levy an execution, the plaintiff is confined to a ling $50,000 of new bonds, to extinguish its enremedy at law by mandamus or otherwise, to tire indebtedness. enforce the payment of his judgment recovered in this court. Second. Whether it was competent for the court, as a court of equity, on the failure of the officers of the City of Watertown to levy the tax as required by law, referred to in the bill of complaint, through their neglect, refusal, ab sence, or resignation, to appoint the Marshal of the court to levy and collect the tax to pay the judgment. Third. Whether it was competent for the court, as a court of equity, to subject the taxable property situate within the corporate limits of the City of Watertown, in any way to an assessment, in order to pay the judgment of this court referred to in the bill of complaint. The allegations of the bill on this subject were as follows: Your orator further states that, for the pur pose of preventing the payment of said indebtedness, and thwarting all the efforts of their creditors to collect the same, the said City and its citizens have, from time to time, procured from the Legislature of the State of Wisconsin, divers amendments of their charter, and other acts craftily devised for the purpose of hindering, delaying and defrauding their creditors, making the collection of such taxes difficult or impossible and thwarting whatever process might be issued by courts to compel the payment of such indebtedness; and among others they have procured the passage of the following described Acts and provisions, to wit: Chapter 124 of the General Laws of 1861An Act to Enable Said City to Compromise with its Creditors. This Act provides, among other things, that new bonds not exceeding $80,000 in all, may be issued to take up the old ones, which were then more than four times that amount, but they were only to be issued upon such a compromise that the $80,000 new bonds would take up all the old ones, and the penalty of fine and imprisonment was imposed for delivering them on any other terms. Chapter 233 of the General Laws of 1865amended and consolidated charter. Section 2 of chapter 5 provides that the tax annually levied for general city purposes and to defray the expenses of the city general fund shall not exceed one fourth of one per cent. per annum. This sum was barely sufficient to pay the current expenses of the City. Section 12, chapter 9, of the same Act repeals section 9 of chapter 127 of the private and local laws of 1856, being that by which the faith of the City was irrevocably pledged for the payment of this indebtedness, and by which it was made the duty of the Mayor and Council to levy and collect taxes for the payment of it. Chapter 163 of the private and local laws of 1866. This provides that no execution shall issue against said City until ninety days after judgment, and then only on special application to the court. It also again repeals said section 9 of chapter 123 of the Laws of 1853. Chapter 449 of the private and local laws of 1866, to enable the City to compromise its debts. This Act provides for the issue of not exceed Chapter 61 of the private and local laws of 1867. This provides that any officer may resign by a writing addressed to the Mayor, and that such resignation "shall take effect from the time of filing the same." It also provides that the annual tax shall not exceed one fourth of one per cent., and that, on the application of any taxpayer, injunctions may issue to restrain the levy or collection of any tax when the proceedings are not in pursuance of law. Chapter 236 of the private and local laws of 1868. This provides that "all laws, resolutions, etc., assessing a tax, etc., shall be passed by an affirmative vote of a majority of all the members composing the Common Council," and by ayes and noes; provided that in all other matters, an affirmative vote of a majority of a quorum shall be sufficient. Chapter 227 of the private and local laws of 1867 makes further provision of the same kind, and provides for injunctions upon tax proceedings. Chapter 453 of the private and local laws of 1869 provides for a compromise of the city debt, but restricts the amount to be paid to fifty per cent. of the principal. Chapter 72 of the private and local laws of 1870, to enable the City to compromise its debts. This Act provides for the issue of new bonds "to the amount in all of fifty per cent. of the principal of all bonds outstanding,” and provides that in no case shall more than fifty per cent. of the principal be paid," exclusive of all unpaid interest coupons or judgments." Chapter 163 of the private and local laws of 1870. This provides that when any taxes are levied to pay anything on city bonds, coupons or judg ments, such a tax shall be put in a separate list. and all proceedings thereupon shall be carried on separately and in a different way from those in regard to other taxes. It provides that if no bid shall be made for any lot offered for sale for such taxes, the treasurer shall adjourn such sale from time to time, not exceeding six months at a time; the former provision requiring the county to bid in when there was no other bid der, is abrogated. The Act further provides for injunctions to restrain any tax proceedings when not in pursuance of law. It