What distinguished an office from a mere employment or contract. See note on this subject in 17 L. R. A. 244.

The incumbent of an office which is created for the benefit of the public, and which the Legislature may abolish at any time, has no vested or absolute right in the office or the unexpired time. Gibbons v. Young, 1 Ky. Opin. 318.

"No office or post of profit, trust or honor under this Commonwealth, whether civil or military, legislative, executive, ministerial or judicial, nor the deputation thereof, in whole or in part, shall be sold or let to farm by any person holding or expecting to hold the same." Ky. Stats. (1915), Sec. 3740. Under Sec. 485 of the Civil Code, an action in the name of the Commonwealth may be brought by the attorney-general to prevent the usurpation of a city office, that being an office "other than a county office." Wheeler v. Com., 98 Ky. 59, 32 S. W. 259, 17 R. 636.

In the following cases the Court of Appeals recognized the law to be that an office may be forfeited and vacated by abandonment, although it was held that a non-occupation for one day merely was not sufficient. Taylor v. Johnson, 148 Ky. 649; Lewin v. Ft. Mitchell, 148 Ky. 816; Jewett v. Matteson, 148 Ky. 820; City of Williamsburg v. Weesner, 164 Ky. 769, 176 S. W. 224. See, also, USURPATION; VACATION OF OFFICE.

OFFICE DE FACTO.-"There is a radical and fundamental distinction between a de facto office and a de facto officer. The former can not exist except in case of revolution, a complete overturning of constitutional authority, and the usurpation of all power of government by occupants exercising a force superior to the constitutional authorities. There might be under our constitution, and there have been, de facto officers. But there never was and never can be under the present constitution a de facto office." Coquillard Wagon Works v. Melton, 137 Ky. 189, 125 S. W. 291.

An office de facto can not exist under our constitution; it is a solecism; it only results from necessity, where there is a total subversion of the legal government and a usurpation of all the powers of sovereignty. Hildreth v. McIntire, 1 J. J. M.

OFFICE FOUND.-"The ‘inquest of office found' is abolished by the statute (Sec. 2971), as many ancient commonlaw writs, such as the writ of injunction, scire facias, and quo warranto have been similarly abolished; but in lieu thereof other modes of procedure more simple and effective have been provided. Civil Code Prac., Secs. 271, 480. The statute, supra, makes such provision; an action being substituted for the inquest of office. So, while the statute declares that such property as is therein described shall escheat to the Commonwealth 'without office found,' this does not obviate the necessity for having determined the question of whether the grounds or conditions which authorize an escheat of the property involved in fact exist, which must be done 'by an action at law or in equity.' Louisville School Board v. King, 127 Ky. 834, 107 S. W. 247, 32 R. 687, 15 L. R. A. (N.S.) 379.

OFFICE HOURS.-A telegraph company may establish reasonable hours during which its office shall be kept open for the transmission and delivery of messages. Davis v. W. U. T. Co., 66 S. W. 17, 23 R. 1758.

Office hours may be fixed with reference to the quantity of business done, and where the business does not justify night delivery the failure to provide for such delivery is not negligence. Western U. Tel. Co. v. Van Cleave, 54 S. W. 827, 22 R. 53.

Where the office hours of the company, at the place where the message was to be delivered, were from seven o'clock in the morning to seven o'clock in the evening, the company was under no obligation to deliver a message received during the night until within a reasonable time after seven o'clock next morning. Western U. Tel. Co. v. Steenberger, 54 S. W. 829, 21 R. 1289.

OFFICERS. See, also, OFFICERS DE FACTO; VACANCY IN OFFICE; DISTRICT OR STATE OFFICERS; CHANGE OF SALARY; PUBLIC OFFICERS; VACATION OF OFFICE; USURPATION OF OFFICE.

It is provided in Civil Code, Sec. 732, that in the construction of the Code the word "sheriff" means the sheriff of the

county in which the action or proceeding referred to is pending,
or the sheriff of another county to which process is directed;
and it means, also, any officer or person who is or may be
authorized by law to act as, or in place of, a sheriff.

It is provided in Civil Code, Sec. 732, that in the construc-
tion of the Code the words "coroner," "justice," "jailer,"
"constable," mean officers of the county in which the action or
proceeding referred to is pending, or may be brought, or to
which the process referred to is directed.

"There are various tests by which to determine who are
officers in the meaning of the law, but at last, in case of uncer-
tainty, the intention of the law-makers control. To constitute
an officer it does not seem to be material whether his term be
for a period fixed by law or endure at the will of the creating
power; but if an individual be invested with some portion of
the functions of the government, to be exercised for the benefit
of the public, he is a public officer." (Meacham on Public
Offices, Sec. 1.) City of Louisville v. Wilson, 99 Ky. 604, 36
S. W. 944, 18 R. 527, quoted in Fox v. Lantrip, 162 Ky. 178,
172 S. W. 133; Lowry v. City of Lexington, 113 Ky. 773, 68
S. W. 1109, 24 R. 516.

