cepted the version as given by the detectives | making the sale in the sense of the statute. as true, and rejected that of the appellant. [2] The evidence was conflicting as to the existence of the sale, and the jury, having determined the question against the appellant, and that too upon substantial evidence, we cannot disturb the verdict unless some prejudicial error to the appellant was committed in the course of the trial. [3] The vigorous attacks in the brief of counsel for appellant made upon these detectives and their testimony were all very proper, and perhaps might have been very effective arguments to the jury, but they are of no avail here. This court has recently had occasion to say, in reference to similar attacks: "We are asked to scrutinize inconsistencies in the testimony that are inevitable in the record of every case, to destroy the weight and credibility of the testimony on account of the interest and character of the prosecuting witness, and reconcile the conflicts and resolve all doubts in favor of the defendant. This is all matter for argument to a jury, and it was their exclusive province to determine it. They have determined it against the defendant upon substantial evidence, and there it must end. There is no law forbidding the employment of detectives to aid in the discovery and suppression of crime. Such a method is not inherently bad. Its credibility and weight is therefore for the consideration of the jury." Duff v. State, 19 Ariz. -, 171 Pac. 133, 135. [4] The principal complaint of appellant seems to be that the court refused to charge the jury upon the issue of accomplice and corroboration. It is urged that one who buys liquor at an unlawful sale for the avowed purpose of procuring evidence upon which to instigate a criminal prosecution against the seller induces the seller to commit the crime of selling the liquor and so aids and abets in the commission of the crime, and that the purchaser is therefore an accomplice, and that his testimony must be corroborated. This contention is based upon our statute: "All persons concerned in the commission of a crime, whether it be a felony or misdemeanor, and whether they directly commit the act constituting the offense, or aid and abet in its commission, or, not being present, have advised and encouraged its commission * principals in any crime so committed." Penal Code 1913, par. 27. are "A conviction cannot be had on the testimony of an accomplice, unless he is corroborated by other evidence which, in itself, and without the aid of the testimony of the accomplice, tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense; and the corroboration is not sufficient if it merely shows the commission of the offense, or the circumstances thereof." Penal Code 1913, par. 1051. It is true that, in a far-away sense, the purchaser, by his offer to buy, induces the seller to make the sale, but he cannot be said to have "aided" or "abetted" the seller in The "aiding" or "abetting" contemplated by the statute is some positive act in aid of the commission of the offense-a force physical or moral joined with that of the perpetrator in producing it. The aider or abettor must stand in the same relation to the crime as the criminal, approach it from the same angle, touch it at the same point. Such is not the case with the purchaser. His approach to the crime is from the other side. The whole force, physical or moral, that goes to the production of the crime, as such, is the seller's. It is well to observe that the offense in question, the sale of intoxicating liquor, is bounded by the prohibition amendment creating it, and this amendment operates on and has force and effect against the persons therein named, and no other. The penalty of the law is denounced against the seller, and not the purchaser. We do not see how a mere purchaser who confines his participation in the transaction exclusively to the buying, and not to the selling, commits himself or exposes himself to conviction and punishment for selling the liquor as he would do were he an accomplice. No precedent and no authority has been shown for such a prosecution, although the prohibition amendment of this state has been in force for several years and many prosecutions have been had under it, most of which have been sustained by the testimony of the buyers. That such a prosecution has been unprecedented shows very strongly what has been understood to be the law upon the subject. It is our conclusion that a purchaser of liquor at an unlawful sale of such liquor-one who confines himself to the mere purchase and not to the selling—although he may have solicited such sale, is not a person "concerned in the commission of a crime" or an accomplice, and it has been so held in various jurisdictions under similar laws. 16 C. J. 683; Comm. v. Willard, 22 Pick. (Mass.) 476; State V. Teahan, 50 Conn. 92; Wakeman v. Chambers, 69 Iowa, 169, 28 N. W. 498, 58 Am. Rep. 218; State v. Gesell, 137 Minn. 41, 43, 162 N. W. 683. We need not stop to consider whether or not the testimony of the detectives was corroborated by other testimony in the case. They were not accomplices, and therefore corroboration is not in the case. [5] For