the supposition that the deed executed by her did not divest her of title. Said husband and children answered by plea of not guilty, and also by a special plea setting up title in themselves under said deed to Nora Daniels, and asking that the cloud cast upon their title by the assertion of claim thereto by Rowena M. Mason be removed, and that their title be decreed perfect. Upon a trial before the court without a jury upon the facts above stated, the court found the following conclusions of law: "1. I find that by executing the deed to John T. Mason and allowing and permitting James Coffey to deliver same, and it following as a natural consequence that the same would be placed of record, and thus making an apparently clear title upon the record, that the said Nora Daniels was guilty of such fraud as will estop her and those in privity with her from asserting any right, claim, or title to the property in controversy, especially as against the second vendee, the plaintiff herein, who had no notice of the coverture of the said Nora Daniels and no knowledge of any fact that would demand an inquiry as to such coverture. "2. I find that the said Rowena Mason, being unaffected by actual notice of the coverture of Nora Daniels or of any fact that would put her upon inquiry as to the truth of said Nora Daniels' disability, and having paid value for the land, had a right to rely upon the record as to the condition of the title of the property she was purchasing, and the right to assume that the said Nora Daniels was sui juris and competent to contract; and, in consequence, the said Rowena Mason is an innocent purchaser and entitled to protection as such. "3. I accordingly find that the plaintiff should be given judg ment to remove the cloud from title to the property, as prayed for in her petition." In accordance with these findings, the trial court rendered judgment for plaintiff Rowena Mason, from which judgment said defendants appealed to the court of civil appeals, assigning as error the action of the trial court in finding each of said conclusions of law, whereupon the court of civil appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court, adopting the second conclusion of law found by the trial court as above stated. From 244 which judgment of affirmance plaintiffs in error have brought the case to this court by writ of error, assigning as error, among other things, the action of the court of civil appeals in holding that the trial court did not err in finding each of said conclusions of law. We are of opinion that the trial court erred in its first conclusion of law, to the effect that the heirs of Nora Daniels were estopped. She did nothing more than execute and deliver the deed, and probably receive the purchase money. If the mere execution of a deed and receipt of the purchase money constitute an estoppel, then in all cases, though a married woman has no capacity to convey by deed wherein she is not joined by her husband, nevertheless the deed and its subsequent recording by the purchaser would pass the title by estoppel. Thus the attempt to make a conveyance which she has no legal capacity to make would, of itself, be held sufficient to estop her and her heirs from denying its binding force. This would virtually remove the disability of coverture. Such a rule has never been recognized in this state: McLaren v. Jones, 89 Tex. 131. We are of opinion that the court of civil appeals erred in not holding that the trial court erred in its said conclusion of law. The court of civil appeals, however, affirmed the judgment as a result of its approval of the trial court's second finding of law above set out, and cite as authority the following cases: Hill v. Moore, 62 Tex. 610; Edwards v. Brown, 68 Tex. 329; Patty v. Middleton, 82 Tex. 586, and cases cited; Hensley v. Lewis, 82 Tex. 595; Key v. La Pice, 88 Tex. 209. These cases hold that where the legal tile is in one and the equitable title is wholly or in part in another, a bona fide purchaser of such legal title from the holder thereof, for value, without notice of such undisclosed equity, will take free of same. In other words, the doctrine of these cases protects a bona fide purchaser for value, from the holder of the legal title with capacity to contract, against the undisclosed equity of another in the thing conveyed. As said by Associate Justice Stayton in Hill v. Moore, 62 Tex. 610: "It is a well-recognized doctrine in equity that a bona fide purchaser of the legal title to property, who pays a valuable consideration therefor, without notice, actual or constructive, of the right of other persons, is entitled to protection against others who may have equitable title or interest in the thing purchased; and it matters not whether the thing purchased be real or personal property." AM. ST. REP., VOL. LIX.-52 An entirely different proposition, however, is advanced by the trial court's second conclusion of law above set out as having been approved by the court of civil appeals as the basis for the affirmance of the judgment. The proposition is, that a bona fide purchaser for value, from the holder of the legal title with no capacity to contract, will be protected against the subsequent claims of such vendor or his heirs seeking to avoid the binding force of such contract by reason of such want of capacity, on the ground that such purchaser had no notice of such want of capacity. We know of no instance in which such protection has ever 245 been extended. Even under the rules of the law merchant, which manifest so much solicitude for the protection of a bona fide holder for value of negotiable paper, such protection is not afforded. In Daniel on Negotiable Instruments, third edition, sections S06, 807, it is said: "There are some defenses which are as available against a bona fide holder for value, and without notice, as against any other party. . . . . Thus, if the maker of the note were an infant, a married woman, a lunatic, or a person under guardianship, the signature would impart no validity to it, and the bona fide holder could not recover against him, or her, however ignorant of the incapacity when he took the paper." In the case before us the legal title was in Nora Daniels; but during coverture, in the absence of special circumstances not shown to have existed, she was without capacity to convey, whether the land be considered community or her separate estate; and the rules of equity, established for the protection of bona fide purchasers against secret or undisclosed equities, in the thing conveyed, afford purchasers from her and those claiming under them no protection against the consequences of such want of capacity though they were ignorant thereof. We are, therefore, of opinion that the court of civil appeals erred in approving said conclusion of law and affirming the judgment of the trial court. For the errors indicated, the judgments of the trial court and court of civil appeals will be reversed and the cause remanded. MARRIED WOMEN-ESTOPPEL BY CONVEYANCE.