became, by his own direction, a dynamo of vengeance. The Spanish garrison in Jolo, for all its size, lived in terror-terror of the individual human creatures at its back.

At last, after a year and a half of hopeless conflict between the cooped-up, nerve-racked garrison and the furious and desperate people, came a wise Spaniard, Colonel Carlos Martinez, as Governor of Sulu. He, by skill and tact, and by cooperation with an equally wise and skilful Sulu chief, Datu Harun al Rashid, arranged with the Sultan a treaty to stop futile bloodshed.

This treaty, the last of many signed with Spain, and never abrogated, secured to Sulu the free administration of all her internal affairs, with the undisturbed enjoyment of her own laws and all her old rights of trade. It gave the Sultan direct access to the Spanish Governor-General of the Philippines, over the head of warship commanders or of the Governor of Sulu. It recognized the Sultan's privilege to collect duties from foreign vessels outside of Jolo and to handle all Moro delinquents and criminals. It recognized the right of all the people of Sulu to “use muzzle-loading rifles and lantaka" (Moro-made cannon). And most important of all-it re-affirmed the pledge that the customs, usages and religion of the people should be held inviolable. It provided a fixed yearly payment from Spain to the Sultan and to the members of the Sultan's council. It effected the recognition, by the Sultan and his council, of Spanish suzerainty. And it settled the status of Sulu as a protectorate of Spain, not a dependency.

It was this treaty that America found in force when, in May, 1899, she took over from Spain the fortress of Jolo.

Chapter XXVII

MEN AND A CURSE

MEANTIME, over to the east of the Sulu archipelago, among the Moros of Mindanao, Basilan and the lesser islands, a parallel drama had been enacted. There, during the last quarter of the sixteenth century, Spain hectored the country, arousing fear and hatred, killing and being killed, but making no real progress toward occupation. Underestimating, at first, the quality of the people, the Spanish brought to Mindanao only such forces as had sufficed for the rapid and easy conquests of the Visayas and Luzon.

In 1598, however, General Ronquillo was ordered "to make a last effort against the Mindanaos, doing them all possible damage." Setting out from Oton, February 8, 1597, Ronquillo sailed for the Mindanao river, meaning to proceed thereby up into the country of the Sultan sa Maguindanao. At the river's mouth he stopped to repair his ships and store his ammunition, then ran up until he met the enemy's artillery outposts, where he stopped to reconnoitre. Here, he reported:

On the third day, as the work of reconnoitring was proceeding, a large ambuscade of Indians attacked us in the open near a palmgrove. As was learned later, they numbered about two thousand. They attacked us with the greatest fury and determination, in small bodies of skilful troops. . . . Of a truth they showed clearly that they were brave; for I do not believe that there are many peoples who would attack with so gallant a determination, when they were armed with nothing but shields and campilans.

...

I planted my battery of eight pieces. . . . Although I battered the fort hotly, I could not effect a breach through which to make

1 Don Juan de Ronquillo to Governor Tello, Mindanao, 1597. Blair and Robertson, Vol. IX, pp. 284-6.

an assault. All the damage that I did them by day, they repaired by night. . . . I reconnoitred the fort. . . . It is located at the entrance of a lagoon, thus having only water at the back, and swampy and marshy ground at the sides. It has a frontage of more than 1,000 paces, is furnished with very good transversals, and is well supplied with artillery and arquebuses. Moreover, it has a ditch of water more than 4 brazas [24 feet] wide and 2 deep, and thus there was a space of dry ground of only fifteen paces where it was possible to attack; and this space was bravely defended. . . . The inner parts were water, where they sailed in vessels, while we had no footing at all.

Under the circumstances General Ronquillo decided that to negotiate and retire were wiser than to fight. In his subsequent report, he added:

These Indians are not like those in Luzon, but are accustomed to power and sovereignty. . . .2

And again:

the inhabitants are Indians only in name-a great force is needed, as well as much ammunition, in order to make them pay tribute.3

The Jesuits, however, still pressed the Spanish government to occupy southern Mindanao and especially to plant a fortress at Zamboanga for the protection of their missionaries and of Christian ships. At last, in 1635, a strong expedition actually began the erection of a fort at Zamboanga.

