so much space to the enunciation of so obvious and fundamental a doctrine, were it not that the present tendency of judicial decisions in this country seems to be to establish, as sale dealer dealing directly with customers not dealers, at a point where a member of the association might be doing business. Here the existence of such by-law may be regarded as an announcement of intention. So held, notwithstanding a demand by the association, in accordance with its by-laws, for a percentage on sales made. So the by-law was declared not to operate as coercion upon the members of the association. Compare Jackson v. Stanfield, 137 Ind. 592; s. C., 36 N. E. Rep. 345 (1894), p. 76, below. Bohn Manuf. Co. v. Hollis was followed in Macauley v. Tierney, 19 R. I. 255; s. C., 33 Atl. Rep. 1 (1895), as applicable to a similar agreement contained in resolutions adopted by an association of master plumbers, it being held not illegal for them to send notices to dealers not to sell to plumbers not members of the association, under penalty of withdrawal of patronage. Bohn Manuf. Co. v. Hollis was also applied in Cote v. Murphy, 159 Pa. St. 420, 431; s. C., 28 Atl. Rep. 190 (1894), sustaining an agreement among employers not to sell to persons who had conceded demands of striking employees; also to dissuade others from dealing with him. See also Buchanan v. Kerr, 159 Pa. St. 433; s. C., 28 Atl. Rep. 195 (1894). The rule was well illustrated in Longshore Printing Co. v. Howell, 26 Oreg. 527, 544; s. C., 38 Pac. Rep. 547 (1894), where the Oregon stat ute making it a misdemeanor to "by force, threats or intimidation, prevent or endeavor to prevent any person employed by another, from continuing or performing his work, or from accepting any new work or employment," was held to have no application to a case of officers of a labor union entering upon an employer's premises, and ordering members of the union then at work under contract with it, to cease work "under penalty of being dealt with according to the laws and regulations of said union," or to a resolution of such union ordering all union men working for such employer to cease working for it. The court say (p. 546): "No intimidation is specifically alleged or shown, unless it can be inferred that, by a refusal to quit, the members of the union would subject themselves to the charge of insubordination to the order, and it does not appear that there was sufficient odium attached to this, to put the members in fear, or that compliance with the order and resolution was induced thereby." So held, notwithstanding allegations in the complaint here held bad on demurrer, that by the first order the employees "were intimidated and influenced and without delay immediately obeyed;" that, "being intimidated," they obeyed the second order, and "ceased to fulfill their contracts with plaintiff." Furthermore, the rules of the union provided for suspension or expul especially applicable to acts accompanying strikes and boycotts, a doctrine directly opposed to it. Such tendency has, however, been recently abruptly checked in England.1 sion for failure to comply with such an order. So, too, statutes making it a misdemeanor to "wilfully and wrongfully commit any act which grossly injures the property of another," or to "either verbally, or by any written or printed communication, threaten any injury to the person or property of another with intent thereby to extort any pecuniary advantage or property from such other, or with intent to compel such other to do any act against his will," were held to have no application. So in Commonwealth v. Sheriff, 15 Phila. (Pa.) 393 (1881), the prohibition of the Pennsylvania statute of 1876 against hindering persons from laboring, by "the use of force, threat, or menace of harm to persons or property," was held not to cover the case of persons who, in behalf of a labor organization, demanded of employers an increase of wages of certain employees, and notified them that a refusal would result in a strike of themselves, followed by notifying such employees that a strike was ordered. Compare with People v. Barondess, note 1, below. By the English Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act of 1875, it is forbidden to "wrongfully and without legal authority" do any of certain specified acts, "with a view to compel any other person to abstain from doing or to do any act which such other person has a legal right to do or abstain from doing." One such class is "using violence to, or intimidating, such other person or his wife or children, or injuring his property." Held in Gibson v. Lawson, 2 L. R. Q. B. (1891), 557, not to apply to the action of a member of a labor union, in announcing to the complainant's employer that the union had resolved to strike unless the complainant joined the union. There was no violence or threat of violence to his person or property, but merely fear of loss of employment, produced by the action of the union. It seems that "intimidation," as the word is here used, is limited to "such intimidation as implies a threat of personal violence." See also Curran v. Treleaven, Id. 560. Compare Judge v. Bennett, 36 Weekly Rep. 103. (1887). Under a former statute, "threats or intimidation" had been held to cover the case of announcement of intention to leave employment in a body. Walsby v. Anley, 3 El. & El. 516 (1861). See Skinner v. Kitch, 2 L. R. Q. B. 393 (1867). 