tions, the defendant also pleaded that the indorsement of the note sued on was made at Walnut Plains, in Arkansas, and that the consideration for the same was a debt due from the maker to the plaintiffs, and that the note was made payable to the decedent, and was indorsed by him in blank, merely as a means of securing a debt due to the plaintiffs, and that the plaintiffs had due notice of that fact; and the defendant avers that after the note became due and payable, to wit: on the first of December in the same year, the decedent then in full life, the maker of the note, being then fully solvent and able to pay the note, by his certain notice in writing duly served, required the plaintiffs to sue the parties liable on the note, to wit: the maker and indorser, and that the plaintiffs wholly neglected to do so for more than the period of thirty days and until the commencement of this suit, during which time the maker of the note became insolvent and unable to pay. Leave was granted to the defendant to file that plea, and the plaintiffs demurred to it specially for the following reasons:

(1) That the indorser became primarily liable to the plaintiffs by virtue of his contract; that his contract was separate and distinct from the contract of the maker of the note; that there was no unity or privity between the maker and indorser, nor was the indorser in any sense the surety of the maker on his contract.

(2) That the liability of the indorser became perfect on protest of the note and notice of nonpayment, and that he could not discharge it by the matters set up in the plea.

Two errors are assigned, as follows:

(1) That the court erred in sustaining the demurrer of the plaintiffs to the rejoinder filed by the defendant to the plaintiffs' replication to the first special plea of the defendant.

(2) That the court erred in sustaining the demurrer of the plaintiffs to the third plea of the defendant.

Unsealed written contracts are barred by the Statute of Limitations of that State in five years from maturity, and it appears that the note described in the declaration matured on the first of November next after its date, but the record shows that the indorser deceased on the 15th of November, 1869, leaving the note unpaid and outstanding. Under the laws of the State the general Statute of Limitations runs from the maturity of the contract to the granting of administration upon the estate of the decedent, when the general statute ceases to run and the Statute of Limitations applicable to the estates of deceased persons begins to run. Brown v. Merrick, 16 Ark., 612; Biscoe v. Madden, 17 Ark., 534.

Hence the defendant pleaded that the cause of action did not accrue to the plaintiffs at any time within five years next before the grant of letters of administration upon the estate of the deceased indorser.

War, when duly declared or recognized as such by the war making power, imports a prohibition to the subjects or citizens of all com mercial intercourse and all correspondence with citizens or persons domiciled in the enemy country. Total inability, therefore, on the part of an enemy creditor to sustain any contract in the tribunals of the other belligerent, exists by the law of nations during the continuance of the See 22 WALL. U. S., Book 22.

war, but the restoration of peace removes the disability and opens the doors of the courts.

Unquestioned right to sue is the status of the creditor if the contract was made during peace, but the effect of war is to suspend the right not only without any fault on the part of the creditor, but under circumstances which make it his duty to abstain from any such attempt. His remedy is suspended by the acts of the two governments and by the law of nations, not applicable to the contract at its date, but which comes into operation in consequence of an event over which he has no control. Hanger v. Ahbott, 6 Wall., 539 [73 U. S., XVIII., 942].

Peace, it is said, restores the right and the remedy, but as that cannot be if the Statute of Limitations continues to run during the period the creditor is rendered incapable of suing, it necessarily follows that the operation of the statute is also suspended during the same period.

Attempt is made to distinguish the case before the court from the case in which that rule of decision was first promulgated by this court, but it is clear that the attempt must be unsuccessful, as the same doctrines have since been applied in a case where a mortgagee, who was a citizen and resident of one of the Confederate States, brought a suit after the close of the war upon a bond and mortgage executed prior to the war by citizens of one of the loyal States, and the court held that the period from the proc lamation of the blockade to the proclamation that the war was closed, must be deducted in the computation of the time which the Statute of Limitations of the loyal State had run against the right of action. Brown v. Hiatts, 15 Wall, 177 [82 U. S., XXI., 128].

Extended discussion of that topic is quite unnecessary, as the oft repeated decisions of this court have established the rule that the Statute of Limitations was suspended in the rebellious States during the existence of the late rebellion, and the express decision of this court is, that the war was flagrant in that State for the whole period specified in the replication filed by the plaintiffs. Batesville Inst. v. Kauffman, 18 Wall., 155 [85 U. S., XXI., 776].

Viewed in the light of that decision, it is clear that the rejoinder filed by the defendant is insufficient and that the ruling of the circuit court adjudging it bad was correct. The Protector, 12 Wall., 700 [79 U. S., XX., 463]; Adger v. Alston, 15 Wall., 555 [82 U. S., XXI., 234]; Semmes v. Ins. Co., 13 Wall., 158 [80 U. S., XX., 490]; Levy v. Stewart, 11 Wali., 253 [78 U. S., XX., 89].