-Any conveyance made by a married woman in which the statute is not strictly complied with is void as to her and cannot bind her by estoppel: Monographic rote to Trimble v. State, 57 Am. St. Rep. 170, on estoppel against married women. See Louisville etc. Ry. Co. v. Stephens, 96 Ky. 401; 49 Am. St. Rep. 303, and note. FROM MARRIED WOMEN-BONA FIDE PURCHASERS RIGHTS OF.- A married woman cannot profit by her own fraud to the prejudice of a bona fide purchaser from her. Therefore, if she bas received and invested the proceeds of a sale of her lands to him conveying an imperfect title, by purchasing other lands for her own use and benefit, she is estopped from dispossessing him except upon refunding the purchase money and paying for such necessary improvements as may have been made in good faith: McDanell v. Landrum, 87 Ky. 404; 12 Am. St. Rep. 500, and note. But see Morrison v. Wilson, 13 Cal. 494; 73 Am. Dec. 593, and note. If a married woman refuses to comply with her contract to convey land, it may be subjected to the payment of the amount of the purchase price paid by the purchaser: Newman v. Moore, 94 Ky. 147; 42 Am. St. Rep. 343, and note. HALE V. HOLLON. A NAKED POSSIBILITY OR THE EXPECTANCY OF AN HEIR to an ancestor's estate, or even an anticipated right of a person as next of kin, may be the subject of a contract in equity, which will be equivalent to an assignment of the property, if and when it shall fall into his possession. A CONVEYANCE BY AN HEIR OF HIS EXPECTANCY in the estate of his ancestor or next of kin is valid as against his credit ors. AN ASSIGNMENT BY AN HEIR OF HIS EXPECTANCY in the estate of his ancestor was, by the common law, deemed a fraud upon the latter, and the assignee was required to rebut this presumption of fraud, which he might do by proving that the assignment was made without the consent of such ancestor and was free from fraud, unfairness, or inadequacy of consideration. EXPECTANCY IN ESTATE OF INSANE ANCESTOR.The fact that an ancestor was insane and did not, and could not, consent to an assignment by an heir of his expectancy in the estate of such ancestor is not fatal to the assignment, and it will be sustained if otherwise fair and free from objectionable features. A. C. Prendergast, R. W. Anderson, and Hale & Hale, for the plaintiff in error. Clark & Bolinger, for the defendant in error. 428 DENMAN, A. J. S. E. Hollon, who was all her life non compos mentis, died October 15, 1894, at the age of about sixtyeight years the owner of valuable real estate situated in McLennan and other counties in Texas, which she had inherited some years before, leaving as her heirs her brothers, D. P. Hollon and W. R. Hollon, and the children of a deceased sister, said D. P. Hollon having been her guardian for some years. Prior to the twentyfifth day of June, 1894, various judgments were rendered against D. P. Hollon, and on that date he executed to his brother, W. R. Hollon, a conveyance of his "entire interest in the estate of S. E. 429 Hollon, of whatsoever kind and nature she is now in possession of or may hereafter become possessed of," which conveyance contained a general warranty of title and was duly filed for record in McLennan county on the day of its execution. A few days after the death of S. E. Hollon, executions issued upon said judgments were levied upon an undivided one-third interest in the lands owned by S. E. Hollon at the date of her death as the property of D. P. Hollon, and at the sales under said executions the same was purchased by plaintiff in error, V. W. Hale. On the tenth day of January, 1895, said Hale brought this suit against D. P. and W. R. Hollon, and, in addition to the facts above stated, alleged that said transfer from D. P. to W. R. Hollon was executed for the purpose of hindering, delaying, and defrauding the creditors of D. P. Hollon, who was then insolvent, and for the purpose of defrauding the said S. E. Hollon, the same being made without her knowledge or consent, all of which was well known to W. R. Hollon; wherefore he prayed for a cancellation of said instrument as being a cloud upon his title, acquired as purchaser at the execution sales aforesaid. W. R. and D. P. Hollon answered by general denial, and W. R. Hellon answered specially, denying all knowledge of insolvency of D. P. Hollon or of any fraud or intent to hinder or delay creditors in the execution of said instrument, alleging that he purchased the interest of D. P. Hollon in the estate of their sister, S. E. Hollon, in good faith, paying value therefor, and prayed for a cancellation of plaintiff's deeds as a cloud upon his title thereto. On trial before the court without a jury, judgment was rendered that plaintiff take nothing by his suit, and that the deeds from the sheriff to plaintiff be canceled as a cloud upon the title of defendant, W. R. Hollon. The trial judge filed no conclusions of fact or law. The court of civil appeals, in affirming the judgment, upon conflicting testimony, find as a fact "that the transfer (from D. P. to W. R. Hollon above mentioned) was not made with intent to defraud creditors of D. P. Holland." It is assigned as error here that the court of civil appeals erred in holding that D. P. Hollon could, as against his judgment creditors, make a valid conveyance of a naked expectancy without the knowledge or consent of S. E. Hollon. The first question involved in the assignment is, Could D. P. Hollon contract with reference to the mere expectancy of inheritance from his sister in such way that by virtue of such contract any property he might inherit from her would pass to W. R. Hollon? Whatever may be the rule at law it is well settled as stated in Spence's Equity Jurisdiction, volume 2, page 865, that "a naked possibility or expectancy of an heir to his ancestor's estate, or even of the anticipated rights of a person as next of kin, |