that it is true of Kansas, and that the Legisla-Randolph, 31 Vt., 236; Hampshire v. Franklin, ture may do anything which it is not expressly 16 Mass., 83. prohibited by the Constitution from doing, is too broad. Our Constitution, at least, is a grant of enumerated powers. It creates the Legislature, the Executive and the Court, defines their duties, grants, and limits their power. Sec. 1, art. II., says: The legislative power of this State shall be vested in a House of Representatives and Senate." Then follow many sections prescribing rules for the government of the Legislature, delegating to it certain powers in some matters, and restricting it in others. Before this grant of powers, however, the people in their Bill of Rights declare as follows: Sec. 2. All political power is inherent in the people, and all free governments are founded upon their authority, and are instituted for their equal protection and benefit. No special priv | ileges or immunities shall ever be granted by the Legislature, which may not be altered, revoked or repealed by the same body, and this power shall be exercised by no other tribunal or agency." "Sec. 20. This enumeration of rights shall not be construed to impair or deny others retained by the people, and all powers not herein delegated remain with the people.' Under our Constitution, then, with its restrictions and limitations, has the Legislature power to compel, by law, the citizens of Topeka to contribute to the erection and maintenance of bridge shops? Or, to state the question squarely, is such enforced donation taxation or robbery? This power, if it exists, is claimed under the law making power, and the power to levy and collect taxes; and we are defiantly told to point out the precise clause of the Constitution which prohibits its exercise. Whatever other difference of opinion may exist as to the nature and requisites of a tax, it will be conceded that, irrespective of constitutional provisions, it can only be raised as revenue for public or governmental purposes, and that any attempt to compel the payment of money for purely private purposes is void, no matter by what name the imposition is called. Who shall determine what is a public purpose? The courts. It is essentially a judicial question, and no legislative declaration of the public purpose of a proposed tax, will or should have any weight, if, upon an inspection of the statute authorizing such tax, it is apparent that the purpose is purely a private one. The Supreme Court of Kansas, in the case of Commissioners of Leavenworth Co. v. Miller, 7 Kan., 479, take strong ground in favor of the constitutionality of bonded aid to railroads, and in as careful, well considered and exhaustive examination as can be found in any report, grouped together and stated all the arguments for and against such aid, and arrived at the conclusion, of course, that “If it were not for the public purpose to be attained by the building of such roads, no aid could constitutionally be given them." Sharpless v. Phila., 21 Pa.. 147; Nat. Bank v. lola City, 9 Kan., 701; Olcott v. Suprs, of Fond du Lac Co., 16 Wall., 678 (83 U. S., XXI., 382); Cooley, Const. Lim., p. 487. We append hereto, not by way of authority, but for convenience of reference, a table of cases, chronologically arranged by States, containing, we believe, all the authorities on the subject of municipal aid to railroads; all of which show that a tax, to be constitutional, must be for a public purpose. Nash Under a Constitution like ours, of delegated Goddin v. Crump. 8 Leigh, (1837) 140: Harand limited powers, sustained by the assertion rison Justices v. Holland, 3 Gratt., (1846) 236; that "All powers not herein delegated remain Langhorne v. Robinson, 20 Gratt.. (1871) 661; with the people," we may well call upon the Case of Co. Levy, 5 Call, (1871) 139; Bridgeport other side to show the clause which authorizes v. Housatonic R. R. Co., 15 Conn., (1843) 475; such legislation. The answer is, "The Legis- Soc. for Savings v. New London, 29 Conn., lature is vested with the power to make laws. (1846) 174; Harvey v. Lloyd, 3 Pa. St., (1846) The power to make laws includes the power to 331; Commonwealth v. Mc Williams, 11 Pa, make laws levying taxes; the Legislature passed (1849) 62; Sharpless v. Mayor of Phila., 21 Pa., the law, ordered the taxes to be collected and, (1853) 188; Moers v. City of Reading, 21 Pa., therefore, the law is constitutional, the tax is (1853) 