II. Due demand of the maker, protest and notice to the indorser of non-payment are admitted, and it is alleged that the indorser subsequently, by a certain notice in writing, required the plaintiffs, as holders of the note, to sue the maker and the indorser at a time when the maker was solvent and able to pay the same, and that the plaintiffs omitted for more than thirty days to comply with the terms of the notice, during which time the maker became insolvent.

Based on these facts, the second defense set up is that the indorser was discharged by the neglect of the holders of the note to comply with the terms of that notice, which must depend in a great measure upon the nature of the obligation that the indorser assumed by his con.

Simple indulgence, however, or mere delay to enforce payment, without a binding contract to give time, will not, under the general rules of commercial law, have that effect, even in the case of a party occupying strictly the contract relation of a surety. Philpot v. Briant, 4 Bing., 721; Story, P. Notes, 5th ed., sec. 415.

Indorsers, it is sometimes said, are sureties, but their contract, which is a new one as com pared with the maker of the note, differs in some important respects from that of the surety, who is a joint promisor with the principal, as the holder of such an instrument is under no obligation to use diligence to enforce payment against the maker in order to hold the indorser. Bk. v. Myers, 1 Bailey, 418; Powell v. Waters, 17 Johns., 179; Stafford v. Yates, 18 Johns., 329; Bk. v. Rollins, 13 Me., 205: Page v. Webster, 15 Me., 256; Bk. v. Ives, 17 Wend., 502; Sterling v. Marietta & S. T. Co., 11 Serg. & R., 182; Kennard v. Knott, 4 Man. & G., 474.

Even in a case where the holder of a promissory note was, after the note fell due, called upon by the indorser to prosecute the maker, of whom the amount might then have been collected, but who afterwards became insolvent, and the holder neglected to do as requested, still it is held that such neglect will not discharge the indorser. Trimble v. Thorne, 16 Johns., 152; Beebe v. Bk., 7 Watts & S., 375. Judicial decisions of high authority deny that the indorser is to be regarded as a surety after his liability is fixed by due presentment, demand and notice of the dishonor of the note, and insist that when his liability is fixed by those acts of the holder, that he, the indorser, becomes a principal debtor himself, subject only to the condition that the holder shall do no act to suspend, impair or destroy his remedy over against prior parties to whom he has a right to resort for a remedy; and support to that view is certainly derived from the conceded fact that the indorser is answerable upon an independent contract, which makes it his legal duty to pay the note when duly presented and demanded and due notice is given to him of its dishonor; and also from the fact, which is also conceded, that he has not the same reason as may exist in common cases of suretyship to compel the creditor to active diligence against the maker, as he has in general the complete power, by paying the note, to reinstate himself in the possession and ownership of the same, and thus to entitle himself to a personal remedy against the maker. M'Lemore v. Powell, 12 Wheat., 556; 2 Pars. Bills and Notes, 243-245; 3 Kent, Com., 12th ed., 105.

Doubtless the indorser is in some respects a surety, but his principal relation to the instrument is that expressed by the commercial term

Confirmation that the indorser is not a surety in the general sense is also derived from the fact that he stands in the attitude of the drawer of a new bill, and that he is not primarily liable to make the payment, but only in case of the default of the maker and proof of due presentment, protest and notice of dishonor, and that even then he cannot be joined with the maker, as the surety proper may be, because the maker and indorser are liable on different contracts. 2 Pars. Bills and Notes, 25.

Suppose that is so, when the theory is tested by the rules of commercial law, still it is insisted by the defendant that the contract of the indorser in this case was made in the State where he resides, and that the indorser, by the law of that State, is discharged, for the reason that the holder of the note omitted to seek his remedy against the maker, as thereto requested by the indorser.

Support to that defense, as exhibited in the second assigment of errors, is attempted to be drawn from the statute of the State where the indorser resides, which provides, in effect, that a surety in any bond, bill or note, may give the holder notice to sue the principal in writing. and if the holder fails to do so within thirty days the surety shall be discharged. Gould, Dig. Stat., 1015.

Founded on that statute the defendant alleges that the indorsement was made in that State, and the allegation also is that the consideration of the note was a debt due from the maker to the plaintiffs, and that it was made payable to the decedent and was by him indorsed merely as a means of procuring his liability for the payment of the said debt due to the plaintiffs.

Grant that the contract of indorsement was actually executed in that State, still it is the bet ter opinion that the case is not governed by the statute of that State already referred to, for the reason that the statute of the State does not include the contract of an indorser.

