Once acquired for the Defense Production Act inventory, these materials have been available for stockpiling or for resale to industry. The Defense Production Act is sufficiently broad to apply to technical information, processes, components, supplies, commodities, products, articles, and raw materials.

"The 1955 amendments to the Defense Production Act recognized a change in emphasis from the early mobilization activities to advance preparation for future emergencies. The act also places emphasis upon the time required to mobilize, and an attack on the United States is recognized as a possibility in such an emergency. In past periods of mobilization the fighting has been at distant locations and time for mobilization has been available to the United States. There is no assurance that this country will again have the benefit of these advantages in a future emergency.

"Readiness for future emergencies requires that plans be sufficiently flexible to meet any eventuality. One readiness plan assumes general mobilization without an attack on the continental United States, and another plan assumes an immediate attack without prior warning. Planning for mobilization has been said to be complicated by two basic facts. First, the vagaries of the international tensions today make it impossible to forecast the location and magnitude of potential conflict. Second, nuclear and technological developments continue from year to year to introduce new dimensions and timing requirements for the defense of the United States.

"As expansion programs have declined, increased efforts have been devoted to planning to achieve readiness for any emergency. Efforts have been made to assure the continuity of Government in the event of a massive attack. It is reported that 90 emergency relocation sites have been established for Central Government operations, and that some 300 such sites have been established for regional and field activities. Emergency agencies have been established on a standby basis, to be activated in the event of an attack. Many specific plans and action steps have been developed, and implementing documents have been drafted. All of these are necessary first steps; however, it should be emphasized that these steps are not enough, in themselves, to assure national survival in the event of an attack. A massive thermonuclear attack on this Nation would lead to tens of millions of casualties. Existing organizational relationships would be upset, and there would be severe disruption of transportation and communications. Survival would demand effective action at both the State and National level.

"A nuclear attack would present problems vastly different from the problems of World War II and Korea. Nuclear attack is generally considered as a massive exchange of nuclear weapons followed by an extended period when national attention would be devoted primarily to problems of human survival. Some experts think that in the event of such an attack the war would be over almost immediately, while others believe a so-called broken-back war would continue indefinitely.

"In either event, the conventional concept of a tremendous increase in defense production after M-day is clearly inadequate for a nuclear situation. The view has been expressed that for a period of days, or possibly even weeks, large segments of the surviving population would be confined because of lethal intensities of residual radiation from fallout. There would be a need for a maximum amount of protection for the people, and the finished and semifinished supplies to support them. There would not be time to tool up to produce vital medical supplies and other essential items to meet the survival needs of the population. The present concentration of industry in the large centers would indicate that the productive ability of remaining plants to meet the needs of the population or other defense needs would be seriously impaired.

"In setting up the Interagency Committee on Essential Survival Items in April 1956, the Director of ODM stated, in part, as follows:

"In connection with our mobilization planning work for a postattack situation, we are concerned over the lack of basic information with respect to a very important area-the determination of those items essential to survival following a bomb attack. All of those items necessary to survival must be planned for in advance, requirements determined, stockpiles built up if necessary, and vulnerability to attack lessened to the extent possible. Once identified, and the requirements determined, the list would serve as a basis for the development of programs to insure the availability of minimum stocks during the immediate postattack period.'

"A tentative list of essential survival items is reported to have been completed in February 1957. During Operation Alert 1957, a problem was developed around a consideration of the supply requirements situation which would probably exist in a postattack period with respect to approximately 50 survival items. A tentative bomb attack pattern was devised for planning purposes during the preattack phase of the alert; factors for determining requirements were estimated; and Government agencies were requested to develop supply requirements data. In the light of this information the FCDA is reported to have submitted recommended programs for stockpiling some of the items. The Operation Alert 1957 exercise provided information considered to be of value with respect to methods for measuring deficiencies, verified certain assumptions with respect to anticipated deficiencies of survival items, and indicated problem areas to be considered in future planning.

"For example, prior to Operation Alert it was estimated that the supply of penicillin in the hands of the manufacturers and wholesalers was about 170 trillion units. Postattack requirements for the first 90 days, the period of maximum need, were estimated at only 150 trillion units. However, an analysis of the attack pattern assumed in the exercise showed that more than half of the supply would have been destroyed in the attack. This exercise indicated that hypothetically many people would have died solely because existing stocks of penicillin were not maintained in dispersed locations.

