433), requiring, in actions between citizeus of dif. ferent states, suits to be brought only in the district of the residence of either the plaintiff or the defendant, it is admissible to bring a suit for partition in a district in which only a part of such defendants reside. Where the laws of a particular state give a The question is too clear for extended argument. By the "internal affairs" of a municipal corporation, in the administration of which the legislature could alone authorize it to incur a debt, was undoubtedly intended such business as municipalities of like character are usually required to engage in to fulfill their proper functions, and to effectuate the objects of their charters. In the case of counties these are ordinarily to provide a court-house for the administration of justice; a jail for the confinement of prisoners; a poor-house for the suste-3. nance of paupers (where by local law they are made chargeable upon the county); offices for the various officials of the county; and, under certain circumstances, highways and bridges for the accommodation of the public. It could Submitted April 30, 1894. Decided Oct. 29, never have been contemplated, however, that this power would be used to incur obligations in favor of a railroad operated by a private corporation for private gain, though also subserving a public purpose. The record before us does not show whether this railroad was designed to extend beyond the limits of the county; but if the county had power to issue its bonds in aid of railroads at all, there is nothing to indicate that such power was restricted to such roads as were wholly within the county, and if this act were a valid exercise of the authority of the legislature, the credit of the county might be indefinitely pledged for the construction of railways extending far beyond the county limits, and, in deed, for carrying out any such schemes of public improvement as the legislature could be persuaded to authorize. Clearly such debts would not be incurred in the administration of the internal affairs of the county. 2. [No. 517.] 1894. APPEAL from a decree of the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Florida, dismissing a suit in equity for the partition of real estate brought by George P. Greeley and Mary P. Greeley, his wife, plaintiffs, for the former of whom Mary P. Greeley was afterwards substituted as executrix, against Richard H. Lowe et al. Reversed and case remanded for further proceedings. Statement by Mr. Justice Brown: This was a bill in equity for the partition of real estate originally filed by George P. Greeley and wife, who were alleged to be citizens of New Hampshire, against 130 defendants, most of whom were citizens of Florida. Of the remaining defendants some were citizens of Georgia, others of Illinois, South Carolina, Alabama, Texas, North Carolina, New York, New Jersey, Mississippi, and one Eliza B. Anderson, of the city of Washington and District of Columbia. The argument of counsel on both sides was 58]largely directed to the question whether the territorial act of 1883, under which these bonds were issued, conferred an "especial privilege" upon the railroad company, within the mean- The bill averred the plaintiff, George P. ing of Revised Statutes, section 1889, inhibit- Greeley, to be seized as tenant in common, in ing "private charters and especial privileges," fee simple, and in actual possession of 10,016 and also to the further question whether bonds acres of land in the Northern District of Florissued under a mandatory or compulsory stat-ida, of the value of $10,000, exclusive of inute are valid. But in the view we have taken of the case it is unnecessary to express an opinion upon these points. We are compelled to hold that the bonds in question create no obligation against the county which a court of law can enforce. The judgment of the court below is, therefore, affirmed. MARY P. GREELEY, Executrix of GEORGE v. RICHARD H. LOWE ET AL. (See S. C. Reporter's ed. 58-76.) District in which suit may be brought-jurisdiction of Federal courts-appeal. 