the same reason, it was not error for the court to refuse a charge to the effect that "the testimony of an accomplice ought to be viewed with caution and distrust." The court, however, did charge the jury to the effect that if they found that the witnesses Shackley, Penturf, and Whitney were detectives and bought the liquor from the appellant for the purpose of securing evidence upon which to instigate a criminal prosecution against him, such facts or circumstances were proper for their consideration in weighing the testimony of such witnesses. We think that this was all that the appellant was entitled to upon that subject. was seen drunk, and that they collected money from others for the purpose of buying whisky to be drunk at a dance-all bad enough, it is true. But evidence of this character was not admissible to impeach the witnesses. These peccadillos were not felonies, and, furthermore, the reputation or character of a witness may not be proven by particular instances of misconduct. The proof is confined to the general reputation of the witness concerning the trait involved. 40 Cyc. 2607, and cases cited. [6] Another complaint is based upon the fact that a small keg of whisky was found in a building owned by the appellant and used by him in connection with the business of conducting his pool hall, where, it is claimed, he sold the liquor to the detectives, and that the jury was instructed that that fact might | be considered by them in arriving at their verdict. The objection seems to be compound, to the introduction of the keg of whisky as evidence as well as to the instruction. Waiving all informality in this assignment, we do not think there was error in either respect. The argument of the appellant is that the liquor in the keg was of a different kind or brand, that in the bottle being Bourbon and that in the keg rye whisky. They were both whisky, and the finding of the keg upon the premises used by the appellant in connection with his business at the pool hall We are compelled to call attention to the made it admissible in evidence and proper for omission of counsel to comply with the statthe jury to consider in arriving at their ver-ute and the rules of this court on the subdict. Porras v. State, 19 Ariz. -, 166 Pac.ject of assignment of errors: 288. We have examined the other instructions requested and refused, but we find no error in such refusal. A large percentage of these instructions are based upon the assumption that the detectives were accomplices. The instructions given, taken as a whole, were very clear and correct, and none were of such a character as to give appellant any just or legal cause for complain. [7-9] The court limited the number of witnesses testifying to the good character of the appellant to seven, and this action is assigned as error. The general rule is that a trial court, in the exercise of a sound and reasonable discretion, has the power to limit the number of witnesses who shall testify to a particular fact. 1 Thompson on Trials (2d Ed.) par. 353; 5 Jones on Evidence, par, 814. This rule is recognized by statute in some states, and has been frequently approved independent of any statute in other states, in both criminal and civil cases. 5 Jones on Evidence, par. 900. In this case seven witnesses were allowed to testify as to the good character of the appellant, and such testimony was in no wise controverted by the prosecution. In the interest of economy of time and the orderly dispatch of the business of the court we do not believe that the action of the court in limiting the number of witnesses to seven was prejudicial to the appellant nor an abuse of the discretion of the court. [10] Further complaint is made that the court erred in excluding testimony of the alleged misconduct of certain witnesses for the prosecution to the effect that they had sold whisky themselves to women, that one of them had stolen a dog, for which he was arrested and convicted, that one of them [11] Appellant assigns as error the refusal of the court to admit testimony as to the general reputation of appellant for truth and veracity. The reputation of appellant in this respect was not attacked by the prosecution at any time during the course of the trial, and evidence to sustain his credibility, under the circumstances, was not admissible. 40 Cyc. 2556, and cases cited. "The brief shall contain a statement of the case, and assignment of the errors relied upon, separately stated, and the argument and authorities in support thereof." Revised Statutes 1913, par. 1261; subdivision 2, rule 4 (126 Pac. 7). Instead of separately assigning the errors, they are indiscriminately intermingled throughout the brief with the argument, requiring the court to make a diligent search of the entire brief to locate the alleged errors, all of which would have been obviated by an observance of the statute and the rules. If any assignment has been overlooked, it is the fault of the appellant. However, we believe that we have noticed the principal or controlling assignments. Perceiving no reversible error in the record, the judgment is affirmed. CUNNINGHAM, C. J., and HENRY D. ROSS, J., concur. JENKINS v. IRVIN. (No. 1616.) (Supreme Court of Arizona. Feb. 1, 1919.) 