The New Brig, Gilp.. 536; The Hull of a New | tion depends not upon where the contract was Ship, Davies, 199; The Richard Busteed, Sprague, made, but upon its subject-matter. 441. The maritime law, as laid down by all the great civilians and jurists, embraced contracts for building, repairing, supplying and navigat ing ships. The Digest, Lib. 42. tit. 6, arts. 26-34; The Consulat de la Mer, ch. 32; Cleirac Jur de la Marine, 351, art. 6; Marine Ordinance of 1691, 1 Valin, 113; Emerig. Tr. Mar. Loans, ch. 12, secs. 3-5, p. 566, quarto ed., Boulay-Paty, secs. 1, 2, English Judges with the King and Counsel on the Resolutions of 1632, Resolution 3: Pardessus, 6th vol., quarto collection de Loix Maritimes. See, also, in the case of The Richard Busteed. 1 Sprague, Dec., 444, reviewing the case of The People's Ferry Co. v. Beers, 20 How., 393 (61 U. S., XV., 961), and, also, reviewing the two cases of Clinton v. The Hannah, Bee, 419, and of The Turnbull v. The Enterprise, Bee, 345, quoted in the opinion of The People's Ferry Co. v. Beers (supra). Mr. A. Q. Keasbey, for defendants in er ror: The question of the constitutionality of the Act was not before the court and was not decided. It is not sufficient that it might have arisen or been applicable to the case, unless it is further shown by the record that it did arise, and was applied by the court to the case. The Victory, 6 Wall., 382 (73 U. S., XVIII. 848); Hamilton Co. v. Mass., 6 Wall., 632 (73 U. S., XVIII.,904); Steines v. Franklin Co., 14 Wall., 15 (81 U. S., XX., 846). The judgment of the Supreme Court states clearly the ground of the decision, that the claims were subsisting liens under the laws of New Jersey. And the record of the Court of Errors as amended shows that the question, whether the builders were owners at the time the claims were liens, was the sole question before the court. If the court had decided the Act valid on the ground that a contract for building a vessel was not a maritime contract, such decision would have been in conformity with the uniform decisions of this court, and would have been correct. People's Ferry Co. v. Beers, 20 How., 393 (61 U. S., XV., 961); Roach v. Chapman, 22 How., 129 (63 U. S., XVI., 294); Morewood v. Enequist, 23 How., 494 (64 U. S., XVI., 517); The Belfast, 7 Wall., 624 (74 U. S.. XIX.,266); Cunningham v. Hall, 1 Cliff., 43; Young v. The Orpheus, 2 Cliff., 29; The Norway, 3 Ben., 163; The Revenue-Cutter, 21 Law Rep., 24. It is true that there has been a constant tendency to throw off the fetters imposed upon the admiralty courts by English tradition, and that, by a series of decisions, culminating in the case of The Ins. Co. v. Dunham (supra), and Wilson v. Bell (The Lottawanna), Oct. Term, 1873 (ante, 259), it is now settled that, as to locality, the admiralty jurisdiction extends not only to the main sea, but to all the navigable waters of the United States, whether land-locked or open, salt or fresh, tide or no tide; and that as to con tracts, the fundamental inquiry is, whether it is or is not a maritime contract; and that that ques It is enough to say that during all the changes of opinion manifested by the court, the positions then taken upon this particular point have never been impugned or modified. If every contract relating to the building of a ship, steamboat, ferry-boat or canal-boat or other structure intended to float upon the water, is a maritime contract, then the jurisdiction of the admiralty courts will indeed be widely extended. If a man built two engines just alike, and sold one to turn the wheels of a boat, and the other to turn the wheels of a mill, one would be a maritime contract, and the other not. The state law gave a lien for materials so furnished, as it does for materials for a house or dock. The contract for furnishing materials to be used in building a ship, for which that law gave a lien, was not a maritime contract; and, therefore, the law, giving the lien and prescribing the remedy, is not invalid, and the judgment of the Court of Errors ought to be affirmed. Mr. Justice Clifford delivered the opinion of the court: Judicial power, as vested in the Federal Courts was created by the Constitution; and the Consti. tution provides, among other things, that the judicial power shall extend to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, and the District Courts, as provided by the 9th section of the Judiciary Act, have exclusive original cognizance, except where the common law is competent to give to suitors a remedy of all civil cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, including all seizures under laws of imposts, navigation or trade, where the seizure is made on waters which are navigable from the sea by vessels of ten or more tons burden, within their respective districts as well as upon the high seas. Certain persons named in the record contracted with a firm composed of two ship-builders to build for them a center board schooner, of the dimensions and for the price specified in the written agreement referred to in the declaration. By the terms of the agreement, payments were to be made by installments as follows: $2,500 were to be paid when the keel was laid; $3,000 when the frame was up; $3,500 when the vessel was sealed, deck beams in, and she was kneed