availability of the remedy by injunction in particular cases. The circumstance that the injuries in question are frequently the acts of considerable numbers of persons, and cover a though, as we have intimated with regard to similar cases, the point was not in the case. The court say: "These men had bound themselves to obey; and they knew that they had done so, and that if they did not obey, they would be fined or expelled from the union to which they belonged." But it may be said of this case, as of Barr v. Essex Trades Council, p. 74, above, that this was merely the enforcing against such men, of a contract that, so far as appears, was legal and voluntarily entered into. So in the following cases, notwithstanding the bewildering verbiage concerning "conspiracy," "threats," "coercion,” and the like, the action declared unlawful was merely that of employees in announcing their intention to induce persons not to deal with their employers or their customers, and it does not appear that there was any injury or threat of injury to person or property. Crump v. Commonwealth, 84 Va. 927, 940; S. C., 6 S. E. Rep. 620 (1888; see opinion of court below in 11 Va. Law Jour. 324); State v. Glidden, 55 Conn. 46, 69; s. c., 8 Atl. Rep. 890 (1887). Compare Old Dominion Steamship Co. v. McKenna, 30 Fed. Rep. 48 (Cir. Ct. N. Y., 1887). However it may have been as to the evidence, the court in Crump v. Commonwealth were, in our view, clearly in error in refusing to charge as requested, for instance, that if 'the alleged con spirators confined themselves to merely announcing to the patrons of B. Bros. (the employers) that they had stopped dealing with that firm, and would not deal with the patrons of said firm, and would get their friends to agree with them in their course,” then the prisoner was not guilty. In Jackson v. Stanfield, 137 Ind. 592; s. c., 36 N. E. Rep. 345 (1894), the facts were substantially the same as in Bohn Manuf. Co. v. Hollis, 54 Minn. 223; s. C., 55 N. W. Rep. 1119 (1893) (see p. 70, above), but a contrary result was reached, and the by-law held to operate as unlawful "coercion " upon the wholesale dealers, the court disapproving Bohn Manuf. Co. v. Hollis. Compare People v. Duke, 19 Misc. 292; s. c., 44 N. Y. Suppl. 336 (N. Y. Co. General Sessions, 1897). In Jackson v. Stanfield there is a dictum that the by-law operated as coercion upon the members of the association. In Perkins v. Pendleton, 90 Me. 166; s. c., 38 Atl. Rep. 96 (1897), an action for inducing a discharge from employment was sustained on allegations of "wilfully threatening, persuading, inducing and, by other overt acts, compelling” the employer, "against its will and without any desire on its part so to do, to discharge the said plaintiff from its employ." As urged by counsel, there was no allegation of "any threat of injury" or use of intimidation or force. considerable extent of territory, besides being frequently repeated, has within a comparatively recent period1 led to the extensive use of injunctions in the case of strikes and boycotts, and acts accompanying the same. 1 Thus, in Consolidated Steel & Wire Co. v. Murray, 80 Fed. Rep. 811, 827 (Cir. Ct. Ohio, 1897), it is said, citing Stimson's hand-book of the "Labor Law of the United States," that the remedy by injunction, as applied to labor disputes, is traced back to Springhead Spinning Co. v. Riley, 6 L. R. Eq. Cas. 551 (1868). And in so recent a decision as Mayer v. Journeymen Stonecutters' Assoc., 47 N. J. Eq. 519, 527; s. c., 20 Atl. Rep. 492 (1890), it is said with reference to "the effort to control employment and wages, by labor organizations," that "the industry, research and learning of the distinguished counsel of the complainants has furnished but one reported case where a court of equity has interfered to prevent or control the action of such organizations. All of the reported cases save three, referred to by counsel, were proceedings of a criminal nature, either by information or indictment.” Bearing in mind that the word "boycott was not used in any American decision prior to 1887 (see § 9, p. 42, above), there seems to be but a limited scope for the application of the following statement in Casey v. Cincinnati Typographical Union, 45 Fed. Rep. 135, 143 (Cir. Ct. Ohio, 1891): "No case has been cited where, upon a proper showing of facts, an unsuccessful appeal has been made to a court of chancery to restrain a boycott." The rules ap from contractual relations, to quit one's employment, an injunction against so quitting will not be granted. In Reynolds v. Everett, 144 N. Y. 189; s. c., 39 N. E. Rep. 72 (1894), the discretion of the court below was held properly exercised in refusing an injunction in favor of an employer against a strike, in the absence of elements of intimidation, especially as the acts complained of had