also provides that all laws, ordinances, resolutions or orders levying or assessing a tax shall be passed by an affirmative vote or a majority of all the fourteen Aldermen constituting the Common Council," but that in other proceedings an affirmative vote of a majority of a quorum shall be sufficient." I also provides that when there is not a quorum, seven Aldermen may audit_accounts for repairs of bridges and streets, and in case of vacancy in the office of Mayor, they may draw orders on the treasurer for the amount so audited. Several other provisions of like character and tending to the same end, are embodied in the law above referred to and in other Acts. Proof was given tending to show that the indebtedness of respondent is about seventy per cent. of the assessed value of all the property | the recusant Aldermen, which were ordered to within its corporate limits; that it was fraudu- be applied in discharge of the costs of the prolently voted on its people largely by non-resi- ceedings. dent railroad laborers, and the bonds were sold at about ten per cent. of their face, and have always been sold at a small fraction of their face value, and that a large share, three fourths or two thirds, of the property in said City is exempt from all legal process; and that one half of it is owned by persons having none but exempt property, and only about one tenth of its people have any property not exempt under the general statutes of the State from every process a court can issue; that the collection of the whole debt by taxation is impossible; that the effect of such an attempt would be to drive personal property out of the City and depreciate the realty; but that efforts have been made to compromise it, with partial success, still leaving the percentage of indebtedness as above stated. Messrs. H. W. & D. K. Tenney and S. U. Pinney, for appellant. Messrs. D. Hall and H. L. Palmer, for appellee. Mr. Justice Hunt delivered the opinion of the court: In October, 1870, the plaintiff obtained a third writ of mandamus which resulted as the former ones had done and by the same means on the part of the officers of the City. A special election was ordered to be held, to fill the vacancies of the Aldermen so resigning, but no votes were cast except three in one ward, and the person for whom they were cast refused to qualify. There.is a very limited denial in the answer of some of these allegations, but their general truth is not denied. It is certain that no part of the debt of the plaintiff has ever been paid, and that, with an accumulation of fourteen years' interest, the same remains wholly due and that the plaintiffs efforts to obtain satisfaction of his judgments have failed. The bill sets forth certain Acts of the Legislature of Wisconsin, which it is alleged were intended to aid the defendant in evading the payment of its debts, and which, it can scarcely be denied, have had that effect, whatever might have been the intent of the Legislature in passing them. The plaintiff asks the aid of the court to subThe plaintiff was the owner of certain bonds ject the taxable property of the City to the payissued by the City of Watertown, to the Water- ment of his judgments, alleging that the cortown and Madison Railroad Company, and by porate authorities are trustees for the benefit of them sold for their benefit. The plaintiff re- the creditors of the City, and the property of covered three several judgments in the United the citizen a trust fund for that purpose, and States Court on these bonds, amounting to that it is the duty of the court to lay hold of nearly $10,000, Afterwards he brought another the property and cause it to be justly applied. suit in the United States Court for the Western He asks specifically that a decree may be made District of Wisconsin, upon these several judg-subjecting the taxable property of the citizens, ments, and on the 3d of February, 1871, recovered a judgment for $11,066.89. In the summer of 1868, he issued executions upon the two judgments first obtained, which were returned wholly unsatisfied. In November of the same year, he procured from the United States Circuit Court a peremptory writ of mandamus, directing the City of Watertown to levy and collect a tax from the taxable property of the City to pay the said judgments. But as the plaintiff alleges, before the writ could be served, a majority of the members of the City Council resigned their offices. This fact was returned by the marshal, and proceedings upon the mandamus thereupon ceased. In May, 1869, another Board of Aldermen having been elected, the plaintiff procured another writ of mandamus to be issued, which writ was served on all the Aldermen except one, Holger, who was sick at the time of the service upon the others. No steps were taken to comply with the requisition of the writ. An order to show cause why the Aldermen should not be punished for contempt in not complying with its requirements was obtained, but before its return day, six of the Aldermen resigned their offices, leaving in office but one more than a quorum, of whom the said Holger, upon whom the writ had not been served, was one. Various proceedings were had, and various excuses made, the whole resulting in an order that the Aldermen should at once levy and collect the tax; but