in sight one of the other, but the men on each ship were actually watching the other ship. It follows as a statutory conclusion from these facts that under regulation 28 the Bellanoch was under the obligation to give the sound signals there prescribed in order to indicate what she was doing to the approaching ship. Now, we have it both from her log and from the evidence of her helmsman that during this period the engines of the Bellanoch were on three occasions going full speed astern, and therefore it was her duty to give on each of those occasions the signal of three short blasts to indicate the fact. She did not do so on any of the occasions. Similarly, though proceeding under a port helm, she omitted until the last occasion to give the corresponding signal, and then only did so at the last moment. She therefore committed a breach of the regulations, or, as it is commonly called, incurred statutory blame, and must, under sect. 419 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1894, be deemed to be in fault unless it is shown to the satisfaction of the court that the circumstances of the case made a departure from the regulations necessary.

There is no pretence for saying that any such circumstances existed in the present case. No one could contend that it was necessary for the captain of the Bellanoch to omit to give these signals on any one of the three occasions. Nor does the judgment of the learned President proceed on any such ground. He absolves the Bellanoch from blame for not giving the statutory signals by calling in aid the provisions of art. 27, and it is this part of the judgment of the learned President which I view with such grave misgiving, deepened by the respect which I have for his judgment and great experience in these matters. He holds that the captain of the Bellanoch was justified in withholding the signals which would have indicated to the Canning that she was reversing her engines because the information so given might have induced the master of the Canning to take a wrong course. It appears to me that this is pessimi exempli. The regulation directs that the vessel shall give the prescribed signal when the engines are going full speed astern. It is not left to the captain to decide whether or not it would be better to give the prescribed signal. The object of this regulation being made statutory and enforced by such strong statutory sanctions is for the very purpose of preventing captains from so acting. The captain of the Canning was entitled to be told what the Bellanoch was doing, and the responsibility is upon him to take the proper course upon such information being given. The gravity of the decision is that the issue is not whether the captain of the Bellanoch acted with good intentions; it is whether he acted according to the regulations. The decision of the court that he was justified in withholding the information because it might be put to a wrong use would, in my opinion, destroy the value of the imperative character of the provisions, and it would leave captains of all vessels uncertain whether they were being informed or deceived as to the movements of the vessels near them. I hold, therefore, that it is a breach of the regulation to withhold these signals on the occasion when they are prescribed, and that such a breach is not purged by showing that it was possible, or that the captain of the defaulting ship believed it to be possible, that the information might enVOL. X., N. S.

courage the other ship to act unwisely. But I have the gravest doubt whether art. 27 has any application to a case of the withholding of information ordered to be given by art. 28. It will be seen that art. 27 comes at the end of and forms a member of a group of articles headed "Steering and Sailing Rules." It does not stand apart, as does art. 29, so that the word "rules," when used in it, has to be taken by the court to have general application to all the thirty-one rules and regulations, but it may bear the more limited meaning which would make it apply only to the group of rules in which it stands. When the language of art. 27 is closely scrutinised, the probability of this being the true interpretation is greatly increased, because we find that it speaks of a departure from the " above rules." It is scarcely possible that in a code drawn up with such care the word "above" would have been inserted if the word "rules" were intended to have the broader and not the more limited construction, and, although I do not wish to decide the point, I incline to the view that art. 27 had in contemplation only deviations from the "steering and sailing rules,' and that above all it did not contemplate any relaxation of the imperative orders as to signals such as are contained in art. 28.

Nor do I think that it applies to circumstances such as are found in the present case. It does not leave captains at liberty to consider to what extent they shall obey the regulations as to signals during the period of from five to twenty minutes before the collision, but only applies to cases in which, in the throes of the danger, a departure from the strict observance of the rules is imperatively forced upon the captain of a ship by the danger in which he is placed.

