or laws of the United States, the transfer of the record into the Supreme Court for the sole purpose of inquiring whether the judgment violates the Constitution or laws of the United States, can not be denominated a suit commenced or prosecuted against the State whose judgment is so far reexamined. Nothing is demanded from the State. No claim against it of any description is asserted or prosecuted. Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264.

The Federal courts may entertain a suit against a corporation although a State is one of the corporators. Bank v. Planters' Bank, 9 Wheat. 904; Louisville R. R. Co. v. Letson, 2 How. 497.

The Federal courts may entertain a suit against a corporation although a State is the sole proprietor of the stock. Bank v. Wister, 2 Pet. 318.

Where the chief magistrate of a State is sued not by his name but by his style of office, and the claim made upon him is entirely in his official character, the State itself may be considered as a party on the record. Governor v. Madrazo, 1 Pet. 110.

An independent foreign sovereign can not be sued, and does not appear in court. But a friend of the court comes in, and by suggestion gives it to understand that his interests are involved in the controversy. The interests of the sovereign in such a case, and in every other where he chooses to assert them under the name of the real party to the cause, are as well defended as if he were a party to the record. Osborn v. Bank, 9 Wheat. 738.

The right of a State to assert as plaintiff any interest it may have in a subject which forms the matter of controversy between individuals in a Federal court is not affected by this amendment, nor can it be so construed as to oust the court of jurisdiction should such claim be suggested. The amendment simply provides that no suit shall be commenced or prosecuted against a State. The State can not be made a defendant to any suit brought by an individual. U. S. v. Peters, 5 Cranch, 115; Osborn v. Bank, 9 Wheat. 738.

A mere suggestion of title in a State to property in the possession of an individual, will not arrest proceedings in a Federal court between individuals, and prevent its looking into the suggestion and examining the validity of the title. U. S. v. Peters, 5 Cranch, 115; Osborn v. Bank, 9 Wheat. 738.

If the Federal court decides that the State has no title or claim to property in a suit between individuals, the State has no constitutional right to resist the legal process which may be directed in the cause. U.S. v. Peters, 5 Cranch, 115.

A Federal court has no power to compel the officers of a State to execute its laws. To do so, would be to substitute the court for the executive

officers of the State, to supplant their views of duty and the obligations imposed upon them by their official oaths by the discretion of the court and its official oath. In other words, it would be an undertaking on the part of the court to administer the State Government. This the court has no power to do. Macauley v. Kellogg, 2 Woods, 13; S. C. I Cent. L. J. 164.

[The three following sections were proposed as amendments at the first session of the eighth Congress. I Stat. 22.]

ARTICLE XII.

I. The electors shall meet in their respective States, and vote by ballot for President and Vice-President, one of whom, at least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same State with themselves; they shall name in their ballots the person voted for as President, and in distinct ballots the person voted for as Vice-President ; and they shall make distinct lists of all persons voted for as President, and of all persons voted for as VicePresident, and of the number of votes for each, which lists they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the seat of the Government of the United States, directed to the president of the Senate; the president of the Senate shall, in the presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the certificates, and the votes shall then be counted; the person having the greatest number of votes for President, shall be the President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of electors appointed; and if no person have such majority, then from the persons having the highest numbers, not exceeding three, on the list of those voted for as President, the House of Representatives shall choose immediately, by ballot, the President. in choosing the President, the votes shall be taken by States, the representation from each State having one vote; a quorum for this purpose shall consist of a member or members from two-thirds of the States, and a majority of all the States shall be necessary to a choice. And if the House of Representatives shall not choose a President, whenever the right of choice

But

shall devolve upon them, before the fourth day of March next following, then the Vice-President shall act as President, as in the case of the death or other constitutional disability of the President.

Fraud and misconduct on the part of the State authorities, constituted for the very purpose of declaring the final will of the State, is not a subject over which the two Houses of Congress have jurisdiction to institute an examination. Electoral Count.

The utmost that the two Houses of Congress can do, is to ascertain whether the State has made the appointment according to the form prescribed by its laws. Electoral Count.

If the State is in the enjoyment of its proper relations to the Federal Government, the two Houses can not inquire whether the tumults and disorders existing therein at the time of the election, or the presence of troops sent there by the President for the purpose of preserving the peace, had such an influence as to render the election void. Electoral Count.

Congress can not institute a scrutiny into the appointment of electors by a State. While the two Houses of Congress are authorized to canvass the electoral vote, no authority is given them to canvass the election of the electors themselves on the suggestion of fraud, or for any other cause. Electoral Count.

The two Houses of Congress may inquire whether the certificate of the executive is genuine, whether it is plainly false, and whether it contains a clear mistake of fact. Electoral Count.

