justifiable, correctly states the law, and is applicable to the evi-
dence in the case, if one of the witnesses testifies to facts making
it pertinent, though his testimony is contradicted by that of several
others. (People v. Lewis, 167.)
HOUSE OF ILL-FAME.
See Disorderly Houses.
1. HUSBAND AND WIFE, HIS AGREEMENT TO PAY FOR
HER SERVICES.-An agreement between a husband and wife that
they will dispense with servants and that she will perform with her
own hands the ordinary household duties, for which he will pay
her one hundred dollars per annum, is without consideration, and
therefore cannot, as against his creditors, support a conveyance
made by him to her in satisfaction of moneys due by the terms of
such agreement. Notwithstanding the statutes enlarging the rights
of married women, they remain subject to the duty of assuming the
ordinary burdens of wifehood. (Lee v. Savannah Guano Co., 243.)
2. HUSBAND AND WIFE, HIS CREDITORS' RIGHT TO HIS
EARNINGS AND SERVICES.-If a married woman has property
and a business of her own to which her husband contributes his
time and labor, thereby improving it and otherwise increasing its
productiveness or value, a court of equity will, at the instance of his
creditors, inquire and determine what part of the property has there-
by become equitably his, and will order such part, exclusive of the
homestead and other exemptions, to be sold and applied to the pay.
ment of their claims, or will direct such property to be placed in the
hands of a receiver to be rented, and the husband's share of the pro-
ceeds applied to the payment of his debts. (Brooks-Waterfield Co.
v. Frisbie, 452.)
3. HUSBAND AND WIFE-CONVEYANCES
Under a statute authorizing a husband and wife to contract with
each other, she may make a valid conveyance of her separate estate
directly to him for a valuable consideration in the absence of an
abuse of the confidential relations between them. A statute requir
ing the husband to join in conveyances or encumbrances of the
wife's separate estate applies only to conveyances by the wife to a
third person other than her husband. (Osborne v. Cooper, 117.)
4. HUSBAND AND WIFE-CONVEYANCES BETWEEN-ES-
TOPPEL OF WIFE TO DENY CONSIDERATION.—If a wife con-
veys her separate estate directly to her husband for a valuable con-
sideration without disclosing their relationship, or an abuse of the
confidential relations between them, and afterward joins her hus-
band in a mortgage of such property to an innocent third person,
she is estopped from alleging the invalidity of her deed to her hus-
band or want of consideration therefor. (Osborne v. Cooper, 117.)
5. HUSBAND AND WIFE-MORTGAGE OF WIFE'S SEP-
ARATE ESTATE.-A mortgage on her separate real estate male
by a wife to secure her husband's debt is void under a statute pro-
viding that "the wife shall not directly or indirectly become surety
for her husband." (Osborne v. Cooper, 117.)
6. HOMESTEAD-DIVORCE.-A wife, upon being divorced from
her husband, ceases to have any right to the occupancy of the home-
stead property, unless such right is given to her in the decree of
divorce. (Brady v. Krueger, 771.)
7. A BONA FIDE PURCHASER FROM A MARRIED WOMAN
having no knowledge of her coverture and her consequent inability
to convey without her husband joining with her is not protected
either as against her or her heirs; and she and they may therefore
recover of such purchaser or his successor in interest the property so
conveyed, though the purchase price was paid to, and retained by,
her, and there is no offer to restore it to the purchaser. (Daniel v.
Mason, 815.)
S. MARRIED WOMEN-DEFENSE OF SURETYSHIP.-If a
husband and wife execute their joint note apparently as makers and
without disclosing any suretyship, she cannot assert the defense of
suretyship as against any person acquiring the note before maturity
without notice that she was not a principal. (Strickland v. Vance,
241.)
9. MARRIED WOMAN, ESTOPPEL AGAINST.-The execution
and delivery of a conveyance as a feme sole by a married woman
to a person having no knowledge of her coverture, and her receiving
and retaining the purchase price, cannot estop her nor her heirs
from urging that she was married at the execution of such convey-
ance, and that it is void because her husband did not join therein.