Sureties in a note who become joint promis ors with the maker, it may be conceded, are within the terms of that statute, as they stand in the same relation to the principal as in a bond given for the payment of money or the delivery of property. Authority to give the described notice arises immediately after the bond. bill or note falls due, which evidently refers to the lapse of time specified in the contract; but the absolute obligation to pay does not arise in

Evidently the statute contemplates that the cause of action will accrue against the principal and surety at the same time, which is never the case with the indorser and maker. Such a notice may, unquestionably, be given by a surety proper, whether his contract is expressed in a bond, bill or note, as soon as the instrument falls due; but it would be unreasonable to suppose that an indorser would give such a notice before his liability had become fixed, as it may be that such a demand to sue would operate as waiver of the right to notice of the dishonor of the note. Nor is it necessary to extend the operation of the statute so as to include an indorser, in order to satisfy the literal scope of the language employed. "Persons, bound as security for another," are the words of the statute, which undoubtedly includes sureties proper in a bond, bill or note, but it would be extending the words of the statute beyond their reasonable meaning, to hold that it includes an indorser whose liability is fixed by the required notice of the dishonor of the bill or note.

Beyond all doubt the statute is one passed in derogation of the common law, even if restricted to sureties in the general sense, but it would be even more so, if, by a broad construction, it could be extended to include indorsers upon bills of exchange and negotiable promissory

notes.

Statutes passed in derogation of the common law, it is everywhere held, should be construed strictly; nor is there any subject-matter to which that rule should be applied with greater intensity than where the attempt is made to change by local legislation the rules of commercial law, applicable to that class of commercial instruments. Remedies of a statutory character, where the right to be enforced was unknown at the common law, are to be followed with strictness, both as to the methods to be pursued and the cases to which they are to be applied. Lease v. Vance, 28 lowa, 509.

When a statute alters the common law, the meaning shall not be strained beyond the meaning of the words, except in cases of public utility, as when the end in view appears to be more comprehensive than the enacting words. Pott. Dwar., Stat., 186.

Where the expression is in general terms, statutes are to receive such a construction as may be agreeable to the rules of the common law in cases of that nature, for statutes are not presumed to make any alteration in the common law, beyond what is expressed in the statute. 9 Bac. Abr., Bouvier, 245; Sedg. Stat., 2d ed. 267: 1 Kent, Com., 12th ed., 464; Broom, Leg. Max., 4th ed., 552; Smith, Com., 676.

the duty of the holder of a note which has been dishonored and due notice thereof given to the indorser, to sue the maker merely because the indorser requests him so to do. On the contrary, the holder has his choice to sue any one of the parties to the note who is in default, and it is the duty of the indorser, if he desires to secure the amount against the maker, to pay the note himself and thus to entitle himself to bring a suit against that party. Story, Notes, 5th ed., sec 115, a.

Such a holder, says Judge Story, is perfectly at liberty to sue any or all the parties at his pleasure, and he is not bound to any diligence in seeking his re-imbursement. Nor can the indorser insist that the holder should, upon his request, use any such diligence. His remedy is to pay the note and then to seek recourse against the maker or any other party liable over to him. Story, Notes, 5th ed., sec. 419; Beebe v. Banks, 7 Watts & S., 375.

Such an indorser, that is, one whose liability is fixed by due notice of the maker's default, is not entitled to the aid of a court of equity as a surety, as he has the right to pay the amount of the note to the holder, and to be subrogated to all his rights as against the maker. Lenox v. Prout, 3 Wheat, 525; Trimble v. Thorne [supra]; Warner v. Beardsley, 8 Wend., 199; Beardsley v. Warner, 6 Wend., 610; Frye v. Baker, 4 Pick., 382; Hunt v. Bridgham, 2 Pick., 581.

None of these suggestions are intended to deny the well known rule that the maker of the note is in general the principal debtor, nor that all the other parties are in a special sense sureties for him; they, if indorsers, being liable only in case of his default, unless they have waived demand and notice. Though all the other parties are sureties in respect to the maker, still they are not co sureties, but each prior party is a principal in respect to each subsequent party.

An indorser of a promissory note, though in the nature of a surety, is not for all purposes entitled to the privileges of that character, as he is answerable upon an independent contract and it is his duty to take up the note when it is dishonored. Ellsworth v. Brewer, 11 Pick., 320.

Unquestionably, there is in some respects a resemblance between the indorser and a surety, but in others there is none, as he does not in any case lose his character of indorser nor can he be made liable on the note without proof of due demand and notice. Bradford v. Corey,5 Barb., 462.