But the courts have by their decisions rendered it necessary to notice another point which may in some cases be raised. They have held that where the omission is of such a character that it could not possibly have affected the events, it may be put on one side as not material to the case, so that it is ordinarily stated that where there is a breach of the regulations the offending vessel may still be held not to be in fault if it can be shown that the breach could not possibly have affected the matter. But it must be borne in mind that this issue is not whether the performance of the obligation would have affected the collision, but whether it could possibly have done so. For instance, if a ship is run down in broad daylight its rights would not be affected by the fact that it was not carrying an efficient fog-horn, or if it was run down by a vessel which was all the time to port, its rights would not be affected by its being shown that something was wrong with its starboard light, if that could not possibly have been seen by the offending vessel. The circumstances in the Duke of Buccleuch (ubi sup.), which is the case usually quoted in support of the doctrine, were substantially of this latter kind, inasmuch as the statutory breach was a defect in one of the lights of the vessel which could not have affected the matter. This must not be treated as though it were another statutory exception, of like status to that to be found at the end of sect. 419 (4). The courts have no power to add to a statute. The matter depends solely on the right of a court to reject that which is in its nature essentially immaterial in fact when considering the purview of the statute. It 3 R

is somewhat akin to an application of the legal maxim: De non apparentibus et de non existentibus eadem est ratio. But no circumstances exist here which would justify the application of such a principle.

It is impossible to say that if the Canning had been told on three separate occasions within a space of less than half an hour the Bellanoch had reversed its engines it might not have affected the conduct of the Canning. The most stupid of sailors must have realised that he could not calculate on the behaviour of a ship crossing his course which it was his duty to avoid, when it was alternately driving its engines ahead and astern in this way, and a natural consequence would be that he would approach it slowly and give it a wide berth when passing it. But it is not necessary or permissible to argue whether the Canning would or would not have acted thus on the information given to it. It is sufficient if the information was of a character which might possibly bear on the question of her course and speed, and it appears to me impossible 'to decide this otherwise than in the affirmative. In my opinion the courts must be very careful lest, under this plea that a breach of the statutory regulations could not possibly have affected events, they allow to creep in the question of what would or would not probably have occurred had the regulation been adhered to, and thus reintroduce the old issue of whether the breach contributed to the collision, which it was the direct object of sect. 419 to abolish in case of breaches of the statutory regulations. The statu. tory blame makes the offending vessel in fault unless the omission is of such a nature that it could not possibly have affected the course of events in any way, and I doubt if we can say this in any case where the omission is not of a matter which would never have come to the knowledge of the other ship. I am therefore of opinion that both vessels were to blame.

KENNEDY, L.J.-I have had an opportunity of reading the judgment which has been pronounced. by the Lord Chief Justice, and I entirely concur in that judgment, both in its reasons and in its conclusions. I also desire to say that, with one slight exception, which is really immaterial for the purpose of this appeal, I agree with the judgment which was pronounced by the President of the Division. That slight exception is this, that I do not find in the evidence anything which would lead to the conclusion that there was some current setting across the course which would account for the mistake made by those who were navigating the Canning in giving insufficient room for the clearance of the vessel, which they were bound to avoid. Having said so much, I have to add but very few words to the judg. ments already pronounced. In my judgment it is clear that there was no statutory necessity, or necessity under the terms of the rule referred to, for any signal such as Moulton, L.J. has suggested to be given by the Bellanoch. It is not a question at all, in my opinion, of any judicial view in any way varying, or seeking to vary, statutory regulations, because in my opinion the statutory regulation referred to bas no application to the period within which it is suggested that the Bellanoch ought to have given the signals that she at that time was reversing. Nobody can dispute, in this court, the judgment