1. Under the Act of August 13, 1888 (25 Stat. at L. NOTE. As to jurisdiction of United States circuit cour: depending on parties and residence, see note to Emory v. Greenough, 1: 640. As to colorable conveyances to enable suit to be brought motive of transfer; when no objection; coupons; residence of assignor, see uote to M'Donald v. Smalley, 7: 287. terest and costs, etc.; that one John T. Lowe and Susan, his wife, were originally seized of the said premises by grant from the Spanish government in 1816, as a mill right, Lowe being then married, and his wife Susan being seized by ganancial right of an undivided half of said premises under the laws of Spain, which declared that real estate acquired by either the husband or wife during coverture by purchase, gift, or gain becomes and remains community property, and that they were seized thereof as tenants in common; that Lowe died in 1824, and the grant was subsequently confirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States in 1842 (United States v. Low, 41 U. S. 16 Pet. 162 [10: Susan Lowe has never been alienated, relin923]), that the ganancial right and title of said quished, or annulled, and has been duly protected and guaranteed by the treaty of 1819 As to amount necessary to give jurisdiction in circuit court cases prior to Act of 1875; amount necessary since Act of 1875; amouut in dispute, see note to Schunk v. Moline, M. & S. Co. 37: 255. between the United States and Spain; that | of other Federal districts than that where the Lowe attempted to convey to one Clark the land is situate, and where certain defendants southern half of this grant, but his wife, then reside, it was decreed that "this court has not living, did not join, and the half of the south jurisdiction over all the defendants to this achalf only was conveyed; that Clark conveyed tion, because they are not all residents and citito Duncan L. Clinch, who died testate, leaving zens of the district in which the land sought to 60] his *executor power to sell said lands; that be partitioned lies, and are not all found in Susan Lowe survived her husband, but both said district at the time of the service of the died intestate, and their estates had long been process.' settled. That the north half of said graut and half of the south half descended to their children, nine in number. The genealogy and shares of the heirs and their grantees are stated at great length in the bill, all the claims of the various members being set up and defined, and the invalidity of certain deeds attached as exhibits being averred and pointed out. The bill contained a general averment that no other person except such as were made parties had any interest in or title to the premises; that by reason of the lapse of time, the disturbed condition of the country, etc., it has been almost impossible to trace the lineage of the several families, and to find the actual parties in interest. The bill prayed that the different deeds attached as exhibits might be construed, and the interest, if any conveyed, ascertained or the deeds canceled; that all persons having any claims or liens upon the lands might be brought in and required to prove their claims, or have the same held null and void; that partition of the lands be made, if possible and equitable, aud if not, that they might be sold and the proceeds distributed; that plaintiff recover his advances for taxes and expenses, including costs and counsel fees; that a master be appointed to state the shares, advances, and fees; and that commissioners be appointed to make partition or sale, etc. On May 6, 1892, plaintiffs filed a petition for rehearing, and on June 13 amended their bill by striking out the name of Eliza B. Anderson as defendant. While no formal decree subsequent to the rehearing appears to have been entered, by an endorsement made upon the bill of June 15, it would appear that the bill was finally dismissed upon that date. From this decree an appeal was taken to this court, and the question of jurisdiction as above stated was certified to this court for decision, pursuant to section 5 of the Court of Appeals Act. Messrs. James R. Challen and Geo. A. King, for appellants: The wives of the respective co tenants are proper or necessary parties in an action for partition when the allegations of the bill and the prayer ask for a sale of all the property, and the number of the parties and condition of the property is such that three fourths of it must be sold. Ripple v. Gilborn, 8 How. Pr. 456; Wilkinson v. Parish, 3 Paige, 653. Where the contrary is held it is owing to statutes. McArthur v. Franklin, 15 Ohio St. 485; Gordon v. Sterling, 13 How. Pr. 405: Curtis v. Snead, 12 Gratt. 