1. PLEADING 205(2)-DEMURRER-CONCLUSIONS OF LAW-SURPLUSAGE. the fact that there are unnecessary allegations, Where complaint is sufficient in substance, or some conclusions of law in addition to the necessary allegations, does not render it vulnerable to general demurrer. 2. TRIAL 59(2)-ORDER OF PROOF-ALTERATIONS IN WRITING. of contract authorizing sale of land containing In agent's action for commission, admission interlineations, and thereafter admitting explanation of the apparent alteration, was within the discretion of the court. For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes 178 P.-3 3. BROKERS 81 NECESSARY PARTIES SUBAGENTS. Where agent for sale of land had privately agreed with third person to divide commission with him, such third person was neither a necessary nor a proper party to an action for com have been sustained. We would not recommend the complaint as a model to be follow. ed, but any criticism of it would not be for a defect of substance. It contains all of the allegations of a legal contract of agency to sell real estate and, in addition, full performance by appellee. That there were some unnecessary allegations, or some conclusions WAIVER of law in addition to the necessary allegations, did not make the complaint vulnerable to general demurrer. mission; the owner of the land not being in privity with him. Assuming that defect of parties was created by failure of agent for sale of land, in action for commission, to make one with whom he had agreed to share the commission a party, the landowner could not avail himself of the defect where he failed to make objection to the defect in the answer as required by Civ. Code 1913, § 469. 5. APPEAL AND ERROR ERRORS-FINDINGS OF FACT. [2] It is next urged the court erred in admitting in evidence "the written authority of appellee to sell the land in question," for the reason it had been materially altered after its execution by appellant. This assignment is based upon a question of fact which the 219(2)-WAIVER OF court must have resolved against appellant. If the alteration had been confessed, its materiality would be a question of law and properly before us for decision under this assignment, but it was denied that any alteration had taken place, and upon the evidence submitted the court found the fact against appellant's contention and admitted the contract in evidence. The fact that the apparent alteration by interlineation was explained aft One who failed to request findings, under Civ. Code 1913, § 528, could not on appeal complain that the court made no findings of fact, or that he failed to find on all the material is sues. Appeal from Superior Court, Maricopa County; R. C. Stanford, Judge. Action by John L. Irvin against A. R. Jen-er the admission of the contract, rather than kins. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant before, was not prejudicial error, as the orappeals. Affirmed. der of proof was within the court's discretion. Hubert W. Clark, of Phoenix, for appellant. HENRY D. ROSS, J. This is an action by appellee for commissions for effecting a sale of land for appellant under a written contract of employment. It was tried by the court without a jury, and from a judgment favorable to appellee appellant appeals. [3, 4] Appellant complains because the court, at the conclusion of appellee's case, overruled his motion to dismiss. His ground for the motion was that, according to the evidence, one Hughes was interested in the commissions for making the sale and should have been made a party. Hughes was the person who brought the appellant and the purchaser together. At the time he was Working for appellee, and was sent by appellee with the purchaser to appellant's land. Because Hughes' compensation was to be a moiety of the commission agreed to be paid Irvin, the appellee, it is contended by appellant that he should have been made a party to the suit. Under the evidence, the contract of agency was with the appellee, and appellant owed no duty or obligation to appellee's employés, or servants, or subagents to see that they were paid for their services, nor were they privity to the contract between the The rules of the court were very indifferently observed by appellant in the making and presenting of his assignment of error, and the temptation to sustain appellee's objections thereto is withstood only because we prefer to decide each case upon its merits, if we can reasonably ascertain from the brief as a whole the errors complained of and are satisfied that appellant has not purposely or knowingly ignored the rules. Will say, without restating here what the rules and statutes require, that there are a number of propositions of law and criticisms scattered throughout appellant's brief, but just what was in-appellant and appellee so as to make them tended as assignments of error and what as argument is most difficult to determine by an inspection of the brief. What was said in Baumgartner v. State, 178 Pac. 30, just decided, in regard to the assignments, might well be said of this record. Of the many propositions or assignments, we will review those that we consider of sufficient merit. [1] It is