off; $3,500, when her poop-deck was completed; $2,000 when she was ready to be launched, and the balance when she should be delivered. Individual owners were to pay for the respective installments in proportion to the interest they respectively represented, the contract price for the vessel when completed being about $21,000. Large advances, it seems, were made to the first named contractor, even greater than the contract price, whether before or after the work was commenced does not appear; but it does appear that he subsequently assigned the original contract to the first named defendant, together with all his right, interest and claim unto the same. authorizing and empowering the assignee to take possession of the schooner and to complete the building of the vessel. Work done or materials or articles furnished in that State for or towards the building.repair- | the discharge of the schooner from the seizure ing, fitting, furnishing or equipping ships or under those proceedings. vessels, constitute a lien upon such ship or ves sel, her tackle, apparel and furniture, and the provision is that they shall continue to be a lien on the same for nine months after the debt is contracted, and that such lien shall be preferred to all other liens except mariner's wages. Sess. Acts, 1857, sec. 382. Means are also provided to enforce such liens if the debt amounts to the sum of $20. Such a creditor for such a debt may make applica tion to one of the magistrates therein named for a warrant to enforce the lien of such debts and to collect the amount. Applications of the kind must be in writing, but if drawn in due form, the officer or magistrate to whom the same is addressed is required to issue his warrant to the sheriff or other proper officer, commanding him to attach, seize and safely keep the ship or vessel, to be disposed of as directed in the same legislative Act. He must also make return within ten days to the officer who issued the warrant, of his doings in the premises, and make out, subscribe and annex thereto a just and true inventory of all the property so seized and to be signed by him and annexed to his return. Thereupon it is made the duty of the officer issuing the warrant, to direct that a notice containing certain prescribed requisites shall be published in one or more of the newspapers printed in the county, in order that any other person, having such lien upon the ship or vessel, may deliver to the said officer an account in writing of their demands, accompanied by the prescribed affidavits and proofs; and the Act provides that every such person shall be deemed an attaching creditor, and shall be entitled to the same benefit and advantage, and be sub ject to the same responsibilities and obligation as the creditor who made the first obligation; and the provision is that liens not so presented and verified shall be deemed inoperative and cease. Due application for such a warrant was made by the first named plaintiff, to enforce a subsisting lien upon the schooner for materials furnished in the State to the builders of the schooner, and it appears that he duly verified his demand, and that the requisite notice was published as required by law, and that the sheriff to whom the warrant was delivered duly attached and seized the vessel as commanded; that the other plaintiffs also presented their demands of like character to the officer who issued the warrant, and that the same were duly verified by affidavits and proofs, showing that the respective demands were subsisting liens upon the same vessel. Pursuant to the notice the first named defendant appeared and applied to the officer who is sued the warrant, for an order to discharge the schooner under the 11th section of the same Act and that the order was passed, he, the applicant, having tendered the required bond in double the amount of the debt so verified, executed by himself with two sufficient sureties. Bonds of the kind are required to be held for the common benefit of all such attaching creditors, and it is enacted that they may prosecute the same jointly or severally at their election. All joined in the suit in this case, which is an action of debt founded upon the bond given to procure See 21 WALL. U. S., Book 22. Process was served and the defendants ap peared and pleaded as follows: (1) Non est factum. (2) Nil debet. (3) That the respective demands were not subsisting liens when the appli cation was made for the warrant. (4) That the persons who contracted the debts were neither owners nor agents of the vessel. (5) That there was no such vessel in being at the time the warrant was issued. Issues were tendered by the plaintiffs and were joined by the defendants as to all the pleas. Subsequently the parties went to trial, and the jury returned a special verdict. Hearing was had upon the special verdict, and the court rendered judgment for the plaintiffs for the whole amount of the claims set up in the declaration. (2) Jurisdiction is vested in the Court of Errors and Appeals to re-examine such a judgment and to correct any errors apparent in the record. Errors were accordingly assigned by the defendant in the said Court of Errors as follows: (1) That the Supreme Court improperly held that the lien law was valid and constitutional. That the Supreme Court