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Sale-Delivery-Goods in Bulk-Conversion.-1. Where a sale of goods is executory, and something remains to be done to distinguish the goods sold from the other goods, title does not pass, though the purchase money has been paid. The purchaser cannot, therefore, maintain trover against a third party. 2. A person who has an interest in a thing created by contract-a jus in re—e. g., an equitable lien, may maintain an action on the case for conversion. Fry v. Mobile Savings Bank. Ala. Sup. Ct., 1884. 17 Rep. 295.

Survivorship-Presumption of, in Deaths by same Calamity.—When both the husband and wife perished in the same calamity, the survivorship of the wife is not conclusively presumed, in a proceeding brug it by her administrator to set aside the probate of her husband's will, from the fact that the order of the probate court granting the letters of administration recites that such deceased was "the surviving wife" of the testator. A finding that the wife survived her husband, based entirely upon such recital, is un supported by the evidence; and a refusal of the court to admit evidence on the question of survivorship, is error. Sanders v. Simcich. Cal. Sup. Ct., Feb. 12, 1884. 1 West Coast Rep. 868.

Will--Bequest-Witness-Member of Charitable Institution Benefited.-1. The fact that a witness to a will is a corporator of a charitable institution and a distributee upon the dissolution thereof, will not defeat bequest thereto. 2. The fact that a bequest is to a charitable institution to be chosen by a trustee or executor will not render the bequest invalid for uncertainty. Quinn v. Shields. Ia. Sup. Ct., Dec. 4, 1883. 17 N. W. R. 437.

Water Power-Lease-Equitable Intervention.-1. Where the owner of a water power leases the use of a specific quantity of water, and the lessee persistently uses water in excess of the amount covered by the lease, and threatens to continue in so doing, and where the extent of such use is contingent and difficult of estimation, such owner may successfully invoke the aid of equitable intervention to prevent the lessee from using such excess, without alleging that such excess is essential to the operation of other mills, or is diverted therefrom. 2. The mere existence of a legal remedy will not bar equitable interference when the latter is more adequate, comprehensive, and effectual. Lawson u. Mernasha WoodenWare Co. Wis. Sup. Ct., Jan. 29, 1885. 18 N. W. Rep. 440.

Will-Revocation by Marriage.-Where an unmarried person has made a will and afterwards marries, the marriage, whether followed by the birth of issue or not, operates by presumption of law, in case of the sur-` vival of the wife or children, as a revocation of the will, unless some specific provision has been made by the will itself or by marriage contract for the wife, or by some settlement or provision for any surviving children. Such presumption or revocation depends upon the question of survivorship and does not admit of evidence to the contrary unless provision has been made for the wife or children surviving. Sanders v. Bimcich. Cal. Sup. Ct.. Feb. 12. 1884. 1 West Coast Rep. 868.

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There seems to be still some prospect for the passage of a law for the organization of circuit courts at the present session of the legislature. Mr. Barger's bill for the organization of these courts-the only one introduced into either house of the legislature was introduced quite late in the session, and its provision for ten circuits with thirty circuit judges, found strong opposition. It was finally agreed that the number of circuits should be seven, with twenty-one judges, but this required a new division of the state into circuits; and the judiciary committee, of which Mr. Barger is chairman, has only last week reported an amendment to the bill, defining the seven circuits. They are as follows:

First Circuit-Hamilton, Clermont, Butler, Warren and Clinton. Second Circuit-Preble, Darke, Shelby, Miami, Montgomery, Champaign, Clarke, Greene, Fayette, Madison and Franklin. Third Circuit-Mercer, Van Wert, Paulding,. Defiance, Williams, Fulton, Henry, Putnam, Allen, Auglaize, Wood, Hancock, Hardin, Logan, Union, Delaware, Marion, Wyandot and Crawford. Fourth Circuit-Brown, Adams, Highland, Pickaway, Ross, Pike, Scioto, Lawrence, Gallia, Jackson, Meigs, Vinton, Hocking, Athens, Washington and Monroe, Fifth Circuit-Morrow, Richland, Ashland, Knox, Licking, Fairfield, Perry, Morgan, Muskingum, Coshocton, Holmes, Wayne, Stark and Tuscarawas. Sixth Circuit-Lucas, Ottawa,

Sandusky, Seneca, Erie, Huron, Lorain, Medina, Summit and Cuyahoga. Seventh Circuit-Lake, Ashtabula, Geauga, Trumbull, Portage, Mahoning, Columbiana, Carroll, Jefferson, Hårrison, Guernsey, Belmont and Noble.

The session is drawing to a close, but as there seems to be little or no opposition to the other features of the bill, there is yet hope that the bill as amended will pass at this session. This will give us the circuit courts in full operation just about the time when the supreme court commission expires, which would certainly be desirable.

