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CHAPTER V

THE TREATY OF PARIS

49. The Spanish-American War. The advent of the United States in the Philippines was an incident of the Spanish-American War. This war had its origin in Cuba. War against Spain was declared on April 19, 1898, by the passage of the so-called Teller Resolution, which provided that the people of the Island of Cuba were, and of right ought to be, free and independent, that the Government of Spain should relinquish its authority over the Island, that the United States disclaimed any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty over the Island, except for its pacification, and that once that work was finished it would leave the government of Cuba in control of its people. The declaration of war found Admiral Dewey in Hongkong ready and anxious to destroy the Spanish fleet at Manila. Upon the final break, he received the order to proceed to Manila. There was fought the naval Battle of Manila Bay on May 1, 1898, which made Dewey famous in history.

At this time General Aguinaldo was in Singapore anxiously awaiting the carrying out of the promised reforms by Spain. The Filipino leader saw his opportunity in the SpanishAmerican War. There was a chance to renew the old fight against Spain. America had declared war on Spain to free the Cuban people. The Philippines were also preparing to renew with greater force the fight against Spain. In fact, even while General Aguinaldo was still away, some of the Filipino revolutionists had begun to fight.

50. Determination to Retain the Philippines. - - With the Spanish forces defeated in Cuba, Porto Rico, and the Philippines, it was necessary for the United States to determine what to do with the Philippine Islands. It was deemed inadvisable either to return the Philippines to Spain, to

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President of the United States at the time of the acqui

sition of the Philippines by the United States, and
largely responsible for the American Philippine policy

turn them over to the Filipino Revolutionary Government, or to cede them to another power. The only remaining course was for the United States to take the Philippines.

There were undoubtedly many reasons which induced the

United States to retain the Philippine Islands. American public opinion was influenced by patriotic, humanitarian, religious, and commercial motives. A course which would best subserve the interests of the Filipino people, which would guard their welfare, and which would lead to their eventual political emancipation, while, at the same time, permitting American trade expansion in the Orient, had probably the strongest influence.

An intimate knowledge of President McKinley's position in regard to the Philippines is disclosed in a description of an interview with the President, as given by different writers on the Philippines:

"Before you go I should like to say just a word about the Philippine business. I have been criticized a good deal about the Philippines, but I don't deserve it. The truth is, I didn't want the Philippines, and when they came to us, as a gift from the gods, I did not know what to do with them. When the Spanish war broke out, Dewey was at Hongkong, and I ordered him to go to Manila, and he had to; because, if defeated, he had no place to refit on that side of the globe, and if the Dons were victorious they would likely cross the Pacific and ravage our Oregon and California coasts. And so he had to destroy the Spanish fleet, and did it! But that was as far as I thought then. When next I realized that the Philippines had dropped into our lap, I confess that I did not know what to do with them. I sought counsel from all sides - Democrats as well as Republicans - but got little help. I thought first we would take only Manila; then Luzon; then other islands, perhaps all. I walked the floor of the White House night after night until midnight; and I am not ashamed to tell you, gentlemen, that I went down on my knees and prayed Almighty God for light and guidance, more than one night.

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"And one night late it came to me this way I don't know how it was, but it came: (1) That we could not give them back to Spain - that would be cowardly and dishonorable; (2) that we could not turn them over to France or Germany - that would be bad business and discreditable; (3) that we would not leave them to themselves - they were unfit for self-government and they would soon have anarchy and misrule over there worse than Spain's was; and (4) that there was nothing left for us to do but to take them all, and to educate the Filipinos, and uplift and civilize and Christianize them, and, by God's grace, do the very best we could by them, as our fellowmen for whom Christ also died. And then I went to bed, and went to sleep, and slept soundly, and the next morning I sent for the chief engineer of the War Department (our map maker), and told him to put the Philippines on the map of the United States" (pointing to a large map on the wall of his office); "and there they are, and there they will stay while I am president!" 1

51. Instructions to the Peace Commissioners. The five American commissioners appointed to negotiate the final treaty with Spain were: William R. Day, ex-Secretary of State; Cushman K. Davis, chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations; William P. Frye and George Gray, members of the same committee; and Whitelaw Reid, former minister of the United States to France.

Five weeks after the signing of the protocol, President McKinley handed to the American commissioners the instructions that would guide them in negotiating the treaty of peace. The President first explained the attack on Manila, saying that notice of the protocol was sent as soon as possible,

1 Devins, An Observer in the Philippines, pages 69-71; Stuntz, The Philippines and the Far East, pages 143, 144.

but that when it reached the Islands, Manila had already been taken. Manila was, therefore, according to the Administration's viewpoint, held by the United States not primarily by virtue of the protocol but by conquest. "In view of what has taken place," the instructions continued, "it is necessary now to determine what shall be our future relations to the Philippines. Before giving you specific instruction on this subject it is my desire to present certain general considerations." President McKinley then reiterated the humane objects of the war. "It is my earnest wish," he said, "that the United States in making peace should follow the same high rule of conduct which guided it in facing war. The luster and the moral strength attaching to a cause which can be properly rested upon the considerate judgment of the world should not under any illusion of the hour be dimmed by ulterior designs which might tempt us into excessive demands or into adventurous departure on untried paths." A succeeding paragraph would indicate that Mr. McKinley. was not blind to his people's vision of commercial greatness. Then as a logical sequence of the foregoing considerations came a demand in the form of "the cession in full right and sovereignty of the island of Luzon."

The Spanish and American commissioners met in Paris on October 1, 1898. Several days afterwards General Merritt arrived with statements on conditions in the Philippine Islands from Admiral Dewey, Colonel Jewett, General Greene, Major Bell, and the Belgian consul, Andre. These statements of Philippine conditions were to guide the American commissioners in deciding the fate of the Philippines. The papers read were practically of the same tenor that it would not be wise to return all of the Islands or perhaps even any of them to Spain, that the natives would not offer much resistance to American rule, and that, above all, the cession of

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