before the order could be served on Holger, he resigned his office, and again the Board was left without a quorum. Nothing was accomplished by their effort in aid of the plaintiff, but fines were imposed upon to the payment of his judgments, and that the marshal of the district may be empowered to seize and sell so much of it as may be necessary, and to pay over to him the proceeds of such sale. This case is free from the objections usually made to a recovery upon municipal bonds. It is beyond doubt that the bonds were issued by the authority of an Act of the Legislature of the State of Wisconsin, and in the manner prescribed by the statute. It is not denied that the railroad, in aid of the construction of which they were issued, has been built, and was put in operation. Upon a class of the defenses interposed in the answer and in the argument it is not necessary to spend much time. Thus it is alleged that the City of Watertown contains a population of but 7,553 inhabitants; that the value of its property is assessed at but little over $1,000000; that the debt of the City is $750,000; that it is impossible for the City to pay this debt; that it was expected and provided that the railroad company would pay the bonds in question; but the roads have been foreclosed and sold; that the City has compromised and settled a portion of its indebtedness; that it has levied the taxes necessary to effect such compromise; and that it is ready to compromise all outstanding bonds and judgments at as high a rate as can be collected of the people of Watertown; that there is no law to compel the retention of the office by Aldermen to levy taxes; that the plaintiff took his chance of its being voluntarily done and that not being voluntarily done, there is no violation of law. These theories are vicious. They are based upon the idea that a refusal to pay an honest debt is justifiable because it There is, however, a grave question of the power of the court to grant the relief asked for. We are of the opinion that this court has not the power to direct a tax to be levied for the payment of these judgments. This power to impose burdens and raise money is the highest attribute of sovereignty, and is exercised, first, to raise money for public purposes only; and, second, by the power of legislative authority only. It is a power that has not been extended to the judiciary. Especially is it beyond the power of the Federal judiciary to assume the place of a State in the exercise of this authority at once so delicate and so important. The question is not entirely new in this court. would distress the debtor to pay it. A voluntary | of Missouri, a tax was ordered to be levied by refusal to pay an honest debt is a high offense the marshal under similar circumstances. We in a commercial community and is just cause are not able to recognize the authority of the of war between nations. So far as the defense case. No counsel appeared for the City (Mr. rests upon these principles we find no difficulty Reynolds as amicus curia only); no authorities in overruling it. are cited which sustain the position taken by the court; the power of the court to make the order is disposed of in a single paragraph, and the execution of the order suspended for three months to give the Corporation an opportunity to select officers and itself to levy and collect the tax, with the reservation of a longer suspension if it should appear advisable. The judge, in delivering the opinion of the court, states that the case is without precedent, and cites in support of its decision no other cases than that of Riggs v. Johnson Co. [supra], and U. S. v. Treasurer, 9 Am. Law Reg., N. S., 415. The case cited from 6 Wallace does not touch the present point. The question in that case was whether a mandamus having been issued by a United States court in the regular course of proceedings, its operation could be stayed by an injunction from the state court, and it was held that it could not be. It is probable that the case of Supervisors v. Rogers [supra] was the one intended to be cited. This case has already been considered. In the case of Supervisors v. Rogers,7 Wall., 175 [74 U. S., XIX, 162], an order was made by this court appointing the marshal a commissioner, with power to levy a tax upon the taxable property of the county, to pay the principal and interest of certain bonds issued by the county, the payment of which had been refused. That case was like the present, except that it occurred in the State of Iowa, and the proceeding was taken by the express authority of a statute of that State. The court say: "The next question is as to the appointment of the Marshal as a commissioner to levy the tax in satisfaction of the judgment. This depends upon a provision of the Code of the State of Iowa. This proceeding is found in a chapter regulating proceedings in the writ of mandamus, and the power is given to the court to appoint a person to discharge the duty enjoined by the peremptory writ which the defendant had refused to perform, and for which refusal he was liable to an attachment, and is express and unqualified. The duty of levying the tax upon the taxable property of the county to pay the principal and interest of these bonds was specially enjoined upon the Board of Supervisors by the