MEDICAL EXAMINATION.-Where a medical examination is made that shows the applicant not to be a desirable risk, and it is agreed between him and the examiner that the medical report shall be retained until he can submit to another examination, no medical examination within the meaning of the application has been made. Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Neafus, 145 Ky. 563, 140 S. W. 1026, 36 L. R. A. (N.S.) 1211.

MEDICAL EXAMINER.-A medical examiner is not an agent of an applicant for insurance. Masonic Life Association v. Robinson, 149 Ky. 80.

MEDICINES.-Compounds of medicines with alcoholic liquors, made in good faith as medicines for medical use and not as a device to avoid the law regulating or prohibiting the sale of liquors, are not prohibited by the law, and a druggist may make and sell them for use as medicine without violating the law. Higdon v. Com., 8. Ky. Opin. 574. See, also, LIQUOR.

MEETING OF MINDS.-See CONTRACT.

MELIOR EST CONDITIO DEFENDENTIS, OR POSSIDENTIS. The condition of the party in possession is the better one; i. e., where the right of the parties is equal. Cochran's Law Lexicon.

This maxim is applied in Coleman v. Talbot, 2 Bibb 130; Trible v. Fryer, 5 J. J. M. 180.

MELIUS EST PETERE FONTES QUAM SECTARI RIVULOS. It is better to go to the fountain head than to follow streamlets from it. This applies especially to quotations, extracts, and conclusions deduced from leading cases and authorities. Cochran's Law Lexicon.

MEMBER. A provision in the charter of a small mutual fire insurance company, organized purely for the protection of its members and depending on the initiation fee to cover

losses, that when a member disposed of his property by a recorded conveyance, this should terminate his membership as well as the liability of the company was valid, the conveyance by a member of the property terminated the insurance, although, under a private, unrecorded contract between the member and the grantee, the insured remained the beneficial owner of the property, and a few months thereafter it was reconveyed to him, and the fire did not occur until after the reconveyance. L. G. M. F. I. A. v. Schneider, 165 Ky. 285, 176 S. W. 1154.

MEMBER OF FAMILY.-See FAMILY.

MEMORANDA.-The word "memoranda" in the Act to Regulate Commerce, held not to include correspondence. U. S. v. L. & N. R. Co., 236 U. S. 334.

MEMORANDUM.-A "memorandum," required by the statute of frauds, is such a written declaration of the parties to the agreement as will relieve the court from relying on parol evidence to ascertain the subject of the contract. Campbell v. Preece, 133 Ky. 572, 118 S. W. 373.

A memorandum, sufficient to satisfy the statute of frauds, need not state the terms of the contract as to the consideration, which may be proved by parol, even if to do so involves contradiction of the memorandum. Id.

The statute of frauds is sufficiently complied with if there is a written memorandum of the contract for the sale of land, signed by the party to be charged. Id.

"In Campbell v. Preece, 133 Ky. 572, after quoting the statute, this court said: 'It is not necessary to the validity of. the contract that it shall be in writing. If there be a written memorandum of it, signed by the party to be charged, it is taken out of the statute. Nor is it necessary that the memorandum be contemporaneous with the contract. If it be executed subsequently, and ratifies the contract, it is sufficient. The statute pertains to evidence of the contract-not to its validity. While it follows that, if the required evidence of the contract be wanting, its enforcement is denied, and the contract

is said to be void, it is void only because of the lack of legal evidence of its existence.'" McKnight v. Broadway Investment Co., 147 Ky. 535, 145 S. W. 377.

The evidence as to what lands are the subject of the contract must be contained within the contract. The writing or memorandum must afford the means of identification, and unless it does it is within the statute of frauds. Where no words are used in the writing to give a starting point, nor is the description sufficient to authorize parol proof to aid in identifying the land, the writing is within the statute. Price v. Hays, 144 Ky. 535, 139 S. W. 810.

The endorsement by vendor of a check drawn by vendee purporting to be given "for lot" purchased by parol contract, is not a signing by the party to be charged, and is not, therefore, a sufficient memorandum or ratification in writing to take the case out of the statute of frauds. Rhinehart v. Kelley, 145 Ky. 470, 140 S. W. 653.

Two or more writings, signed by the party to be charged and shown to refer to the same subject-matter and describing the subject of the contract so that it may be identified, may together constitute a sufficient memorandum. Campbell v. Preece, 133 Ky. 572, 118 S. W. 373.