which has been given in the case of The Beryl (ubi sup.), which dealt broadly with the question of the time at which vessels, having a duty to act, ought to take steps, in accordance with the rules, to fulfil their duty, and nobody disputes that the time is when it is, or ought to be, apparent that there will be risk if nothing is done to prevent it. That is the rule, and it is, I venture to say with great respect to the judgment which has been pronounced, in my view not at all the right position to take up, that the period at which the complaint is made of the Bellanoch's not sounding her whistle was a period in which it was, and ought to be, apparent that there was any risk if nothing was done. That, I think, is the very language of The Beryl, and I wholly adopt that decision. I think, as a matter of fact, that there was no point prior to the time at which the offending vessel, the Canning, reached the buoys, at which there was anything which, under rule 28, called for a signal; indeed, I would go so far, having the authority of a judge of very great experience, the President of the Admiralty Division, to support it, as to say that I think that it would have been a wrong thing to do, because misleading. But I wish to point out, with regard to that, that as I read the judgment it certainly does not, as a necessary ground for the judgment, say that the Bellanoch must be held to be excused because of art. 27. The learned judge has expressly found that there was no breach on her part, but he says equally that if there is a technical breach proved he holds her excused under this article. In that he may be right, or he may be wrong. I do not think it necessary to enter into that discussion at all; but it is only just to him, after what has been said, to point out that his reference to art. 27 is after the words "even if it could be said that there was a breach of the article "-that means that if there was a breach he was prepared to hold there was a notification which made that immaterial under art. 27. I certainly hold, without any reasonable doubt, that there was no obligation on the part of those who were navigating the Bellanoch to give any intimation until the other vessel was in a position not of risk of collision, but in a position in which it ought to be apparent that there would be risk if nothing was done to prevent it. As to this case, I confess myself as leaning to the view that one ought to treat with some suspicion a change of case that is made in the course of an Admiralty trial. I look at the case which is actually put by the Canning in par. 3, in which they set out their statement of facts and their complaint. They describe themselves as having very particularly noticed the Bellanoch apparently under way about three-quarters of a mile off, and about ahead, and then follow these words: "The Canning kept on down the channel till she was in a position at the black buoys to do so, when she hard-a-ported her helm to pass astern of the Bellanoch, which had remained much in the same position." What is the meaning of that?-that the Canning says, to my mind, by implication of the clearest kind, that there was nothing we could do which we were in a position to do until we passed the buoys; in other words, if they are observing, as one does not dispute in this respect, the duty cast upon them, of avoiding the other ship in the position in which she was, they were not in a position to act

at all; they could not act, and it was immaterial that any signal should be given to them until they reached the buoys. It seems to me, if that is so, the complaint which they meant to urge and which they were deliberately putting on the pleadings is not right-namely, that after the position arose in which the rule in The Beryl (ubi sup.) would apply, the other vessel was in fault. That is the real case which they allege; then they go on to say that "the Canning swung under a port helm, drew nearer to the Bellanoch, and the latter was observed to be moving astern," and so on. It is quite true that they do include art. 28 in par. 7 of the claim as an allegation that there was a breach of that article; but to what period were they then referring? Not to the period before the buoys, which they themselves have discarded as an important period by their pleadings, but they were saying that the Bellanoch, after she was port to port, and when the period of action under the rules had arisen, moved her engines astern without giving the signal under art. 28. I can understand, looking at the evidence and the pleadings, that that was the case which they came to fight, and the case upon which they would have had real ground of complaint had their evidence been truthful, and been believed by the court, as to whether or not the vessel did then go astern. If she did she was bound to give a signal under art. 28, and that was their allegation, and it seems to me that it was not only a really technical point, but a point that was not made, and I think it was rightly not made, because when you come to look at art. 28 that clearly says that when vessels are in sight of one another "a steam vessel under way in taking any course authorised or required' by these rules shall indicate that course by the following signals on her whistle or siren-namely, three short blasts to mean my engines are going full speed astern." To what does that relate? It is made clear by the following words: "Any steam vessel under way in taking any course authorised or required by these rules shall indi cate that course.' I am not at all desiring to put a harsh meaning on the words "authorised or required," but authorised or required" must surely mean some direction which, according to the doctrine of The Beryl (ubi sup.), a seaman ought to know, because he has to act, and if so he is authorised and required to perform the manoeuvre. In The Uskmoor (ubi sup.), which was referred to, the word "authorised" has a larger meaning than "required." If the Canning herself says, "I was not in a position to act until Ï got to the buoys," if a vessel going down a dredged channel, a loaded vessel, until she gets to the buoys cannot safely navigate, if she knows that the other vessel would not expect her to navigate, it seems to me that there is no requirement or authority on the part of this other vessel, until that time comes, under those articles, to give the signals which are required. I am therefore of opinion that on this matter the Bellanoch is free from blame, and that the judgment appealed against is right.

The plaintiffs appealed to the House of Lords. Aspinall, K.C., Horridge, K.C, and Bateson, for the appellants, contended that as the two vessels were in sight of each other the Bellanoch was in

fault in not indicating by whistle signals that her engines were going full speed astern, and thereby infringed art. 28 of the Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, and was in part to blame for the collision. She also infringed the regulation in not indicating by whistle signal that she was porting her helm. She came astern negligently, and must be held to have been either "not under command" or "aground" within the meaning of regulations 4 and 11, and did not exhibit the signals required by those articles. They referred

to

The Khedive, 4 Asp. Mar. Law Cas. 182, 360, 567; 43 L. T. Rep. 610; 5 App. Cas. 876;

The Uskmoor, (ubi sup.);

The Anselm, ante, p. 438; (1907) P. 151. Cohen, K.C., Laing, K.C., and Robertson Dunlop, who appeared for the respondents, were not called on to address their Lordships.

