fations, towards confirming their profperity.-Will it not be their wisdom to rely for the prefervation of these advantages on the UNION by which they were procured? Will they not henceforth be deaf to thofe advifers, if fuch there are, who would fever them from their brethren and connect thei with aliens ?

To the efficacy and permanency of your Unión, a Government for the whole is indifpenfible-No alliances, however ftrict, between the parts can be an adequate fubftitute; they muft inevitably experience the infractions and interruptions which all alliances in all times have experienced. Senfible of this momentous truth, you have improved upon your firft cffay, by the adoption of a Conftitution of Government better calculated than your former for an intimate Union, and for the efficacious management of your common concerns. This Government, the offspring of our own choice, uninfluenced and unawed, adopted upon full invefligation and mature deliberation, completely free in its principles, in the diftribution of its powers, uniting fecurity with energy, and containing within itself a provifion for its own amendment, has a jut claim to your confidence and your fupport, Refpect for its authority, compliance with its laws, acquiefcence in its meafures are duties enjoined by the fundamental maxims of true liberty. The bafis of our political fyftems is the right of the people to make and to alter their Conflitutions of Government-But, the Confiitution which at any time exifts, till changed by an explicit and authentic act of the whole people, is facredly obligatory upon ali. The very idea of the power and the right of the people to eftablish Governemnt, prefuppofes the duty of every individua to obey the ellablished Government.

All obftructions to the execution of the laws, all combinations and affociations, under whatever plaufible character, with the real defign to direct, control, counteract, or awe the regular deliberation and action of the confituted authorities, are deftructive of this fundamental principle, and of fatal tendency. They ferve to organize faction, to give it an artificial and extraordinary force--to put in the place of the delegated will of the nation, the will of a party, often a small but artful and enterprizing minority of the community; and, according to the alternate triumphs of different parties, to make the public adminiftration the mirror of the ill concerted and incongruprojects of faction, rather than the organ of confiftent and wholefume plans digefted by common councils, and modified by mutual interes.

However combinations or affociations of the above defcription may now and then answer popular ends, they are likely in the courfe of time and things, to become potent engines, by which cunning, ambitious and unprincipled men will be enabled to fubvert the power of the people, and to furp for themfelves the reins of government; deftroying afterwards the very engines which have lifted them to unjuft dominion.

Towards the prefervation of your government, and the permanency of your prefent happy flate, it is requifite, not only that you fteadily difconntenance irregular oppofitions to its acknowledged authority, bit alfo that you refift with care the fpirit of innovation upon its principles however Ipecious the pretexts.-One method of alfault may be to effect in the formus of the conftitution alterations which will impair the energy of the fyllem, and thus to undermine what cannot be directly overthrown. In all the changes to which you may be invited, remember that time and habit are at leaf as neceffary to fix the true character of governments, as of other human initutions-that experience is the fureft ftandard by which to tef the real VOL. IV. Bb

tendency of the exifting conftitutions of a country-that facility in changes upon the credit of mere hypothefis and opinion, expofes to perpetual change from the endless variety of hypothefis and opinion; and remember, especially that for the efficient management of your common interefts, in a country fo extenfive as ours; a government of as much vigor as is confiftent with the perfect fecurity of liberty, is indifpenfible. Liberty itfelf will find in fuch a government, with powers properly diflributed and adjufted, its fureft guardian. It is, indeed, little effe than a name, where the government is 100 feeble to withftaud the enterprifes of faction, to confine each member of the society, within the limits prescribed by the laws, and to maintain ail in the fecure and tranquil enjoyment of the rights of perfon and property.

I have already intimated to you, the danger of parties in the flate, with particular reference to the founding of them on geographical difcriminations. Let me now take a comprehenfive view, and warn you in the most folemn manner against the moft baneful effects of the fpririt of party, generally.

This fpirit, unfortunately, is infeparable from our nature, having its root in the frongeft paffions of the human mind. It exifls under different fhapes in all governments, more or lefs flifled, controuled, or repressed but in thofe of the popular form, it is feen in greatest rankness, and it is truly their work enemy:

The alternate domination of one faction over another, fharpened by the fpirit of revenge, natural to party diffention, which in different ages and countries has perpetrated the moft horrid enormities, is itself a frightful defpotifm-But this leads at length to a more formal and permanent defpotifm-The diforders and miferies, which refult, gradually incline the minds of men to feek fecurity, and repofe in the abfolute power of an individual; and fooner or later the chief of fome prevailing faction more able or more fortunate than his competitors, turns this difpofition to the purposes of his own elevation, on the ruins of public liberty.

Without looking forward to an extremity of this kind (which nevertheless ought not to be cutirely out of fight) the common and continual mifchiefs of the fpirit of party are fufficient to make it the intereft and duty of a wife people to difcourage and refrain it.