On Wednesday last the number of new laws filed with the secretary of state was 178, of which number 118 originated in the house, and 60 in the senate. There were also 44 joint resolutions passed, of which number 22 originated in the senate and 22 in the house. Of the new laws, as usual, a very large proportion are local acts. Among the general laws passed since our fast number, we notice another important amendment of the jury law, the second proviso of section 7278 being changed to read as follows:

Second: That he has formed or expressed an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the accused; but if a juror has formed or expressed an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the accused, the court shall thereupon proceed to examine such juror on oath, as to the grounds of such opinion, and if such juror shall say that he believes he can render an impartial verdict, notwithstanding such opinion, and if the court is satisfied that such juror will render an impartial verdict on the evidence, may admit him as competent to serve in such case as a juror. Passed March 18.

NOTES OF CASES.

INVIOLABILITY OF WIDOW'S LIFE INSURANCE MONEY.

At Kingston, N. Y., on March fifth, a decision was rendered in the supreme court establishing the inviolability of a widow's life insurance money, as respects even a judgment rendered against her in the lifetime of her husband. In 1871, Crosby & Co., wholesale hardware dealers, recovered judgments in the supreme court against Sarah Stephan, upon

which the sneriff was unable to collect anything. Mrs. Stephan's husband died some months ago, and she was paid $2,000 by a life insurance company, that being the amount of a policy held by her on her husband's life. Hearing of this, Crosby & Co. took supplemental proceedings to enforce payment of their judgments, interest and costs, and having examined Mrs. Stephan under oath, and she having sworn. that the money had been deposited in the Rondout Savings Bank, they had a receiver appointed and procured an injunction which restrained her from in any way interfering with any of her property or money not exempt from levy and sale under execution. The day after the service of the injunction order she drew the money out of the bank, and Crosby & Co. imediately moved to have her punished for contempt of court. After extended argument the court (Judge Kenyon) dismissed the proceedings, holding as above. This precise point is a new one, we believe, and the decision of it, while perhaps it strains the letter a trifle, manifestly accords with the generous spirit of the law.

CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.

In Germantown Pass. Ry. Co. v. Brophy, Pa. S. C. 29 Alb. L. J. 222; 14 W. N. Cas. 213, it was held that where a person sits in a street car with his arm resting on a window-sill, wholly within the car, and by a sudden collision his arm is thrown out and broken, his occupying such a position is not contributory negligence in law. The court said:

"Resting his arm upon the window-sill wholly within the ear, created no legal presumption of negligence. If it constituted negligence, it was a fact to be found by the jury, to whom it was submitted, and it was not to be so declared by the court. In the absence of a collision with an external object his arm was in no danger of injury. He was under no legal obligation to assume or anticipate that the company would run another car against the one in which he was sitting. The window-sill in a railway car is substantially the top of the back of the seat. It cannot be declared negligence in law for a passenger to so rest his arm, and the jury has found it is not negligence in fact."

PUBLIC RECORDS PUBLIC INSPECTION.

In Clerk v. People ex rel., S. C. Col. 16 Ch. Leg. N., is i held that the section of the general statutes (667) which requires the county clerk to keep his office "open during the usual business hours * ** and that (all) books and papers required to be in his office shall be open for the examination of any person," does not require the clerk to permit any person so desiring to use his books for the purpose of making and keeping up a complete set of abstract books for private speculation. Buck v. Collins, 51 Ga. 391, and Weber v. Townley, 43 Mich. 534, are cited in support of this conclusion.

FARM INSURANCE,

In Wildy v. Farmer's Mutual Ins. Co., S. C. Mich., 18 N. W. Rep. 212, plaintiff sued to recover insurance on a horse, harness, cushion and blanket burned at a hotel barn in the village of Paw Paw, near and within one hundred feet of other buildings. The defense was that the policy did not cover this property situated and used as it was when destroyed. The entire property insured consisted of dwelling house and contents, barns and sheds, and "personal farm property in buildings and on farm."

The company was organized and formed for the purpose of farm insurance, and the laws of the company, and the statute forbade insuring of buildings or property in buildings within one hundred feet of other buildings, and contemplated only risks on farm buildings and property. The court, CAMPBELL, J., held the company was not liable, and said:

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"Where particular property is specified as covered by the risk, it may very well be held covered though moved elsewhere, unless there are clear provisions to the contrary. But where property is only insured as farm property, it may be so restricted as to raise very different presumptions.

The loss here was by burning, and the only way in which live animals are likely to be burned is by the burning of such buildings as shelter them, or such surroundings as confine them. The situation of the building is, therefore, a very important consideration; because, where fire risks vary according to location, it is not reasonable to hold that any risks were

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