"This committee has been advised that during the coming year work will be undertaken on the determination of the probable availability of all of the survival items in a postattack period. These determinations will rest on a supply-requirements balance sheet for each of the items. It will be necessary to develop the assumptions and guidelines under which the studies will be conducted, to develop generalized attack patterns for planning purposes, to arrange for the participation of the responsible agencies, and to coordinate and evaluate the results. It is the belief of ODM that the information compiled will furnish the basis for the development of action programs designed to insure the availability of these essential survival items. These findings could in some cases point to the need for the dispersion of new productive facilities; in other cases the studies may indicate the need for the stockpiling of inventories or supplies. It may be that in many cases a satisfactory supply may be made available by dispersing existing inventories, as in the case of penicillin. ODM has indicated that it may be possible to achieve considerable dispersion of inventories on a voluntary basis, but that some incentives may be required. It is believed that the studies could reveal the need for larger inventories of some items in the hands of manufacturers. For example, larger inventories of items which quickly become obsolete or which have a relatively short useful life may be the solution. It is possible that these studies may indicate the need for additional legislation.

"Mobilization readiness will require adequate planning to point the way to action programs, and central direction and coordination of preparedness efforts. 'The transfer of the remaining functions of the Defense Production Administration to the Office of Defense Mobilization in 1953 was the first in a series of moves calculated to strengthen the central direction of the mobilization program. A few months later the old Office of Defense Mobilization, which had been established under authority of the Defense Production Act by Executive order, was abolished. A new Office of Defense Mobilization was established in the Executive Office of the President by Reorganization Plan No. 3 (effective June 12, 1953). The stated purpose of this action was to improve the organization and to enable one executive office agency, the new Office of Defense Mobilization, to exercise leadership in our national mobilization effort, including both current defense activities and readiness for any future national emergency. On August 14, 1953, the President issued Executive Order 10480. This order provides that the Director of ODM shall coordinate all mobilization activities of the executive branch of the Government and direct and coordinate all activities of other agencies under the Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended.

"Transferred to the Director of ODM were: (a) All functions of the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board as authorized by the National Security Act of 1947, as amended; (b) all functions under the Strategic and Critical Materials Stockpiling Act, as amended, then vested in the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Interior, including the functions which were vested in the Munitions Board, Department of Defense, but excluding functions vested in the Secretary of the Interior by section 7 of said act; (c) the functions vested in the Munitions Board by section 4(L) of the Commodity Credit Corporation

Charter Act, as amended; and (d) all functions vested by any statute in the Director of Defense Mobilization or in the Office of Defense Mobilization provided for in Executive Order 10193.

"On September 18, 1953, after absorbing the additional duties formerly vested in the National Security Resources Board and the Defense Production Adminis tration, and the stockpiling functions of the Munitions Board, the Office of Defense Mobilization staff totaled 296. The budget estimates for the fiscal year 1958 set forth total employees of ODM at 238, of which 120 are professional and 118 clerical. A total of 239 employees are estimated for the fiscal year 1959, of which 117 are to be professional. The total number of professional employees is estimated to increase from 13 to 21 for plans and readiness for the fiscal year 1959. The plans and readiness area is responsible for coordinating the development, review, and revision of mobilization plans; developing programs and monitoring activities to assure a continuity of essential wartime functions of the Federal Government in the event of an attack; making preparation for censorship operations in time of war; and conducting test exercises to improve our national readiness for any emergency. These functions are authorized by the Defense Production Act and the National Security Act. ODM, as the top level defense planning agency of the Government, should be staffed with the competent professional personnel required to do the job.

"If solutions to preparedness problems are to be found, professional people must be available to devote adequate study to unanswered questions. Though a good start has been made toward delving into the outer fringes of preparedness problems, the magnitude of these problems must not deter us in our efforts to find the answers essential to national survival. The population looks to the Government to provide the leadership in this undertaking. The Office of Defense Mobilization has delegated many functions to various departments and agencies. If there is to be the central direction and coordination contemplated by Reorganization Plan No. 3, there must be a sufficient number of trained personnel in ODM to insure that preparedenss problems will receive adequate study and review. It is a tremendous job to determine the means of affording protection to the population and to insure adequate industrial capacity or end items. Yet, such are the requirements of national defense and national security.

