the profession or by the public as conclusive of the matter. If it is ever to be reconsidered, a thing which we deem inevitable, the true interests of all demands that it be done at the earliest practicable moment. We did not seek the occasion, but when the case seemed fairly before us we could not shrink from our duty as we understood it. We could not deny to a party in Court the right which the law gave him to a hearing on all the defences which he claimed to have. When, on the other hand, the rules of the Court did not admit of a rehearing in the case of Hepburn v. Griswold, we did not attempt to strain or modify those rules to reach the question. In this case, as in all others, we have endeavored to act as the law and our duty required. The foregoing paper of eighteen pages [in the manuscript] was prepared and agreed to as the reply of the Court to a paper filed by the Chief Justice on behalf of himself and Justices NELSON, CLIFFORD and FIELD. That paper has been withdrawn by them from the files of the Court, and this is, therefore, not filed. We all concur in the statements of the foregoing paper as to the reasons for our action in the matter to which it refers, and the statement of facts we declare to be true so far as they are matters which took place while we were respectively members of the Supreme Court. WASHINGTON, April 30, 1870. N. H. SWAYNE. SAM. F. MILLER. DAVID DAVIS. W. STRONG. JOSEPH P. BRADLEY. [NOTE.-The original draft of the statement, as drawn by Justice MILLER, from the asterisk on page 71, concluded in the words printed below. But, on consultation with the other Justices at the time it was thought best to omit it, as Justice GRIER was still living, and might be pained if it should come to his knowledge. Justice MILLER, however, preserved it, and placed it in the same envelope with the statement as modified, where it was found after his death. It was as follows:] * This would have affirmed the judgment, but settled no principle. An attempt was then made to convince an aged and infirm member of the Court that he had not understood the question on which he voted. He said that he understood the Court of Appeals of Kentucky had declared the legal tender law unconstitutional, and he voted to reverse that judgment. As this was true, the case of Hepburn v. Griswold was declared to be affirmed by a Court equally divided, and we passed to the next case. This was the case of McGlynn, Ex., v. Magraw, and involved another aspect of the legal tender question. In this case the venerable Judge referred to, for whose public services and character we entertain the highest respect, made some remarks. He was told that they were inconsistent with his vote in the former case. He was reminded that he had agreed with a certain member of the Court in conversation on propositions differing from all the other Judges, and finally his vote was obtained for affirming Hepburn v. Griswold, and so the majority, whose judgment is now said to be so sacred, was obtained. To all this we submitted. We could do nothing| else. In a week from that day every Judge on the bench authorized a committee of their number to say to the Judge who had reconsidered his vote, that it was their unanimous opinion that he ought to resign. These are the facts. We make no comment. We do not say he did not agree to the opinion. We only ask, of what value was his concurrence, and of what value is the judgment under such circumstances? That question thus decided is of immense importance to the Government, to the public, and to individuals. The decision only partially disposed of the great question to which it related, and has not been received by the profession or by the public as concluding the matter. If it is ever to be reconsidered, a thing which we deem inevitable, the best interests of all concerned, public and private, demands that it be done at the earliest practicable moment. We have not sought the occasion, but when the case is fairly before us, if it shall be found to be so in these cases, we shall not shrink from our duty, whatever that may be. For the present, we believe it is our duty to hear argument on this question in these cases. Whether the judgment of the Court in Hepburn v. Griswold shall be found by the Court to be conclusive, or whether its principles shall be reconsidered and reversed, can only be known after the hearing; and in the final judgment of the Court, whatever it may be, we are satisfied there will be acquiescence. At all events, the duty is one which we have not sought-which we cannot avoid. |