Knowles, ex parte, 16 R. 263. Opinion of Warren Circuit Court.

The proceedings on a writ of habeas corpus may be ex parte, and carried on without the knowledge of the persons directly interested in the decision. Weddington v. Sloan, 15 B. M. 155.

The Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction of habeas corpus proceedings, either originally or by appeal. In re Channels, 131 Ky. 737, 100 S. W. 214, 30 R. 1248.

HABENDUM.-The clause following the granting part of a deed, and beginning with the words "to have and to hold," which defines the extent of the interest conveyed. Cochran's Law Lexicon.

The purpose of the habendum clause of a deed is to describe and limit the character and extent of the title intended to be conveyed, and in a properly drafted deed any exception or reservation in the grant should occur in this clause in its proper place. Towns v. Brown, 114 S. W. 773.

The office of the habendum in a deed is to determine the estate or interest granted. The object in construing a deed is to ascertain the intention of the parties, and this is to be arrived at by considering the entire instrument. Heingley v. Harris, 1 R. 55.

"The office of the habendum clause in a deed is to limit and define the estate granted. While as a general rule it must give way to the granting clause of the deed when clearly contradictory of them, yet it should certainly be resorted to equally with the balance of the instrument to arrive at the intention of the maker, which must govern, when ascertainable. When the intention does not appear, then the words of grant should govern, if repugnant to the habendum of the deed; but if the intention is apparent, then it should govern." May v. Justice, 148 Ky. 696, 147 S. W. 409.

HABERE FACIAS.-(That you have cause to have.) Words used in various writs of execution, or in aid of execution. Habere facias possessionem, issued for a successful plaintiff in ejectment, to put him in possession of the premises recovered. Habere facias seisinam, an older writ, to the same effect as

the last. Habere facias visum, a writ that lay in divers real actions, where a view was required to be taken of the lands in controversy. Cochran's Law Lexicon.

HABIT. The word "practice," with reference to intoxicants, when used in an application for insurance means "custom," "habit," and if the applicant's use of intoxicants has not been so frequent as that he can be said to have acquired the habit of using intoxicants, a jury would be warranted in finding that his answer in the negative to a question as to his practice in the use of intoxicants to be true. Columbia Life Ins. Co.

v. Tousey, 152 Ky. 447, 153 S. W. 767.

Under Sec. 639, Ky. Stats., providing that no misrepresentations in an application for a policy of insurance shall prevent a recovery unless material or fraudulent, false statements by an applicant that he does not use intoxicating liquors will invalidate the policy, though he be not addicted to the intemperate use of such liquors, the rule being different, however, as to his past habits in that regard. Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. Lee, 47 S. W. 614, 20 R. 839.

The representation of assured in his application that he was a man of temperate habits and had not taken a drink for over a year was material to the risk and amounted to a warranty. A warranty that the insured is of sober and temperate habits means not only at the time of the insurance, but for such a reasonable time prior thereto as would allow one to form a habit. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Gividen, 13 R. 970.

Where plaintiff sues for personal injuries, he may prove that before his injury he was a man of industrious habits, sober and moral, for the sole purpose of showing the value of his earning capacity, but in such case the court should instruct the jury that they should not consider it for any other purpose than to show the value of his earning capacity before he was injured. It is likewise permissible to prove by way of diminution of damages that the plaintiff was an habitually lazy and drunken person, which should also be accompanied by a strict admonition from the court as to the purpose for which it is admitted. L. & N. R. Co. v. Daniel, 122 Ky. 256, 91 S. W. 691, 28 R. 1146.

Where a servant sues his master for impairment of power to earn money, the master may show that the servant was habitually lazy and drunk; and the servant may show, if he can, that he was of sober habits and industrious. Buffalo Creek Coal Mining Co. v. Hodges, 98 S. W. 274, 30 R. 346.

Where plaintiff sued for injuries by falling into a hole in a sidewalk, it was not competent for defendant to show, on the issue as to whether plaintiff was drunk when he was injured, that he had the habit of drunkenness. City of Madisonville v. Stewart, 121 S. W. 421.

HABITABLE ROOM.-"A 'habitable room,' as used in this Act, is a room which can be used for sleeping or living purposes, and does not include such entry halls, closets, pantries, kitchens, kitchenettes or store rooms which by reason of their size or arrangement can not be used for sleeping or living rooms for any considerable period of the day or night." Tenement House Act. Acts 1912, Chap. 140; Ky. Stats. (1915), Sec. 3037g.

