If we pursue the subject before us by the light of the rules of law which apply, we shall reach the same conclusion. An analysis of the clause in question eliminates these particulars: Laying out of view the estate of her mother, a life estate is given to Elizabeth Cropley.

At her death, whenever that might occur, and whatever then the age of her offspring, the property was to be sold and converted into money. Her death and the sale might have occurred immediately after the death of the

testator.

Upon the sale being made, her offspring, if minors, would have become entitled to the interest of the fund until the age of twenty-one years was reached. The right to receive the whole or an aliquot part of the fund would then have accrued.

The time of selling had no relation to the age of the legatees.

It depended wholly on the death of the tenant of the life estate.

The effect of her dying during their infancy would have been that they would have taken the interest instead of the principal of the fund up to the age of twenty-one, and then the principal instead of the interest.

The real estate having been directed by the will to be converted into money, it is to be regarded for all the purposes of this case as if it were money at the time of the death of the tes tator. That it was not to be sold until after the termination of two successive life estates does not affect the application of the principle. Equity regards substance and not form, and considers that as done which is required to be done. The sale being directed absolutely, the time is immaterial. Craig v. Leslie, 3 Wheat., 563; Peter v. Beverly, 10 Pet., 563; Taylor v. Benham, 5 How., 269; Fairly v. Kline, 2 Penning., 754; Reading v. Blackwell, Bald., 166; Hocker v. Gentry, 3 Met. (Ky.), 473.

Where a bequest is given by a direction to pay when the legatee attains to a certain age, and the interest of the fund is given to him in the mean time, this shows that a present gift was intended, and the legacy vests in interest at the death of the testator. In re Hart's Trusts, 3 De Gex & J., 202; Hanson v. Graham,6 Ves., 239; Hammond v. Maule, 1 Coll., 281; Burrill v. Sheil, 2 Barb., 471; Bayard v. Atkins, 10 Pa. St., 20; Provenchere's Appeal, 67 Pa. St., 466; Hanson v. Brawner, 2 Md., 102; Nixon v. Robbins, 24 Ala., 669.

A bequest in the form of a direction to pay at a future period, vests in interest immediately if the payment be postponed for the convenience of the estate or to let in some other interest. The payment of debts is an instance of the former, and a prior temporary provision for some other person, as for Elizabeth Cropley in this case, is an instance of the latter. In all such cases it is presumed that the testator postponed the time of enjoyment by the ultimate legatee for the purpose of the prior devise or bequest. Hallifax v. Wilson. 16 Ves., 171; Leeming v. Sterratt, 2 Hare, 14; Packham v. Gregory, 4 Hare, 396; Winslow v. Goodwin, 7 Met., 363; White v. Curtis, 12 Gray, 54; Tucker v. Ball, 1 Barb., 94; See 19 WALL. U. S., Book 22.

Anderson, 6 C. E. Green, 22; McGill's Appeal, 61 Pa. St., 47; Tayloe v. Mosher, 29 Md., 443; Brent v. Washington, 18 Gratt., 526; Fuller v. Fuller, 5 Jones, Eq., 223; Roberts v. Brinker, 4 Dana, 573; Rawlings v. Landes, 2 Bush., 159. A devise of lands to be sold after the termi nation of a life estate given by the will, the proceeds to be distributed thereafter to certain persons, is a bequest to those persons and vests at the death of the testator.

Fairly v. Kline [supra]; Reading v. Blackwell, 1 Bald., 166; Rinehart v. Harrison, 1 Bald., 177; Loftis v. Glass, 15 Ark., 680.

It is a consideration of weight that if William Cooper Cropley, who died at the age of twentyeight, had married and left children, according to the proposition of the appellees, they could have taken no benefit from the provision made for their father. Such could not have been the intention of the testator. In real property cases where the question arises whether a remainder is vested or contingent, this consequence is held to be conclusive-that it was the former. Carver v. Jackson, 4 Pet., 1. In Goodtitle v. Whitby, 1 Bur., 234, Lord Mansfield said: "Here, upon the reason of the thing, the infant is the object of the testator's bounty, and the testator does not mean to deprive him of it in any event. Now, suppose this object of the testator's bounty marries and dies before his age of twenty-one leaving children, could the testator intend, in such event, to disinherit him? Certainly he could not." In Doe v. Perryn, 3 T. R.,495, Buller, J., said: "But if this were held not to vest until the death of the parents, this inconvenience would follow: that it would not go to grandchildren, for if a child were born, who died in the lifetime of his parents, leaving issue, such grandchild could not take, which could not be supposed to be the intention of the testator." This reasoning applies to the present case.

