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You have given the answer as to when the internal audit was started. Has the audit of selected activities started at the same time?

Mr. IRWIN. It is the same thing, Mr. Zablocki. It is ill-phrased in giving that impression. A comprehensive internal audit system has been designed and under that system audits of selective activities are now in process.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. If the audit is an audit of selective activities, then it is not comprehensive, is it?

Mr. IRWIN. It is comprehensive in that it will encompass all aspects of the program.

It is selective in that it does not automatically

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Then it gives the wrong impression. Apparently what you are trying to say is that the selected activities are comprehensively audited?

Mr. IRWIN. Yes, sir. We are not auditing all countries that we give military assistance to at one time.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. That leads me to another question. Is the audit implemented or in effect in all countries where we have military

assistance?

Mr. IRWIN. This particular audit report will cover certain countries where there are MAAG groups, but it will not cover every country.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Can you tell us how the countries are selected? Mr. IRWIN. We will supply that.

(The information requested is as follows:)

MAP COMPREHENSIVE AUDIT SCHEDULE

Country MAAGS or MAP activities under audit:

MAP activities: CINCEUR; CINCPAC.

Country military assistance advisory groups: France, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Greece, Saudi Arabia, Ethiopia, Korea, and Thailand.

Countries scheduled for audit: Turkey and Japan.

Countries in which audits have been completed: Philippines and Taiwan. These countries have been selected after consultation with GAO in order to obtain maximum audit coverage.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. On page 8 at the bottom of the page, "GRC" personnel.

Mr. IRWIN. Government of the Republic of China.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. On page 11, although you explained from where the additional funds are obtained, but they are still just amounts in dollars. Could you give an example of previously programed items no longer required, for the record? Give an example of programs that no longer have been required and therefore the funds made available.

Mr. IRWIN. Yugoslavia would be an example of one case, Mr. Zablocki.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Thank you.

On pages 14 and 15, you do give the amount-the U.S. portion of the fiscal year 1960 cost of the infrastructure program. What is the total cost of the infrastructure program, and what is the allied portion? Mr. Irwin, you enumerated the four programs which are subject to special cost-sharing agreements, in each instance you give the U.S. portion but you do not give the total cost, or our allies' contribution. Mr. IRWIN. And at the top of page 15 it speaks of the cost being $70 million.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. What is the allies' portion?

Mr. IRWIN. I think the allies' cost is around $130 million plus their contributions of land and local utilities.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Could we have the amount for each of the four programs?

Mr. IRWIN. Am I wrong?

We can give you the figures. I think it would total up to Mr. ZABLOCKI. Either the allies' cost, our percentage or both would be helpful.

Mr. IRWIN. I believe it is

STATEMENT OF JOHN L. HOLCOMBE, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF PROGRAMING AND CONTROL, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

Mr. HOLCOMBE. The proportionate share was about 38 and a fraction percent for the United States, leaving a balance for other NATO countries that participate in the infrastructure.

In the support of the military headquarters, the U.S. share is 24 percent, leaving a balance of 76 percent for other NATO nations and there is about the best bargain the United States gets in any international organization.

The mutual weapons development program is an individual itemby-item agreement with the various countries who have research and development projects to propose, or that are underway but the general rule of thumb is that we ordinarily do not pay more than 50 percent of that item.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. In other words, the allies cost for that item would be $40 million, about the same as ours.

Mr. HOLCOMBE. Something on that order. In many items they pay more than 50 percent. For a few items where the country has no direct responsibility we accept lesser payments.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. I realize my time is up, Mr. Chairman. But I would like to request that an accurate cost of the allies' portion, on each of the cost-sharing agreements programs be furnished for the committee

record.

Chairman MORGAN. You can furnish that for the record.

Mr. HOLCOMBE. Yes, sir.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Thank you.

(The information requested appears on p. 150.)