188; Commonwealth v. Comrs, of Allevalid." But is a legislative enactment necessarily gheny Co., 32 Pa., (1858) 218: Commonwealth v. a law, unless it violates some specific limitations Pittsburgh, 41 Pa., (1868) 278; Commonwealth imposed by the Constitution? In Kansas, where v. Perkins, 43 Pa., (1863) 400; Nichol v. the line between legislative and judicial author-ville, 9 Humph., (1848) 252, 271; L. & N. R. ity is not yet definitely settled in the legislative Co. v. Davidson Co., 1 Sneed, (1854) 637; Hord mind, we have many illustrations to show that v. Rogersville, etc.. R. R. Co., 3 Head, (1859) all enactments, though called laws, are not so, 208; Byrd v. Ralston, 3 Head, (1859) 477; Juseven where no constitutional provision, express tices Campbell Co. v. K. & K. R. R. Co., 6 Cold., in its terms, has been violated. (1869) 598; Talbot v. Dent, 9 B. Mon., (1849) 526; Justices, etc., v. P. W. & K. R. Turnpike Co., 11 B. Mon., (1850) 143; Slack v. M. & L. R. R. Co., 13 B. Mon.. (1852) 1; Maddox v. Graham, 2 Metc. Ky., (1859) 56; Ryder v. A. & S. R. R. Co., 13 Ill., (1851) 516; Prettyman v. Tazewell Co., 19 Ill., (1858) 406; Robertson v. Rockford, 21 Ill., (1859) 451; Johnson v. Stark Co., 24 Ill., (1860) 75: Perkins v. Lewis, 24 Ill., (1860) 208; Butler v. Dunham, 27 Ill., (1861) 474; Clarke v. Hancock Co., 27 Ill., (1862) 305; Piatt v. People, 29 Ill., (1862) 54; Keithsburg v. Frick, 34 Ill., (1864) 405; Cotten v. Co. Comrs., 6 Fla., (1856) 610; C. W. & Z. R. R. Co. v. The taking of the property of one person and giving it to another, with or without pay, is not within the province of the Legislature, and any attempts by statute to do so is void, irrespective of any constitutional prohibition of such acts. Cooley, Const. Lim., 530; In the Matter of Townsend, 39 N. Y. 171; Mill-Dam Foundry v. Hovey, 38 Mass., 421; Stinson v. Rouse, 52 Me., 265; Embury v. Conner, 3 N. Y., 511; Harding v. Butts, 18 Illinois, 502; Baker v. Kelley, 11 Minnesota, 496; Reeves v. Treasurer, 8 O. St., 333; Brown v. Foster, 51 Pa. St., 167; Atkins v. The plaintiffs in error brought their action in the Circuit Court for the District of Nebraska, on coupons for interest attached to bonds of the City of Topeka. The bonds on their face purported to be payable to the King Wrought Iron Bridge Manufacturing and Iron Works Company, of Topeka, to aid and encourage that company in establishing and operating bridge shops in said City of Topeka, under and in pursuance of section 26 of an Act of the Legislature of the State of Kansas, entitled An Act to Incorporate Cities of the Second Class, approved Feb. 29, 1872; also another Act to authorize cities and counties to issue bonds for the purpose of building bridges, aiding railroads, water-power, or other works of internal improvement, approved March 2, 1872. The declaration also alleges that the interest coupons first due were paid out of a fund raised by taxation for that purpose, and that after this purchase the plaintiff became the purchaser of the bonds and the coupons on which suit is brought for value. A demurrer to this declaration was sustained by the Circuit Court, and to the judgment rendered thereon in favor of defendant, the present writ of error is prosecuted. Comrs. Clinton Co., 1 Ohio St.. (1852) 77; The | People v. San Francisco, 27 Cal., (1865) 655; 8. & 1. R. R. Co. v. Trustees of N. T. Ship, Augusta Bank v. Augusta, 49 Me., (1860) 507. etc., 1 Ohio St., (1852) 105; Cass v. Dillon, 2 Ohio St., (1853) 607; Thompson v. Kelly, 2 Ohio Mr. Justice Miller delivered the opinion of St., (1853) 647; State v. Van Horne, 7 Ohio St., the court: (1857) 327; State v. Union Tp., 8 Ohio St., (1858) 394; State v. Comrs. Hancock Co., 12 Ohio St., (1861) 596; Comrs. of Knox Co. v. Nichols, 14 Ohio St., (1863) 260; Fosdick v. Perrysburg, 14 Ohio St..