Act of the Legislature that authorized their issue, and the appointment of the marshal as a commissioner in pursuance of the above section is to provide for the performance of this duty where the Board has disobeyed or evaded the law of the State and the peremptory mandate of the court. The State of Wisconsin, of which the City of Watertown is a municipal corporation, has passed no such act. The case of Supervisors v. Rogers is, therefore, of no authority in the case before us. The appropriate remedy of the plaintiff was, and is, a writ of mandamus. Riggs v. Johnson Co., 6 Wall., 193 [73 U. S., XVIII., 775]. This may be repeated as often as the occasion requires. It is a judicial writ, a part of a recognized course of legal proceedings. In the present case it has been thus far unavailing, and the prospect of its future success is, perhaps, not flattering. However this may be, we are aware of no authority in this court to appoint its own officer to execute the duty thus neglected by the City in a case like the present. The case of Lansing v. Treasurer (also cited) arose within the State of Iowa. It fell within the case of Supervisors v. Rogers, and was rightly decided because authorized by the express Statute of the State of Iowa. It offered no precedent for the decision of a case arising in a State where such a statute does not exist. These are the only authorities upon the power of this court to direct the levy of a tax under the circumstances existing in this case to which our attention has been called. The plaintiff insists that the court may accomplish the same result under a different name, that it has jurisdiction of the persons and of the property, and may subject the property of the citizens to the payment of the plaintiff's debt without the intervention of state taxing officers, and without regard to tax laws. His theory is that the court should make a decree subjecting the individual property of the citizens of Watertown to the payment of the plaintiff's judgment; direct the marshal to make a list thereof from the assessment rolls or from such other sources of information as he may obtain; report the same to the court, where any objections should be heard; that the amount of the debt should be apportioned upon the several pieces of property owned by individual citizens; that the marshal should be directed to collect such apportioned amount from such persons, or in default thereof to sell the property. As a part of this theory, the plaintiff argues that the court has authority to direct the amount of the judgment to be wholly made from the property belonging to any inhabitant of the City, leaving the citizens to settle the equities between themselves. This theory has many difficulties to encounter. In seeking to obtain for the plaintiff his just rights we must be careful not to invade the rights of others. If an inhabitant of the City of Watertown should own a block of buildings of the value of $20,000, upon no principle of In Welch v. St. Genevieve, 10 Am. Law Reg., law could the whole of the plaintiff's debt be N. S., 512, at a Circuit Court for the District | collected from that property. Upon the assump tion that individal property is liable for the payment of the corporate debts of the municipality, it is only so liable for its proportionate amount. The inhabitants are not joint and several debtors with the Corporation, nor does their property stand in that relation to the Corporation or to the creditor. This is not the theory of law, even in regard to taxation. The block of buildings we have supposed is liable to taxation only upon its value in proportion to the value of the entire property, to be ascertained by assessment, and when the proportion is ascertained and paid, it is no longer or further liable. It is discharged. The residue of the tax is to be obtained from other sources. There may be repeated taxes and assessments to make ap delinquencies, but the principle and the general rule of law are as we have stated. In relation to the Corporation before us, this objection to the liability of individual prop erty for the payment of a corporate debt is presented in a specific form. It is of a statutory character. The remedies for the collection of a debt are essential parts of the contract of indebtedness, and those in existence at the time it is incurred must be substantially preserved to the creditor. Thus a statute prohibiting the exercise of its taxing power by the City to raise money for the payment of these bonds would be void. Von Hoffman v. Quincy, 4 Wall., 535 [71 U. S., XVIII., 403]. But it is otherwise of statutes which are in existence at the time the debt is contracted. Of these the creditor must take notice, and if all the remedies are preserved to him which were in existence when his debt was contracted, he has no cause of complaint. Cooley, Const. Lim., 285, 287. not be righted elsewhere, and hence the right must be sustained in chancery. The difficulty arises from too broad an application of a general principle. The great advantage possessed by the Court of Chancery is not so much in its enlarged jurisdiction as in the extent and adaptability of its remedial powers. Generally its jurisdiction is as well defined and limited as is that of a court of law. It cannot exercise jurisdiction when there is an adequate and complete remedy at law. It cannot assume control over that large class of obligations called imperfect obligations, resting upon conscience and moral duty only, unconnected with legal obligations. Judge Story says: "There are cases of fraud, of accident, and of trust which neither courts of law nor of equity presume to relieve or to mitigate," of which he cites many instances. 