264; Allen v. Libbey, 140 Mass. 82; Greiner v. Klein, 32 Mich. 17; Leo v. Lindell, 22 Mo. 202, 64 Am. Dec. 262. The court may, upon the hearing, if it shall so think fit, order such persons to be made parties. Goodman v. Niblack, 102 U. S. 562 (26: 232). If the executor is personally qualified by his citizenship to bring suit in this Federal court, or to be sued, the jurisdiction is not defeated by the fact that the party, whom he represents may be disqualified. And as to the plea of another action pending between the same parties, for the same cause of action if that plea were held sufficient in law, the complainant would deny the truth of it; but even if true, the action being in the same court could be consolidated. Isaac A. Stewart, one of the defendants resident in Florida, filed a plea to the jurisdiction, setting up, among other things, that the suit was not brought in the district of the residence of either the plaintiffs or defendants; that the controversy was not between citizens of different states; that certain defendants had interests adverse to other defendants; that Eliza B. Anderson, one of the defendants, was a resident and citizen of the District of Columbia; that Chappedelaine v. Dechenaux, 8 U. S. 4 her claim was adverse to his (Stewart's); that Cranch, 307 (2: 629); Osborn v. Bank of United Greeley's wife was improperly joined, was not States, 22 U. S. 9 Wheat. 738 (6: 204); Childress the cotenant, and could not maintain a suit; v. Emory, 21 U. S. 8 Wheat, 669 (5: 711). that the wives of several of the defendants were 61] improperly joined, *in that they possessed no legal interest in the property; and that others who were necessary parties were not joined as defendants. Thereupon plaintiff moved for leave to amend his bill by inserting after the name of Eliza Anderson the words "citizen of South Carolina, now resident in Washington, D. C.," and also to add other defendants. The court granted the motion to amend, and the cause came on to be heard on the plea to the jurisdiction. The court made a final decree, holding that, while it was true that the complainants were citizens of New Hampshire and resident there, and some of the defendants were citizens of Florida, in the district in which the land lies, yet because there were other defendants citizens of New York and also of other states than the state in which the complainants reside and have citizenship, and also citizens Emma Silver Min, Co. (Limited) v. Emma Silver Min. Co. of N. Y. 1 Fed. Rep. 39: Foster v. Vassall, 3 Atk. 590; Wabash, St L. & P. R. Co. v. Central Trust Co. of N. Y. 23 Fed. Rep. 513. Suit in state court no bar in Federal court though same parties and same cause of action. Stanton v. Embrey, 93 U. S. 548 (23: 983; Gordon v. Gilfoil, 99 U. S. 168 (25: 393); Washburn & M. Mfg. Co. v. Scutt, 22 Fed. Rep. 710; Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. Harris, 96 U. S. 588 (24: 737); Memphis v. Dean, 75 U. S. 8 Wall. 64 (19: 326); Thorne v. Towanda Tanniny Co. 15 Fed. Rep. 289; Radford v. Folsom, 14 Fed. Rep. 97; Sharon v. Hill, 22 Fed. Rep. 28: Coe v. Aiken, 50 Fed. Rep. 640. If there are parties whose interests are severable, and a decree without prejudice to their rights can be made, the jurisdiction of the court should be retained and the suit dismissed as to them. Horn v. Lockhart, 84 U. S. 17 Wall. 570 (21: 657): Breedlove v. Nicolet, 32 U. S. 7 Pet. 431 (S: 738); Vattier v. Hinde, 32 U. S. 7 Pet. 252 (8: 675). Under Rev. Stat. section 738, in suits where the object is to subject property within the district, a non-resident defendant whether sole defendant or one of several, may be brought into court by service anywhere, or by publica tion. This Act is a remedial statute, and should be liberally construed. McBurney v. Carson, 99 U. S. 567 (25: 378); Loomis v. New York & C. G. C. Co. 33 Fed. Rep. 353; St. Louis, V. & T. H. R. Co. v. Terre Haute & 1. R. Co. 33 Fed. Rep. 385; Wilson v. Western U. Teleg. Co. 34 Fed. Rep. 561; Ober v. Gallagher, 