Mr. FULTON. We are glad to have you here. You had spoken about the reduction in amount in dollars in the pipeline and have by your statement brought out that the amount is approaching the danger line below which the pipeline should not go in view of the leadtime. Would you give us an estimate of what the peril point is to the U.S. mutual security program in dollar amount? We on the Foreign Affairs Committee should not permit the pipeline to go below an absolute minimum at any particular point of time in this program. You have spoken of a danger point. What is the peril point at which reduction in the amount in the pipeline would not only reduce efliciency but would peril the program?

Mr. IRWIN. We believe it is getting near that point now.

Mr. FULTON. Would you set the figure for the peril point of reduction in the amount on order production and delivery in the pipeline of the mutual security program?

Mr. IRWIN. I would say somewhere between $2 billion and $2.3 or $2.4 billion.

Mr. FULTON. Below that it would be dangerously destructive then of the general policies and aims of the whole program, is that correct?

Mr. IRWIN. I believe it would be, sir.

Mr. FULTON. And you have spoken in your statement at page 2 at the bottom, "Various levels of the combined military strength of the western world." Those figures I believe are public. Our U.S. free world allies provide: 80 percent of the combined ground forces, 40 percent of our combined combat planes and 60 percent of our combined naval aircraft. You do not mean that figure to be restricted by your testimony today to this committee, nor do you mean on page 3 that the 250 major installations overseas you referred to, are to be restricted because I have heard each of those publicly.

Mr. IRWIN. That is correct, sir.

Mr. FULTON. Now, moving over to the missile field. Let's take page 8, on this secret matter.

Under "Far East" on August 23, 1958, when the attack occurred by the Chinese Communists on Quemoy Island, the results have been given in the papers as to what has happened. You have added, though, that 29 of the 33 planes of Communist China were downed by .50caliber machinegun fire rather than the Sidewinders.

I think that is a correction and I think that likewise should be public as of now, because the other figures I have heard.

I am on this new Science and Space Committee and I am interested in the missile progress being made public as having an effect on the people behind the Iron Curtain in the countries that are the overrun countries, the captive countries, as well as a deterrent to Russia and China with regard to aggression.

The fact that there are 10 missile installations in fiscal year 1959, with 20 to be delivered in addition to NATO prior to December 31, 1959, that should not be a restricted figure, should it? Because it doesn't give the locations nor the countries. Nor the amounts.

Mr. IRWIN. I am not certain whether that is treated as a restricted figure or not. If it can be released I agree with you it would be helpful to have it.

Mr. FULTON. Actually the 10 that are now in existence should certainly not be a restricted figure because anybody can add up where they are. Anybody can almost visit the sites. But of the 20 additional ones would you have that released if you can this afternoon?

Mr. IRWIN. Yes, sir; I will.

Mr. FULTON. I would like to have that.

Mr. IRWIN. Yes, sir.

Mr. FULTON. In Latin America I am especially interested in the fact that each of the 12 nations with whom the United States has bilateral military assistance agreements has continued to abide by and fulfill its obligations under the agreements, and each of these Latin American nations has fully done so to the satisfaction of the Department of Defense, the ICA and the U.S. State Department.

Would you give us for the record later a list of those countries and also how they have fulfilled their obligations in more detail so that we can set it out?

I am interested in the Atlantic missile range and the fact that on that complex the United States needs necessary rights and cooperation from Brazil, as well as the United States strategically needs the base in the Dominican Republic, which has given the necessary rights and cooperation to our Government and the U.S. personnel and technicians installed there. To have a fully operating Atlantic missile complex as well as a Caribbean undersea cable range for experimental purposes, the United States just can't do without these U.S. installations and the necessary cooperation of both governments for our own U.S. security programs.

Would you put in the record military, and research and development, necessity for the security of our country that we do continue these bases and, of course, the military arrangements for those two countries?

Mr. IRWIN. Yes, sir; we will do that.

(The information is as follows:)

Development of any new item of equipment as an acceptable weapon requires extensive testing and evaluation. The 81st Congress recognized this requirement in missile research and development when it passed legislation in 1949 making possible the establishment of a long-range missile proving ground. As a result, the Atlantic missile range was established to extend from the Florida mainland to Ascension Island.

