The first object was an examina, tion into our refources of money, of men, and of the probability of ufing them effectually. ft. Our refources arofe from our trade, manufactures, and population. ́ 2d, From our allies, their will and power to ferve the common caufe, And, 3d. The principles of the war, and our conduct in it: upon that all eyes would be turned; and by retaining the character of moderation and juftice, we could alone procure the refources of vigour, wifdom, and prudence. Thefe were most effential parts of our refources; for if it fhould turn out, as minifters afferted, that we had entered upon the war with vigour, and conducted ourselves with prudence and moderation, if a system of wifdom and vigour was productive of fuch calamities, the refult would be abfolute defpair. An inquiry muft, in this view, be favourable to minifters; if they had thus acted, it was manifeft the caufe of failure lay in the principle itfelf, not in them. But if they had not acted with wifdom and vigour, it might be feen that the principle was good, though the conduct had been defective. They muft, upon inquiry, either change the principle, or cenfure the conduct; and it was highly neceffary to afcertain this effential truth. With respect to the first branch of his inquiry, it was impoffible to ftate the lofs of men we had incurred, independently of thofe loft by the allies. The accounts of the loffes amongst the British troops, he stated as extremely erroneous and defective. it, he asked, true, in the only documents which we received of the proceedings in France, that more than 60,0co men had furrendered as prifoners of war during the laft campaign? If this was true, what diffused through the country, from the idea that the house of commons was not the representative of the people; and what better argument could diffatisfied perfons have, than to fay that at fuch a moment the houfe of commons did not attempt to bring the executive government to account, or inquire into the measures which had uniformly produced fuch calamity and difafter? This argument would be ftrengthened by the general defire for peace. If, when the public mind was fo changed, the house should continue to repofe a blind confidence in minifters, to impofe new burdens on the people, not only without driving minifters to negotiation, but even without requiring them to account for the blood and treafure they had fquandered,-and fhould further refift a motion for inquiring into the ufe they had made of the confidence already granted to them,-great advantages must be given to whoever wished to diffeminate diffatisfaction. If it were poffible for the minifters of Great Britain to perfevere in their mea fures under fuch a series of difafters, not only without refponfibili ty, but even without inquiry, the most just accufation against defpotic governments would be applicable to this, and the advocates for the British conftitution would be deprived of their beft arguments in its defence. Nothing more was, he thought, neceffary, than to ftate to the house, that after a war of two years we had been uniformly unfuccefsful, had loft the object for which the war was faid to be undertaken, while the enemy had gained more than the wildeft imaginations ever afcribed either to their ambition or principles. An inquiry, fuch as was neceffary, divided itfelf into various branches. Was muft must be the mortality? The fate of British population ought to be afcertained before the houfe confented to new drains of blood. This country had not, Mr. Fox faid, increafed in population in proportion to the increase of wealth; and, in confirmation of this, he appealed to a paper then on the table, containing an account of the houfes paying taxes to government, from which it appeared that the number had not materially increafed fince 1777. This fact appeared fo extraordinary to thofe who faw houfes every where ftarting up, that inquiry had been made into the truth; and it was found, that though many were built, they were not of a kind that paid taxes; and that though the number of houfes had increafed in Middlefex and Lancafiire, other counties had decreafed in proportion. The next argument repecting our refources was, that we had already funded 60,000,000l. which, with the unfunded debt, would make the fum we had fpent in the prefent war between fixty and feventy millions, We had raised taxes little fhort of three millions of perpetual burden on the people, which, however laid, were felt by all claffes. What was the extent of the burdens to be im. pofed next year? It was fit, before plunging the country into fresh expences, to prove its means were equal to fuch a demand, Our refources had been faid to be fupported by the manufactures and trade of the country:-the exports of the country were far fhort of what took place in 1792; and the diminution of trade, ftated to have taken place in Lancashire, was to an aftonishing extent. The decreafe in population in that county had in fome parishes been onehalf in others one-third, and in 9 none fo little as one-fourth. In the largest parish of Manchester, the decreafe of births had been onehalf; and the whole went to an extent that affected the population no iefs than 12,000 fouls. Surely then it was neceffary to inquire whether we could find the neceffary numbers to recruit our ar mies. With refpect to our trade, he thought it unable to bear the enormous weight of infurance, which was as high as when we contended with America, France, Spain, and Holiand united; and to fome parts of Spain the trade, on account