93 U. S. 199 (23: 829; Meyer v. Delaware R. Const. Co. 100 U. S. 457 (25: 593); Goodman v. Niblack, 102 U. S. 562 (26: 232); Ames v. Holderbaum, 42 Fed. Rep. 341; Carpenter v. Talbott, 33 Fed. Rep. 537; Jewett v. Bradford Sav. Bank & T. Co. 45 Fed. Rep. 801; Mc Bee v. Marietta & N. G. R. Co. 48 Fed. Rep. 243; Barney v. Latham, 103 U. S. 205 (26: 514). If the object of the suit be single, different persons have separate interests in distinct questions which arise out of that single object, such different persons must be brought before the court, in order, that the suit may conclude the whole subject. Lehigh Zinc & 1. Co. v. New Jersey Zinc & 1. Co. 43 Fed. Rep. 548; Tate v. Norton, 94 U. S. 749, 24 L. ed. 223; Payne v. Hook, 74 U. S. 7 Wall. 425, 19 L. ed. 260; Tate v. Hambly, 2 Atk. 363; Brinkerhoff v. Brown, 6 Johns. Ch. 157. If the question before the court is one of title, it must be tried where the land lies, if it is one of fraud, trust, or contract, it follows the per Arndt v. Griggs, 134 U. S. 316 (33: 918); Morris v. Graham, 51 Fed. Rep. 53; Boswell v. Otis, 50 U. S. 9 How. 336 (13:164); Huling v. Karo Valley R. & Imp. Co. 130 U. S. 559 (32: 1045); Mellen v. Moline Malleable Iron Works, 131 U. S. 352 (33: 178). An action for partition being a proceeding in rem, must be brought in the district or county where the land lies. 17 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law 707a; Johnson v. Kimbro, 3 Head, 557, 75 Am. Dec. 781; Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 746 (24: 565, 577). A foreign court may order and decree a deed, but cannot give possession-it could not, therefore, make partition. Muller v. Dous, 94 U. S. 444 (24: 207); Massie v. Watts, 10 U. S. 6 Cranch, 148 (3: 181). Suits to marsbal liens and claims, are in rem, local, and lie only in the district where the property is. Massie v. Watts, supra. Partition may be ordered if plaintiff is seised, whether the land is claimed adversely to him or not. Ormond v. Martin, 37 Ala. 598; Griffin v. | Griffin, 33 Ga. 107; Breit v. Yeaton, 101 IN 242, 119 Ill. 298; Gage v. Reid, 104 Ill. 509; Luntz v. Greve, 102 Ind. 173. Federal courts make partition when the complainant is not a resident of the district in which the land lies; when the defendants are not all residents of the state where the suit is brought. Lowe v. Phillips, 21 Ohio St. 657; Simmons v. Baynard, 30 Fed. Rep. 532. Messrs. I. A. Stewart, E. K. Foster, A. G. Hamlin, and E. Bly, for appellees: The court did not err in dismissing the bill for want of jurisdiction. A controversy between citizens of different states, when they are several plaintiffs or defendants, is one in which each plaintiff is competent to sue, and each defendant liable to be sued at the place where suit is brought. There is no difference in this respect between cases at law and equity. Smith v. Lyon, 133 U. S. 315 (33: 635); Anderson v. Watt, 138 U. S. 694 (34: 1078); Susquehanna & W. V. R. & Coal Co. v. Blatchford, 78 U. S. 11 Wall. 172 (20: 179); Karns v. Atlantic & O. R. Co. 10 Fed. Rep. 309. Every party on one side must be a citizen of different state from every party on the other. a Blake v. McKim, 103 U. S. 336 (26: 563). In determining between whom the controversy exists the court is not bound by the title of the cause or the form of the pleadings, but should examine the record, ascertain the matter in dispute, and arrange the parties on opposite sides according to the facts, no matter what their technical places as plaintiffs or defendants may be. This is true of all classes of cases at law or equity. Pacific R. Co. v. Ketchum, 101 U. S. 289 (25: 932); Peninsular Iron Co. v. Stone, 121 U. S. 631 (30: 1020); Bland v. Freeman, 29 Fed. Rep. 669. This rule is applicable to original suits, as well as to those removed from state courts. Pacific R. Co. v. Ketchum, 101 U. S. 289 (25: 932); Meyer v. Delaware R. Const. Co. 100 U. S. 457 (25: 593). United States circuit courts have no original jurisdiction in suits between citizens of one state, and citizens of the same aud of another state, either in law or equity. The statute of 1887 "makes no provisions for the case of two defendants or two plaintiffs who are citizens of different states." Smith v. Lyon, 133 U. S. 315 (33: 635). In