When we get them in such a position, we don't follow through. One day they are likely to get a breakthrough and if they do, they will go to our goal line, I am afraid-and without giving us a conference or time to catch up.

Mr. HAYS. I agree with you.

Mr. JUDD. I realize you can't answer this here, Mr. Secretary. Every year we take this money from our taxpayers to support what amounts to a holding operation. But in my own heart I am convinced that we must assume the offensive. I do not mean militarily, but when they say, "Now, we stand for the freedom of all Africans from the terrible colonial powers of Europe," and so on, we should say, "Why don't you stand for liberating Hungary and Poland and Uzbekistan from the colonialism of the Soviet Union?" When they tell about our agreeing to their phony proposals on Berlin, why don't we say that we'll be glad to go along on Berlin when they agree to let all Germans vote on the reunion of Germany. Let's point out endlessly that the division of Germany can't really be solved until the division of Europe is solved by letting all unite who want to. Why not take the initiative and push them back where they have to come up with answers.

They hold us up with a gun and when we get our gun trained on them in return they say, "Make us a counterproposal. Will you give us half of what we are not entitled to instead of all?"

Why don't we say, "Okay, if you want to unite Berlin, just set all the Germans free." When they say, "Relax tensions"; we need to say, "Fine, set the Hungarians free and all the other captive peoples. That will relax the tensions at once.' 99

I think we have to play tougher and rougher, and publicly, with such an adversary, instead of being such nice gentlemen, operating under codes which we respect and which they don't have any respect for whatsoever. It isn't enough to stop them. They have to be outpressured, outmaneuvered, defeated. That is my point.

Secretary MCELROY. If you are talking about a political response to a political probe, this is something I think is a little hard to disagree with.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Will you yield?

Mr. JUDD. My time is up, I guess.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Fascell.

Mr. FASCELL. I think Dr. Judd has probably vented a frustration that resides in all of us. I would only add this comment: The military is ready to go on the offense whenever the politics dictate that they should do so and their job is to be ready. They are telling us that they are ready, and let's hope that they are.

I agree with you though, Dr. Judd, the time has long since gone past that we should no longer be negative in our thinking. I believe that we have been completely negative and I think it is time to go on the affirmative, and on the offensive, politically and otherwise, particularly psychologically. Is it not true that we do not program any military assistance, either by grant or by loan unless the recipient country has either a multilateral or a bilateral agreement which provides for the use of the forces of the recipient country, or provides base rights which can be used by us or make some other military concession to the United States?

Mr. IRWIN. In general that is true, sir.
Mr. FASCELL. Is there an exception?

Mr. IRWIN. There is a provision in the law which permits the President to make an exception.

Mr. FASCELL. All right. Have there been any significant changes in these agreements in the past year?

Mr. IRWIN. Do you mean any new countries added or changes in agreements?

Mr. FASCELL. I am talking about any changes in recent agreements. In other words, have we increased under existing agreements our need for base rights or other military objectives? The answer is we have not, obviously.

Mr. IRWIN. That is right.

Mr. FASCELL. Have there been any changes in force objectives. within the last year, anywhere in the world-significant changes? Secretary MCELROY. Not significant.

Mr. FASCELL. Then I will have to ask the question another way. Do we have any increases in manpower, either Army, Navy or Air Force, provided in the mutual security program, military assistance section, of this fiscal presentation?

I would assume we are having a decrease in personnel.

General TWINING. [Security deletion]. The goal is going up so naturally more people will be coming in, but the goals themselves are fixed and the people are coming in to fill them up.

Mr. FASCELL. But those original force objectives were fixed some time ago, General Twining, and all you are doing is programing your materiel to fill those objectives.

You have been programing this over a period of years, but this year is no significant increase over last year. Isn't that right? General TWINING. I think that is right. That is right. Mr. FASCELL. Are we accounting for a significant increase in equipment of some kind this year over last year?

General TWINING. We are hoping to modernize and improve the forces.

Mr. FASCELL. You are modernizing at a given rate all the time to take care of obsolescence?