contended by the appellant that his general demurrer to the complaint should either a necessary or proper party. In any event, appellant is in no position to urge the point, not having raised it in his answer. Under the statutes (section 468, subd. 4, Civil Code of 1913), a defect of parties, when it appears upon the face of the complaint, should be raised by demurrer, or if it does not appear upon the face of the complaint, it is provided by section 469, Id., that the objection may be taken thereto by answer. Appellant was cognizant of Hughes' connection For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes with the transaction all the time from the date he introduced appellant to the purchaser up to the filing of his answer, and even if his contention possessed the merits of truth, he injects it in the case too late to be of any avail. [5] There is nothing in the appellant's complaint that the court made no findings of fact, or that he failed to find on all the material issues raised by the pleadings. If appellant had wanted findings, he should have requested them. Section 528, Civil Code of 1913. We are unable to find the court committed any error prejudicial to the rights of appellant, and therefore the judgment is affirmed. Action by C. F. Roberson and others against William H. Draney and others. There was a judgment for plaintiffs, and defendants appeal. Reversed and remanded. C. R. Hollingsworth and H. H. Henderson, both of Ogden, for appellants. John G. Willis, of Ogden, for respondents. FRICK, C. J. The plaintiffs C. F. Roberson, Margaret Kay, Louis K. Bitton, Joseph Ballantyne, Joseph Williams, L. B. Young, Davis, and Lincoln Lumber Company, a corJoseph E. Storey, Bredgey Sammon, David E. poration, as stockholders of the Lincoln-Kemmerer Coal Company, brought this action for the benefit of themselves and for the benefit CUNNINGHAM, C. J., and BAKER, J., of other stockholders, against said last-nam concur. 2. CORPORATIONS 30(3)-STOCK ISSUED TO PROMOTERS-LIABILITY. Where an entryman on public coal lands, being unable to pay the price required by the government, induced three, others to organize a corporation, to which it was proposed to transfer the entries in return for stock, and the several parties agreed as to the proportions in which the stock was to be distributed, held that other stockholders cannot recover from the three promoters, where the transaction resulted in a profit to the corporation, and its stock was worth at least par by reason of the lands conveyed; it being immaterial that such promoters reaped greater profits than other purchasers of shares. ed company and against William H. Draney, Charles H. Gosling, and T. D. Ryan, individually and as officers and directors of such company, and against F. Julius Anderson, for an accounting, to have a receiver appointed to take charge of the affairs of said company, and to require each one of said Anderson, Draney, Gosling, and Ryan to surrender for cancellation, and to have canceled, certain stock certificates issued to them by said company-each one of said Draney, Gosling, and Ryan to surrender 300 shares, and said Anderson to surrender 600 shares, making 1,500 shares in all-and for general relief. In view, however, that no relief was obtained against said Anderson, and since nothing is claimed against him on this appeal, he, hereinafter, will be considered only to the extent that he was a party to and connected with the transactions material to this controversy. The pleadings are necessarily long, and, in view that the questions to be decided can be stated without specifically setting forth the issues therein contained, we shall not refer to them further. The evidence is also very voluminous, but, for the reason that ultimately there was only one question considered and determined by the trial court, not all of what was presented to that court is material on this appeal. After the close of plaintiffs' case the trial court eliminated everything except two questions, which, stating them in its own language, are as follows: "My view of the matter is this: That the only issues in this case are with respect to the increase of the capitalization and with respect to the issuance of the 1,500 shares of stock: in other words, whether or not I ought to require that stock to be returned, or whether or not I ought to declare the amendment, by which the capitalization of the company was increased, void. Those are the only issues in this case." After the evidence was all in, the court, in summing up the same, however, eliminated Appeal from District Court, Weber Coun- the question with respect to the "increase of ty; A. E. Pratt, Judge. the capitalization" mentioned in its statement For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes we have quoted, and hence determined the (tain all of the provisions agreed upon by Ansingle question whether the 1,500 shares of stock issued to Draney, Gosling, Ryan, and Anderson should be canceled. The court arrived at the conclusion that only 900 shares of that amount were improperly issued, and hence should be canceled, namely, that the 300 shares issued to Draney and a like number of shares issued to Gosling, and a like number