a partition or other suit if it appears that many of the defendants are from the same state, with conflicting interests, the controversy is between citizens of the same state and cannot be sustained. Covert v. Waldron, 33 Fed. Rep. 311. United States courts will not allow their jurisdiction to be imposed upon by being im properly invoked, or allow parties by subterfuge or collusion to successfully thrust jurisdiction upon such courts. Anderson v. Watt, 138 U. S. 694 (34: 1078); Rich v. Bray, 37 Fed. Rep. 279; Börs v. Pres ton, 111 U. S. 255, 28 L. ed. 420; Bland v. Freeman, 29 Fed. Rep. 669. The bill was properly dismissed because jurisdiction depending only upon difference in citizenship, the suit was not brought in the district of the residence of plaintiff or defend ant. McCormick Harvesting Mach. Co. v. Walthers, 134 U. S. 41 (33: 833); Anderson v. Watt, 138 U. S. 694 (34: 1078); Smith v. Lyon, 133 U. S. 315 (33: 635); Bensinger Self-Adjusting | Cash Register Co. v. National Cash Register Co. 42 Fed. Rep. 81; Susquehanna & W. V. R. & Coal Co. v. Blatchford, 78 U. S. 11 Wall. 172 (20: 179); New Orleans v. Winter, 14 U. S. 1 Wheat. 91 (4: 44). and all statutes under it must be construed to gether as one law. Cincinnati, N O. & T. P. R. Co. v. Kentucky, 115 U. S. 326 (29: 414); Presser v. Illinois, 116 U. S. 252 (29: 615); Grenada County Suprs. v. Brown, 112 U. S. 261 (28: 704). But if we concede that the publication law permits non-residents of the district to be brought in when the suit is to enforce a legal or equitable claim against property within the district this is not a case of that kind, and hence cannot be aided by that Act. A suit for partition is not a proceeding in rem. It is not a suit to enforce a claim to or lien upon realty. Where necessary parties to a suit in citizenship is such as to prevent it, the decree cannot bind such parties, and the court cannot for that very reason afford the relief asked to the other parties. The statute providing for publication does not enlarge the jurisdiction of United States courts, but only provides a method of bringing parties before the court in a certain class of cases wherein there is jurisdiction other-partition cannot be brought in because their wise. Brigham v. Luddington, 12 Blatchf. 237; Pacific R. Co. v. Missouri Pac. R. Co. 3 Fed. Rep. 772; Jewett v. Bradford Sav. Bank & T. Co. 45 Fed. Rep. 801: Van Antwerp v. Hulburd, 7 Blatchf. 432; Detweiler v. Holderbaum, 42 Fed. Rep. 337; Remer v. Mackay, 35 Fed. Rep. 86. United States courts have no jurisdiction except such as the statutes clearly confer. There is no such thing as a presumption of jurisdiction. The presumption is always against it, and if there is any doubt as to jurisdiction it is the uniform rule to refuse to entertain jurisdiction. Grover & B. Sewing Mach. Co. v. Florence Sewing Mach. Co. 85 U. S. 18 Wall. 553 (21: 914); Menard v. Goggan, 121 U. S. 253 (30: 914); Robertson v. Cease, 97 U. S. 646 (24: 1057) Brown v. Keene, 33 U. S. 8 Pet. 112 (8: 885). The Act of 1887 has been construed in many cases in which the publication Act is not particularly mentioned, but if the construction of the general jurisdiction of courts therein be sound, this construction cannot be changed by the publication Act. Anderson v. Watt, 138 U. S. 694 (34: 1078). Neither the Act of 1839 or Rule 47 was intended to make it unnecessary to join all material parties. Shields v. Barrow, 58 U. S. 17 How. 130 (15: 158); Barney v. Baltimore, 73 U. S. 6 Wall. 285 (18: 826). State statutes cannot enlarge the jurisdiction | of United States courts. Rich v. Bray, 37 Fed. Rep. 273: Beebe v. Louisville, N. O. & T. R. Co. 39 Fed. Rep. 481, Holland v. Challen, 110 U. S. 15 (28: 52); Parker v. Ormsby, 141 U. S. 81 (35: 654). A special act is not repealed or affected by a subsequent act, general in its terms, which does not in express terms repeal or change the special. Neither are they construed “in pari materia." Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U. S. 556 (27: 1030); State v. Stoll, 84 U. S. 17 Wall. 425 (21: 650): Movius v. Arthur, 95 U. S. 144 (24: 420); Cass County v. Gillett, 100 U. S. 585 (25: 585): Jones v. Dexter, 8 Fla. 276; Luke v. State, 5 Fla. 185; McCarthy v. Havis, 23 Fla. 508; State v. Palmes, 23 Fla. 620; Mitchell v. Duncan, 7 Fla. 13. No provision of a statute can enlarge the constitutional jurisdiction. The constitution Barney v. Baltimore, 73 U. S. 6 Wall. 280 (18: 825); Orton v. Smith, 59 U. S. 18 How. 263 (15: 393). A suit to compel defendants to release and discharge an apparent cloud upon title to land is wholly in personam. Remer v. Mackay, 35 Fed. Rep. 86; Hart v. Sansom, 110 U. S. 151 (28: 101). The relief sought by the bill is such as to render the publication Act inoperative. Ellis v. Reynolds, 35 Fed. Rep. 394. The bill was properly dismissed because Eliza B. Anderson, one of the defendants, is a citizen of the District of Columbia, and a suit between a citizen of a state and of the District of Columbia, is not a controversy between citizens of different states since the District of Columbia is not a state within the construction of the law. Hepburn v. Ellzey, 6 U. S. 2 Cranch, 445 (2: 332); Barney v. Baltimore, 73 U. S. 6 Wall. 280 (18: 825);' New Orleans v. Winter, 14 U. S. 1 Wheat. 91 (4:44). All cotenants and persons whose interests will be affected by partition and sale are necessary parties to bill seeking partition sale. Fost. Fed. Pr. §53; 5 Wait, Act. & Def. 94; McClelland, Dig. Laws of Fla. p. 801, § 2: 1 Washb. Real Prop. p. 679-682 and notes; Buckmaster v. Kelley, 15 Fla. 199; Barney v. Baltimore, 73 U. S. 6 Wall. 280 (18: 825); McClaskey v. Barr, 48 Fed. Rep. 134. This is the general rule in all equity causes; every party who will be affected by the decree is a material party. Bland v. Freeman, 29 Fed. Rep. 669; Detweiler v. Holderbaum, 42 Fed. Rep. 327. A will directing the executors to sell testator's land and divide the proceeds does not require any estate in the executor and therefore none exists by implication, and until the sale the title and right of possession remain in the heirs at law, as tenants in common. Jackson v. Burr, 9 Johns. 104; Cohea v. Jemison, 68 Miss. 510, and cases cited: Simmons v. Spratt, 9 L. R. A. 343, 26 Fla. 449, and cases cited. The executor has no present interest in the land, and the devisees are necessary parties to suits affecting it. Creditors who have remained silent so long that their delay amounts to Jaches cannot com- | follows: "And no civil suit shall be brought pel a sale. Crosby's Estate, 55 Cal. 574; McCrary v. Tasker, 41 Iowa, 255; McKean v. Vick, 108 Ill. 373. In the case at the bar there is a delay of over forty years. The executors, therefore, not being trustees, have no such title as to be able to maintain or to defend suit for partition. Freem. Cotenancy & Partition, $471; Whitlock v. Willard, 18 Fla. 156; Greeley v. Hendricks, 23 Fla. 366. The character of this bill is such that it can not be entertained by a court of equity, and was properly dismissed. The parties to a suit in partition must be tenants in common of all the land sought to be divided. If some of them have an interest in a part only of the land, a decree in partition will not be valid. 5 Wait, Act. & Def. p. 94; Jackson v. Myers, 14 Johns. 354; Marmaduke v. Tennant, 4 B. Mon. 210; Harmon v. Kelley, 14 Ohio 502, 45 Am. Dec. 552; Wickersham v. Young, 1 Miles (Pa.) 395; Re Prentiss, 7 Ohio, 129, 30 Am. Dec. 203; Ramsay v. Bell, 38 N. C. 209, 42 Am. Dec. 163: Brownell v. Bradley, 16 Vt. 105, 42 Am. Dec. 498. A suit in partition to try legal titles cannot be maintained. Chapin v. Sears, 18 Fed. Rep. 814; Beebe v. Louisville, N. O. & T. R. Co. 39 Fed. Rep. 481; Doe v. Carpenter, 59 U. S. 18 How. 297 (15: 389); Rich v. Bray. 37 Fed. Rep. 273; Mattair v. Payne, 15 Fla. 682; Matthews v. Lindsay, 20 Fla. 962; Freem. Cotenancy & Partition, § 502. To create a separate interest there must exist a separate and distinct cause of action on which a separate and distinct suit might have been brought and compiete relief afforded, independent of the other defendants and not affecting their interests. Graves v. Corbin, 132 U. S. 571 (33: 462); Fraser v. Jennison, 106 U. S. 191 (27: 131); Ayres v. Wiswall, 112 U. S. 187 (28: 693); Fost. Fed. Pr. § 384. Multifarious bills and those lacking proper parties will be dismissed. McDonnell v. Eaton, 18 Fed. Rep. 710; Orton v. Smith, 59 U. S. 18 How. 263 (15: 393). Mr. Justice Brown delivered the opinion of the