istence of differences of opinion concerning a science, does not unfit it to take its place in a course of public instruction, might be drawn from all the other sciences. We frequently find men, through a deficiency of mathematical clearness, opposing the Newtonian doctrine of gravity, and stating new theories of mechanics; -or putting out new ideas concerning optics. Even in the Reports of the Proceedings of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, you will find a paper explaining the zodiacal light, the whole paper being based on the astounding assumption that both ends of a straight line may be far below the horizon, and yet a large part of the line remain above the horizon.

I might go into chemistry and find still more striking instances of differences of opinion. I need not allude to bygones, such as the contest concerning the nature of chlorine, but may appeal to the present state of the science. Who shall set bounds to the doctrines of allotropism, and assure us that the whole list of elemental substances is not after all but a series of allotropic forms of one and the same substance? Yet if this be so, who shall be able to define the science of chemistry? Nevertheless the science is pursued and taught and justly considered an essential element in a course of public instruction. It is even demanded as a practical science for the use of agriculturists, although the most vital points concerning the value of mineral and organic manures are still in

dispute. We may therefore set it down as certain, that differences of opinion concerning the truth or falsehood of a doctrine do not constitute, in the judgment of wise men, any reason for omitting the discussion of those doctrines from the course of public instruction. Nor, on the other hand, is perfect unanimity of opinion upon a point, or perfect certainty of a doctrine, any reason why such points should be included in our general course of study. No mathematician doubts the truth, or the utility, of that little book on the division of superficies, published by John Dee and Frederic Commandine, and thought by Dee to be from the hand of the great Euclid, but no one has ever proposed to incorporate it, or any part of it, into a course of academical study.

It is, therefore, manifest that the questions of certainty or uncertainty, and difference or unity of opinion, are only secondary considerations in deciding whether a certain study should or should not enter into the course of instruction in this or that form.

The general principles which I have already enunciated concerning the relation of each part to the whole, and to the whole hierarchy of sciences, to the length of the curriculum, and to the capacities of the individuals, these general principles are sufficient to decide the minor as well as the greater questions. Those parts of geometry are to be introduced which bear most directly upon the progress of the student in higher mathematical studies, and to the acquire

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unjust in compelling them to pay taxes to sustain such schools? The writer of this article is a Protestant of the most radical ty does not stop with Martin Luther, but who protests against all of

ment of mechanical, chemical, botanical, or zoological knowledge. Those parts are to be excluded which are not thus connected. And inasmuch as no knowledge is wholly disconnected with other branches (the work to which I just alluded as resuscitated by Dee, is capable of some useful applications in surveying, etc.), we must omit those things which have fewest or least important connections, and retain those which are most directly in the highway of truth.

So in religion. It makes no essential difference whether there is, or is not, an agreement of opinion on a point; it does not necessarily follow that it is important if all are agreed, or that it is unimportant if men are disagreed upon it. The question rather is, Is this doctrine important in its connection with other matters? Does it throw light on the course of history? Does it have a connection with the physical sciences? Does it bear Does it bear directly on the moral character of the pupil? Does it bear upon his relig ious character, his habits of piety?

We have tested, on such general principles, the question whether religion ought, or ought not, to enter into the course of public instruction, and have decided that it should. But shall we teach Theism or Atheism, Pantheism or Exotheism? By the last term, I designate that steadfast ignoring of religious questions to which an exclusive attachment to physical researches may lead one. But this and blank Atheism we have already condemned as unfit to be taught

anywhere, or by anybody; Atheism, because it denies the central truth of all science, the truth which alone makes science possible, destroying thus the natural head of the whole hierarchy of sciences; Exotheism, because it steadily puts this central truth of all science out of view, and attempts to degrade theology from its natural position of the head of the sciences, and to place it in a subordinate position among "oldwives' fables."

It remains, then, to consider whether we should. teach Pantheism or Monotheism. Now, to me, Pantheism is, in theology, very much like the doctrine that in geometry we have only logical forms of thought, and are not dealing with entities. To teach such geometry seriously and earnestly, is better than to deride the science altogether; but it does not develop the powers of imagination and conception; it does not link itself with all the higher branches of science so well as the higher doctrine that geometry is the science treating of the real subject-matter — space. So, a reverent and devout Pantheism may be better than Atheism, and even better than the Exotheism of positive science. For, as the language of a devout spirit, even when intellectually misled towards Pantheism, is theistic, the mind of the pupil may receive the higher truth, through the medium intended by the teacher to convey only the lower truth. But Monotheistic views alone give theology its true position in the scale of sciences. With Pantheistic

unjust in compelling them to pay taxes to sustain such schools? The writer of this article is a Protestant of the most radical ty does not stop with Martin Luther, but who protests against all ob

views the highest science is lower than one of inferior grade. When on going upward through the sciences we have at last studied in the human mind the laws of thought and feeling and volition, we perceive that this self-conscious mind is the highest object of our thought yet found. But as we have seen, while studying the material universe, innumerable evidences of wisdom, of plan and of purpose, we must suppose an Infinite mind ruling the great mass of matter. But here comes the question, Does this great mind which adapts all organs to their functions, all materials to their uses, all forms to the fulfilment of an ideal plan, do so consciously or unconsciously? In other words, when we rise from the contemplation of our minds to the contemplation of the Infinite mind, do we fall from the consideration of a conscious being, to the consideration of an unconscious being? To me it seems that this question answers itself by its own absurdity. The modern philosophy which regards the universe as an unconscious struggle of non-being to become being, saved only by that struggle from relapsing into the pure zero of non-existence, saved only by the impossibility of succeeding in the struggle, from going over to the pure zero (as they term it) of being, seems to me to be itself the pure zero of irrationality, - which would be shocking to our sentiments of reverence, if it were only sufficiently intelligible to be comprehended. To us who believe in the first article of the creed, that