improperly decided that the builders of the vessel were the owners of the same and competent to charge the vessel with liens. (3) That the Supreme Court improperly ruled and determined that the respective claims of the plaintiffs were subsisting liens on the vessel at the time the same were exhibited to the magistrate or officer who issued the warrant. (4) That the Supreme Court erro neously rendered judgment for the plaintiff. Appearance was also entered in the Court of Errors by the original plaintiffs and they pleaded in nullo est erratum, and prayed the court to examine as well the record and proceedings as the matters assigned for error. Both parties were again heard, and the Court of Errors affirmed the judgment of the Supreme Court. Since that time the cause has been removed into this court for re-examination under the Acts of Congress providing for a writ of error to a State Court. Nothing appears in the record to warrant the conclusion that any question re-examinable here was presented in the court of original jurisdiction, whether the proposition is tested by the declaration, the pleas filed by the defendant, the special verdict, or by the judgment, as all alike tend to show that the questions presented, examined and decided were questions of local law. Every suggestion of that kind, therefore, may be dismissed without further remark, as they are utterly destitute of support. Opposed to that statement is the suggestion in argument, that the presiding justice overruled the demurrer to the declaration; but it is a sufficient answer to that suggestion to say that this court cannot go out of the record to reexamine any question under a writ of error to a State Court. Suppose that is so, still it is contended that the defect is supplied by what occurred in the Court of Errors and Appeals. Tested alone by the errors assigned in that court; it is quite clear that the jurisdiction of this court could not be sustained, as the errors assigned in that court do not show, with sufficient definiteness, that any question cognizable here under a writ of error to a State Court was presented to the State 31 489 Court of Errors for decision. Complaint, it is true, is made that the subordinate court improp erly decided that the lien law of the State is valid and constitutional, but it is not alleged that the law is repugnant to any particular provision of the Constitution of the United States, nor that the court of original jurisdiction rendered any decision upon that subject. Messenger v. Mason, 10 Wall., 509 [77 U. S., XIX., 10291: Bridge Proprs. v. Hoboken Co., 1 Wall., 116 [68 U. S., XVII., 571]; Furman v. Nichol, 8 Wall., 44 [75 U. S., XIX., 370]; Maxwell v. Newbold, 18 How., 516 [59 U. S., XV., 509]. Something more must be set forth in such a pleading, to raise a federal question, than the mere allegation that the law is invalid and unconstitutiona!, as such an assignment is satisfied if held to refer to the Constitution of the State, in which event the question raised is not one cognizable here under a writ of error to a State Court. Farney v. Toole, 1 Black, 351 [66 U. S., XVII., 217]; Hoyt v. Sheldon, 1 Black, 521 [66 U. S., XVII., 66]; R. R. Co. v. Rock, 4 Wall., 180 [71 U. S., XVIII., 382]. If the case stopped there it would be clear that the writ of error must be dismissed for the want of jurisdiction, but it does not stop there, as plainly appears by the judgment of affirm ance rendered in the Court of Errors, which shows that the State Court of last resort de termined, among other things, the following propositions: (1) That the lien law of the State is not in any respect repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, as contended by the original defendants. (2) That the contract for building the vessel in question is not a maritime contract, and that the remedy given by the lien law of the State does not conflict with the Constitution or laws of the United States. (3) That the said lien law does not violate the right of trial by jury nor conflict with the Constitution of the State. Due entry of the writ of error to the State Court was made here the 6th of December, 1872, and on the 1st of April, 1874, the Court of Errors decided that the judgment of affirmance, entered there in the case under date of the 20th of August, 1872, did not correctly express the judgment of the court; and after hearing argument the court ordered that it be wholly annulled, and that it be stricken from the minutes, and that the judgment exhibited in the supplemental record be entered nunc pro tunc in lieu thereof. Alterations of a very material character are made in the substituted judgment, as compared with the judgment originally entered, and which remained unchallenged at the time the writ of error was sued out and when the supersedeas bond was filed. Such alterations, it is insisted by the defendants, could not properly be made at that stage of the litigation, as the writ of error from this court to the Court of Errors brought up the judgment first mentioned as a part of the transcript annexed to the return made, to the writ of error, by the Court of Errors, to which it was addressed. Exceptions may arise to that proposition, as broadly stated, but it is not necessary in this case to examine the question in so general