1 Story, Eq. Jur., sec. 61. Lord Talbot says: "There are cases, indeed, in which a court of equity gives remedy where the law gives none, but where a particular remedy is given by law, and that remedy bounded and circumscribed by particular rules, it would be very improper for this court to take it up where the law leaves it, and extend it further than the law allows." Heard v. Stanford, Talbot, Cas. Temp., 174. Generally its jurisdiction depends upon legal obligations, and its decrees can only enforce remedies to the extent and in the mode by law established. With the subjects of fraud, trust or accident, when properly before it, it can deal more completely than can a court of law. These subjects, however, may arise in courts of law, and there be well disposed of. 1 Story, Eq. Jur., sec. 60. A court of equity cannot, by avowing that By section nine of the defendant's charter, there is a right but no remedy known to the law, Priv. L,ch. 237, p. 667, it is enacted as follows: create a remedy in violation of law, or even "Nor shall any real or personal property of any without the authority of law. It acts upon esinhabitant of said City or any individual or cor-tablished principles not only, but through estabporation, be levied upon or sold by virtue of any execution issued to satisfy or collect any debt, obligation or contract of said City." If the power of taxation is conceded not to be applicable, and the power of the court is invoked to collect the money as upon an execution to satisfy a contract or obligation of the City, this section is directly applicable and forbids the proceeding. The process or order asked for is in the nature of an execution; the property proposed to be sold is that of an inhabitant of the City; the purpose to which it is to be applied is the satisfaction of a debt of the City. The proposed remedy is in direct violation of a statute in existence when the debt was incurred, and made known to the creditor with the same solemnity as the statute which gave power to contract the debt. All laws in existence when the contract is made are necessarily referred to in it and form a part of the measure of the obligation of the one party, and of the right acquired by the other. Cooley, Const. Lim., 285. But independently of this statute, upon the general principles of law and of equity jurisprudence, we are of opinion that we cannot grant the relief asked for. The plaintiff invokes the aid of the principle that all legal remedies having failed, the Court of Chancery must give him a remedy; that there is a wrong which can lished channels. Thus, assume that the plaintiff is entitled to the payment of his judgment, and that the defendant neglects its duty in refusing to raise the amount by taxation, it does not follow that this court may order the amount to be made from the private estate of one of its citizens. This summary proceeding would involve a violation of the rights of the latter. He has never been heard in court. He has had no opportunity to establish a defense to the debt itself, or if the judgment is valid, to show that his property is not liable to its payment. It is well settled that legislative exemptions from taxation are valid, that such exemptions may be perpetual in their duration, and that they are in some cases beyond legislative interference. The proceeding supposed would violate that fundamental principle contained in chapter 29 of Magna Charta, and embodied in the Constitution of the United States, that no man shall be deprived of his property without due process of law-that is, he must be served with notice of the proceeding, and have a day in court to make his defense. Westervelt v. Gregg, 12 N. Y., 209. "Due process of law (it is said) undoubtedly means in the due course of legal proceedings, according to those rules and forms which have been established for the protection of private rights." Westervelt v. Gregg [supra]. In the New England States it is held that a judgment obtained against a town may be levied upon and made out of the property of any inhabitant of the town. The suit in those States is brought in form against the inhabitants of the town, naming it; the individual inhabitants, it is said, may and do appear and defend the suit, and hence it is held that the individual inhabitants have their day in court, are each bound by the judgment, and that it may be collected from the property of any one of them. Cooley, Const. Lim., 240-245. This is local law peculiar to New England. It is not the law of this country generally, or of England. Russell v. Men of Devon, 2 T R., 667. It has never been held to be the law in New York. in New Jersey, in Pennsylvania, nor, as stated by Mr. Cooley, in any of the Western States. Emeric v. Gilman, 10 Cal., 408, where all the cases are collected. So far as it rests upon the rule that these municipalities have no common fund, and that no other