issued to Ryan, should be canceled, and that the 600 shares issued to Anderson were properly issued and should not be canceled. We have made this preliminary statement in the hope of affording the reader a better understanding of the controlling facts, which, briefly stated, are as follows: derson, Draney, Gosling, and Ryan. For example, it was agreed that the corporation should be capitalized for $250,000, to be divided into 2,500 shares of the par value of $100 each, yet the writing was silent with respect to that. The evidence also shows that the plaintiff Margaret Kay was interested in having the corporation formed, and that she rendered Anderson some assistance in interesting Draney, Gosling, and Ryan in the enterprise and in disposing of some of the corporate stock to others, for which Anderson compensated her in giving her 10 shares of the capital stock, and for which services she was otherwise compensated, as hereinafter indicated. She was, however, not a party to the agreement between Anderson and Draney, Gosling, and Ryan. Mrs. Kay was, however, one of the original incorporators. On the 29th day of August, 1914, and pursuant to the foregoing agreement, articles of incorporation were adopted, signed, and on the 1st day of September following, duly filed. The incorporators were Draney, Gosling, Ryan, Anderson, and Mrs. Kay. Each one of the four first named subscribed for 22 shares of the capital stock of the par value of $2,200, while Margaret Kay subscribed for 25 shares of the par value of $2,500, making in all 113 shares of the par value of $11,300. The capital stock was, however, limited in the articles of corporation to $50,000, divided into 500 shares of the par value of $100 each. As before stated, however, the agreement and understanding between Anderson and Draney, Gosling, and Ryan was that the corporation should be capitalized at $250,000. The reason why that agreement was not fulfilled at the time is, however, clearly explained by Mr. Ryan who testified: In the spring of 1914 the defendant F. Julius Anderson, hereinafter called Anderson, was interested in certain coal entries or locations on government coal lands lying in the state of Wyoming. Anderson had made several entries or locations under the federal laws relating to coal lands. The time to purchase being about to expire, on at least some of the entries, he induced his brother John Anderson and one Dr. E. A. Edlen, to relocate some of the claims, and in that way to obtain additional time within which to make payment to the government for the coal lands. Anderson had expended considerable labor and some money in making the developments on the coal lands, and had incurred other obligations for labor, etc., but he did not have the necessary money to pay therefor, and unless payment was made within the time required by law the coal entries would lapse, and he would forfeit all of his rights thereto. In order to avoid such a result, Anderson sought some person or persons with sufficient means to pay the government price for the lands, or to form a corporation to take them over and to develop them into a mine, and to work the same. With that end in view he was introduced to the defendant Ry-certained that we didn't have sufficient money an, who, in turn, introduced him to the other two defendants, Gosling and Draney, all of whom lived in Ogden, Utah. The three last named talked the matter over with Anderson, and they went to Wyoming to inspect the coal entries. After doing so, on the 2d day of May, 1914, Anderson, Draney, Gosling, and Ryan entered into an agreement in writing, whereby it was, in substance, agreed that the three last named would promote a corporation to take over the coal lands in Wyoming; that upon the organization of the corporation there should be issued to said Anderson $150,000 worth of the capital stock of said corporation, of which amount the three, Draney, Gosling, and Ryan, agreed to purchase, "for the sum of one dollar and other good and valuable consideration," $90,000 worth of the stock. It is clear from the evidence and from what subsequently took place that the foregoing agreement did not con "We were incorporated for $50,000, and afterwards increased the stock to $250,000. Our idea was to incorporate for $250,000, but we as to pay in the 10 per cent. of the capitalization, so we organized for $50,000, with the intention of amending the articles as soon as possible a stockholders' meeting held at the office of Mr. thereafter, which we did on September 5th, at Hollingsworth." The evidence is conclusive on that point. The stockholders' meeting was held as stated by Mr. Ryan, and the articles were accordingly amended, and the capital stock was increased from $50,000, divided into 500 shares, to $250,000, divided into 2,500 shares of the par value of $100 each. While there was considerable dispute at the trial with respect to whether all of the stockholders were present at the foregoing meeting, the evidence leaves no room for even a reasonable doubt that all were present and consented to what was done. There was also much controversy at the hearing, and counsel still disagree, with respect to who were the stockholders at the |