(1863) 472; Shoemaker v. Goshen, Tp., 14 Ohio St., (1863) 569; Police Jury v. Suc. of Mc Donogh, 8 La. Ann., (1853) 341; New Orleans v. Graihle, 9 La. Ann., (1854) 561; Parker v. Scogin, 11 La. Ann., (1856) 629; V. S. & T. R. Co. v. Parish of Ouachita, 11 La. Ann., (1856) 649; Dubuque Co. v. D. & P. R. R. Co.. 4 G. Greene, (1853) 1; State v. Bissell, 4 G. Greene, (1854) 328; Clapp v. Cedar Co., 5 Ia., (1857) 15; Ring v. Johnson Co., 6 Ia.. (1858) 265; McMillen v. Boyles, 6 Ia., (1858) 304; McMillen v. Lee Co., 6 Ia., (1858) 391; Whittaker v. Johnson Co., 10 Ia., (1859) 161; Stein v. Mayor of Mobile,24 Ala., (1854) 591; Wetumpka v. Winter, 29 Ala., (1857) 651; Gibbons v. Mobile, etc., R. R., The City issued one hundred of these bonds, 36 Ala., (1860) 410; Strickland v. Miss. Central for $1,000 each, as a donation, and so it is stated R. R. Co., (1854) not reported; Williams v. in the declaration, to encourage that company Cammack, 27 Miss., (1854) 224; Taylor v. New-in its design of establishing a manufactory of berne, 2 Jones, Eq., (1855) 151; Caldwell v. Jus- iron bridges in that City. tices of Burke Co., 4 Jones, Eq., (1858) 323; St. Louis v. Alexander, 23 Mo., (1863) 483; Flagg v. Palmyra, 33 Mo., (1863) 440; St. Jo. & D. C. R. R. Co. v. Buchanan Co., 39 Mo., (1867) 485; Grant v. Courter, 24 Barb., (1857) 232; Benson v. Mayor of Albany, 24 Barb., (1857) 248; Clarke v. City of Rochester, 24 Barb., (1857) 446; Bank of Rome v. Rome, 18 N. Y., (1858) 38; Gould v. Town of Venice, 29 Barb., (1859) 442; Starin v. Genoa, 23 N. Y., (1861) 439; Clarke v. Rochester, 28 N. Y.. (1866) 605; People v. Mitchell, 45 Barb., (1865) 208; S. C., 35 N. Y., (1866) 551; Copes v. Charleston, 10 Rich., (1857) 491; Winn v. Macon, 21 Ga., (1857) 275; Powers v. Dougherty Co., 23 Ga., (1857) 65; Aurora v. West, 9 Ind., (1857) 74; Evansville R. R. Co. v. Evansville, 15 Ind., (1860) 395; Bartholomew Co. v. Bright, 18 Ind., (1862) 93; Aurora v. West, 22 Ind., (1864) 88; Comrs. Knox Co. v. Aspinwall, 21 How.. (1858) 539 (62 U. S., XVI., 208); Same v. Wallace, 21 How., (1858) 547 (62 U. S., XVI., 211): Zabriskie v. R. R. Co., 23 How., (1859) 381 (64 U. S., XVI., 488); Bissell v. Jef fersonville, 24 How., (1860) 287 (65 U. S., XVI., 664); Amey v. Allegheny City, 24 How., (1860) 365 (65 U. S., XVI., 614); Comrs. Knox Co. v. Aspinwall, 24 How., (1860) 376 (65 U. S., XVI., 735); Woods v. Lawrence Co., 1 Black, (1861) 386 (66 U. S., XVII., 122); Moran v. Miami Co., 2 Black, (1862) 722 (67 U. S., XVII., 342); 1 Wall., (1863) 80, 175, 272, 291 and 384 (68 U. S., XVII., 548, 684, 553, 538, 564); 3 Wall., (1865) 93, 294, 327 and 654 (70 U. S., XVII., 33, 38, 177, 79); 4 Wall., (1866) 270, 275 and 535 (71 U. S.. XVIII., 350, 370, 403; 6 Wall., (1869) 166, 210, 514 and 518 (73 U. S., XVIII., 768, 781, 933, 918); 7 Wall., (1868) 181 and 313 (74 U. S., XIX., 160, 93); 9 Wall., (1879) 477 (76 U. S., XIX., 725); Clark v. Janesville, 10 Wis., (1859) 136; Bushnell v. Beloit, 10 Wis., (1860) 195; Pattison v. Yuba Co., 13 Cal., (1859) 175; Hobart v. Butte Co., 17 Cal., (1860) 23; Robinson v. Bidwell, 22 Cal., (1863) 379; French v. Teschemaker, 24 Cal., (1864) 518; People v. Coon, 25 Cal., (1864) 635; The section of the Act of February 29, on which the main reliance is placed for the authority to issue these bonds, reads as follows: Section 76. The Council shall have power to encourage the establishment of manufactories and such other enterprises as may tend to develop and improve such City, either by direct appropriation from the general fund, or by the issuance of bonds of such City in such amounts as the Council may determine: Provided, That no greater amount than $1,000 shall be granted for any one purpose, unless a majority of the votes cast at an election called for that purpose shall authorize the same. The bonds thus issued shall be made payable at any time within twenty years, and bear interest not exceeding ten per cent. per annum. It is conceded that the steps required by this Act, prerequisite to issuing the bonds and other details, were regular, and that the language of the statute is sufficient to justify the action of the city authorities if the statute was within the constitutional competency of the Legislature. The single question, therefore, for consideration raised by the demurrer, is the authority of the Legislature of the State of Kansas to enact this part of the statute. Two grounds are taken in the opinion of the circuit judge and in the argument of counsel for defendant, on which it is insisted that the statute is unconstitutional. The first of these is, that by section 5 of article 12 of the Constitution of that State it is declared that provision shall be made by general law for the organization of cities, towns and villages; and their power of taxation, assessment, borrowing money, contracting debts and loaning their credit, shall be so restricted as to prevent the abuse of such power. The argument is that the statute in question is void because it authorizes cities and towns to contract debts, and does not contain any restriction on the power so conferred. But