court: This bill appears to have been dismissed by the court below upon the ground that inhabitants of other districts than the northern district of Florida were made defendants. The question really is whether, under the Act of August 13, 1888 (25 Stat. at L. 433) requiring, in actions 68]between citizens of *different states, suits to be brought only in the district of the residence of either the plaintiff or the defendant, it is admissible to bring a suit for partition in a district in which only a part of such defendants reside. As suits are usually begun in the district in which the defendants, or one of the defendants, reside, the question practically involves the whole power of the circuit court of one district to take jurisdiction of such suits, brought against defendants some of whom are residents of other districts. (1) The paragraph of section 1 of the Act of 1888, relied upon by the defendants, reads as before either of said courts against any person by any original process or proceeding in any other district than that whereof he is an inhabitant, but where the jurisdiction is founded only on the fact that the action is between citizens of different states, suit shall be brought only in the district of the residence of either the plaintiff or the defendant." In the case of Smith v. Lyon, 133 U. S. 315 [33: 635], this court held that the circuit court has no jurisdiction on the ground of diverse citizenship, if there are two plaintiffs to the action, who are citizens of and residents in different states, and defendant is a citizen of and a resident in a third state, and the action is brought in a state in which one of the plaintiffs resides. As was said by the court, p. 317 [636], the argument in support of the jurisdiction was, "that it is sufficient if the suit is brought in a state where one of the defendants or one of the plaintiffs is a citizen. This would be true if there were but one plaintiff or one defendant. But the statute makes no provisions, in terms, for the case of two defendants or two plaintiffs who are citizens of different states. In the present case, there being two plaintiffs, citizens of different state, there does not seem to be, in the language of the statute, any provision that both plaintiffs may unite in one suit in a state in which either of them is a citizen." The court referring to several prior cases in this court, in which it was held that the word "citizen," as used in the Judiciary Act of 1789, is used collectively, and means all citizens upon one side of the suit, and if there are several co-plaintiffs. the intention of the Act is that each *plain-[69 tiff must be competent to sue, and if there are several co-defendants, each defendant must be liable to be sued or the jurisdiction cannot be entertained, held that the same construction must be given to the word "inhabitant" as used in the above paragraph in the Act of 1888, and that, if suit were begun in a district whereof the plaintiff was an inhabitant, jurisdiction would only attach if there were no other plaintiffs, citizens, and inhabitants of other districts. If this doctrine be also ap plicable to defendants in local actions, it necessarily follows that suit will not lie in any district of which a defendant is a citizen or inhabitant, if there are inhabitants of other districts also made defendants. As above stated, this practically inhibits all suits against defendants residents in different districts. A brief review of the history of corresponding provisions in prior acts will show that it has never been supposed that the Federal courts did not have jurisdiction of local actions in which citizens of different districts were defendants, and, in fact, provision was expressly made by law for such contingency. In the eleventh section of the Judiciary Act of 1789 (1 Stat. at L. 79) is a provision subsequently incorporated in section 739 of the Revised Statutes, that "no civil suit shall be before either of said courts against an inhabitant of the United States, by any original process in any other district than that whereof he is an inhabitant, or in which he shall be found at the time of serving the writ." Under this section any number of non-residents could be joined as defendants if only they were |