General TWINING. That is right.

Mr. FASCELL. Is there a significant increase in the rate at which you are modernizing this year over what you did last year?

Mr. IRWIN. We will be presenting figures on that tomorrow. Mr. FARBSTEIN. Dr. Judd, I think the view you hold prevails throughout the committee. If you will recall, I inquired of Mr. Dulles why we are always taking the negative position and last week I asked the very same question of the head of the European desk. So I think that the people in the State Department who have control of this situation will gradually begin to understand our feelings as to the business of taking both a positive and a negative position on all questions.

Mr. FULTON. Would the gentleman yield for a request?

I would like to send a special messenger up to Foster Dulles and tell him the sense of this committee is that he has not been standing firm and inflexible enough.

Mr. FASCELL. That is an incorrect assumption on my part and the gentleman can send it for himself but don't include me.

Mr. FULTON. What do you want to do, not only stand firm, but go ahead and push further? Maybe Mr. Irwin of the Department of Defense under such circumstances is not asking for enough money for fiscal 1960 mutual security programs. Did that ever strike you? Mr. FASCELL. Maybe.

Mr. FARBSTEIN. That is all right with me.

The question I wanted to ask was if I could get an evaluation of the situation in Taiwan, because I understand there are about 80 percent Taiwanese as against about 20 percent mainland Chinese and I don't know that Mr. Chiang Kai-shek will live forever.

What would be the situation in Taiwan if anything happens to Chiang Kai-shek?

Mr. FASCELL. I think they have a successor in mind.

Mr. FARBSTEIN. Do you think they have anyone who can succeed to the extent of the present administration?

Mr. MCELROY. This is one of the familiar problems when you have very great men, very strong men as leaders of countries, the succession is not a simple matter.

I think this is no more than the kind of problem you have. People don't live forever. It is unfortunate.

I don't think that answers your question, but it certainly hasn't been unanticipated.

Mr. FARBSTEIN. It was just of the nature of speculation.

Mr. FASCELL. There is no speculation there. He is going to die. Mr. JUDD. He has announced he is going to remove himself as President next year.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Beckworth.

Mr. BECKWORTH. Military and economic aid have to be grouped; is that right? You think of them as accompanying each other.

Secretary MCELROY. Certainly defense support which is aid of an economic nature, is mutually supported with military aid in those

countries.

Mr. BECKWORTH. You think of them together and as both being essential? Secretary MCELROY. I do, sir.

Mr. BECKWORTH. We heard some requests made as to what would be the effect if the military aid is reduced, for example, 25 percent.

When you consider that type of question, I would appreciate your including your viewpoint concerning economic aid, if it is reduced 25 percent.

Now, I will admit that you say that is out of your province, but at the same time if defense and economic aid are to be grouped we ought to have, as I see it, a military viewpoint or a defense viewpoint as to the effect of any reduction of economic aid because it is very easy for a person at this time to say "Oh, I am not for cutting military aid to our allies, but on this economic aid, let's knife it good.'

Do you see what I am talking about?

Secretary McELROY. Surely I do.

Mr. BECKWORTH. I hope you will include in this record some consideration on the economic aid you feel is needed as you come to a conclusion on the amount of military aid needed.

Secretary MCELROY. I am sure we can give our answer on the defense support aspect. The degree to which we feel free to comment on a program which is not our own, the strictly economic aid outside of defense, I don't quite know, but we will look at it.

Mr. BECKWORTH. Bear in mind the observation that they are grouped; they are together. One assists the other.

Secretary MCELROY. I said the defense support portion of economic aid is grouped with military assistance.

Mr. BECKWORTH. That is right and that is the basis of my request along the line for you to have an opinion on the necessary amount of economic aid, if possible.

Secretary MCELROY. Therein you are not asking about the economic aid which is other than defense support.

Mr. BECKWORTH. Well, I am if the two work with each other. As I understand the testimony, they do. I have understood that the economic aid is necessary for the defense posture.

Secretary MCELROY. You would have to stretch defense a little bit far.