whether the statute which confers power to contract debts should always contain some limitation or restriction, or whether a general restriction applicable to all cases should be passed, and whether in the absence of both, the grant of power to contract is wholly void, are questions whose solution we prefer to remit to the state courts, as in this case we find ample reason to sustain the demurrer on the second ground on which it is argued by counsel and sustained by the circuit court. That proposition is, that the Act authorizes the towns and other municipalities to which it applies, by issuing bonds or loaning their credit, to take the property of the citizen under the guise of taxation to pay these bonds, and use it in aid of the enterprises of others which are not of a public character, thus perverting the right of taxation, which can only be exercised for a public use, to the aid of individual interests and personal purposes of profit and gain. The proposition as thus broadly stated is not new, nor is the question which it raises difficult of solution. If these municipal corporations, which are in fact subdivisions of the State, and which for many reasons are vested with quasi legislative powers, have a fund or other property out of which they can pay the debts which they contract, without resort to taxation, it may be within the power of the Legislature of the State to authorize them to use it in aid of projects strictly private or personal, but which would in a secondary manner contribute to the public good; or where there is property or money vested in a corporation of the kind for a particular use, as public worship or charity, the Legislature may pass laws authorizing them to make contracts in reference to this property, and incur debts payable from that source. But such instances are few and exceptional, and the proposition is a very broad one, that debts contracted by municipal corporations must be paid, if paid at all, out of taxes which they may lawfully levy, and that all contracts creating debts to be paid in future, not limited to pay ment from some other source, imply an obligation to pay by taxation. It follows that in this class of cases the right to contract must be limited by the right to tax, and if in the given case no tax can lawfully be levied to pay the debt, the contract itself is void for want of authority to make it. If this were not so, these corporations could make valid promises, which they have no means of fulfilling, and on which even the Legislature that created them can confer no such power. The validity of a contract which can only be fulfilled by a resort to taxation, depends on the power to levy the tax for that purpose. Sharp less v. Mayor of Phila., 21 Pa. St., 147, 167; Hanson v. Vernon, 27 Iowa, 28; Allen v. Inhab. of Jay, 60 Me., 127; Lowell v. Boston [111 Mass., 454]; Whiting v. Fond du Lac, 25 Wis., 188. It is, therefore, to be inferred that when the Legislature of the State authorizes a county or city to contract a debt by bond, it intends to authorize it to levy such taxes as are necessary to pay the debt, unless there is in the Act itself, or in some general statute, a limitation upon the power of taxation which repels such an inference. With these remarks and with the reference to the authorities which support them, we assume, that unless the Legislature of Kansas had the right to authorize the counties and towns in that State to levy taxes to be used in aid of manufacturing enterprises, conducted by individuals, or private corporations, for purposes of gain, the law is void, and the bonds issued under it are also void. We proceed to the inquiry whether such a power exists in the Legislature of the State of Kansas. We have already said that the question is not new. The subject of the aid voted to railroads by counties and towns has been brought to the attention of the courts of almost every State in the Union. It has been thoroughly discussed and is still the subject of discussion in those courts. It is quite true that a decided preponderance of authority is to be found in favor of the proposition that the Legislatures of the States, unless restricted by some special provisions of their Constitutions, may confer upon these municipal bodies the right to take stock in corporations created to build railroads, and to lend their credit to such corporations. Also to levy the necessary taxes on the inhabitants, and on property within their limits subject to