of the infurance, was altogether stopped. Our next point of refource was our foreign alliances. Who were our allies? The conduct of the king of Pruffia demanded an inquiry from the country. If he was no longer our ally, what became of the treaty of 1788, by which he was obliged to furnish 30,000 men? and this obligation had justified the treaty of 1793, by which we gave him 1,200,000l. to furnith 60,000. Why did he leave the allies in the midst of the campaign? and what was become of the treaty of 1788 Was he an ally? was he neutral? or was he an enemy? Perhaps the monarch of Pruffia might urge, that, as the war was undertaken against jacobinical principles, he rendered the greatest fervice to the allies by the attack against Poland. If so, we had given 1,200,000l. to fubdue Poland; for he had said he could do nothing without a fubfidy; and if he was again to be confidered as an ally, he must again be fubfidifed. With refpect to the emperor, we were to give him four or fix millions, which ever he pleafed to accept, without having even the fame tie upon him as we had upon Pruffia; and if he chofe chafe to withdraw in the middle of a campaign, we could not, and had no check on his conduct. What was, however, ftill more material, was, that next year he would be equally unable to move without, another loan; and Great Britain muft fuftain the whole weight of the war. Though great fubfidies were paid to the Italian princes, we fcarcely heard of a movement in that country; and as to Sardinia, would its neutrality not have been as ferviceable to us as the diverfion it had made? Spain had loft Navarre, Bifcay, and Catalonia; and her finances were in fuch a ftate, that they muft either call for a fubfidy, or make peace with the enemy. All this called for inquiry. It was the duty of the houfe to inquire whether our conduct had been fuch, fince the commencement of the war, as entitled us to the good opinion of the vir-, tuous and enlightened part of mankind. With refpect to America, after taking her fhips, we had agreed to pay for the damage he had fuftained. To the court of Denmark we had fent repeated memorials complaining of her neutrality; the prudent anfwers to, which had raised the character of M. Bernstorff higher than that of any former Danifh minifter. After repeatedly bullying the grand duke of Tufcany, we had not only fubmitted to his neutrality, but to his concluding a treaty of peace and amity with the French convention. We had prefumed to direct the Swifs cantons to decline their neutrality, and had been anfwered, that they would preferve a neutrality, which his Britannic majefty had often commended, and even acknowledged as an obligation. We had ufed the most unjust menace, and the most meanly ex preffed, towards Genoa; but, after blockading the port, had withdrawn our fhips, with an ungracious apology for the infult we had offered. Mr. Fox next infifted upon the neceffity of a specific avowal of the object of the war. Minifters fhould, he faid, either declare the form of government in France immaterial, and that we fought to repel an unprovoked aggreffion, and to protect the Dutch, or, according to the idea of Mr. Burke, we fhould have declared that we took up arms for the restoration of monarchy in France, and of the emigrants to their property, and the re-establishment, of ancient inititutions. Through a childish hope of grafping the advantage of both plans, minifters had not, however, gained the advantage of either. We had fo fhuffled and trimmed in our profes fions, that no party would flock to our ftandard. When Condé and Valenciennes furrendered, they were taken poffefion of in the name of the emperor. The garrifon of Mentz was fent to fight against the royalifts of La Vendée. The islands taken in the Weft Indies were not taken poffeffion of for Louis XVII. but for ourselves, to be retained as conquests, if the chance of war permitted. Could it then be imagined that any emigrant, whofe fituation was not deiperate, would join us, or that all who loved their country better than royalty, would not be against us? Had the allies been fighting either for or against France, what should have been their conduct towards Fayette and Dumouriez? The treatment of the first by the Auftrians would damn. their name to eternal infamy; and after extolling the virtue of Dumouriez at a time when it became extremely doubtful, he was treated as if a decree had paffed, prohibite ing a French general from coming over to the allies in future. Had they been fighting for France againft the convention, they ought to have praised Dumouriez as a convert, and held him up as an example. If they were fighting against France, they fhould have confidered all Frenchmen as enemies, in the common acceptation of the term; and by denouncing vengeance for crimes, as lord Auckland had done in a paper published at the Hague, given ground for that enthufiafm of refiftance, which arofe in men who thought their lives, as well as liberties, in danger. If the allies were fighting for the restoration of monarchy, &c. they ought not to have begun with thundering forth an infenfate impotent manifefto, threatening deftruction to Paris and all its inhabitants. If we were fight ing for France, we ought to have published to its people that we had no views of aggrandifement, much lefs of difmembering the kingdom, and taking vengeance of the inhabitants. The terrifying of France by indifcriminate threats, he thought a fundamental error. To be convinced of the propriety of making an inquiry into this, it was only neceffary