He who performs the duties of an office is an "officer."'
Com. v. Bush, 131 Ky. 384, 115 S. W. 249.

A usurper is not an officer. Com. v. Bush, 131 Ky. 384, 115
S. W. 249.

The clerk of a tax collector is not an officer of the city; he is
his principal's clerk and bound to account to the principal alone.
Snapp v. Com., 82 Ky. 173, 6 R. 34.

Act 1886 (Sec. 3909, Ky Stats.), prohibiting the location of
a pest house within or near a city or town, and providing that
"any officer of any city or town" who shall violate the act
shall be liable, etc., does not apply to legislative officers of a
municipality, but to the executive and ministerial officers who
establish the pest house. Clayton v. City of Henderson, 103

Ky. 228, 44 S. W. 667, 20 R. 87, 44 L. R. A. 474.

The act also imposes a liability on any person who shall
"in anywise aid or abet" a violation of its provisions. Held,

that it did not apply to the surety of the pest-house keeper, merely by virtue of such suretyship. Id.

Sec. 3484, Ky. Stats., part of the charter of cities of the fourth class, which declares that any officer who shall be interested in any contract with the city shall vacate his offiee, has no application to city attorneys. Com. v. Willis, 42 S. W. 1118, 19 R. 962.

Members of the boards of public safety and public works and the secretaries of such boards are municipal "officers" (Sec. 161, Constitution), and an ordinance reducing their salaries during their term of office is therefore unconstitutional. City of Lou. v. Wilson, 99 Ky. 598, 36 S. W. 944, 18 R. 427.

The assistant bailiff of the police court, performing the duties of a peace officer and authorized to serve process, is also such an "officer." Id.

So, also, is the stenographer of the City Court, whose official acts, under the statute authorizing the appointment of an official stenographer, have the same degree of verity as do those of the Iclerk of the Police Court. Id.

The provision of Sec. 160, Ky. Constitution, that the General Assembly "shall prescribe the qualification of all officers of towns and cities, the manner in and cause for which they may be removed from office," applies to all offices of towns and cities, whether created by the Constitution or Legislature; and the Legislature, having fixed by the charter of cities of the first class (Sec. 2781, Ky. Stats.), the manner in which the officers of such cities may be removed, but failing to prescribe the cause for which it may be done, such cause must be such as constitutes misfeasance or malfeasance in office, or that character of charge. which renders the officer unfit for the position. Todd v. Dunlap, 99 Ky. 449, 36 S. W. 541, 18 R. 329.

Sec. 2794, Ky. Stats., providing that the mayor may, by written order "giving the reasons therefor," remove from office any head of department, director, or other officer appointed by him, does not authorize the removal of officers appointed for a fixed term without notice and an opportunity to be heard. Todd v. Dunlap, 99 Ky. 449, 36 S. W. 541, 18 R. 329,

The word "officer" used in the Act of 1827 includes attorneys at law, and authorizes bank-paper collected to be specifically recovered. Bank Com. v. Patton, 4 J. J. M. 192.

An indictment charging defendant with acting as officer of an investment company without having first procured a license from the State treasurer is defective in failing to state what office in the company accused held. Com. v. Loving, 92 S. W. 575, 29 R. 175.

Whether or not a person attempting to make an arrest was an officer was a question of law for the court. Hendrickson v. Com., 81 S. W. 266, 26 R. 224.

Under Sec. 186d, Ky. Stats., the statutory obligation which is really the basis of the contract obligation for public officials, is that the officer will faithfully discharge the duties of the office or else the surety will pay the loss occasioned thereby, not to exceed the sum fixed in the bond. Bankers Surety Co. v. City of Newport, 162 Ky. 473, 172 S. W. 940.

A master commissioner is not a State officer or a deputy State officer. Goodloe v. Fox, 96 Ky. 627, 16 R. 653.

All civil officers liable to removal from office by impeachment before the senate. Constitution, Art. 5, Secs. 2, 3. Or by address to the governor by two-thirds of both branches of the Legislature. Constitution, Art. 4, Sec. 3. Page v. Hardin, 8 B. M. 673.

Women are not eligible to offices created by the Constitution of this State, and are therefore not eligible to the office of jailer. Atchison, County Judge, v. Lucas, 83 Ky. 451, 7 R. 424.

Sec. 1722, Ky. Stats., providing for the payment to various clerks of the Circuit Courts of a fee of $5 for services in each felony case, was unconstitutional in so far as it affected clerks in office at the date of its passage, as Sec. 161, Constitution, forbidding a change in the "compensation" of any officer during his term applies to officers paid by fees as well as to those paid by salaries. Com. v. Carter, 21 R. 1509, 55 S. W. 701.

Under an indictment against a bank cashier for making a false entry with intent to defraud the bank an instruction authorizing a conviction if the intent was to defraud "the