general taxation, to enable them to pay the debts thus incurred. But very few of these courts have decided this without a division among the judges of which they were composed, while others have decided against the existence of the power altogether. State v. Wapello Co., 13 Iowa, 388; Hanson v. Vernon [supra]; Sharpless v. Mayor [supra]; Whiting v. Fond du Lac [supra]. In all these cases, however, the decision has turned upon the question whether the taxation by which this aid was afforded to the building of railroads was for a public purpose. Those who came to the conclusion that it was, held the laws for that purpose valid. Those who could not reach that conclusion held them void. In all the controversy this has been the turning point of the judgments of the courts. And it is safe to say that no court has held debts created in aid of railroad companies, by counties or towns, valid on any other ground than that the purpose for which the taxes were levied was a public use, a purpose or object which it was the right and the duty of state governments to assist by money raised from the people by taxation. The argument in opposition to this power has been, that railroads built by corporations organized mainly for purposes of gain-the roads which they built being under their control, and not that of the State-were private and not public roads, and the tax assessed on the people went to swell the profits of individuals and not to the good of the State, or the benefit of the public, except in a remote and collateral way. On the other hand, it was said that roads, canals, bridges, navigable streams and all other highways had in all times been matter of public concern. That such channels of travel and of the carrying business had always been established, improved, regulated by the State, and that the railroad had not lost this character because constructed by individual enterprise, aggregated into a corporation. We are not prepared to say that the latter view of it is not the true one, especially as there are other characteristics of a public nature conferred on these corporations, such as the power to obtain right of way, their subjection to the laws which govern common carriers, and the like, which seem to justify the proposition. Of the disastrous consequences which have followed its recognition by the courts and which were predicted when it was first established there can be no doubt. We have referred to this history of the contest over aid to railroads by taxation, to show that the strongest advocates for the validity of these laws never placed it on the ground of the unlimited power in the State Legislature to tax the people, but conceded that where the purpose for which the tax was to be issued could no longer be justly claimed to have this public character, but was purely in aid of private or personal objects, the law authorizing it was beyond the legislative power, and was an unauthorized invasion of private right. Olcott v. Supervisors, 16 Wall., 689 [83 U. S., XXI., 386]; People v. Salem, 20 Mich., 452; Jenkins v. Andover, 103 Mass., 94; Dill. Mun. Cor., sec. 587; 2 Redf. R. R., 398, rule 2. lawfully used and the extent of its exercise is To lay, with one hand, the power of the government on the property of the citizen, and with the other to bestow it upon favored individuals to aid private enterprises and build up private fortunes, is none the less a robbery because it is done under the forms of law and is called taxation. This is not legislation. It is a decree under legislative forms. 66 It must be conceded that there are such rights in every free government beyond the control of the State. A government which recognized no such rights, which held the lives, the liberty and the property of its citizens subject at all times to the absolute disposition and unlimited con- Nor is it taxation. "A tax," says Webster's trol of even the most democratic depository of Dictionary," is a rate or sum of money assessed power, is after all but a despotism. It is true on the person or property of a citizen by govit is a despotism of the many, of the majority, ernment for the use of the nation or State." if you choose to call it so, but it is none the less Taxes are burdens or charges imposed by the a despotism. It may well be doubted if a man Legislature upon persons or property to raise is to hold all that he is accustomed to call his money for public purposes." Cooley, Const. own, all in which he has placed