Mr. PILCHER. You don't concur with Mr. Dillon, then?

Mr. SACCIO. I would have to disagree, if that is the statement he made, because it seems to me that the military part of this program is just as important as the economic.

Mr. PILCHER. You have answered the question. Mr. Dillon says it is, and you say it is not.

Mr. SACCIO. I don't know what Mr. Dillon said. If you ask me the question specifically, I think both parts of this program

Mr. PILCHER. I didn't ask you about both parts. I asked you which one, if we had to cut out one or the other, which one do you think is more important; military assistance or economic assistance?

Mr. SACCIO. If you say I have to lose an arm, I say all right, you take my left arm. But I don't want to lose either one of them.

Mr. PILCHER. You just refuse to answer, then. You won't say which one in your opinion is the more important if we had to lose one or the other.

Mr. O'HARA. He may take the fifth amendment.

Mr. SACCIO. I have just gotten through saying here that we are spending some $800 million in defense support in order to maintainMr. PILCHER. Don't take up my time explaining. That is like your statement. It is just a pretty good high school essay.

On page 21, and I quote, you said, "Since the turn of the century the average per capita income of the United States has risen from about $600 a year to about $2,500 a year."

Then you state that we can expect by 2000, or in the next 40 years, if the country can maintain its present rate of economic progress, the average income will be about two and one-half times what it is now, or something like $6,000 a year.

Now, using the same yardstick, if our national debt increases in the same proportion, our dollar value declines in the same proportion, the cost of living increases every year in the same proportion, which will be worth the most by 2000: $6,000 a year or $2,500 a year?

Mr. SACCIO. I intended to give these figures, Mr. Pilcher, taking into

account

Mr. PILCHER. You have to use the same yardstick, the same economic progress in the future.

Mr. SACCIO. I mean in real wealth. The figures I have here are intended to say that when you had $600 back in 1900 and you have $2,500 now, there was an increase in real wealth to the people of the United States in services and commodities, and the same

Mr. PILCHER. Using your yardstick, in 20 years-the dollar in 1939 was worth one dollar. Today it is worth 48 cents, or it has declined about 2.6 percent per year.

Well, in 40 years, the dollar, using your yardstick, will lack fourtenths of a cent of being worth anything at all. In other words, if you are going to use the same yardstick of our economic progress for the next 40 years as we have in the past 20 years, then a dollar will lack four-tenths of a cent of being worth anything at all.

Now, Mr. Saccio, what are the main agricultural commodities of Korea?

Mr. SACCIO. I think it is rice, sir. Two hundred thousand tons ready to be exported this year.

Mr. PILCHER. What kind of farming equipment and things do the Koreans use in cultivating their rice crop?

Mr. SACCIO. I am afraid I can't answer that question. I don't know these facts, sir.

Mr. PILCHER. We spent about $47 million on this nitrogen plant over there, and you can't tote the nitrogen around in a bucket and put it on the crops. It has to be put out with high-priced aluminum equipment. Wouldn't it have been much cheaper for the taxpayers in America to furnish Korea their fertilizer free, for years, until they learned how to use it and progressed far enough to use this kind of equipment, than to spend that much money on a big nitrogen plant in Korea?

Mr. SACCIO. I think at the time we decided to go ahead with this: plan, sir, it was our calculation it would save the U.S. taxpayers money if we went into an operation of this kind.

Mr. PILCHER. No, your first programing was a complete fertilizer plant at a cost of about $11 million. And some of the boys down there found out there wasn't a phosphate mine within 5,000 miles of there, so they then had to switch it to a nitrogen plant. And what in high heaven, with those poor farmers not knowing how to use liquid nitrogen, can they do with that type of plant is more than I can understand.

That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Bentley.

Mr. BENTLEY. Mr. Saccio, have you had brought to your attention the article in the recent issue of the Saturday Evening Post by one of your distinguished predecessors?

Mr. SACCIO. I have read it, sir.

Mr. BENTLEY. It is a very fine article, Mr. Chairman, by Mr. John Hollister, containing a very hardheaded and realistic appraisal of the entire foreign aid program, with the advantage of the author having been on the inside as Mr. Hollister was for a period of time. I would commend it to members of the committee.

As a matter of fact, Mr. Chairman, I am wondering if it would be appropriate to have it included at this point in the record.