At the conclusion of the arguments for the appellants their Lordships gave judgment as follows:

July 2, 1907.-The LORD CHANCELLOR (Loreburn).-My Lords: I think that the judgment of the court below, affirming that of the President of the Admiralty Court, ought to be affirmed. I hope that I shall say nothing to indicate any doubt as to the duty of obedience to the 28th article. It ought to be remembered that the object of that article is to give information to another vessel, and it ought to be very strictly observed. In this case I am inclined to agree with the judgment of Kennedy, L.J. that in the peculiar and exceptional circumstances, inasmuch as both vessels were more or less in the mud, there was no obligation to give a signal until the Canning came to the buoys, after which there was, in fact, no default. I will assume, although I will not affirm, that the duty of the Bellanoch was to sound three short blasts on each of the three occasions when, according to her log, she reversed her engines. I think that if she had done so it could not in this case have affected the collision. The master of the Canning knew the course of the Bellanoch, and what her manoeuvring was, and a whistle could not tell him anything but what he knew already, and could not have affected his action. For those reasons I submit that this appeal ought to be dismissed with costs.

Lord ASHBOURNE. - My Lords: I entirely agree with the judgment and order indicated by the Lord Chancellor. I should be very sorry to say anything to weaken the effect of the stringency of the 28th article, but I think for the reasons stated that it is avoided in this case.

Lords MACNAGHTEN, JAMES OF HEREFORD, and ATKINSON concurred.

Judgment appealed from affirmed, and appeal dismissed.

Solicitors for the appellants, Stokes and Stokes, for Thornely and Cameron, Liverpool.

Solicitors for the respondents, Lowless and Co.

CT. OF APP.]

[CT. OF APP.

COURT OF APPEAL.

March 23 and 25, 1907.

(Before Sir GORELL BARNES, P., MOULTON and KENNEDY, L.JJ.)

THE HOPPER No. 66. (a)

Collision Limitation of liability Right of charterer by demise to limit-" Owners' Merchant Shipping Act 1894 (57 & 58 Vict. c. 60), ss. 503, 504.

Contractors hired from the owners the steam Hopper No. 66 for eighteen months upon terms which amounted to a demise of the hopper. While the hopper was still on hire and while being navigated by the servants of the contractors she collided with and sank a steamship.

The owners of the steamship and her master and crew then brought an action in personam against the contractors to recover damages caused by negligence, and in that action recovered judgment, the Hopper No. 66 being held alone to blame.

66

The contractors then instituted proceedings as "" owners of the Hopper No. 66 claiming to limit their liability under sects. 503 and 504 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1894 (57 & 58 Vict. c. 60).

Held, that charterers by demise are not owners" within the meaning of sect. 503 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1894, and therefore the contractors had not the right to limit their liability in respect of loss or damage caused by the improper navigation of the chartered ship by their servants.

Decision of Bargrave Deane, J., The Hopper No. 66 (94 L. T. Rep. 344; 10 Asp. Mar. Law Cas. 203; (1906) P. 34) affirmed. (b)

APPEAL from a decision of Bargrave Deane, J. by which he held that the charterers of the Hopper No. 66 were not entitled to limit their liability in respect of a collision which occurred between that vessel and the steamship Blanche, on the 30th Nov. 1904.

The Hopper No. 66 was demised to Sir John Jackson Limited by her owners, the London and Tilbury Lighterage, Contracting, and Dredging Company Limited.

An action in personam was brought against Sir John Jackson Limited for the damage caused by the negligence of his servants in the navigation of the Hopper No. 66. In that action the Hopper No. 66 was found alone to blame.

On the 17th Nov. 1905 Sir John Jackson Limited issued a writ in a limitation suit claiming to limit his liability to an amount not exceed

(a) Reported by L. F. C. DARBY, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. (b) A charterer to whom a ship is demised is now included in the word "owner," for the Merchant Shipping Act 1906 (6 Edw. 7, c. 48), s. 71, provides that "sections 502-509 of the principal Act shall be read so that the word 'owner' shall be deemed to include any charterer to whom the ship is demised." This Act came into force on the 1st June 1907.-ED.