(Daniel v. Mason, 815.)
See Agency, 11; Appeal, 5; Homestead, 24, 6, 8, 10; Mechanic's
Lien, 2.
INDICTMENT-VARIANCE.-Where words are the gist of
an offense, the words themselves must be alleged, but only the sub-
stance need be proved. If some of the words are proved as alleged,
and the words so proved amount to an indictable offense, it will be
sufficient. A variance in a word, or in several words, where the
sense is not in any degree changed, is not fatal. (Dyer v. State,
228.)
See Forcible Entry and Detainer, 3.
INJUNCTION AGAINST PUBLIC NUISANCE.-A court of
equity has jurisdiction to restrain an existing or threatened public
nuisance at the suit of the state or the people of a municipality, or
some public officer representing the state of the municipality. (Hu-
ron v. Bank of Volga, 769.)
See Corporations, 16, 17; Execution, 1.
INSANITY.
See Homicide, 7.
See Corporations, 11, 13-15, 20; Homestead, 5, 7; Insurance, 82, 83;
Sales, 1.
1. INSTRUCTIONS-ADMISSIONS OF FACT.-An instruction
that plaintiff's testimony against his own interest is to be taken as
true should not be given unless facts material to the issue have been
admitted. (Ephland v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 498.)
2. CRIMINAL LAW-INSTRUCTION TO JURY, OMITTING
QUESTION OF JUSTIFICATION.-Where the person sought to be
arrested fired at the officer with a pistol, and was indicted for as-
sault with intent to murder and, upon the trial, testimony was intro-
duced to the effect that both parties fired, though it was an issue of
fact as to who fired first, it was error to charge: "If you find it
would be a case of murder had death ensued, you will find [the
accused] guilty of shooting at another," such charge being errone
ous in that it omitted altogether all question of justification on the
part of the accused. (Pickett v. State, 226.)
3. JURY TRIAL-INSTRUCTION RESPECTING WEIGHT OF
EVIDENCE.-An instruction to a jury "that many of the claims of
the plaintiff as to just what had occurred have been denied by the de-
fendant's witnesses, and you will be called upon to find the facts you
believe to be established by the fair weight of all the evidence" is
not erroneous or misleading. (McKeon v. Chicago etc. Ry. Co., 910.3
See Animals, 5; Damages, 4; Homicide, 14, 18-21; Libel, 6; Liens, 2;
Trial, 8, 9.
1. INSURANCE POLICIES MUST BE LIBERALLY CON-
STRUED in favor of the assured, so as not to defeat, without a
plain necessity, his claim for indemnity, and where words used may,
without violence, be given two interpretations, that which will sus-
tain the claim and cover the loss should be adopted. (Goodwin v.
Provident Savings etc. Assn., 411.)
2. INSURANCE-CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACT.-Policies
of fire insurance are to be liberally construed to uphold the contract,
and conditions contained in them which create forfeitures will be
construed most strongly against the insurer, and will never be ex-
tended beyond the strict words of the policy. (Snyder v. Dwelling-
House Ius. Co., 625.)
3. INSURANCE-ACCIDENT-CONSTRUCTION OF POLICY.
Evidence that the insured staggered before he received a fall result-
ing in an injury is not conclusive that he had "fits or vertigo," ex-
cepted by the policy, if he had been in good health previous to the
fall, and expert evidence shows that the staggering might have beer
produced by other causes. (Meyer v. Fidelity etc. Co., 374.)
4. INSURANCE-ACCIDENT-CONSTRUCTION OF POLICY.
The words "disease" and "bodily infirmity," as used in an accident
insurance policy excepting liability for injury caused thereby, mean,
practically, the same thing; and refer to some ailment or disorder of
a somewhat established and settled character, some physical disturb-
ance to which the insured is subject, and of which an attack causing
him an injury is, in some measure, a recurrence; and they have no
reference to some temporary disorder which is new and unusual, and
arises from some sudden and unexpected derangement of the system,
though it produces or causes unconsciousness. (Meyer v. Fidelity
etc., Co., 374.)