Chairman MORGAN. How long is it?

Mr. BENTLEY. It is a lengthy article.

ence? I don't know how long it is.

Would that make a differ

Mr. SACCIO. Mr. Hollister might object to the expense.

Yes, it is a good article, and I think you should really note the basic point.

Mr. BENTLEY. If it may be included in the record, Mr. Chairman, I would appreciate it, but in any event I would strongly recommend it to the members of the committee. I think it gives praise where praise is due, and criticism where criticism is due.

Mr. SACCIO. I agree, it is worth reading.

Mr. BENTLEY. Mr. Hollister points out there has been a tendency over the past several years to try to get rapid industrialization moving in certain countries before the country is ready to absorb rapid industrialization.

Mr. SACCIO. I would concur in the general principle that you should not attempt rapid industrialization in many of these countries. Possibly the immediate problem is to do something that lies in the field of agriculture, or something similar to that. Industrialization is not a cure-all, for the development of these countries, and I think our people

Mr. BENTLEY. I can't hear the witness, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman MORGAN. May we have order, please.

Mr. SACCIO. And I think our people are truly cognizant of this fact and it is one of the principles under which we operate. We do not think that all you do is industrialize people. You have education and health problems, you have to take care of agricultural problems, all of which exist in these countries where there are population increases. There is plenty of land to use except that it might be closed by malaria or diseases of one kind or another. You don't attack these problems just by one solution, you look at the entire problem of a country, and in some cases industrialization is not the answer.

Mr. BENTLEY. Mr. Hollister made the comment that he felt sometimes our people in the field were inclined to get programs approved for the particular country in which they were stationed without regard to the overall situation. I recall at the very beginning of his article he made reference to a request of a certain Asiatic country for $1 million to build a Buddhist mission, a request not concurred in by the Ambassador to that country, and which Mr. Hollister vetoed when it came to his desk.

Do you believe our people have that tendency at times?

Mr. SACCIO. I don't doubt when a man is assigned to a particular country it is his job to find out all the facts to be known about the country, and he develops certain programs. We in Washington have to weigh these recommendations. Obviously, if a man working in a particular country feels we should undertake a certain project, that it would have a certain impact important to the position of the country, he is going to recommend it. But that doesn't mean it gets by. There is review and sometimes people get mad because there are reviews in Washington. It takes time.

Mr. BENTLEY. I raise that question, sir, because early in your statement here, although I can't put my finger on it at the moment, there was an indication that your people in the field had the final word on some of these things, and their judgment would have to be trusted in the final analysis.

Did you not intend to convey that impression?

Mr. SACCIO. If I did that is certainly in error. We certainly have to rely on the people in the field who know the nature of the problem, the factual situation. You can't make judgments in Washington without knowing what the specific situation in the country itself is. Obviously here we have to look at the whole picture. We have to apply general policy, which a man in the country may not be familiar with on an intimate basis.

Mr. BENTLEY. May I ask you later on for more specific comments on this.

There is one question I would like to ask with reference to your statement on special assistance, at the bottom of page 7, with respect to the economic situation in Bolivia, which you say remains a matter of serious concern. You refer to additional assistance to Bolivia in the immediately coming year. Does that mean in spite of recent developments in Bolivia, our economic program there has been increased?

Mr. SACCIO. By additional assistance we mean continued assistance along the level that we have right now, but it does not mean that we

are going ahead unless we are satisfied that there will be an improvement there.

Mr. BENTLEY. I am glad to have that observation because you didn't make any such statement

Mr. SACCIO. I realize the statement is subject to misinterpretation. Mr. BENTLEY. There has been some serious criticism over the possible effect or lack of effect of our economic program in Bolivia, and when I read this statement that additional assistance will be needed my immediate reaction was that we were willing to increase our program there in spite of the possible bad results or lack of results that it had.

You assure me that no such program is contemplated?
Mr. SACCIO. That is correct.

Mr. BENTLEY. There is no increase in the program?
Mr. SACCIO. No. It is pretty much-

Mr. BENTLEY. And even the question of continuing the present program will be subject to review in the light of everything that has happened there recently, plus the overall effects upon the Bolivian economy which you may or may not have had over the past several years.

Mr. SACCIO. That is right.