for all who heard him to ask themselves whether it was poffible, that if the conven tion fhould refufe any thing like reasonable terms of peace, they could call forth fuch exertions from the people as the idea of no alter native but victory or fubjugation had enabled them to do. The lef. fer errors of the war, which he would name, were the lofs of Toulon, owing to the fmallness of the garrifon left there, in order to fend as many troops as poffible to the Weft Indies, while this expedition was crippled by collecting troops for a descent on the coaft of France, which had not yet been found practicable. The error of the lait campaign was confidence in the king of Pruffia, the Belgians, and the Dutch. The laft were drawn by us into a war, which they had no inclination to undertake, even in defence of the Scheldt. When we were driven out of the Netherlands, and the United Provinces were to be defended, the Dutch joined in welcoming the French and this we ought to have forefeen. In the naval part of the campaign, Mr. Fox contended that the captures by the enemy were greater than in any former war, and our trade not greater in proportion. In the fecond year after France took part in the Ame rican war, the number of captures was 499. In the fecond year of this war, when we had France alone to contend with, the number was 860. So much delay had arifen in preparing our fleet for fea, that the French had been for two months masters of the fea; and after they had been ready to fail, it was faid they were further detained for want of bifcuit, which it was neceffary to fend after them by land carriage. All this demanded inquiry. Mr. Fox adverted to his opinions refpecting the Netherlands, Holland, and the king of Pruffia, at the commencement of the war. He was then told what he faid was a libel upon our allies. Experience had, indeed, proved that it contained what had been deemed the ftrongest ingredient of libel,-truth. Upon the fame occafion he had adverted to Ireland*, but was told, "touch not Ireland;" the present irritated ftate of that country he afcribed, however, folely to the * The reader will find the affairs of Ireland difcuffed at full length in the 6th chapter. mifcon mifconduct of minifters. He might be told that earl Fitzwilliam had gone beyond his inftructions; but this he did not believe. However this might be, the danger from the irritation of the country was the fame; and if the house refused an inquiry into the circumftances, they might make themselves re1ponsible for the difmemberment of Ireland. He was, he faid, aware, that, in fuch motions as the prefent, it might be faid, that as the ultimate object of an inquiry was the removal of minifters, why not as well at once move for their removal? He would not do fo, becaufe, in the prefent ftate of affairs, he thought inquiry fhould precede a motion for their removal, which should however follow, if the inquiry was gone into. With fuch men and fuch meafures, fuccefs was not, he thought, to be hoped for. Minifters had never decided whether they were making war for France, or upon France; and their conduct towards Ireland had been precisely fimilar. After defcribing the minifter as in rebus politicis, nihil fimplex, nihil apertum, nihil fincerum, Mr. Fox concluded a fpeech of uncommon brilliancy and energy, by moving "that the house do refolve itself into a committee on the state of the nation." When the reader adverts to the length of Mr. Fox's fpeech, the vaft variety of topics which it embraced, and the flight allufion which it contained to the affairs of Ireland, he will doubtlefs be aftonished, when he is told that Mr. Pitt reprefented the whole of what had been brought forward by Mr. Fox, as done for the fole purpofe of introducing the prefent fituation of Ireland. Beginning with that, therefore, he would contend that there was, upon every principle of poli cy, the strongest reafon that the houfe fhould negative the motion. He would admit that there was reafon to regret fome occurrences which had taken place in Ireland; but when the affair was fully inveftigated, it would be found that no blame attached to his majefty's fervants here. More than this he could not at prefent fay, except. that if the fifter-kingdom was in fuch a ftate of ferment and irrita tion, it was the ftrongeft reason poffible against an inquiry at prefent. Such an inquiry could not be made without the production of a variety of papers, which could not poffibly be made public at prefent. If the probable effects of the embarrassments and irritation of Ireland were fuch (as had been ftated) that we fhould not have a cordial co-operation from Ireland, was it likely they would procure us a better peace, for the immediate neceffity of which they had been adduced as arguments? The dangers were, however, he contended, nothing near fo great as had been reprefented. The house would feel that the business of the Roman catholics in Ireland, which had been referred to, could not with propriety be difcuffed in an English houfe of commons. It was productive of danger to them, and proclaiming to the enemy the difficulties under which we laboured at home. Would the houfe proclaim a danger with refpect to themfelves, which, if not proclaimed, might, in fact, have no exiftence? He had no complaint to make of the fubjects selected for inquiry: if the house was convinced of the necefity of an inquiry, they were certainly the most important points for confideration. In fuch a cafe, however, was there any thing, however diftantly related to external or inter nal |