1 The following are illustrations: In People v. Barondess, 133 N. Y. 649; s. C., 31 N. E. Rep. 240 (1892), adopting opinion of Daniels, J., in 61 Hun, 571, 581 (1891), it was held a "threat to do an unlawful injury to property," to "threaten” to prevent persons who had been on strike from returning to their employment. What the defendant actually told the employer was that he would have to pay him a certain sum "to have his peo § 16. Remedies; injunction. Generally speaking, for any of the injuries thus far discussed, an action at law for damages is an available remedy,' though sometimes, as in ple back again to work;" that if he did not pay it "he could not have his people back again to work." This was a decision by four judges against three, reversing a decision made by two judges against one. The dissenting opinion of Gray, J., reported in 45 N. Y. State Reporter, 248, furnishes the better reason. In Curran v. Galen, 152 N. Y. 33; s. C., 46 N. E. Rep. 297 (1897), an action was sustained against members of a labor union, for conspiring to injure the plaintiff by taking away his means of earning a livelihood, and preventing him from obtaining employment, by threatening to procure his discharge, and prevent him from obtaining employment elsewhere, unless he joined the union; it being held no defense that their action was in pursuance of an agreement between the union and an association of employers, whereby all employees of such employers should be members of such union, no employee to work for more than four weeks without becoming a member. Held illegal, as "a plan of compelling workingmen not in affiliation with the organization to join it, at the peril of being deprived of their employment and of the means of making a livelihood." Compare People ex rel. Gill v. Smith, 5 N. Y. Crim. R. 509 (N. Y. Co. Oyer & Terminer, 1887), and N. Y. Penal Code, § 168, subd. 5, forbidding the use of 1 See in 34 Am. Law Reg. & Rev. 102 (1895), an article by S. B. Stan force, threats or intimidation "to prevent another from exercising a lawful trade or calling." Curran v. Galen would seem in essence to be merely the case of a request to comply with an agreement for exclusive employment of persons of a specified class. As admitted by the demurrer, there was no "intent or purpose to injure plaintiff in any way," nor does it appear that, otherwise than as above stated, any unlawful means were employed to effect the object. Though not so distinctly stated, the existence of the combination seems to have largely influenced the decision. It was also intimated that there was a violation of the constitutional guaranty of the right freely to pursue a lawful avocation and of freedom in the pursuit of happiness. See also Consolidated Steel & Wire Co. v. Murray, 80 Fed. Rep. 811, 823 (Cir. Ct. Ohio, 1897). In Barr v. Essex Trades Council, 53 N. J. Eq. 101, 122; s. c., 30 Atl. Rep. 881 (1894), the injury complained of was inducing persons to refuse to deal with the complainant. So far as the establishment of the cause of action is concerned, it seems irrelevant, as alleged, that his customers and employees were intimidated. They were not before the court as complainants. But, waiving this point, we submit that there was no intimidation; at the utmost there ton, on "Mandamus as a Means of Settling Strikes." case of murder, robbery or violent assault, the remedy by indictment exists, either concurrently or exclusively. So, too, in case of conspiracy. But a detailed discussion of the 135 (Cir. Ct. Ohio, 1891), a case very similar on the facts. was injury or fear of injury resulting from the doing of lawful acts or the threat or announcement of In Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 intention to do lawful acts. As to Mass. 92; s. c., 44 N. E. Rep. 1077 his employees, members of labor (1896), was enjoined the mainteunions, the "threat" was at most nance of a patrol in front of the merely to enforce against them plaintiff's place of business, for the the rules of the union, if they purpose of inducing persons to should continue to patronize the leave or refrain from entering his plaintiff, and it was not contended employment, under the conditions that such rules were illegal, nor thus stated (p. 97): "Following upon