his happiness, Lim., 479. and the security of which is essential to that happiness, under the unlimited dominion of others, whether it is not wiser that this power should be exercised by one man than by many. The theory of our governments, state and national, is opposed to the deposit of unlimited power anywhere. The executive, the legislative and the judicial branches of these governments are all of limited and defined powers. There are limitations on such power which grow out of the essential nature of all free governments. Implied reservations of individual rights, without which the social compact could not exist, and which are respected by all governments entitled to the name. No court, for instance, would hesitate to declare void a statute which enacted that A and B who were husband and wife to each other should be so no longer, but that A should thereafter be the husband of C, and B the wife of D. Or which should enact that the homestead now owned by A should no longer be his, but should henceforth be the property of B. Whiting v. Fond du Lac, 25 Wis., 188; Cooley, Const. Lim., 129, 175, 487; Dill. Mun. Cor., sec. 587. Of all the powers conferred upon government that of taxation is most liable to abuse. Given a purpose or object for which taxation may be Coulter, J., in Northern Liberties v. St. John's Church, 13 Pa. St., 104, says, very forcibly, "I think the common mind has everywhere taken in the understanding that taxes are a public imposition, levied by authority of the government for the purpose of carrying on the government in all its machinery and operations-that they are imposed for a public purpose.' See, also, Pray v. Northern Liberties, 31 Pa. St., 69; Matter of Mayor of N. Y., 11 Johns., 77; Camden v. Allen, 2 Dutch., 398; Sharpless v. Mayor, supra; Hanson v. Vernon, 27 Ia., 47; Whiting v. Fond du Lac [supra]. We have established, we think, beyond cavil, that there can be no lawful tax which is not laid for a public purpose. It may not be easy to draw the line in all cases so as to decide what is a public purpose in this sense and what is not. It is undoubtedly the duty of the Legislature which imposes or authorizes municipalities to impose a tax, to see that it is not to be used for purposes of private interest instead of a public use, and the courts can only be justified in interposing when a violation of this principle is clear and the reason for interference cogent. And in deciding whether, in the given case, the object for which the taxes are assessed falls up The same court had previously decided, in the case of Jenkins v. Anderson, 103 Mass., 94, that a statute authorizing the town authorities to aid by taxation a school established by the will of a citizen, and governed by trustees selected by the will, was void because the school was not under the control of the town officers, and was not, therefore, a public purpose for which taxes could be levied on the inhabitants. on the one side or the other of this line, they | nished a copy of the opinion, though it is not must be governed mainly by the course and yet reported in the regular series of that court. usage of the government, the objects for which [111 Mass., 454.] The American Law Review taxes have been customarily and by long course for July, 1873, says that the question was elaboof legislation levied, what objects or purposes rately and ably argued. The court, in an able have been considered necessary to the support and exhaustive opinion, decided that the law and for the proper use of the government, wheth- was unconstitutional, as giving a right to tax for er State or municipal. Whatever lawfully per- other than a public purpose. tains to this and is sanctioned by time and the acquiescence of the people may well be held to belong to the public use, and proper for the maintenance of good government, though this may not be the only criterion of rightful taxation. But in the case before us, in which the towns are authorized to contribute aid by way of taxation to any class of manufacturers, there is no difficulty in holding that this is not such a public purpose as we have been considering. If it The same principle precisely was decided by be said that a benefit results to the local public the State Court of Wisconsin in the case of of a town by establishing manufactures, the Curtis v. Whipple, 24 Wis., 350. In that case same may be said of any other business or pur- a special statute which authorized the town to suit