It ferves always to diftract the public Councils, and enfeeble the public Adminiftration. It agitates the Community with ill founded jealoufies and falfe alarms; kindles the animofity of one part again another, foments occafionally riot and infurrection. It opens the door to foreign influence and corruption, which find a facilitated accefs to the government itself through the channels of party paffions. Thus the policy and the will of one country are fubjected to the policy and will of another.

There is an opinion that parties in free countries are useful checks upon the Adminiftration of Government, and ferve to keep alive the fpirit of Jiberty. This within certain limits is probably true: and in Governments of a Monarchial caft, Patriotifm may look with indulgence, if not with favour upon the spirit of party. But in thofe of the popular character, in governments purely elective, it is a fpirit not to be encouraged. From their natural tendency it is certain there will always be enough of that fpirit for every falutary purpofe. And there being conflant danger of excefs the effort ought to be, by force of public opinion, to mitigate and affuage it. A fire not to be quenched; it demands uniform vigilance to prevent its bursting into a flame, left, inficad of warming, it should confume,

It is important likewife, that the habits of thinking in a free country, hould infpire caution in thofe entrufted with its adminiftration, to confine themselves within their refpective conftitutional fpheres, avoiding in the exercife of the powers of one department to encroach upon another. The fpirit of encroachment tends to confolidate the powers of all departments in one, and thus to create, whatever the form of government, a real defpo. tifm. A just estimate of that love of power, and proneness to abuse it, which predominates in the human heart, is fufficient to fatisfy us of the truth of this pofition. The neceffity of reciprocal power; by dividing and diftributing into different depofitories, and conftituting each the Guardian of the Public Weal against invafions by the others, has been evinced by experiments ancient and modern: fome of them in our country and under our own eyes. To preferve them mufl be as neceffary as to inflitute them. If, in the opinion of the people, the diftribution or modification of the conAitutional powers be in any particular wrong, let is be corrected by an amendment in the way which the conftitution defignates.-But let there be no change by ufurpation; for though this, in one inflance, may be the infirument of good, it is the cullomary weapon by which free governments are deftroyed. The precedent must always greatly over balance in permanent evil any partial or tranfient benefit which the ufe can at any time yield.

Of all the difpofitions and habits which lead to political profperity, Re-, ligion and Morality are indifpenfable fupports. In vain would that man claim the tributes of Patriotifm, who fhould labour to fubvert thefe great pillars of human happinets, thefe firmeft props of the duties of men and citizens. The mere politician, equally with the pious man, ought to refpeft and to cherish them. A volume could not trace all their connections with private and public felicity. Let it fimply be afked, where is the fecurity for property, for reputation, for life, if the fenfe of religious obligation defert the oaths which are the inftruments of invefligation in courts of juflice? And let us with caution indulge the fuppofition, that morality can be maintained without religion. Whatever may be conceded to the influence of refined education on minds of peculiar flructure; realon and experience both forbid us to expect that national morality can prevail in exclufion of religious principle.

'Tis fubftantially true, that virtue or morality is a neceflary fpring of popular government. The rule indeed extends with more or lefs force to every fpecies of free government. Who that is a fincere friend to it, can look with indifference upon attempts to thake the foundation of the fabric ?

Promote then, as an object of primary importance, inftitutions for the general diffufion of knowledge. In proportion as the firucture of a government gives force to public opinion, it is effential that public opinioa thould be enlightened.

As a very important fource of frength, and fecurity, cherish public credit. One method of preferving it is to ufe it as fparingly as pollible; avoiding occafions of expence by cultivating peace, but remember alfo that timely difburfements to prepare for danger, frequently prevent much greater disbursemenis to repel it; avoiding likewife the accumulation of debt, not only by frunning occafions of expence, but by vigorous exertions in time of peace to discharge the debts which unavoidable wars may have occafioned, not ungeneroully throwing upon pofterity the burthen which we on.flives

ought to bear. The execution of thefe, maxims belongs to your Reprefentatives, but it is neceffary that public opinion fhould co-operate. To facilitate to them the performance of their duty, it is effential that you should practically bear it in mind, that towards the payment of debts there must be revenue; that to have revenue there must be taxes; that no taxes can be devifed which are not more or lefs inconvenient and unpleafant; that the, intrinfic embarraffinent infeparable from the felection of the proper objects, (which is always a choice of difficulties) ought to be a decifive motive for a candid conftruction of the conduct of the government in making it, and, for a fpirit of acquiefcence in the meafures for obtaining revenue which the public exigencies may at any time dictate.

Obferve good faith and juflice towards all nations, cultivate peace and harmony with all; religion and morality enjoin this conduct: and can it be, that good people does not equally enjoin it? It will be worthy of a free, enlightened, and, at no diflant period, a great nation, to give to mankind the magnanimous and too novel example of a people always guided by an exalted juftice and benevolence. Who can doubt that in the courfe of, time and things, the fruits of fuch a plan would richly repay any temporary advantage which might be loft by a fleady adherence to it? Can it be, that Providence has not connected the permanent felicity of a nation with its virtue? The experiment, at leaf, is recommended by every fentiment which ennobles human nature. Alas! it is rendered impoflible by its vices!