mode exists by which demands against them can be enforced, he says that it cannot be considered as applicable to those States where provision is made for compulsory taxation to satisfy judgments against a town or city. Cooley, Const. Lim., 246. The general principle of law to which we have adverted is not disturbed by these references. It is applicable to the case before us. Whether, in fact, the individual has a defense to the debt, or by way of exemption, or is without defense, is not important. To assume that he has none and, therefore, that he is entitled to no day in court, is to assume against him the very point he may wish to contest. Again, in the case of Emeric v. Gilman, before cited, it is said: "The inhabitants of a county are constantly changing; those who contributed to the debt may be non-residents upon the recovery of the judgment or the levy of the execution. Those who opposed the creation of the liability may be subjected to its payment, while those, by whose fault the burden has been imposed, may be entirely relieved of responsibility. *To enforce this right against the inhabitants of a county would lead to such a multiplicity of suits as to render the right valueless." We do not perceive, if the doctrine contended for is correct, why the money might not be entirely made from property owned by the creditor himself, if he should happen to own property within the limits of the Corporation, of sufficient value for that purpose. * The difficulty and the embarrassment arising from an apportionment or contribution among those bound to make the payment we do not regard as a serious objection. Contribution and apportionment are recognized heads of equity jurisdiction, and if it be assumed that process could issue directly against the citizens to collect the debt of the City, a court of equity could make the apportionment more conveniently than could a court of law. 1 Story, Eq. Jur., sec. 470, and onwards. We apprehend, also, that there is some confusion in the plaintiff's proposition, upon which the present jurisdiction is claimed. It is conceded, and the authorities are too abundant to admit a question, that there is no chancery ju risdiction where there is an adequate remedy at law. The writ of mandamus is, no doubt, the regular remedy in a case like the present, and ordinarily it is adequate and its results are satisfactory. The plaintiff alleges, however, in the present case, that he has issued such a writ on three different occasions; that, by means of the aid afforded by the Legislature and by the devices and contrivances set forth in the bill, the writs have been fruitless; that, in fact, they afford him no remedy. The remedy is in law and in theory adequate and perfect. The difficulty is in its execution only. The want of a remedy and the inability to obtain the fruits of a remedy are quite distinct, and yet they are confounded in the present proceeding. To illustrate: the writ of habere facias possessionem is the established remedy to obtain the fruits of a judgment for the plaintiff in ejectment. It is a full, adequate and complete remedy. Not many years since there existed in Central New York combinations of settlers and tenants disguised as Indians, and calling themselves such, who resisted the execution of this process in their counties, and so effectually that for some years no landlord could gain possession of his land. There was a perfect remedy at law, but through fraud, violence or crime its execution was prevented. It will hardly be argued that this state of things gave authority to invoke the extraordinary aid of a court of chancery. The enforcement of the legal remedies was temporarily suspended by means of illegal violence, but the remedies remained as before. It was the case of a miniature revolution. The courts of law lost no power, the court of chancery gained none. The present case stands upon the same principle. The legal remedy is adequate and complete, and time and the law must perfect its execution. Entertaining the opinion that the plaintiff has been unreasonably obstructed in the pursuit of his legal remedies, we should be quite willing to give him the aid requested if the law permitted it. We cannot, however, find authority for so doing, and we acquiesce in the conclusion of the court below that the bill must be dismissed. Judgment affirmed. Mr. Justice Clifford, dissenting: I dissent from the opinion of the court in this suffer a trust to be defeated by the refusal of case upon the ground that equity will never the trustee to administer the fund, or on ac count of the misconduct of the trustee, and also because the effect of the decree in the court below, if affirmed by this court, will be to give judicial sanction to a fraudulent repudiation of an honest debt. For which reasons, as it seems to me, the decree of the subordinate court should be reversed. Also dissenting, Mr. Justice Swayne. Cited 19 Wall., 658, 661; 93 U. S., 265; 102 U. S., 516, 526; 1 McCrary, 361; 2 McCrary, 28; 7 Biss., 102; 5 Dill., 314; 15 Fla., 384 (21 Am. Rep., 295); 41 Md., 642 (20 Am. Rep., 80). CHARLES J. CARPENTER, Trustee of SA. RAH S. MCCAMMAUT, Piff. in Err., v. CHARLES S. RANNELS. (See S. C., 19 Wall., 138-146.) Patent for land, construction of. The formula, "or his legal representatives,” in a |