which employs capital or labor. The mer- aid the Jefferson Liberal Institute was declared chant, the mechanic, the inn-keeper, the banker, void because, though a school of learning, it the builder, the steamboat owner are equally was a private enterprise not under the control promoters of the public good, and equally de- of the town authorities. In the subsequent case serving the the aid of the citizens by forced con- of Whiting v. Fond du Lac, already cited, the tributions. No line can be drawn in favor of principle is fully considered and re-affirmed. the manufacturer which would not open the These cases are clearly in point, and they ascoffers of the public treasury to the importuni-sert a principle which meets our cordial apties of two thirds of the business men of the city or town. A reference to one or two cases adjudicated by courts of the highest character will be sufficient, if any authority were needed, to sustain us in this proposition. In the case of Allen v. Inhab. of Jay, 60 Me., 124, the town-meeting had voted to loan their credit to the amount of $10,000, to Hutchins & Lane, if they would invest $12,000 in a steam saw mill, grist-mill and box-factory machinery, to be built in that town by them. There was a provision to secure the town by mortgage on the mill, and the selectmen were authorized to issue town bonds for the amount of the aid so voted. Ten of the taxable inhabitants of the town filed a bill to enjoin the selectmen from issuing the bonds. The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, in an able opinion by Chief Justice Appleton, held that this was not a public purpose, and that the town could levy no taxes on the inhabitants in aid of the enterprise, and could, therefore, issue no bonds, though a special Act of the Legislature had ratified the vote of the town, and they granted the injunction as prayed for. Shortly after the disastrous fire in Boston, in 1872, which laid an important part of that City in ashes, the Governor of the State convened the legislative body of Massachusetts, called the General Court, for the express purpose of affording some relief to the City and its people from the sufferings consequent on this great calamity. A statute was passed, among others, which authorized the City to issue its bonds to an amount not exceeding $20,000,000, which bonds were to be loaned, under proper guards for securing the City from loss, to the owners of the ground whose buildings had been destroyed by fire, to aid them in rebuilding. proval. We do not attach any importance to the fact that the town authorities paid one installment of interest on these bonds. Such a payment works no estoppel. If the Legislature was without power to authorize the issue of these bonds, and its statute attempting to confer such authority is void, the mere payment of interest, which was equally unauthorized, cannot create of itself a power to levy taxes, resting on no other foundation than the fact that they have once been illegally levied for that purpose. The Act of March 2, 1872, concerning internal improvements, can give no assistance to these bonds. If we could hold that the corporation for manufacturing wrought iron bridges was within the meaning of the statute, which seems very difficult to do, it would still be liable to the objection that money raised to assist the company was not for a public purpose, as we have already demonstrated. The judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed. Mr. Justice Clifford, dissenting: Unable to concur either in the opinions or judgments in this case, I will proceed to state, in very brief terms, the reasons which compel me to withhold my concurrence. Corporations of a municipal character are created by the Legislature, and the Legislature, as the trustee or guardian of the public interest, has the exclusive and unrestrained control over such a franchise, and may enlarge, diminish, alter, change or abolish the same at pleasure. Where the grantees of a franchise, as well as the grantors, are public bodies, and the franchise is created solely for municipal objects, the grant is at all times within the control of the Legislature and, consequently, the charter is subject to amendment or repeal at the will of the granting power. In the case of Lowell v. Boston, in the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, the validity of this Act was considered. We have been fur-v. Hartford v. Bridge Co., 10 How., 534; Bissell |