66.

The facts are fully set out in the report of the case below, The Hopper No. 66 (ubi sup.).

J. A. Hamilton, K.C. and Dawson Miller for the appellants, the charterers of the Hopper No. 66. The charterers are owners within the meaning of sects. 503 and 504 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1894. The collision took place without their actual fault or privity, and the fact that they are not on the register is immaterial :

The Spirit of the Ocean, 12 L. T. Rep. 239; 2 Mar.
Law Cas. O. S. 192 (1865); Br. & Lush. 366.

In other sections of the Act the words "owner and "charterer" are used as equivalent terms as in sect. 289 (1) and (3) of the Act, which deals with the surveying of emigrant ships. In other sections the word "owner" obviously includes the words " charterer as in sect. 502, which enacts that an owner of a ship shall not be liable in certain cases for damage to goods caused by fire; the word "owner in that section must mean the person who undertook to carry the goods, and he is not necessarily the owner of the ship. So, too, in sect. 419, which requires all owners and masters to obey the collision regulations. And by sect. 458 (1) in every contract of service with a seaman there is to be an implied obligation on the owner that the person charged with the loading of the ship shall use all reasonable means to insure the seaworthiness of the ship; the "owner" in this section clearly means the person who enters into the contract with the seamen, and in the case of a ship chartered by demise that would be the charterer. Under sect. 111 the only persons who may engage seamen persons licensed by the Board of Trade or owners of ships; under the corresponding section of the Act of 1854 a person who bad contracted to buy a share in a ship was held to be an owner:

are

Hughes v. Sutherland, 45 L. T. Rep. 287; 4 Asp. Mar. Law Cas. 459 (1881); 7 Q. B. Div. 160. Sect. 143 provides that a person in whose favour a seaman has made an allotment note of part of his wages may recover the amount from the owner, and under the Act of 1854 the "owner where the ship is chartered by demise has been held to be the charterer:

Meiklereid v. West, 34 L. T. Rep. 353; 3 Asp. Mar. Law Cas. 129 (1876); 1 Q. B. Div. 428. There are many cases in which when complete control is in the charterer he has been held to be the owner:

Trinity House v. Clark, 4 M. & S. 288. A charterer by demise has been called a pro hác vice owner:

The Lemington, 32 L. T. Rep 69; 2 Asp. Mar. Law Cas. 475, at p. 478 (1874). And in such a case it has been held that a shipowner is not liable for damage to goods caused by the unseaworthiness of the ship:

Baumvoll Manufactur von Carl Scheibler v. Furness, 68 L. T. Rep. 1; 7 Asp. Mar. Law Cas. 263; (1893) A. C. 8.

Bateson (Aspinall, K.C. with him).-The charterers are not owners; they could not be registered. The history of the legislation on this subject shows that the limitation of liability was for the protection of the owner of a vessel;

7 Geo. 2, c. 15, which is the first Act, clearly shows this is so. The Acts confer a privilege on the owner, and they must be construed strictly :

The Andalusian, 39 L. T. Rep. 204; 4 Asp. Mar.
Law Cas. 22 (1878); 3 P. Div. 182.

Until the Merchant Shipping (Liability of Shipowners) Act 1898 (61 & 32 Vict. c. 14), the owner of an unregistered ship could not limit his liability, and when the Legislature intended to extend the benefit to builders or others interested in the ship, they did it in express terms. Again, the Merchant Shipping Act (Liability of Shipowners and Others) Act 1900 (63 & 64 Vict. c. 32), s. 2, which extends the protection to owners of docks or canals, by sub-sect. 5 includes in the word

owner any person having control or management of any dock, which shows how careful the Legislature is as to who is granted the protection. If charterers are included in the word owners, sect. 12 of the Regulation of Railways Act 1871 (34 & 35 Vict. c. 78) was quite unnecessary, for the railway companies could have protected themselves by chartering vessels by charters amounting to a demise. A special enactment is necessary before these plaintiffs can claim the benefit of the limitation sections.

Hamilton, K.C. in reply.

