670]; Darlington v. Mayor, 31 N. Y., 187; Granby v. Thurston, 23 Conn., 416; 2 Kent, Com., 12th ed., 275.

Errors of indiscretion which the Legislature may commit in the exercise of the power it possesses cannot be corrected by the courts, for the reason that the courts cannot adjudge an Act of the Legislature void unless it is in violation of the Federal or State Constitution.

Benson v. Mayor, 24 Barb., 248; Clarke v. Rochester, 24 Barb., 446; Bk. v. Rome, 18 N. Y., 38.

State Constitutions may undoubtedly restrict the power of the Legislature to pass laws, and it is plain that any law passed in violation of such a prohibition is void, but the better opinion is, that where the Constitution of the State contains no prohibition upon the subject, express or implied, neither the State nor Federal Courts can declare a statute of the State void as unwise, unjust or inexpedient, nor for any other cause, unless it be repugnant to the Federal Constitution. Except where the Constitution has imposed limits upon the legislative power, the rule of law appears to be, that the power of legislation must be considered as practically absolute, whether the law operates according to natural justice or not in any particular case, for the reason that courts are not the guardians of the rights of the people of the State, save where those rights are secured by some constitutional provision which comes within judicial cognizance; or, in the language of Marshall, Ch. J., "The interest, wisdom and justice of the representative body furnish the only security in a large class of cases not regulated by any constitutional provision."

Bk. v. Billings, 4 Pet., 563; Cooley, Const. Lim. (2d ed.), 168; Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall., 398. Courts cannot nullify an Act of the State Legislature on the vague ground that they think it opposed to a general latent spirit supposed to pervade or underlie the Constitution, where neither the terms nor the implications of the instrument disclose any such restriction.

Walker v. Cincinnati, 21 Ohio St., 41. Such a power is denied to the courts, because to concede it would be to make the courts sovereign over both the Constitution and the people, and convert the government into a judicial des potism.

Golden v. Prince, 3 Wash. (C. C.), 313. Subject to the Federal Constitution, the Leg islature of the State possesses the whole legislative power of the people, except so far as the

power is limited by the State Constitution.

Bk. v. Brown, 26 N. Y., 467; People v. Draper, 15 N. Y., 532.

Our own decisions are to the same effect, as appears by one of very recent date, in which the court say that "The legislative power of a State extends to everything within the sphere of such power, except as it is restricted by the Federal Constitution or that of the State."

Pine Grove v. Talcott [ante, 227]. Apply those principles to the cases before the court, and it follows, as it seems to me, that the judgment in each case should be reversed for the following reasons: (1) Because the demurrer to the declaration in each case should have been overruled. (2) Because the bonds to which the coupons sued on were attached were issued in pursuance of the express authority of the Legis

lature vesting that power in the Corporation defendants. (3) Because the Constitution of the State does not in any manner prohibit the passage of such a law as that under which the bonds were issued. (4) Because it is not competent for a Federal Court to adjudge a state statute void which does not conflict in any respect with the Constitution of the United States or that of the State whose Legislature enacted the statute.

Unwise laws and such as are highly inexpedient and unjust are frequently passed by legislative bodies, but there is no power vested in a circuit court, nor in this court, to determine that any law passed by a State Legislature is void, if it is not repugnant to their own Constitution nor the Constitution of the United States. Vague apprehensions seem to be entertained that unless such a power is claimed and exercised, inequitable consequences may result from unnecessary taxation; but, in my judgment, there is much more to be dreaded from judicial decisions which may have the effect to sanction the fraudulent repudiation of honest debts, than from any statutes passed by the State to enable municipal corporations to meet and discharge their just pecuniary obligations.

Cited-92 U. S., 448; 93 U. S., 457; 94 U. S., 314; 96 U.S., 105; 98 U. S., 394; 99 U. S., 598: 103 U. S., 589; 104 U. S., 81; 105 U. S., 379, 736; 110 U. S., 536; 5 Dill., 195, 198, 255; 2 Wood, 233; 2 Flipp., 500; 13 Blatchf., 142; 51 Cal., 272; 21 Kan., 560: 23 Kan., 752; 67 Ala., 591; 42 Am. Rep., 120, 122; 14 Kan., 420: 19 Am. Rep., 100; 14 W. Va., 422; 35 Am. Rep., 762, 764.

THE COMMERCIAL NATIONAL BANK OF CLEVELAND, OHIO, Piff. in Err.,

v.

IOLA CITY, KANSAS.

Municipal bonds issued to aid a private enterprise, void.

1. Bonds of a city, issued to a private corporation to aid in constructing and operating a foundry and machine shops, are void, although their issue is ratified by a subsequent Act of the State Legisla

ture.

2. Citizens' Bank v. Topeka, ante, 455, followed. [No. 741.] Submitted Dec. 9, 1874. Decided Feb. 1, 1875.

IN ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United

States for the District of Kansas. The case is sufficiently stated by the court. Mr. Alfred Ennis, for plaintiff in error. Mr. A. L. Williams, for defendant in error:

These bonds were issued to a bridge factory, a private and not a public end. The taxing power cannot be exercised in behalf of a bridge factory.

Curtis v. Whipple, 24 Wis., 350; People v. Salem, 20 Mich., 452; Jenkins v. Andover, 103 Mass., 94; Tyson v. School Directors, 51 Pa., 9; Thompson v. Pittston, 59 Me., 545.

Mr. Justice Miller delivered the opinion of the court:

The only difference between this case and that of The Citizens' Bank v. Topeka [ante, 455], just

decided, is that the bonds were issued before the general Act of February 29, 1872, there being at that time no statute of Kansas which professed to authorize the proceeding.

But after the vote in favor of issuing the bonds, an Act of the Legislature ratified the vote and authorized the city officers to deliver the bonds and to levy the taxes necessary to pay 464

their principal and interest. They were issued to a private corporation, to aid in constructing and operating foundry and machine shops.

This is all that is necessary to be said, and it shows that the case comes within the principles of the one just decided, and that the judgment of the Circuit Court, holding the bonds void, must be affirmed. 87 U.S.