In the execution of fuch a plan, nothing is more effential than that permanent, inveterate antipathies against particular rations, and pallionate attachments for others fhould be excluded and that in place of them juft and amicable feelings towards all fhould be cultivated. The nation, which indulges towards another an habitual hatred, or an habitual fondnefs, is in fome degree a flave. It is a flave to its animofity or to its affection, either of which is fufficient to lead it aftray from its duty and its intereft. ADtipathy in one nation against another, difpofes each more readily to offer infult and injury, to lay hold of flight caufes of umbrage, and to be haughty and intractable, when accidental or trifling occafions of difpute, occur. Hence frequent collifions, obfiinate, envenomed and bloody contefls. The nation, prompted by ill-will and refentment, fometimes impels to war the government, contrary to the best calculations of policy. The government fometimes participates in the national propenfity, and adopts through, pation what reafon would reject; at other times, it makes the animofity fthe nation fubfervient to projects of hoftility infligated by pride, ambition and other finifter and pernicious motives. The peace often, fometimes: perhaps the liberty, of nations has been the victim.

So likewife, a pallionate attachment of one nation for another produces a variety of evils. Sympathy for the favourite nation, facilitaung the illufion, of an imaginary common intereft exifls, and infufing into one the enmities of the other, betrays the former into a participation in the quarrels and wars of the latter, without adequate inducement or juftification. It leads alfo to conceffions to the favourite nation, of privileges denyed to others, which is apt doubly to injure the nation making the concellions, by unneceflarily parting with what ought to have been retained; and by exciting jealousy, il will, and a difpofition to retaliate, in the parties from whom equal privileges are withheld: And it gives to ambitious, corrupted, or deluded citizens (who devote themfelves to the favourite nation) facility to betray, or.

facrifice the interefts of their own country, without odium, fometimes even with popularity: gilding with the appearance of a virtuous fenfe of obliga tion a commendable deference for public opinion, or a laudabie zeal for public good, the bafe or foolish compliances of ambition, corruption or

infatuation.

As avenues to foreign, influence in innumerable ways, fuch attachments are particularly alarming to the truly enlightened and independant Patriot. How many opportunities do they afford to tamper with domeftic factions; to practice the arts of fedition, to miflead public opinion, to influence or awe the public Councils! Such an attachment of a fmall or weak, towards a great and powerful nation, dooms the former to be the fatellite of the later. Against the infidious wiles of foreign influence (I conjure you to believe me, fellow-citizens) the jealoufy of a free people ought to be confiantly awake; fince history and experience prove that foreign influence is one of the most baneful foes of Republican Government. But that jealoufy to be useful must be impartial; elfe it becomes the inftrument of the very influence to be avoided, inflead of a defence against it. Excellive partiality for one foreign nation, and exceffive diflike of another, caufe thofe whom they actuate to fee danger only on one fide, and serve to veil and even fecond the arts of influence on the other. Real patriots, who may refift the intrigues of the favourite, are liable to become futpected and odious; while its tools and dupes ufurp the applaufe and confidence of the people, to furrender their intereffs.

The great rule of conduct for us, in regard to foreign nations, is in extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little political connection as pollible. So far as we have already formed engagements, let them be fulfiled with perfect good faith. Here let us flop.

Europe has a fet of primary interefts, which to us have none, or a very remote relation. Hence the muft be engaged in frequent controverfies, the caufes of which are effentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore,' it must be unwife in us to implicate ourselves, by artificial ties, in the ordinary viciffitudes of her politics, or the ordinary combinations and collifons of her friendships, or enmities.

Our detatched and diftant fituation invites and enables us to pursue a different courfe. If we remain one people, under an efficient government the period is not far off, when we may defy material injury from external annoyance; when we may take fuch an attitude as will cause the neutrality, we may at any time refolve upon, to be fcrupulously refpeéted; when belligerent nations under the impoffibility of making acquifitions upon us, will not lightly hazard the giving us provocation; when we may choose peace or war, as our intereft, guided by jattice, thall confel.

Why forego the advantages of fo peculiar a ficuation? Why quit our own, to ftand upon foreign grond ? Why, by interweaving our deffiny with that of any part of Europe, entangle our peace and profperity in the toils of European ambition, rivalfhip, intereil, humour, or caprice?

'Tis our true policy to fteer clear of permanent alliances, with any portion of the foreign world; fo far, I mean as we are now at liberty to do it; for let me not be underflood as capable of patronifing infidelity to exifhing engagements. I hold the maxim no lefs applicable to public than to private affairs, that honefly is always the belt policy. I repeat it, therefore let thofe engagements be obferved in their genuine fenfe. But in my opinion, it is unnecellary, and would be unwife to extend them.