Mr. BENTLEY. That assurance is categorical.

Mr. SACCIO. It is.

Mr. BENTLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman MORGAN. Mr. O'Hara.

Mr. O'HARA. Mr. Saccio, I wish I could have more confidence in the ICA than I have. In other sessions I have expressed the thought of many people in my district, and many Members of the Congress, that ICA is a closed corporation, and I find in your statement not one word to meet that challenge.

I wish you would furnish for the record a breakdown on the personnel of ICA by States, and by groups, and I wish you would put in the record the background of those in charge of personnel so that I will have some way of measuring the validity of complaints that applicants from the Middle West are under a manifest disadvantage because ICA is excessively top heavy with personnel from some other sections of our Nation.

You pointed out in your statement that ICA is one of the largest nonmilitary businesses in the world. I am sure you will agree with me that such a large business, supported by American taxpayers, should be run on democratic principles and the doors of its personnel department should be open to all qualified applicants.

Mr. SACCIO. Mr. O'Hara, one of the best lawyers who worked for me when I was general counsel came from Chicago, and he happened to be colored, too, if that makes any difference.

Mr. O'HARA. Could they be exceptions to trim the show case?

Mr. SACCIO. I don't know that they are exceptions from the accents I hear in the elevator. There are a lot of people from the Middle West, from California, and the South. I am willing to put some of this stuff in the record. I don't know if I can give you information on race since we don't go by race.

Mr. O'HARA. Who is the Director of Personnel?

Mr. SACCIO. A gentleman by the name of Hinderer is in charge of Personnel.

Mr. O'HARA. Where does he come from?

Mr. SACCIO. I don't know where he comes from. He did a very good job in India as our deputy director of mission there, and we put him in charge here because we knew he had experience in the field, he knew the problems we had in personnel. We thought he had done a good job in India, and we put him in charge of personnel here. Mr. O'HARA. Do you run the personnel department as a large corporation runs its personnel department, having in mind getting the best qualified people regardless of political recommendation?

Mr. SACCIO. I think we do. I don't think it is a closed corporation. I think we run a fair system of personnel recruitment, that we try to get people on the basis of the kind of experience and technique and knowhow that we want. It is a tough job. We certainly don't discriminate against people because they come from various parts of the country, or for their race.

Mr. O'HARA. My reason for requesting a breakdown of ICA personnel by States and groups was motivated by a desire to be fair in reaching my determination, fair both to ICA and those of my constituents who feel that the Midwest is inadequately represented.

People living in Chicago tell me they have written to ICA and have not even had an acknowledgment of their letters.

Mr. SACCIO. If there are any cases of that kind I should like to know about it, because there is no question in my mind what my policy is. Anybody who applies gets a chance in our agency, and they get treated like people.

Chairman MORGAN. The time of the gentleman from Illinois has expired.

(The information requested is as follows:)

DISTRIBUTION OF ICA OVERSEAS EMPLOYEES BY STATES OF U.S. LEGAL RESIDENCE

As of January 31, 1959, ICA personnel records show 790 out of 3,926, or 20 percent, of the overseas employees maintained their legal residence in the 13 Midwestern States. For example, from the State of Illinois come 130 employees, from Michigan 108, and from Ohio 99. Employees in ICA come from all of the 50 States. See attached table "ICA Overseas Employees by Legal Residence and Region."

BIOGRAPHIC DATA ON DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

The following gives the personal history of Mr. Harry A. Hinderer who is the head of the personnel management program in ICA.

Agency positions

Appointed Assistant Deputy Director for Management (Personnel) on January 14, 1959.

1957-59: Deputy Director, Technical Cooperation Mission to India, ICA. 1956-57: Assistant Director for Administration, serving as Acting Mission Director from May to September 1957, Technical Cooperation Mission to India, ICA.

Other experience

1950-56: World Health Organization and Pan American Sanitary Bureau, Washington, D.C.; Director of Administration for both international organizations, involving frequent travel to Europe and Latin America:

1950: U.S. Federal Security Agency, Public Health Service; Special Consultant on Management to the U.S. Surgeon General.

1947-50: U.S. Department of State; Administrative Attaché, U.S. Embassy Nanking (2 years) and later, U.S. Embassy Madrid (1 year).