A memorandum of a contract for the sale of land, sufficient to satisfy the statute of frauds, need not be contemporaneous with the contract, it being sufficient if it is subsequently executed and ratifies the contract. Campbell v. Preece, 133 Ky. 572, 118 S. W. 373.

A writing which does not describe the land is ineffectual under the statute of frauds. McClanahan v. Brown, 157 Ky. 450, 163 S. W. 467.

"Neither does supplying description conflict with the statute of frauds. The necessity for description does not come from the statute; it comes rather from the common law on contracts. Without a description the contract is too indefinite for enforcement. The statute of frauds does not prescribe the form for contracts, nor does it affect the fundamentals of a contract other than to require that contracts for the sale of land be reduced to writing. But such a contract might be reduced to writing

and meet all the requirements of the statute of frauds as written, still be unenforcible under the law of contract for lack of definiteness. And that is the case we have in hand. There is a written memorandum signed by the parties, but for want of description of the thing sold it is so indefinite that it cannot be enforced in its present condition." McMee v. Henry, 163 Ky. 729, 174 S. W. 746.

An auctioneer is to be ordinarily treated as agent of both seller and purchaser of either real or personal property sold by him, and a memorandum of the sale signed by him is a sufficient written memorial of the contract to bind both parties. McBrayer v. Cohen, 92 Ky. 479, 13 R. 667; Linn Boyd Tobacco Warehouse Co. v. Terrill, 13 Bush, 463; Gill v. Hewett, 7 Bush,

12.

An auctioneer's memorandum, signed by him, describing the lots sold, and stating the terms of the sale, was sufficient to bind both seller and buyer, and was a compliance with the statute. Garth v. Davis & Johnson, 120 Ky. 106, 85 S. W. 692, 27 R. 505.

A resolution adopted by the directors and stockholders of a railroad corporation declaring their willingness to sell the roadbed, rolling stock, and the other corporate property at a fixed price, and empowering the president of the corporation to consummate the sale, though entered on the records of the corporation, did not constitute a valid contract for the sale of real estate within the statute of frauds. Cumberland & O. V. R. Co. v. Shelbyville, etc., R. Co., 117 Ky. 95, 77 S. W: 690, 25 R. 1265.

To constitute a valid contract for the sale of land under the statute of frauds, the memorandum or note thereof should be so full that its meaning may be ascertained and the contract enforced without aid of extrinsic verbal testimony, and if it be executory on both sides the terms or considerations should likewise appear independent of parol evidence. Tyler v. Ouzts, 93 Ky. 331, 14 R. 321.

A writing signed by defendants authorizing a firm of real estate brokers to offer plaintiff a named sum for a city lot, specifically described, is equivalent to a written offer by defend

ants themselves to plaintiff, and the plaintiff having written at the bottom of the instrument his acceptance of the offer, the two writings together constitute a sufficient memorandum to satisfy the requirements of the statute of frauds. And the acceptance being unconditional, it is not material that it was never delivered to defendants or to any one for them. Alford v. Wilson, 95 Ky. 506, 16 R. 70.

A writing reciting that a designated person, of a specified place, has this day sold his home place and storehouse to a named person, sufficiently describes the property to take the contract out of the statute of frauds, especially when there has been a partial execution of the contract. Henderson v. Perkins, 94 Ky. 207, 14 R. 782.

Memorandum made by a party on a note or obligation in his possession is not, when the fact it purports to establish, as e. g., a payment, is denied, sufficient evidence to create or continue the liability. Frazer v. Frazer, 13 Bush, 397.

A writing, executed by the wife of an owner of timber, setting out that she was empowered to transact any and all business for her husband, evidencing a sale of certain timber for a sufficient consideration, is a sufficient memorandum to satisfy the statute of frauds, and a subsequent purchaser of the land, having knowledge of the transaction, is bound by it. Acree v. Rozzell, 108 S. W. 846, 32 R. 1342.

While a written memorandum that will satisfy the statute may be an undelivered writing, or a writing other than the contract which rests upon it, it still is necessary for the parties to have entered into a contract respecting the land. Allen v. Stailey, 119 S. W. 755.

Where a paper was executed reciting that it was made "for the satisfaction and security of M.," and then proceeded to restate the substance of the former parol agreement which was barred by limitation, held, the paper was a covenant, and not a mere memorandum of the parol agreement, and the statute of limitations was not available. Metcalfe v. Poindexter, 4 Met. 52.

The memorandum of the sale of town lots in the book of the trustees, unless signed by them or some one of them law