been discontinued. But, proceeding on the theory of an implied agreement not to quit employment under certain conditions (see § 8), in Toledo, Ann Arbor, etc. Ry. Co. v. Pennsylvania Co., 54 Fed. Rep. 746 (Cir. Ct. Ohio, 1893), an injunction restraining railroad companies and their employees from refusing to extend to another railroad facilities for interchange of freight, was held violated by an engineer in the employ of one of the companies, in quitting his train on a main track ten miles from its destination. This is carrying the remedy to an extreme length, and goes far toward justifying the complaints against "government by injunction." The propriety of an injunction against inducing to quit employment has been recognized. Thus, in Toledo, Ann Arbor, etc. Ry. Co. v. Pennsylvania Co., 54 Fed. Rep. 730, 744 (Cir. Ct. Ohio, 1893), though the injunction was granted on the theory that the acts com 2 It being as a rule lawful, apart plained of constituted a boycott, plicable to injunctions generally are applicable here. A question of some difficulty has arisen in connection with the rather than a strike or a quitting of employment (for facts, see § 12), yet the court say that an injunction might have been granted against "directing the engineers to quit work, for the purpose of coercing the defendant companies to violate the law and complainant's rights." An injunction in this form, however, was not asked for. An injunction against inducing to quit employment was also granted in Coons v. Chrystie, N. Y. Law Jour, July 21, 1898 (Supm. Ct., Sp. T.). So in Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92; s. c., 44 N. E. Rep. 1077 (1896; for facts, see § 15), the acts enjoined included inducing to quit employment. So injunctions have been granted against inducing persons not to enter one's employment. Vegelahn v. Guntner, above; Blindell v. Hagan, 54 Fed. Rep. 40 (Cir. Ct. La., 1893); affirmed in Hagan v. Blindell, 13 U. S. App. 354; s. c., 56 Fed. Rep. 696 (5th Cir., 1893). Compare, under English statute against "watching or besetting," Lyons v. Wilkins, 1 L. R. Ch. (1896), 811 (and see § 14). So against boycotts, or inducing a refusal to deal (or threats thereof). Brace v. Evans, 3 Ry. & Corp. L. J. 561 (Allegheny Co., Pa., Com. Pl., 1888; for facts, see § 14); Hopkins v. Oxley Stave Co., 49 U. S. App. 709; s. c., 83 Fed. Rep. 912 (8th Cir., 1897; for facts, see § 15; applying the rule that, where the cause of action arises ex delicto, the injured party may sue either one or more of the joint wrong-doers); Toledo, Ann Ar bor, etc. Ry. Co. v. Pennsylvania Co., 54 Fed. Rep. 730, 744 (Cir. Ct. Ohio, 1893), above. In the case last cited the court say: "The interstate business of complainant will be interrupted and interfered with at every hour of the day and at every point within a radius of many miles." The case against the party seeking to enforce the rule, was strengthened by the fact that, at the time he issued or was about to issue his order, the injunction under consideration in 54 Fed. Rep. 746 (see above), had issued. A notable decision under this head is Barr v. Essex Trades Council, 53 N. J. Eq. 101, 127; s. c., 30 Atl. Rep. 881 (1894), where an injunction was allowed against the boycott of a daily newspaper by an extensive combination of labor unions. The court say: "Representations calculated to reduce the paper's circulation with the public, or to influence, by fear of loss of customers, the number or extent of advertisements, operate, not once for all, but, as it were, day by day, as the paper goes to and comes from the press, and each loss will be a distinctive cause of action. . When opposition through the agency of already-established organizations, reaching in their locality every part of the county, and in their membership almost every industry in prominent operation, comprising, in the territory in which the paper must look for its support, operatives of a purchasing power of $400,000 a week, is put on application of this remedy to injuries consisting of the mere use of words, whether spoken or written. It is obvious that such use of words may do great injury, so as to be action foot, when such an organization, not satisfied with its potential authority over its own members, appeals to the public to boycott the paper, to cease buying or advertising in it, with the significant suggestion that disregard of the appeal will bring upon such person the like opposition of the organizations, who can estimate or approximate the natural damage short of ruin? The legal remedy in this case thus not only involves multiplicity of suits, but the threatened damage seems irreparable." So the boycott of a newspaper was enjoined under similar conditions in Casey v. Cincinnati Typographical Union, 45 Fed. Rep. 135 (Cir. Ct. Ohio, 1891), it being held no defense