an aspect, as whatever may be the power of the Court of Errors to change or amend such a judgment for the purposes of any proceeding under it in the exercise of their own appellate functions, we are, nevertheless, of the opinion that the judgment brought here as part of the return to the writ of error from this court must, under the circumstances, remain as the judg ment which this court is called upon to re-examine and review. Generes v. Bonnemer, 7 Wall.. 564 [74 U. S., XIX., 227]; Avendano v. Gay, 8 Wall., 376 [75 U. S., XIX., 422]; Fianders v. Tweed, 9 Wall., 431 [76 U. S., XIX., 680]: Hozey v. Buchanan, 16 Pet., 215; Albers v. Whitney, 1 Story, 310; Brush v. Robbins, 3 McLean, 486; Medford v. Dorsey, 2 Wash. (C. C.), 433; Kanouse v. Martin, 15 How., 210; Cheang-Kee v. U. S., 3 Wall., 326 [70 U. S., XVII., 74]; Noonan v. Bradley, 12 Wall., 129 [79 U. S.. XX., 281]. Like every other pleading, an assignment of error is subject to a reasonable construction. Reasonably constructed it cannot be held that the first proposition of the judgment of affirmance involves a comparison of the state lien law with every separate provision of the Federal Constitution, and if not with every one, it is Enough has already been remarked to show impossible to determine with which one, as that the judgment of affirmance, first rendered, there is nothing in the judgment or any other raises the question whether the contract under part of the record pointing to any particular which the vessel was built is a maritime conpart of the Constitution, except what is contract, and whether the law of the State which tained in the second proposition of the judg. ment, which, in view of the whole record, must be regarded as a more complete specification of what is meant by the first proposition. Viewed in the light of these suggestions, it must be understood from the two propositions that the State Court of Errors decided that the contract in this case for the building of the schooner was not a maritime contract, and that the law of the State giving the remedy which was pursued by the plaintiffs does not conflict with the Federal Constitution or with Federal laws. Such an allegation in the judgment of the State Court is sufficient to give this court jurisdiction under the writ of error to re-examine that question. Well founded doubt upon that question cannot be entertained, unless it be assumed, as contended by the plaintiffs, that the copy of the judgment embodied in the transcript is not correct. gives the remedy pursued by the plaintiffs is in conflict with the Federal Constitution. Beyond all doubt that question was presented to the State Court of Errors, and was decided by that court adversely to the defense set up by the defendants in the court of appellate jurisdiction. Elliott v. Edwards, 33 N. J. Law, 266; Edwards v. Elliott, 34 N. J. Law, 96. Materials were furnished by the plaintiffs to the persons who contracted to build the schooner, during the progress of the work. Payment for the materials being refused, they instituted the described proceedings to enforce the lien given them by the state law, in such a case, against the vessel for which the materials had been contracted. When the proceedings were commenced, the schooner was only partially constructed and was resting on her original stocks, having never been launched into the water. She was with out a name and had never been registered or enrolled, nor had she ever been licensed or sur veyed, and she was without a master or crew, and the record shows she had never had a commander. Concede all that, and still the defendants contend that the plaintiffs, as the furnishers of the materials, had a maritime lien for their respect ive claims which may be enforced in the admiralty, and that the state law giving the rem edy which the plaintiffs pursued is in conflict with that clause of the Federal Constitution which provides that the judicial power of the United States shall extend to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. They admit, in effect, that to maintain that proposition it is necessary to show that a contract to furnish materials for the construction of a ship is a maritime contract, and they accordingly submit the affirmative of that proposition and insist that all such contracts are maritime, if it appears that the vessel to be constructed is designed for use upon navigable waters. Maritime contracts are such as relate to commerce and navigation, and unless a contract to build a ship is to be regarded as a maritime contract, it will hardly be contended that a contract to furnish the materials to be used in accomplishing that object can fall within that category, as the latter is more strictly a contract made on land, and to be performed on land, than the former, and is certainly one stage further removed from any immediate and direct relation to commerce and navigation. Building materials for such a purpose come very largely from the forest and mines, but if it be admitted that a contract to build a ship is a maritime contract, it is difficult to affirm that a contract to furnish the materials for the same is not of the same character, although its breach and even its performance may involve judicial inquiries into the business transactions of men, as well in the