"Accurate knowledge of the remaining capacity to produce is heavily dependent upon the accuracy of the calculations on the damage to be sustained. The damage assessment program is coordinated by an interagency damage assessment group directed and supported by ODM. This group is responsible for developing and maintaining a system for the assessment and reporting of attack damage and the impact of various patterns of attack on all segments of the mobilization base, including industry, manpower, telecommunication, transportation, and other mobilization resources. A damage assessment center is equipped with electronic computing equipment. It is reported to be possible to plan hypothetical attacks against many targets in the United States, and to compute the overall physical damage, radiological contamination, and casualties that can be expected. The electronic computer received its first major test during Operation Alert 1957. It is acknowledged that many problems in this field remain unsolved and will require intensive study. Damage assessment information on tapes must be expanded to determine the effect on end-item production, materials, components, and subassemblies which are used to manufacture end items. Damage assessment must give consideration to the relationships which exist between various segments of the economy and the overall impact. In the year ahead efforts will be made to improve damage estimating methods.

"The unanswered questions relating to dispersion point to the need for accurate information on attack damage. In past years this committee has urged the responsible agencies to make a determination regarding the practical limits of dispersion. The Congress established its policy on dispersion in passing the Defense Production Act Amendments of 1956. The Congress related dispersion to the construction of Government-owned industrial facilities, Government contracts, loans, and to the procurement of goods and services. Since 1951 there have been numerous orders, directives, delegations, surveys, and policy statements favoring dispersion. However, staff studies of the reports submitted to this committee indicate that there has been little progress toward achieving a significant dispersion to date.

"The justification of recent waivers of the dispersion criteria for the expansion of existing airplane plants and research and development laboratories appears to be that 'in an emergency such facilities, though highly vulnerable, may have fulfilled their immediate essentiality.' These determinations appear to be

based on new strategic concepts under which emphasis is placed on supplies in being rather than production after an attack. The soundness and limitations of these concepts are highly dependent upon the accuracy of damage-assessment information. However, it has been pointed out previously that many problems in the field of damage assessment remain unsolved and will require intensive study. The problem of determining the practical limits of dispersion of industrial facilities continues, and a new problem with respect to the application of dispersion to weapons on hand is introduced.

"During the past year, the Office of Defense Mobilization reviewed all of its expansion goals and closed 25 of them, leaving only 4 open. In addition, Public Law 165, 85th Congress, further restricted the use of rapid amortization. Accordingly, at the present time certifications for rapid amortization are made only to cover expansion of facilities to produce new or specialized defense items or components of new or specialized items, and to provide research, developmental, or experimental services for the military departments or the Atomic Energy Commission as a part of the national defense program.

"The need for other incentives for expansion is also decreasing at the present time. Borrowing authority programs remain in effect for 21 stockpile materials and for 5 machine tool reserves. Many of these programs provide for deliveries to the Government through 1958 and some run through 1962. Accordingly, few new materials contracts were considered during the past year.

"As of August 31, 1957, approximately $1.93 billion of the $2.1 billion borrowing authority authorized by section 304 of the Defense Production Act had been allocated to five agencies using this authority, leaving approximately $170 million unallocated. The probable ultimate net cost of borrowing authority programs is now estimated at $910 million.

"Under new strategic concepts, military planning emphasis is being placed on supplies on hand rather than post-M-day production. Under these plans the anticipated mobilization shortages of essential components and strategic materials needed for production would be lessened. Earlier component studies by ODM and the Departments of Commerce and Defense had revealed nine types of components for which there were capacity deficiencies to meet full mobilization requirements. It is the belief of ODM that capacity of many of these may be sufficient to meet the lower military requirements currently forecast.

"During the past year stockpile policies have been revised to provide that new stockpile procurement should be based on a 3-year emergency period rather than the 5-year period previously used as a standard. Accordingly, new stockpile procurement for the fiscal year 1958 is currently limited to the following materials needed to meet the procurement priority level: Amosite asbestos, chromium metal, metallurgical fluorspar, jewel bearings, chemical type B manganese, muscovite block and film mica, selenium, and crude silicon carbide. The purchases of synthetic manganese dioxide and lead and zinc are reported as being made to support the domestic mobilization base. The purchases of lead and zinc have been covered under a separate heading in this report. It has been indicated that the long-term objectives for lead and zinc will be reached in a few months, and thereafter no further purchases will be made.

"The committee is pleased to note that ODM is to undertake a comprehensive review of the present stockpile status and policies. The purpose of this review will be to develop new stockpile policy to be followed in the light of changing strategic concepts. It is understood that this study will involve an examination of the various proposals that have been made for stockpiling certain items that would be particularly required in the event of nuclear attack.