Boraston's case, 3 Coke Rep., 21, was referred to by counsel on both sides. The point there ruled was as follows: if real estate be devised to A when he shall attain a given age, and until A attains that age, the property is devised to B, A takes an immediate vested estate, not defeasible on his death under that age, the gift being read as a devise to B for a term of years, with remainder to A. The same doctrine has since been affirmed in numerous other cases, and is now a canon of the English law. Hawk., Wills, 237. Boraston's case related to real property. If this were such a case it would be in point and conclusive. It has been applied by American courts to bequests of personalty. Roberts v. Brinker, 4 Dana, 573; Watkins v. Quarles, 23 Ark., 179; Collier's Will, 40 Mo., 287. The subject of vested and contingent remainders was examined by this court in Doe v. Considine, 6 Wall., 476 [73 U. S., XVIII., 875].

Chancellor Kent (4 Com., 280) says: "It is the uncertainty of the right of enjoyment and not the uncertainty of its actual enjoyment which renders a remainder contingent. The present capacity of taking effect in possession, if the possession become vacant, distinguishes a vested from a contingent remainder, and not the certainty that the possession will ever be come vacant while the remainder continues." "When a remainder is limited to a person in

The Court of Claims found the following to be the facts in the case, viz.:

failure to deliver 2,945, 484 pounds of supplies which were transported from Omaha to Columbus, to Lone Tree and the Kearney Station.by rail, and thence to Fort McPherson, Fort Laramie and Fort Reno by wagon. The court limited the recovery to transportation given between the months of April and September, 1866, and refused to allow damages for the failure to deliver for transportation the supplies which were carried after that period and in the year 1866. From the first branch of the judgment, an appeal was taken by the United States, and the petitioner has appealed from the latter part of the judgment.

In the summer of 1866, the United States had collected, at Omaha, military stores and supplies intended for the supply of posts west of the Missouri River, and within the district covered by the contract with the petitioner, and in the year 1866, they sent by said railroad quantities of said stores and supplies from Omaha to Columbus, Lone Tree and Kearney Station, the successive termini of the railroad as it was extended westward, as is set forth in the schedule hereto annexed marked No. 1.

And in the month of June, 1866, the United States contracted with Herman Kountze for the transportation of said stores and supplies from Columbus, Lone Tree and Kearney Station to Fort McPherson, Fort Laramie, and Fort Kear ney on said route No. 1, and copies of said contract are hereto annexed and marked B and C. And thereafter the said Kountze, under the said contract made with him and in the year 1866, performed the transportations specified in the schedule annexed and marked No. 2.

Previous to the delivery of the said military stores and supplies to the said Railroad, and before the making of the said contract with Kountze, the petitioner was prepared, and noti fied the United States of his readiness to transport the said military stores and supplies, under and according to his contract.

Previous to the delivery of said military stores and supplies to said Kountze, but after the mak ing of said contract with him, the petitioner was prepared and claimed of the United States the right under his contract to transport the said military stores and supplies, from the termini of said railroad to such places within his contract as the United States might designate. No notice was given by the United States to the petitioner under his contract, to transport the military stores and supplies transported by said Kountze. But on the 11th of June, 1866, the petitioner was notified by the United States that transportation under his contract would not be needed.

The cost of the transportation of said military stores and supplies delivered to said Kountze in any of the months from April to September inclusive, would have been to the petitioner $1.20 per hundred pounds per hundred miles.

The Court of Claims awarded to the claim

By the second article of the contract of Caldwell, the claimant, he undertakes to transport "from the posts, depots or stations named in Article I.," or from "any other posts, depots or stations that may be established" on the west bank of the Missouri River, any number of pounds of supplies not exceeding 10,000,000 lbs. in the aggregate. The posts named in Article I., are Forts Leavenworth and Riley, in Kansas; Fort Kearney, Nebraska; Fort Sedgwick, Colorado; Fort Laramie, Dakota. The district named in said article within which other posts may be established is, the west bank of the Missouri River, north of Leavenworth and south of 42° north latitude.

The posts from which the supplies were sent, which, it is said, should have been delivered to the claimant, were not those named in Article I., or either of them. They were Omaha at the outset, or starting point, and Columbus, Lone Tree and Kearney Station (not Fort Kearney), as the intermediate points from which wagon transportation was taken. These three points were railroad stations on the Union Pacific Railroad, and they were points to which the road was, from time to time, sufficiently completed for the purposes of railroad travel or transportation.

The judgment of the Court of Claims is based upon the theory that the expression in the contract, posts, depots or stations," includes railway depots or stations; that when a depot or station was established upon the Pacific road, as its construction advanced westwardly, such point became a post or station within the meaning of the contract. We are of the opinion that this was not the intention of the parties, but that military posts or stations alone were intended by them.

The contract was intended to aid the Government in the transfer of its stores and supplies from one military post, station or depot to another. While the same words in a contract, the subject matter of which respected goods to be transported for individuals, and in time of peace, might be construed as claimed, such is not their

ered the ground, and is in accordance with the request to charge, the request was properly refused. [No. 181.] Argued Jan. 15, 1874. Decided Mar. 3, 1874 Ν IN ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of New York.