The PRESIDENT.-This is an appeal from a decision of Bargrave Deane, J. giving judgment for the defendants in a limitation suit. It appears that on the 30th Nov. 1904 the steam Hopper No. 66, whilst proceeding from the Langton Dock, Liverpool, to sea, with a load of excavations, collided with the steamship Blanche in Liverpool Bay. In consequence of the collision the Blanche, which was bound from Fleetwood to Liverpool, sank, together with her cargo of gravel, and was lost, and seven of her crew lost their lives. The learned judge finds that the collision was caused by the negligent navigation of the steam Hopper No. 66 by the plaintiffs' servants, but without the actual fault or privity of the plaintiffs. Claims appear to have been put in, and the plaintiffs, Sir John Jackson Limited, on the 17th Nov. 1905, instituted in the Admiralty Court a limitation suit, claiming to do so as the owners of the steam Hopper No. 66.

They really were charterers by demise- the charter-party is set out, and the learned judge in his judgment gives the substantial paragraphs of it by which the complete control over this steam hopper was given to the plaintiffs, but the legal ownership remained with the London and Tilbury Lighterage, Contracting, and Dredg. ing Company Limited, the registered owners of the hopper. In their defence to the limitation suit the point which gave rise to this appeal was raised by the defendants' pleading that the plaintiffs were not at any time material the owners of the Hopper No. 66. The point was thus clearly raised whether the limitation sections of the Merchant Shipping Act applied to a vessel which is chartered by demise to the persons who are working her. I suppose that since the Act of last year such a point could hardly arise. What Bargrave Deane, J. said in the matter, after referring to the cases which had been cited to him, was this: "I now turn to the very simple defence put forward, which is as follows: This is a claim for a compensation for a tort, and the

[CT. OF APP.

full compensation is due to the claimants, unless there is any statutory provision which may reduce it. It is said that the Merchant Shipping Act 1894, sects. 503 and 504 do. That Act must be construed strictly. The limitation of the liability to make full compensation is expressly reserved to owners,' and you cannot read into the sections words limiting or varying or adding to the word 'owners.' The owners of the steam Hopper No. 66 are and were the London and Tilbury Lighterage, Contracting, and Dredging Company Limited. Sir John Jackson Limited were the charterers, and the sections do not include charterers within the term owners." I agree in substance with what the learned judge has said, and I should like to expand a little more the reasons which induce me to arrive at my conclusion. Looking at the history of this legislation, I think it is fairly obvious that from first to last what has been dealt with is the real ownership of vessels; and, when the Merchant Shipping Act 1894 is looked at, the idea running through it is that it is dealing with ships and their real

owners.

The first section and the second section, which dealt with the qualification of owners of British ships, and the necessity for registration thereof, have some bearing upon one point, because the section which we have to consider, sect. 503, which dealt with the owners of a ship, British or foreign, fortifies the view that what is being dealt with is the real owner of the vessel. In sect. 289 I find there is express mention of something to be done at the expense of the owners or charterers of the ship. In sub-sect. 3 of the same section there is again a dealing with the cost of surveys and expenses of the owner or charterer of the ship. In sub-sect. 4 there is this provision: "If any requirement of this section is not complied with in the case of any emigrant ship, the owner, charterer, or master of the ship, or any of them," &c. Again, sect. 293 has a similar provision imposing a penalty of 50l. for breach of the section upon "the owner, charterer, or master of the ship." Again, sect. 300 begins: "The owner or charterer of every emigrant ship." So that we find certain sections which specifically refer to the charterers by name, to show that where the word owners could not necessarily include the charterers, the word charterer is used. It is an Act dealing primarily with owners, but in one or two sections introducing the word charterer, and in one or two instances, by the necessity of the case, forcing upon the word owner in a particular section a construction which does not mean owner unless he has control of the ship: (see Hughes and Sutherland, ubi sup., and Meiklereid and West, ubi sup.). So we come to consider whether in the particular sections with which we have to deal there is anything which forces on us the construction contended for by the appellants in this particular case, because, unless there is, it seems to me we ought to give the term owner its natural meaning.

These limitation sections are a limitation upon the right of persons to maintain their action, and ought to be construed strictly, and if we turn to the sections I find that there is a clear indication in the actual wording of the section to support the view which is that of the learned judge in the court below. In the first place, sect. 502 commences with "the owner of a British sea-going