forests and mines as in the manufactories and workshops of the whole civilized world. Wherever the question, therefore, involved in the present assignment of error, has been considered, the decision has uniformly turned upon the solution of the inquiry whether a contract for building a ship is or is not a maritime contract. Unless the contract to build a ship is a maritime contract, no one, it is presumed, would contend that the furnishers of the materials for such a purpose can successfully support such a claim; and if it be admitted that the builders of a ship may enforce the payment of the contract price in the admiralty, it would be difficult to maintain that the furnishers of the materials for the purpose are not entitled to pursue their remedy to enforce payment in the same jurisdiction. sold, even before they are fully constructed and before they are equipped for navigation, and no reason is perceived why a contract to build a ship, any more than a contract for the materials of which a ship is composed, or for the instruments or appurtenances to manage or propel the ship, should be regarded as maritime. Attempt is made in vain to point out any distinction in principle between a contract to build a ship and a contract for the materials, as the latter are included in the former, and both fall within the same category under the rules of the civil law. Everyone who had built, repaired or fitted out a ship, whether at home or abroad, or lent money to be employed in those services, had by the civil law a privilege or right of payment, in preference to other creditors, upon the ship itself, without any instrument of hypothecation, or any express contract or agreement subjecting the ship to any such claim, and that privilege still exists in all those countries which have adopted the civil law as the basis of their jurisprudence. Authorities to support that proposition are unnecessary, as the proposition is conceded by both parties in this controversy, but that rule was never adopted in England, and the reverse of it is the settled rule in our jurisprudence in respect to the question under consideration. Conclusive support to that proposition is found in the case of The Jefferson, 20 How., 393 [Ferry Co. v. Beers, 61 U. S., XV., 961], in which the opinion of the court is given by Mr. Justice Catron. By the statement of the case it appears that it was a libel filed by the assignees of the builders against a new steam ferry boat for a balance due to the builders on account of work done and materials used in constructing the hull of the ferry-boat. They claimed a lien for the unpaid balance of the price, and the decree was in their favor in the circuit court, but the claimants appealed to this court. When the cause came up for argument the first point made for the claimants was that a contract to build a ship is not one within the jurisdiction of the admiralty courts, even though it be intended to employ the vessel in ocean navigation. Sufficient appears in the report of the case to show that the libelants took direct issue upon that proposition, and the court say, in disposing of it, that the only matter in controversy is, whether the district courts have jurisdiction in admiralty to enforce liens for labor and materials furnished in constructing vessels to be employed in the navigation of waters to which the admiralty jurisdiction extends. Neither ship builders nor furnishers of materials for ship-building had any lien at that date under the state law, but the court unanimously decided that the admiralty jurisdiction was limex-ited to contracts, claims and services which were purely maritime, and to such as had respect to rights and duties appertaining to commerce and navigation. Applying that rule to the case then under consideration, the court say: "So far from the contract being purely maritime and touching rights and duties appertaining to navigation, it is a contract made on land to be performed on land." Ship-building is an occupation requiring perience and skill and, as ordinarily conducted, is an employment on land, as much as any other mechanical employment, and men engage in the business for a livelihood just as they do in other mechanical pursuits and for the same purpose. Shipwrights, unlike the seamen, have their homes on the land, and not on the seas. and they are seldom ship-owners, and not more frequently interested in commerce and navigation than other mechanics. Ships are bought and sold in the market just as ship timber, engines, anchors or chronometers are bought and Convinced or not, every candid inquirer must admit that this court did decide in that case that neither a contract to build a ship nor to furnish materials for the purpose is a maritime contract. Nor does that decision stand alone, as the same question since that time has more than once come before the court and been decided in the same way. Such was the view of the court in the case of Roach v. Chapman, 22 How., 129 [63 U. S., XVI., 294], in which the opinion of the court was given by Mr. Justice Grier. United States, if he can make proper parties to give that court jurisdiction of the case. But a maritime lien does not arise in a contract to build a ship or in a contract to furnish materials for that purpose; and in respect to such