The collection of data to evaluate the performance of long-range missiles requires observation and communications stations along the route of intended flight path. Two such stations have been activated by agreement with the Dominican Republic and Brazil.

The station in the Dominican Republic is a communications repeater station for the submarine cable extending from Florida to Puerto Rico. This station is a vital link in the communications cable used directly in support of missile launchings from Florida. The station on the island of Fernando de Noronha (Brazil) is a missile impact locations station consisting primarily of telemetry data collecting equipment. This station serves a vital role in the furnishing of telemetry coverage of ballistic missile impact locations and for missile destruction. It also has the capability and is used in collecting weather data on surface and upper air in the area.

The Atlantic missile range consists of 12 such stations, two of which are in the Dominican Republic and Brazil.

(A classified memorandum was also supplied for the committee records.)

Mr. FULTON. Has an approach been made to the present Cuban Government for the readoption or the implementation of the obligations of the 99-year lease, on the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay that was made in 1898? Has the Castro government now accepted the terms of that treaty and its obligations or are they continuing the current status of this important U.S. Naval Base, as an interim de facto government?

Mr. IRWIN. I do not know.

Mr. FULTON. Would you ask for that for inserting in this record. I would ask that proper representations by the United States be made immediately to get the position of the Cuban Government and that we have that treaty assumed by the Cuban Government promptly because we have such a large U.S. investment there.

That is all. Thank you for your cooperation.

(The information requested is as follows:)

The United States leased the Guantanamo Base area in 1903 under an agreement which entered into force on February 23, 1903, and an agreement which entered into force on October 6, 1903 (1 Malloy 358, 360). The lease extends "for the time required for the purposes of coaling and naval stations." No provision is made in the agreements for unilateral termination by the Government of Cuba.

On January 6, 1959, the provisional government of Cuba addressed a note to our Embassy in Havana which stated that that government had been constituted and that "all internal commitments and obligations in force will be fulfilled." This undertaking by the Cuban Government to comply with its obligations included, of course, the lease agreement for the Guantanamo Base and the treaty of 1903 referring to that agreement.

Chairman MORGAN. Mrs. Kelly

Mrs. KELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

On page 4, Mr. Irwin, you mentioned U.S. and NATO forces are being equipped with modern equipment.

You also referred to it at page 8 and mentioned some of these countries. Does that mean that the launching pad and all the agreements will be made by the end of this year?

Mr. IRWIN. Yes.

Mrs. KELLY. And they are ready to be used by the end of this year.

Mr. IRWIN. Yes, ma'am.

Mrs. KELLY. Are they under the control of our personnel or the country involved?

Mr. IRWIN. These particular missiles refer to those that will be under the control of our NATO allies.

Mrs. KELLY. Of our NATO allies.

Mr. IRWIN. Yes, ma'am.

Mrs. KELLY. Then you have the agreement with France, already.
Mr. IRWIN. On these particular missiles [security deletion].
Mrs. KELLY. And they are installed in [security deletion].

Mr. IRWIN. Not with atomic warhead. The atomic warhead must remain in U.S. custody but the missiles themselves, the delivery system will be under the control of the NATO allies.

Mrs. KELLY. How long before it would take you to deliver that to that country?

Mr. IRWIN. Deliver

Mrs. KELLY. The warhead?

Mr. IRWIN. Well, it would vary according to the location of the installation involved."

NATO has adopted the concept of a NATO atomic stockpile and those stockpiles will be located so that they can service quickly both United States and NATO ally units that require warheads for delivery after they have been released for use by the President.

Mrs. KELLY. Would you get for the record the time it would possibly take, for instance, in France, for the delivery of the warhead? Mr. IRWIN. We will see what it will be.

Mr. HOLCOMBE. From the authorization of the allied commanders. Mrs. KELLY. I would like the time on this project-the stockpiling, where it is, and into the launching pad. Will it take 45 days, or hours?

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