that the representations of fact were true. On the other hand, in Longshore Printing Co. v. Howell, 26 Oreg. 527; s. c., 38 Pac. Rep. 547 (1894), an injunction against a boycott by members of trades unions, of the business of "lithographing, engraving, printing and publishing journals, newspapers, etc.," was refused on the ground that there did not appear such threatened and imminent injuries to the plaintiff's business and property, as would result in its irreparable detriment and loss, while conceding that the defendant might be liable in an action at law or criminally. There were allegations of a conspiracy between the officers and members of the union to compel the plaintiff to submit to its dictation, upon pain of being boycotted; of entry on the plaintiff's premises and ordering union men to cease work under penalty of being dealt with according to the regulations of the union; that the plaintiff lost, and apprehended loss of, important business through the wilful and malicious acts of the defendant; of circulation of facts of the plaintiff's employees being called off and ordered to stop work, and the plaintiff's office left without hands, it not being shown how these facts were circulated, or to whom they were communicated; of posting the following notice in conspicuous places: "Owing to the Longshore Printing Company breaking the rules of the Multnomah Typographical Union, all members of the union were withdrawn March 16, 1893." The court say (p. 552): "This may or may not have been detrimental to plaintiff's business, and would depend somewhat upon the state of siege existing at the time." So allegations of "secret assaults" upon the plaintiff, and of its patrons being "harassed" and "boycotted," were held insufficient as unaccompanied with statements of definite facts and circumstances. An injunction against a boycott was refused on the ground that the plaintiff did not come into court with clean hands, in Sinsheimer v. United Garment Workers, 77 Hun (N. Y.), 215; s. C., 28 N. Y. Suppl. 321 (1894; see § 12); but see decision below in able at law. And the remedy by injunction has been extended beyond mere bodily acts producing injury, to the use of words producing injury. But we are here confronted with the rule, supported by much authority, that an injunc 5 Misc. 448; s. c., 26 N. Y. Suppl. 152 (1893). It was refused in Sweeny v. Torrence, 11 Pa. Co. Ct. 497 (1892); Manufacturers' Outlet Co. v. Longley, – R. I. —; S. C., 37 Atl. Rep. 535 (1897), on the ground that the acts complained of were past acts. See also, as to injunctions against boycotts, Lewin v. Welsbach Light Co., 81 Fed. Rep. 904 (Cir. Ct. Pa., 1897). In Worthington v. Waring, 157 Mass. 421; s. C., 32 N. E. Rep. 744 (1892), an injunction against the blacklisting of employees was refused; but see explanation of the decision in 20 L. R. A. 342, note. Injunctions have been granted against the unlawful acts of striking employees or those acting in sympathy with them. Thus, in Coeur D'Alene Consolidated & Mining Co. v. Miners' Union, 51 Fed. Rep. 260 (Cir. Ct. Idaho, 1892), against labor unions and members thereof, restraining them from entering upon the complainant's mines or from interfering with the working thereof, or by the use of force, threats or intimidations, or by other means, from interfering with or preventing the complainant's employees from working upon its mines. The court say (p. 262): "The evidence justifies the conclusion that defendants are organized into associations wherein submission to stringent and arbitrary rules is required; that, by means approaching dictation, they have attempted to control employers in the selection of laborers and the wages to be paid them, and have discouraged and, as far as they could, prevented those who do not belong to their societies from procuring work; that by force, in one instance, they took complainant's laborers from its mine to their hall, where, upon such laborers so refusing to comply with their demands to join them and abide by their laws, they actually ordered their banishment from the State, and, in a manner deserving the most severe condemnation, enforced their lawless decree, and against men who, by reason of their birth and not through the grace of the government, were entitled to all the rights of American citizenship; that, in such numbers and under such circumstances as were menacing, they have requested non-union men to cease work, and to such have applied in an offensive and threatening manner most opprobious epithets, and in other ways have annoyed and vexed laborers who refused to join their associations." The court say (p. 265): "The threatened acts are such that their frequent occurrence might be expected, and to 1 See, for instance, Ryan v. Burger, etc. Brewing Co., 13 N. Y. Suppl. 660 (Supm. Ct., Gen. T., 1891). |