contracts, it is competent for the States, under the decisions of this court, to create such liens Proceedings in that case had been instituted as their Legislatures may deem just and expein the District Court against a steamer to endient, not amounting to a regulation of comforce a lien for a part of the price of the engine merce, and to enact reasonable rules and reguand boiler, which had been furnished to the lations prescribing the mode of their enforcebuilders in another State, where the steamer was ment, if not inconsistent with the exclusive jubuilt. Process was served and the claimants ap risdiction of the admiralty courts. peared and filed a plea to the jurisdiction of the court, which was sustained by the Circuit Court, and the libelants appealed to this court. Able counsel appeared for appellants, but this court decided that a contract for building a ship or for supplying engines, timber or other materials for her construction is clearly not a maritime contract, and the court remarked that any former dicta or decisions which seem to favor a contrary doctrine were overruled. The Jefferson [Ferry Co. v. Beers], 20 How., 400 [61 U. S., XV., 964]. During the same session of the court, the same question was again presented, and was again decided in the same way. Morewood v. Enequist, 23 How., 494 [64 U. S., XVI., 517]. Express reference is there made to the case of The Jefferson [Ferry Co. v. Beers], and the remark of the court is, that the court there decided that a contract to build a ship is not a maritime contract; that in this country such contracts are purely local and are governed by state laws, and should be enforced by the state tribunals. Decisions to the same effect have been made in the Circuit Courts, of which the following are examples: Cunningham v. Hall, 1 Cliff., 45; The Orpheus, 2 Cliff., 35. State Legislatures have no authority to create a maritime lien, nor can they confer any juris diction upon a State Court to enforce such a lien by a suit or proceeding in rem, as practiced in the admiralty courts. The Belfast [supra]; Sheppard v. Steele, 43 N. Y., 55; Ferran v. Hoxford, 54 Barb., 208. Objection is also taken to the validity of the state law, upon the ground that it is in conflict with the provision of the Federal Constitution which secures to every party, where the value in controversy exceeds $20, the right of trial by jury. Two answers may be made to that objection, either of which is decisive: (1) That it does not apply to trials in the State Courts. Barron v. Baltimore. 7 Pet.. 247; Twitchell v. Com, 7 Wall., 326 [74 U. S., XIX., 224]; Livingston v. Moore, 7 Pet., 551; Fox v. Ohio, 5 How., 434; Smith v. Maryland, 18 How., 76 [59 U. S., XV., 271]; Cooley, Const. Lim., 2d ed., 19. (2) That no such error was assigned in the Court of Errors, and that the question was not presented to, nor was it decided by, the Court of Errors. Jurisdiction is not shown unless it appears that some one of the specified questions did arise in the State Court and that the question was decided adversely to the party assigning error in this court. Crowell v. Randell, 10 Pet., 392; Suydam v. Williamson, 20 How., 440 [61 U. S., XV., 933]. Judgment affirmed, with costs. Cited 21 Wall., 592; 92 U. S., 92, 552: 95 U. S., 296; HENRY R. JACKSON, MOSES D. WAD- v The Belfast, 7 Wall., 644 [74 U. S., XIX., 272]; The Moses Taylor, 4 Wall., 411 [71 U. S., XVIII., 397]; Hine v. Trevor, 4 Wall., 555 [71 JOHN T. LUDELING, THE VICKSBURG, U. S., XVIII., 851]. Other support to that proposition than the Act of Congress is not needed, as the provision is to the effect that the District Courts shall have exclusive original cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, except where the common law is competent to give to suitors a common law remedy. Common law remedies are not applicable to enforce a maritime lien by a proceeding in rem and, consequently, the original jurisdiction to enforce such a lien by that mode of proceeding is exclusive in the District Courts. Brookman v. Hamill, 43 N. Y., 554; The Jo sephine, 39 N. Y., 19. Taken together and properly construed, those provisions warrant the conclusion that such a party wishing to enforce such a lien may pro ceed in rem in the admiralty, or he may bring a suit in personam in the same jurisdiction, or he may elect not to go into admiralty at all, and may resort to his common law remedy in the State Courts, or in the Circuit Court of the SHREVEPORT AND TEXAS RAIL- (See S. C., 21 Wall., 616-635.) 1. When two or more persons have a common interest in a security, equity will not allow one to appropriate it exclusively to himself, nor to impair its worth to the others. 2. A person owning part of bonds of a railroad company secured by a mortgage, has no right so to use that fact as to obtain an advantage for himself over the other bond holders, nor to employ it as an instrument by which to become the owner of the property mortgaged at the lowest possible price, leaving the bonds held by his associate holders un paid. 3. He has no right to enter into an agreement which had for its object the purchase of the railroad and mortgaged property at the lowest possithe agreement, with no reference to the other bond ble price, for the exclusive benefit of the parties to holders. |