Proof of the kind, if the demand and notice are seasonable and in due form, removes every condition from his liability except that the holder will do no act to suspend, impair or destroy his right to indemnity from such other parties to the instrument as are bound to save him harmless. Woodman v. Eastman, 10 N. H., 359; Warner v. Beardsley, 8 Wend., 195.

dicial decision calculated to restrain or impede their unembarrassed circulation would be contrary to the soundest principles of public policy. Mercantile law is a system of jurisprudence recognized by all commercial nations, and up on no subject is it of more importance that there should be, as far as practicable, uniformity of decision throughout the world. Goodman v. Simonds, 20 How., 364 [61 U. S., XV., 940]. Apply these several suggestions to the case and it follows that the statute, when properly construed, does not include the indorser of a negotiable promissory note whose liability has become absolute by due notice of the dishonor

[No. 382.]

of the Department of Agriculture, under the 18th section of the Act of July, 28, 1866. That section is as follows:

Sec. 18. And be it further enacted, that there be allowed and paid to the officers, clerks.committee clerks, messengers and all other employés of the Senate and House of Representatives, and to the Globe and official reporters of each House, and the stenographer of the House, and to the Capitol police, and the three superintendents of the public grounds and gardens, their clerks and assistants, and to the Librarian, assistant Librarians, messengers and other employes of the Congressional library, an addition of twenty per cent. on their present pay, to commence with the present Congress; and the amount necessary to pay this allowance is hereby appropriated out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated.

The court, upon the evidence, found the facts to be as follows:

From the 4th day of March, 1865, to the first day of July, 1870. the claimant held the position and performed the duties of Superintend ent of the Public Gardens of the Department of Agriculture, at a salary of $2,000 per annum.

For the time between July 1, 1866, and June 30, 1867, he was, under the Joint Resolution of February 28, 1867, 14 Stat. at L., 569, paid, in separate monthly payments, twenty per cent. additional upon said salary; but he has not been der the 18th section of the Act of July 28, 1866, paid anything additional upon said salary un14 Stat. at L., 310, 323.

for the purpose of obtaining the decision of the Upon the foregoing facts the court, proforma, Supreme Court of the United States upon the

APPEAL from the Court of Claims.

The petition in this case was filed in the court below by the appellee, to recover an increase of 20 per cent. for certain years, upon his salary as superintendent of the public gardens

NOTE.-Construction of statute according to purpose for which it was passed.

Construing a statute according to its equity, is to give effect to it according to the intention of the law makers as indicated by its terms and purposes. Blakeney v. Blakeney, 6 Port., 109; S. C., 30 Am. Dec., 574.

A case within the equity of a statute, though not within its letter, may be declared, in a court of equity, to be within the statute. Davis v. Harkness, 1 Gilm., 173; S. C., 41 Am. Dec., 184.

of law, that the addition of twenty per cent, on the pay of the claimant, authorized by the 18th section of the said Act of July 28, 1866, was not an addition merely for the period of time between the commencement of the Congress that passed said Act, viz.: March 4, 1865, and the

v. Crenshaw, 15 Gratt.. 457; Keyfort St. Co. v. Farm's Trans. Co., 3 C. E. Green, 13.

Statute may be construed with reference to the circumstances at the time and the necessity of enacting it. Thus, an Act as to service of process in civil actions was held not to require filing the complaint as a first step, because of the delay and expense of travel. Keith v. Quinney, 1 Or., 364.

Where the intent is doubtful, equity will give it such construction as is most convenient and equitable. Jersey Co. v. Davison, 5 Dutch., 415. Ambiguous words are to be interpreted by comand by considering its reason, spirit and cause. State v. Judge, etc., 12 La. Ann., 777.

"For the sure and true interpretation of all statutes in general (be they penal or beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of the common law), four things are to be discussed and considered: 1. What was the common law before the making of the Act? 2. What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide? 3. What remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the Commonwealth. 4. The true reason of the remedy. And then the office of all the judges is always to make such construction as shall suppress the mischief and advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle inventions and evasions for the continuance of the mischief." Heydon's case, 3 Co., 7; 1 Bl. Com., 61, 87.

Statutes are to be construed with reference to the object to be accomplished by them. People v. Dana, 22 Cal., 11.

In construction of statutes, the general state of opinion, public, judicial and legislative, at the time of the enactment, may be considered. Delaplane

Statutes should not be so construed as to include cases not intended to fall within them. Estate of Ticknor, 13 Mich., 44; Workman v. Campbell, i Mo., 305.

"Assignee" held to include "grantee" as within the reason and object of the statute. Mattoon v. Young, 45 N. Y., 696.

The intent and meaning of the makers should be followed though it may seem contrary to the letter of the statute. These are sometimes to be collected from the cause or necessity of such statute. Canal Co. v. R. R. Co., 4 Gill & J., 152; Brown v. Somerville, 8 Md., 444; Jackson v. Collins, 3 Cow., 89; People v. Utica Ins. Co., 15 Johns., 358, 380, 381: Edwards v. Dick, 4 B. & Ald., 212.

All persons of full age and sound mind, held not to include married women, on the ground that it was not the intention of the Legislature to alter the relation between husband and wife. Wilbur v. Crane, 13 Pick., 284; Osgood v. Breed, 12 Mass., 53.