This action was commenced in the court below by Russell, for the alleged infringement of a re-issued patent. The descriptive portion of the patent is as follows:

“My invention consists in a novel treatment of what is known as 'Bark tanned lamb or sheepskin,' an article used by book-binders, and which, while sufficiently soft and supple for the purposes of their trade, is too hard and stiff for glove-making, and a variety of other purposes. This objection is removed by my treatment of the article, and the leather rendered so soft and free, yet full in respect of body, as to adapt it, among other purposes or uses, to the making of what are termed 'dog-skin gloves.'

The principal feature of the invention consists in the employment of what is known among tanners and others as fat liquor,' which is ordinarily produced by the scouring of deer-skins after tanning in oil, but which, when it is not convenient to obtain in this manner, may be produced, or a liquor having the same character obtained, by the cutting of oil with a suitable alkali.

In treating leather with the fat liquor,' it is desirable to heat the latter to or near the boiling point, and it is preferred to use the same in connection with other ingredients; thus, for instance, there may be added to each ten gallons in such heated fat liquor, eight ounces of sal soda, twelve ounces of common salt, one pint of soft soap or an equivalent quantity of hard soap, and four ounces of Venetian red, such ingredients to be well stirred, and mixed with the fat liquor.

This forms a good treating mixture or compound and, when made in the foregoing quantity, will suffice for five or six dozen skins. But, of course, such quantity may be more or less varied, as may also the proportions of the ingredients and the Venetian red, or other color ing matter may be modified or omitted, as de sired.

To effect the treatment herein before referred to, of the bark tanned lamb or sheep skin, the same should be well dipped in or saturated with the fat liquor, or compound of which fat liquor is the base. This may be done by laying the skin to be treated on a table or other suitable surface, and rubbing the fat liquor or compound on or into both sides of the skin, using for the purpose a horse-brush or other suitable brush or rubber, by which it can be worked into the skin, that is afterwards hung out to dry, and subse quently staked,' when the character of said skin will be found entirely changed from harsh ness to softness, and in other respects, thereby adapting it to the manufacture of gloves of the description previously named, and to a variety of other purposes for which said skin was not suitable prior to the treatment of it I have herein described.

What is here claimed and desired to be secured by letters patent is:

1. The employment of fat liquor in the treat ment of leather, substantially as specified.

2. The process substantially as herein described, of treating bark tanned lamb or sheepskin by means of a compound composed and applied essentially as specified."

Verdict and judgment were for the plaintiffs. A motion for a new trial having been overruled, the case was brought to this court. The errors relied on here were:

1. The refusal of the court below to direct a judgment for the defendant, because the evidence showed lack of novelty in plaintiff's inventions, and because the re-issued patent was void as not being for the same invention as the original. This last question was not considered by this court.

2. Exceptions to the evidence.

Uriel Case was sworn and examined as a witness for defendant and testified that, eighteen or twenty years ago, he had applied fat liquor to twenty or twenty-five dozens bark tanned skins, dipping some and applying the liquor with a sponge to others, and this made them soft and suitable for gloves; that he made these skins into gloves, which were sold; used the fat liquor both warm and cold. He didn't make any more until last year.

On his cross-examination, this witness testified that of the twenty or twenty-five dozen skins that he so prepared, eighteen or twenty years ago, he could not tell anything about the number of skins treated with warm liquor; that his attention was first called to that old transaction when this suit came off; that he did not know as he ever tried it again until last year; didn't remember whether he did or not; last year there was considerable of it done in Gloversville; that it was a cheaper article than buckskin, and they were making a salable article out of it; that, on the other trial, it was talked in his hearing that there was a large trade in Gloversville in gloves made from these bark tanned skins; that in 1870 he began to use the fat liquor to soften bark tanned skins again. And the counsel for the plaintiff then asked the witness: Did Mr. Russell come and forbid you going on?"

This question was objected to by the counsel for the defendant as immaterial and incompetent, and as calling for the declaration of the plaintiff; but the said objection was overruled by the said judge, and the said question held to be admissible; to which ruling and decision of the said judge, the defendant's counsel then and there duly excepted.

John W. Place, on his cross-examination, testified that he was one of the defendants in the suit tried at Albany; Russell, plaintiff, and his brother Isaac B. Place and himself defendants; that he and his brother were partners and manufacturers at Gloversville; that he was present on this trial as a witness for Klein without payment of fees, and his brother was present also, that he had seen a paper in reference to the expenses of this suit; it was the day after the trial at Albany in reference to plaintiff's patent; that witness handed it to his brother, and hadn't seen it since that. Witness copied the paper at his brother's request, and handed it back to him.

The counsel for plaintiff then asked the witness to state the substance of that paper. This was objected to by defendant's counsel. (1) Upon the ground that it was not the best evidence. (2) That no foundation had been laid