The powers of the president of the Senate are merely ministerial. He is not invested with any authority for making any investigation outside of the joint meeting of the two Houses. He can not send for persons or papers. He is utterly without the means or power to do more than to inspect the documents sent to him, and he can not inspect them until he opens them in the presence of the two Houses. Electoral Count.

2. The person having the greatest number of votes as Vice-President, shall be the Vice-President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of electors appointed; and if no person have a majority, then from the two highest numbers on the list, the Senate shall choose the Vice-President; a quorum for the purpose shall consist of two-thirds of the whole number

of Senators, and a majority of the whole number shall be necessary to a choice.

3. But no person constitutionally ineligible to the office of President, shall be eligible to that of VicePresident of the United States.

[The following amendment was proposed at the second session of the thirty-eighth Congress. 13 Stat. 774.]

ARTICLE XIII.

SEC. I. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.

SEC. 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

Contracts relating to slaves, if valid when made, are not impaired by this amendment. Osborne v. Nicholson, 13 Wall. 654; S. C. 1 Dill. 219; Boyce v. Tabb, 18 Wall. 546; Hall v. Keese, 31 Tex. 504; Roundtree v. Baker, 52 Ill. 241; McElvain v. Mudd, 44 Ala. 48; Calhoun v. Calhoun, 2 Rich. N. S. 283; White v. Hart, 13 Wall. 646; S. C. 39 Geo. 306; contra, Wainwright v. Bridges, 19 La. Ann. 234; Austin v. Sandel, 19 La. Ann. 309; Halley v. Hoeffner, 19 La. Ann. 518; Lytle v. Whicher, 21 La. Ann. 182; Gautden v. Stoddard, 41 Geo. 329; Cherry v. Jones, 41 Geo. 579; Rodrigues v. Bienvenu, 22 La. Ann. 300; Succession of Woodward, 22 La. Ann. 305.

The object of this provision was not only to effect the emancipation of all persons then held in slavery, but also to forever thereafter deprive both Congress and the respective States of any and all power to reduce either the persons so emancipated, or any others within the jurisdiction of the United States, to the condition of slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted. To secure personal freedom to all within the purview of its provisions was the first great and leading object of the amendment. People v. Washington, 38 Cal. 658.

Personal security and the right to acquire and enjoy private property, are powerful auxiliaries to the maintenance of personal liberty. The continued enjoyment of personal liberty can not well be assured without the enjoy

ment of personal security. The right to acquire and enjoy private property is necessary to give that independence and freedom from want essential to the full enjoyment of personal liberty. Whatever, therefore, tends to maintain and assure to a person personal security, and to protect him in the acquisition and enjoyment of private property, aids in the maintenance of personal liberty. People v. Washington, 38 Cal. 658; Smith v. Moody, 26 Ind. 299.

The establishment of different rules as to the competency of evidence applicable to different classes of persons, may tend to the advantage of one class and to the oppression and encroachment upon the personal liberty of another. A law providing that the same rule of evidence shall apply to both classes, placing the class likely to be reduced to servitude upon an equal footing with the other, in respect to the right to testify as to the encroachment upon their personal liberty, strongly conduces to the enforcement of this amendment. People v. Washington, 38 Cal. 658 ; U. §. v. Rhodes, 1 Abb. C. C. 28.

Legislation which practically tends to facilitate the securing to all, through the aid of the judicial and executive departments of the government, the full enjoyment of personal freedom, is appropriate. People v. Washington, 38 Cal. 658.

A law which only permits the same class of persons to testify against a black man as are allowed to testify against a white man, in a matter where personal liberty is concerned, tends to enforce this amendment. People v. Washington, 38 Cal. 658; contra, Bowlin v. Comm. 2 Bush, 5.

Colored children may be excluded from the schools for white children, where separate schools are provided for them. Ward v. Flood, 48 Cal. 36; Cory v. Carter, 48 Ind. 327.

The utmost legal effect of this clause is to declare the colored as free as the white race in the United States. It certainly gave the colored race nothing more than freedom. It did not elevate them to social or political equality with the white race. It neither gave, nor aimed to give them, in defiance of State laws, all the rights of the white race, but left them equally free in all the States, and equally subject to State jurisdiction and State laws. Bowlin v. Comm. 2 Bush, 5.

"Power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation," imports nothing more than to uphold the emancipating section and prevent a violation of the contemplated liberty of the enfranchised race. It does not mean that Congress shall have power to legislate over their civil rights and remedies in the States, any more than over those of all other citizens. Bowlin v. Comm. 2 Bush, 5.

This is not merely a prohibition against the passage or enforcement of