HABITUAL DRUNKARD.-Under the statute which provides that any licensed vendor of liquors, who knowingly sells such liquors to an inebriate or person in the habit of becoming drunk, after written notice from the wife of such person forbidding the sale, shall be liable to an action for damages by the wife; to constitute one an habitual drunkard it is sufficient that he has a fixed habit of frequently getting drunk, though not oftener drunk than sober, and though sober for weeks at a time. Cook v. Newton, 14 R. 860.

HABITUALLY.-The use of the word "habitually" in charging the offense in one of the indictments was mere surplusage, and its omission from the other indictment did not make the offense charged therein of a different character from that charged in the former indictment, and the same evidence which would authorize a conviction in the one case would authorize a conviction in the other. The charge of a continuing nuisance in an indictment is not allowed, except for the purpose of enabling the court upon conviction to abate the nuisance. C. & 0. Ry. Co. v. Com., 88 Ky. 368, 10 R. 919, 8 R. 534.

HACK LINE. Under act of March 15, 1906 (Acts 1906, page 200), providing for an annual tax of $10 "on each regular hack, stage, or automobile line, for public use, a liveryman who keeps a hack and other vehicles for hire, and who sends his hack to the depot near the city daily to meet the trains and convey passengers to their destination in the city, is not operating a hack line in the meaning of the statute. Com. v. Walton, 126 Ky. 523, 104 S. W. 323, 31 R. 916.

HACKNEY COACH.-The statute recognizes a distinction between pleasure coaches or hackney coaches on one hand and stage coaches on the other. A hackney coach is a coach which is hired out; a stage coach is one which is used by the owner to carry passengers from one point to another. A stage coach is not hired out. It remains in the possession of the owner. Burton v. Monticello and Burnside Turnpike Co., 162 Ky. 787, 173 S. W. 144.

HAD CAUSE.-An instruction to the jury telling them to find for the plaintiff if they should believe that any of the employes of defendant knew, or "had cause to believe," that plaintiff or the children who were with him were on either of the standing cars and failed to exercise ordinary care to protect them, was not prejudicial to defendant, as the phrase "had cause' could not have been understood by the jury as meaning other than reasonable grounds to believe. L. & N. R. Co. v. Popp, 96 Ky. 99, 16 R. 369.

HAD TO DO.-Evidence that defendant admitted a few days before the killing that he had "had to do" with a girl, not shown to be deceased, was inadmissible. Franklin v. Com., 105 Ky. 237, 48 S. W. 986, 20 R. 1137.

HAEMOPHILIA. "A congenital morbid condition characterized by a tendency to bleed immoderately from any insignificant wound, or even spontaneously." Ins. Co. v. Duncan, 166 Ky.

521.

HAERES LEGITIMUS EST QUEM NUPTIAE DEMONSTRANT. He is the lawful heir whom the marriage proves to be so. Cochran's Law Lexicon.

HAIR. An assurance by a master to an operator of a sewing machine that a belt connecting the machine with the revolving shaft was not dangerous because the parts thereof were fastened with hooks did not render the master liable for injury to the operator by getting her hair caught in the shafting while connecting the belt on her machine with the shaft; it appearing that she did not rely on such assurance. NelsonBethel Clothing Co. v. Pitts, 131 Ky. 65, 114 S. W. 331, 23 L. R. A. (N.S.) 1013.

HALF BINDING.-Ky. Stats., Sec. 3982, fixing the price for public printing, provides as follows: "For ruling and binding blank-book work (paper and all material used to be furnished by the contractor or contractors), as follows: Per quire, letter size or smaller, for half binding, with corners, thirty (30) cents; half binding, with spring backs, fifty (50) cents; full binding, with spring backs, sixty-five (65) cents; for binding with Russia corners, seventy-five (75) cents; for binding, Russia ends and bands, ninety (90) cents." Held, that saddlestitched pamphlets bound in cardboard glued to the back can not be charged under the clause of the statute for half binding with corners or under the clause of the statute fixing the price for half binding with spring backs or full binding with spring backs. Com. v. Bacon, 111 S. W. 387, 33 R. 935.

HALF-SISTER.-One who carnally knows his half-sister is as much guilty of incest as though she were a sister of the full blood. Burdue v. Com., 144 Ky. 428, 138 S. W. 296.

HALF THE TRUTH.-Where a vendor sells a farm upon which are located two graveyards, and informs his vendee of the existence of one and conceals from him the existence of the other, even if he was under no duty to make any disclosure, he can not seek refuge in the maxim caveat emptor for he can not tell half the truth, creating the false impression that he has told the whole truth, and then avail himself of the maxim. Elsey v. Lamkin, 156 Ky. 836, 162 S. W. 106.

HALLUCINATIONS.-Evidence of hallucinations experienced by an injured person is incompetent. I. C. R. Co. v.