"On the basis of preliminary fiscal year 1957 data, the Department of Defense estimates that in the 7 years since Korea the value of military supplies and equipment delivered, plus the value of military construction put in place, has totaled about $143.3 billion. Of this total $110.7 billion was in hard goods, $8.7 billion in soft goods, and $13.9 billion in construction.

"During the fiscal year 1957, it is estimated that $18.2 billion of military supplies and construction were delivered or put in place, including $14 billion in hard goods, $2.2 billion in soft goods, and $2 billion in construction. The estimated total of $18.2 billion for the fiscal year 1957 compares with $18.2 billion for the fiscal year 1956, $20.7 billion for the fiscal year 1955, $25.S billion for the fiscal year 1954, $28.4 billion for the fiscal year 1953, $22.8 billion for the fiscal year 1952, and $9.2 billion for the fiscal year 1951.

"Comparison of delivery patterns during fiscal year 1957 with those of the fiscal year 1956 indicate that, although the total value of deliveries and construction was the same in the 2 years, hard goods decreased 2.9 percent and soft goods and

construction increased 20.6 and 3.5 percent, respectively. Individual hard goods programs are reported to show wide variations in a comparison of the 2 fiscal years. Increases in the value of deliveries in the aircraft, guided missiles, and miscellaneous hard goods programs were offset by decreases in other hard goods programs. The weapons and ammunition programs showed the largest decreases both proportionately and in dollar totals.

"Although the value of aircraft deliveries increased, the number and airframe weight of aircraft accepted were both smaller in the fiscal year 1957 than in the preceding year, reflecting increased complexity and cost of the newer aircraft models. Airframe weight acceptances are reported to have decreased from 95.6 million pounds in the fiscal year 1956 to $3.8 million pounds in the fiscal year 1957, a decrease of 11.8 million pounds.

"The Department of Defense reports that the development and acceptance of new weapons systems and revised concepts of warfare have pointed to the need for reexamination of the production-allocation program and its broad-scale planning with industry for mobilization production in the event of war. It is now reported that it appears that the existing program will have to be modified to meet a greater variety of contingencies than those for which the program was originally designed. It is reported that new planning systems will be introduced to meet the possibility of direct massive attack on the United States and to cover other problems of mobilizing industry. It is further indicated that the existing system with some modification will continue to apply to planning for other types of aggression.

"The Register of Planned Mobilization Producers lists the firms participating with the Department of Defense in the production-allocation program. The revised edition of 1957 lists approximately 18,500 firms, a reduction of about 2,500 from 1956.

"The preferential planning list of the most critical military items for which mobilization production planning with industry is required by the Secretary of Defense numbered approximately 1,000 items when first established. Further screening now limits this list to approximately 400 of the most important items. In addition, the major subassemblies, parts, and components for preferential items are subjected to the same level of planning attention as the end items. The military departments are authorized to plan with industry for items which do not appear on the preferential planning list provided planning for such items will not delay or interfere with planning for preferential planning list items. "BSDA, Department of Commerce, took action during January 1957 to accord top priority to the procurement of materials by contractors and subcontractors engaged in production, construction, and research and devlopment for the intercontinental ballistic missiles and intermediate range ballistic missiles programs. This action was taken pursuant to a policy decision of ODM and after discussions were held with representatives of ODM and the Department of Defense. thority has been delegated to the Secretary of Defense authorizing the DX rating in support of the ICBM-IRBM programs. Contracts and purchase orders having DX ratings take priority over DO-rated defense orders as well as unrated -orders.

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"The means must be found to provide the solutions to major unresolved preparedness problems without delay."

[PRESS RELEASE FROM THE OFFICE OF SENATOR A. WILLIS ROBERTSON, JAN. 4, 1959]

The Joint Committee on Defense Production, headed by Senator A. Willis Robertson of Virginia, today urged the new Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization to establish definite objectives and priorities of action, and to consolidate all mobilization measures into an overall action program as a means of strengthening the Nation's nonmilitary preparedness posture and of providing essential military support to meet the needs of any emergency.

This and other recommendations, together with an appraisal of Federal preparedness plans and programs, are contained in the committee's eighth annual report to be submitted to Congress on January 7.

"Eight years of effort have produced blueprints for survival," Chairman Robertson said. "But blueprints alone won't save a single life, treat a single casualty, or feed a single citizen. We must be ready-as soon as possible after an attack-to move food, medicine, and other survival items, and to restore governmental authority, business, industry, and essential public services. Otherwise we could become a demoralized people."