Mr. BECKWORTH. I realize that, but it has been my concept all along that it is told us economic aid is in the national interest.

Secretary MCELROY. All right; sure. I believe that.

Mr. BECKWORTH. To have economic aid with the other aid. Secretary MCELROY. My only point is that we have I think in our end of the business, a perfect right to express an opinion which we can pretty much say is an administration opinion on those matters which are of the defense type. But when we come into matters which are outside of our purview, then it seems to me, for us to get talking about them except in those terms in which you did ask me before, which is, do I favor it, and I do favor it, then it seems to me that maybe you are asking me to get in over our heads.

Mr. BECKWORTH. No, it occurs to me that as one charged with the defense of this country that it is not going too far and I may be wrong-in asking you to express an opinion, as the Secretary of Defense, as to how much economic aid you feel is needed, based on the information you are obtaining from all sources.

Secretary MCELROY. Let me say we will work to develop an answer on all forms of economic aid. We will certainly give it on defense support and we will try also to give it on the other type of economic aid. Mr. BECKWORTH. I would appreciate it.

(The following information was subsequently submitted for the record :)

The Department of Defense submits the following information in response to Mr. Beckworth's question on the effect of a cut in the amount of funds requested for defense support:

The DOD would regard any cut in the amounts requested for defense support as inconsistent with the required maintenance of an adequate defensive strength in the free world. Defense support is that quantity of economic assistance which is required to enable the countries receiving such assistance to maintain a level of military strength judged to be essential to our common interests.

Defense support provides the economic foundation for the military strength being maintained in that country. Inadequate defense support assistance would adversely affect the ability of the countries concerned to maintain the forces required in our mutual defense interests.

The determination of the amounts required is the responsibility of the Depart ment of State based on a thorough analysis and consideration of political, military, and economic factors.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Gallagher.

Mr. GALLAGHER. I would just like to follow up on Dr. Judd's question: The other day General White made a statement that perhaps the whole issue would be decided in 2 or possibly 3 days, in the event we got that far. If we were away for a weekend and it happened, then it could be that we could miss the whole thing.

In view of the necessity and in view of what Dr. Judd points out, that we should have an offensive psychology, and the Russians being bright fellows, as you pointed out, and being aware of the historic power to decide the issue, have you and your colleagues ever given any consideration to whether or not we should reappraise this, with some sort of an optional authority resting in the Commander in Chief, as all of these new crises come up? So that not only would we have a psychological approach to it, that we are on the offensive, if need be, but that we would be in a position to meet any intelligence report which may necessitate our using the element of surprise?

Secretary MCELROY. There are, for each of the trouble situations of the world, National Security Council papers which set up objectives, and for that reason give some quite broad guidance as to the policies to be followed. Those, I think, are adequate for the military. We fortunately have quite satisfactory communications and are in close touch, again, with the potential trouble spots of the world. I think that the guidance we need, we have; don't you, General Twining?

General TWINING. Yes.

Secretary MCELROY. I think our commanders in the field have what they need to move with confidence within the limits of national objectives that have been carefully set by combined military and civilian apprisal of these objectives.

Mr. GALLAGHER. I certainly admire the confidence that you and the general displayed, and I think it is very important that our adversaries are aware that we share that confidence and that you have the authority to express that confidence if needed.

Secretary MCELROY. There is an immense amount of planning that goes on in all parts of the world. A lot of it is done here, a lot of it is done in the staffs of the unified commanders around the world. You naturally can't talk about these in any detail at all, but the thing that I think has been reassuring to me about all of this is to recognize the amount of this that has been done, and for that reason the preparation of people who must very suddenly make some hard decisions as to the kind of things which are in accordance with the policy of the country as established, in anticipation of such a thing, by the Security Council which, as I say, is a combination of military and top civilian views. Chairman MORGAN. Any further questions?

Thank you, Mr. Secretary and General Twining. The committee stands adjourned until 10:30 tomorrow, when there will be an executive session here.

(Whereupon, at 4:40 p.m., the committee adjourned to reconvene at 10:30 a.m., Thursday, March 19, 1959.)