5. CONTRACT, PLACE OF.-AN INSURANCE POLICY which
was signed in New York and by which it is agreed that all premiums
and losses shall be paid in that state, and that it shall be construed
as having been made therein, is a contract thereof, though the as-
sured to whom it was issued resides in another state. (Goodwin v.
Provident Savings etc. Assn., 411.)
6. INSURANCE-APPLICATION, WHAT IS A FAILURE TO
ANNEX COPY OF TO THE POLICY.-If a copy of the application
annexed to the policy does not correctly state the place to which no-
tice of premiums shall be addressed, and omits some of the state-
ments of the assured referring to his past afflictions and all of the
examiner's report, the insurer must be deemed to have violated a
statute requiring a cony of the application to be annexed to every
policy. (Goodwin v. Provident Savings etc. Assn., 411.)
7. INSURANCE CONSTRUCTION OF STIPULATIONS.-A
stipulation, in a policy of fire insurance, that no agent of the
company shall have power to waive "any provision or condition"
thereof is, in substance, the same as a stipulation that no agent shall have power to change the "terms and conditions" of the policy. (Snyder v. Dwelling-House Ins. Co., 625.)
8. INSURANCE AGAINST ACCIDENT-PLEADING.-If a polIcy insuring against injury or death from accident states the occupation of the assured, and provides for the recovery of less than the amount of the insurance in case of his injury while pursuing any of the occupations designated in the policy as hazardous, a complaint in an action upon the policy should state in what occupation the assured was engaged at the time of the accident. (American Accident Co. v. Carson, 473.)
9. INSURANCE AGAINST ACCIDENT-LIABILITY WHEN THE ASSURED IS INTENTIONALLY KILLED BY ANOTHER.-Though among the conditions of a policy insuring against accident is one providing that it shall not extend to, or cover, intentional injuries inflicted by the insured or any other person, or injury or death happening while the assured is insane or under the influence of intoxicating drinks, a recovery may be had for the death of the assured through his being intentionally killed, without this fault, by a third person. (American Accident Co. v. Carson, 473.)
EXCEPTIONS-LIABILITY.-The
of one from a number of like causes of damage to or destruction of insured property is a recognition by the insurer of his liability for loss arising from other causes of like nature. (Hey v. Guarantor's etc. Co., 644.)
11. INSURANCE, LIFE-RENEWABLE POLICY.-A policy of life insurance which is renewable from quarter to quarter on payment of premiums less the return premium awarded, and providing that, subject to the payment of premiums, it shall be incontestable after two years, except for fraud, in obtaining it, is governed by the ordinary principles applicable to life insurance contracts. (Goodwin v. Provident Savings etc. Assn., 411.)
12. INSURANCE.-DECLARATIONS AND ADMISSIONS OF THE ASSURED are not binding upon the beneficiary. (Goodwin v. Provident Savings etc. Assn., 411.)
13. INSURANCE-MUTUAL BENEFIT SOCIETIES-PARTIES. If one of the beneficiaries named in a certificate of insurance dies, the surviving beneficiaries may sue alone upon the certificate without joining the administrator of the deceased beneficiary. (Supreme Lodge etc. v. Portingall, 296.)
14. INSURANCE.-ASSESSMENTS TO MEET LIABILITIES on a policy of accident assessment insurance must be made on the basis of membership at the date of the death or accident. (Collins v. Bankers' Accident Ins. Co., 367.)
15. INSURANCE-ACCIDENT-ASSESSMENT.-New of an accident assessment insurance association are not assessable for losses which occur before they become members, and assessments can be made only on the members liable to pay when the loss occurs. (Collins v. Bankers' Accident Ins. Co., 367.)