was such enforcement illegal, even a strike of the plaintiff's workmen, if these results were as thus de- the defendants conspired to prescribed: "A member of a labor or- vent him from getting workmen, ganization who does not submit to and thereby to prevent him from the edict of his union, asserts his carrying on his business, unless independence of judgment and ac- and until he should adopt a certion at the risk, if not the absolute tain schedule of prices. The means sacrifice, of all association with his adopted were persuasion and social fellow-members. They will not eat, pressure, threats of personal indrink, live or work in his company. jury or unlawful harm conveyed Branded by the peculiarly offen- to persons employed or seeking sive epithets adopted, he must employment, and a patrol of two exist ostracised, socially and in- men in front of the plaintiff's facdustrially, so far as his former as- tory, maintained from 6:30 A. M. sociates are concerned. Freedom until 5:30 P. M., on one of the busiof will, under such circumstances, est streets of Boston. The number cannot be expected." Compare of men was greater at times, and Temperton v. Russell, 1 L. R. Q. B. at times showed some little dispo(1893), 715 (p. 75, below). So, as to sition to stop the plaintiff's door. the customers, the "threat" was The patrol proper at times went merely to refuse to deal with them; further than simple advice, not nor does the application of the rule obtruded beyond the point where seem affected by the mere extent the other person was willing to of the organization concerned in listen, and it was found that the the boycott, representing a pur- patrol would probably be continchasing power of $400,000 a week. ued if not enjoined. There was The same general observations also some evidence of persuasion apply also to Casey v. Cincinnati to break existing contracts." So Typographical Union, 45 Fed. Rep. far as these acts constituted an 1 See § 3. application of these remedies belongs to the subject of procedure, and lies beyond the scope of this treatise.1 The questions of greatest difficulty in this connection are as to the enticement to leave employment, poration from buying machinethe decision might be sustained hooped barrels and casks, such under the doctrine considered in customers to be SO dissuaded $10. There were dissenting opin- through fear, inspired by concerted ions by Field and Holmes, JJ., the action of the two organizations, latter of which is especially in- that the members of all the labor structive. See as to reference to organizations throughout the counMassachusetts and other statutes try, would be induced not to purmaking it "a criminal offense for chase any commodity that might one by intimidation or force to be packed in such machine-hooped prevent or seek to prevent a person barrels or casks. The dissenting from entering into or continuing opinion of Caldwell, J., though too in the employment of a person or declamatory in style for a judicial corporation." In Hopkins v. Oxley opinion, nevertheless seems to us Stave Co., 49 U. S. App. 709; s. c., to furnish by far the better reason, 83 Fed. Rep. 912 (8th Cir., 1897), and is rich in suggestion. In Temmembers of labor organizations perton v. Russell, 1 L. R. Q. B. (lodges of the "Coopers' Interna- (1893), 715, 726, where an action tional Union" and the "Trades against members of a joint comAssembly of Kansas City") were mittee of trades unions, for inducenjoined from conspiring to com- ing breaking of a contract with the pel a corporation engaged in the plaintiff, was sustained, the action manufacture of barrels and casks of the committee in notifying for packing purposes, to abandon members of the union to withdraw the use of hooping machines, this from the employment of the perobject to be accomplished by dis- son with whom the plaintiff had suading the customers of the cor- contracted, was declared illegal, tions, in 10 Pol. Sci. Quart. 189 (1895); by W. H. Dunbar, on "Government by Injunction," in 13 Law Quart. Rev. 347 (1897); by C. N. Gregory, on "Government by Injunction," in 11 Harv. Law Rev. 487 (1898). For a vigorous statement of objections arising under constitutional provisions securing the right of trial by jury, see dissenting opinion of Caldwell, J., in Hopkins v. Oxley Stave Co., 49 U. S. App. 709, 729; s. c., 83 Fed. Rep. 912, 925 (8th Cir., 1897). 1 The free application of the remedy of injunction to labor disputes, producing what has been characterized as "government by injunction," has been subjected to fierce criticism, involving a controversy which we consider it needless to here enter upon. Suggestive articles bearing on the subject are those by C. C. Allen on "Injunction and Organized Labor," in 28 Am. Law Rev. 828; 50 Alb. Law Jour. 140 (1894); by F. J. Stimson, on "The Modern Use of Injunc |