Thus time wore on. In 1848, the progress made toward pacification could be fairly measured by the incident of Balangingi. Balangingi, an island not six miles square, lying between Jolo and Basilan, is scarcely more than a mangrove swamp half awash among reefs and shoals. Its inhabitants were Samalsa Mohammedan sea-race that build their houses over the water and drop from their doors to their boats.

2 Blair and Robertson, Vol. IX, p. 289.

a Ibid., p. 292.

Four forts, with walls of triple rows of piles containing artillery embrasures, constituted the island's defence. The Spaniards attacked in greatly superior force. The Moros fought desperately. When the walls fell and the end was sure, they first turned their krises upon their wives and children, then rushed out to certain death from the Spanish guns. Gathering up the loot-in this case rich-the Spaniards then proceeded utterly to destroy all of use or value, down to the last cocoanut tree, that the island contained. The Moro dead numbered about 500. It is said that there were never any Moro wounded when a fight was done.

Yet, out of pure defiance, a Samal datu renewed settlement and built a fort on this same island within the year. And so, with attack, defiance and rapid counterattack, the hopeless fight went on. At last, about 1861, and chiefly by means of steam coast-guard vessels, Spain reduced Zamboanga and Basilan to a sort of stormy and intermittent acceptance.

None of all these activities appreciably affected either the primeval pagan population inhabiting the interior of the island, or the fierce and proud Lanao Moros of the lake region high in the Mindanao hills.

Such were the peoples of the southern archipelago, whose destiny fell into our hands from the broken grasp of Spain.

As for America's impact on the Moro mind, the Moro saw small reason or beauty in the appearance on his horizon of a new foreign assailant of his liberty. Sometimes he parleyed, sometimes he fought, his women fighting at his side-together casting away their lives. And American forces crushed these outbreaks bloodily-perhaps also from lack of understanding of the mind and background of the opponent-from lack of power of direct speech or intelligent interpretation, either way. But these fights had one great merit over the fights with Spain-they were decisive.

Fortunately, the first men we sent out to make the beginnings of government were of our best. Bolton, set down alone in far Davao without troops at his back, governed seventeen

fighting tribes-governed them easily because of his even hand, bis manhood and his sympathy with the people. Stader dispensed order, justice and humane good humour in the Sulu Sea. Febiger's name is yet remembered with affection by the Maguindanaos. Bullard and Pershing, at opposite ends of Lake Lanao, had each such backing among the Moro chiefs as, for its sheer energy, almost caused a war.

These and other young army officers similarly placed handled each his own job by personal influence and prestige, by individual touch, more or less successfully, to the best of his imagination. They demanded order and rendered such protection as was possible. They tried to avoid idle friction and to give no needless offence to ancient prejudices or customs. When revolts broke out they struck swiftly and hard. They acted as men to men. And simplicity and justice gave the two great keynotes for all that they did.

The honourable and intelligent relations of these young soldiers were the origin of the extraordinary faith in America yet held by the Moro of to-day.

In 1903 we erected the whole Moro country into a "Moro Province"-the largest in the Philippines. We gave it an Organic Act, and we sent it General Leonard Wood as first civil governor-under orders to keep peace if he could but to bring on trouble if he must. The Government that General Wood set up was practical, plain, quick in action, and extremely elastic. He did everything through the head men, whom the Moros by their own law and custom were used to trust and obey. When he punished, he punished memorably, clearing the sky like a thunderstorm and leaving no aftermath of grudges. He allowed the Moros to follow their own habits and choice wherever their ideas did not conflict with American vital principles-as they did in the question of slavery.

And, where he could, he made use of his personal advantage. For example:

Up among the Lanaos, where the men still look like Old Testament heroes, where the earth is tilled like a garden, where