INSURANCE-LIFE-FORFEITURE-FAILURE ΤΟ PAY PREMIUMS.-If an insurance company enters into a contract by which it agrees to transfer its membership to another company, and the latter agrees to take such members and reinsure them on the basis of their original applications in the former company on the execution of satisfactory transfer applications, and a member of the former company sends a check for a premium due, and fills out a transfer application, in which he states that he has recently recovered from an attack of pneumonia, but that his health is then fair, the latter company has no right to return his check and reject his application on the ground that it "is not satisfactory on account of physical condition and age," nor to insist that the applicant submit to a medical
examination, and his failure to pay a subsequent premium when it
falls due does not forfeit the right to recover on the policy. (Na-
tional Mut. Ins. Co. v. Home Benefit Soc., 666.)
17. INSURANCE-LIFE-FORFEITURE-FAILURE TO PAY
PREMIUMS.-If a life insurance company has declared a policy for-
feited without authority, and has refused to accept a premium, the
fact that the insured subsequently failed to pay premiums as they
fell due does not affect the right to recover on the policy. (National
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Home Benefit Soc., 666.)
18. INSURANCE.—THERE IS NO PRESUMPTION THAT THE
ASSURED RECEIVED NOTICE of the maturity of premiums
where such notice is not mailed to his address, but is, on the other
hand, sent to another city of which he was before that time a resi-
dent. (Goodwin v. Provident Savings etc. Assn., 411.)
19. INSURANCE, PROOF THAT PREMIUMS DEMANDED
WERE CORRECT.-Where the amount of a premium to be paid is
variable, and a knowledge of the amount rests peculiarly with the in-
surer, he must show that the sum which he demanded was correct.
(Goodwin v. Provident Savings etc. Assn., 411.)
20. INSURANCE.-A NOTICE OF THE MATURITY OF A PRE-
MIUM which is improperly addressed and does not reach the assured
cannot establish a forfeiture. (Goodwin v. Provident Savings etc.
Assn., 411.)
21. INSURANCE-MUTUAL BENEFIT SOCIETIES-APPEAL.
WANT OF JURISDICTION does away with the obligation to seek
relief by appeal even when required by the constitution of a mutual
benefit association, such as a lodge of the Knights of Pythias, in
otherwise proper cases. The duty of an expelled member to exhaust
by appeal, or otherwise, all the remedies within the organization
arises only where the association is acting strictly within the scope
of its powers. (Supreme Lodge K. of P. v. Eskholme, 609.)
22. INSURANCE-MUTUAL BENEFIT SOCIETIES EFFECT
OF ILLEGAL EXPULSION.-A vote, in a mutual benefit society,
such as the Knights of Pythias, to suspend a member indefinitely is,
in effect, a vote to expel, and no jurisdiction is acquired, in either
case, without proper notice of the appointment of a committee of trial,
and where the proceedings have been otherwise irregular. Hence, he
may recover upon a certificate of insurance issued to him by the lodge,
where he has not been convicted in accordance with the rules of the
society, nor under general principles of law, as his membership still
continues. (Supreme Lodge K. of P. v. Eskholme, 609.)
23. INSURANCE.-A REINSTATEMENT of the insured after a
forfeiture is not the making of a new contract where no different
terms are agreed upon. It simply restores the old contracts, and the
fact that the reinstatement occurred in a state different from that in
which the policy was issued does not make it a contract of the state
where the reinstatement took place. (Goodwin v. Provident Sav-
Ings etc. Assn., 411.)
24. INSURANCE, REINSTATEMENTS, APPLICATION. COPY
OF WHEN MUST BE ANNEXED TO.-If a statute provides that
all insurance corporations or associations shall, upon the issuing of a
renewal of a policy, attach to, or indorse thereon, a true copy of any
application or representation of the insured which, by the policy, is
made a part thereof, and, on failing to do so, that the insurer shall
not be permitted to prove any such application or representation, a
reinstatement after forfeiture falls within the statute, and the In-
surer cannot plead any representation or application not attached to
the policy or to the reinstatement. (Goodwin v. Provident Savings
etc. Assn., 411.)
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