1 With reference to the Federal anti-trust act it is said in The Charles E. Wise wall, 74 Fed. Rep. 802 (Dist. Ct. N. Y., 1896), that "the courts have found it very difficult to apply the indefinite generalities of this act to the facts of any given case." It was held in Re Greene, 52 Fed. Rep. 104, 112 (Cir. Ct. Ohio, 1892), not to be retroactive, or to have any ex post facto operation; but in United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Assoc., 166 U. S. 290, 342; s. c., 17 Supm. Ct. Rep. 540 (1897), to apply to a continuance after its passage of an agreement entered into before. In United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Assoc., 19 U. S. App. 36, 67; S. C., 58 Fed. Rep. 58, 77 (8th Cir., 1893); Greer v. Stoller, 77 Fed. Rep. 1 (Cir. Ct. Mo., 1896), it was held, as a penal statute, to be subject to the rule of strict construction. In the case last cited the remedies created by the act are said to be "exclusive of all others." In Queen Ins. Co. v. State, 22 S. W. Rep. 1048 (Tex. Civ. App., 1893), the Texas act of 1893 had been held inoperative for failure to declare trusts illegal; but this decision was reversed in 86 Tex. 250, 268; s. C., 24 S. W. Rep. 397 (1893). As to effect of provision of

2 In Fuqua v. Pabst Brewing Co., 90 Tex. 298; s. c., 38 S. W. Rep. 29, 750 (1897), recovery was not allowed for beer sold by a brewing company transacting business in another State, and shipping the beer from that State under a contract providing that, during the performance of the contract, the company would not sell or consign any beer of its manufacture to any other party at Amarillo, Texas (where the buyer transacted business), and that the buyer would neither sell nor be interested in the sale of any beer not manufactured by the company, the company to erect a coldstorage house, and allow the buyer the free use of the same. The transaction was held within the Texas anti-trust act of 1889, notwithstanding the commerce clause of the Federal constitution; this on the ground that the contract dealt with the beer after it had ceased to be an article of interstate commerce. The court say (p. 302): "A portion of the stipulations of the contract being lawful, and the others unlawful, the taint of illegality affects and destroys the whole. The commerce clause of

the constitution was not designed to protect the contractual rights of a person who thus voluntarily intermingles an otherwise legal interstate commerce transaction with an entirely local and unlawful one." But it was also held that exemption from the operation of the State statute was prevented by the Wilson Act of Congress of August 8, 1890. See, also, Anheuser-Busch Brewing Assoc. v. Houck, 27 S. W. Rep. 692 (Tex. Civ. App., 1894); affirmed as Houck v. Anheuser-Busch Brewing Assoc., in 88 Tex. 184; S. C., 30 S. W. Rep. 869 (1895). So the State statute was held applicable in Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. State, Tex. Civ. App. —; s. c., 44 S. W. Rep. 936 (1898), where the right of a foreign corporation to do business in the State was declared forfeited, it appearing that it not only shipped its products into the State, but entered into agreements with dealers in the State for exclusive dealing, by which the latter were to buy and sell the products of such corporation exclusively, and not to sell the products so bought to any one dealing with a dealer in competitive oils. But was not all this a mere incident of the interstate dealing? Still further seems to go People ex rel. v. American Tobacco Co., 2 Chicago L. J. Weekly, 249 (Cook Co. Cir. Ct., 1897?), where the authority of the State to exclude a foreign corporation, illegal as a restriction upon competition, was sustained as an exercise of the police power, against the objection

that the corporation shipping its products into the State was engaged in interstate commerce. But the soundness of this decision is very doubtful in view of such decisions of the United States Supreme Court as Bowman v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co., 125 U. S 465; s. C., 8 Supm. Ct. Rep. 689 (1888).

See

1 Of course, the Federal anti-trust act has no application to trade or commerce wholly within the boundaries of a given State. The Charles E. Wiswall, 57 U. S. App. 179; s. c., 86 Fed. Rep. 671 (2d Cir., 1898); but as to a Territory, see Moore v. United States, 56 U. S. App. 471; s. c., 85 Fed. Rep. 465 (8th Cir., 1898). Its constitutionality was asserted in United States v. Patterson, 55 Fed. Rep. 605, 638 (Cir. Ct. Mass., 1893). But in United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U. S. 1; S. C., 15 Supm. Ct. Rep. 249 (1895), affirming 60 Fed. Rep. 306 (Cir. Ct. Pa., 1894), the act was held to have no application to a mere monopoly in manufacture in the United States, though of a necessity of life (sugar). The court say (p. 13): "The fact that an article is manufactured for export to another State does not of itself make it an article of interstate commerce;" and of the act (p. 16): "Congress did not attempt thereby to assert the power to deal with monopoly directly as such, or to limit and restrict the rights of corporations created by the States or the citizens of the States in the acquisi

tion, control or disposition of property; or to regulate or prescribe the price or prices at which such property or the products thereof should be sold; or to make criminal the acts of persons in the acquisition and control of property, which the States of their residence or creation sanctioned or permitted." See elaborate dissenting opinion of Harlan, J. Compare United States v. Jellico Mountain Coal, etc. Co., 46 Fed. Rep. 432 (Cir. Ct. Tenn., 1891). The decision in United States v. E. C. Knight Co. was applied under similar conditions in Merz Capsule Co. v. United States Capsule Co., 67 Fed. Rep. 414 (Cir. Ct. Mich., 1895). The same conclusion had been reached in Dueber Watch-case Manuf. Co. v. Howard Watch & Clock Co., 35 U. S. App. 16; s. c., 66 Fed. Rep. 637 (2d Cir., 1895); also in Re Greene, 52 Fed. Rep. 104, 112 (Cir. Ct. Ohio, 1892); and see National Distilling Co. v. Cream City Importing Co., 86 Wis. 352; s. c., 56 N. W. Rep. 864 (1893). For a vigorous criticism of the decision in United States v. E. C. Knight Co., see article by Jackson Guy in 1 Va. Law Reg. 709 (1896); see also reply by John Hunter in 2 Id. 160 (1896). In United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 54 U. S. App. 723, 770; s. c., 85 Fed. Rep. 271, 297 (6th Cir., 1898), it is said of United States v. E. C. Knight Co. that it "draws the distinction between a restraint upon the business of manufacturing, and a restraint

upon the trade or commerce between the States in the articles after manufacture, with the manifest purpose of showing that the regulating power of Congress under the constitution could affect only the latter, while the former was not under Federal control and rested wholly with the States."

More recent attempts to apply the act have been successful. In United States v. Hopkins, 82 Fed. Rep. 529 (Cir. Ct. Kan., 1897), an injunction was granted under § 4 of the act, dissolving the "Kansas City Live-Stock Exchange," composed of persons engaged in the livestock commission business, the purpose of which was to monopolize the business of buying and selling stock at Kansas City. Their method of business is thus described (p. 537): "The shipment of live-stock from growers, dealers and traders in Kansas, Colorado, Nebraska, Missouri, Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, Oklahoma and other States and Territories, is solicited by the commission merchant in various ways, but largely by the personal solicitation of agents who travel about the country and interview the stockmen. Frequently the commission man makes loans of money on the herds, secured by chattel mortgage. The consignment of the stock is made to the commission man or firm at the Kansas City stockyards, and there unloaded. Frequently the shipper draws on the consignee through his local bank, with the bill of shipment attached;