Mrs. BOLTON. I think it is very difficult for the people at home to understand those things.

Secretary MCELROY. It is most difficult. The pipeline was very adequately filled up at the time of the Korean war. However, during the years since then we have been able to accept authorizations of considerably less than our deliveries, thereby drawing down the pipeline. This is something which I think has been most difficult for the average voter to understand. We are now, as this committee well knows, practically at the point-in fact, we are at the point where reduced authorizations mean reduced deliveries.

Mrs. BOLTON. So if there is a rather large cut made in the military budget as presented it would really put us in a very difficult position?

Secretary MCELROY. I think it would be a critically difficult position. To me it is unthinkable that the figure of $1.6 billion should be cut by 1 dollar. I have confidence in the right thinking of Congress in a matter of this kind and believe they will not cut it.

Mrs. BOLTON. I think of one phrase in the Draper report, that “it would be a first step into that last ditch." I think it was a vividly dramatic little phrase and it does express it; does it not?

Secretary MCELROY. Yes, it does.

Mrs. BOLTON. In the various things that are here before us, it grows increasingly important for us to continue the confidence that other countries have in us; doesn't it?

Secretary MCELROY. This is a major factor in this entire program. It is not only important materially, but also important psychologically to our allies.

Mrs. BOLTON. If we do not have that, then we, of course, cannot expect them to take what we say, or play with us; can we?

Secretary MCELROY. No; and certainly General Twining could attest to this professionally better than I, but there can be no doubt that a will to resist is as important as the possession of the facilities with which to resist aggression.

Mrs. BOLTON. Of course.

And the whole method that is being used in this country to counteract this legislation, to prevent it, would seem to you a very serious matter; wouldn't it?

Secretary MCELROY. I have meant everything I have said in my statement. I think this is just as important as any essential part of our own military program.

Mrs. BOLTON. And that our military program could not possibly continue at the rate that it now is. It would have to double and triple and quadruple.

Secretary MCELROY. The only other alternative in my mind would be to gradually withdraw to a fortress America concept to get along in the world, which is a short road or a long road, whichever it may turn out to be, to ultimate defeat of this country.

Mrs. BOLTON. You would be in accord, both of you, with the hope that we could get over to the people of the country that this is not a matter of a 2-year or a 4-year program, but that is a matter which must be pursued until the enemy is finished.

Secretary MCELROY. I think it is important that this be understood. It would be a disservice to the American public in my mind

to suggest that this is a 1-year or a 2-year or even a 3-year program. Mrs. BOLTON. I have thought of that so long and I have wished there were more ways of getting it over to our people.

Secretary MCELROY. I think we have indicated that where, by the judicial application of economic assistance the capabilities of our allied countries have grown so that they can carry more and more of their own programs, that this has taken place. We have observed it in the NATO area, but there are other countries around the world. that seem to need more. In the NATO area where the modernization of the forces is so very, very expensive, I think, assistance will be needed for some little time.

Mrs. BOLTON. Thank you very much.
Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Carnahan.

Mr. CARNAHAN. Mr. Secretary, you point out the size of the free world forces in your statement as 5 million men, 3,000 combat vessels and 30,000 aircraft and 14,000 jets.

Does that include just the forces of our allies with whom we have some type of agreement, or, in other words, is it all of the non-Communist forces in the world, is what I am driving at.

Secretary MCELROY. Well, it is the former, covering nations with which we have agreements of one sort or another. It includes NATO; SEATO; Anzus Treaty, Rio Pact and certain countries with which we have bilateral pacts. All these countries are added together to make these figures.

Mr. CARNAHAN. Would it be helpful to know the size of the nonCommunist world forces, even though we were not directly allied with the countries?

Secretary MCELROY. We would be very glad to give you what figures we have on those. We have not included those in our statement because there is no obligation on their part to fight alongside other nations of the free world. This is the group I presume, Mr. Carnahan, that we would class as uncommitted countries-are those the ones of which you think?

Mr. CARNAHAN. At least the countries that are striving to maintain their own national independence.

Secretary MCELROY. Yes. We could prepare such a figure and it might be an interesting one to include in the record.

Mr. CARNAHAN. What percentage of that vast non-Communist force would our own U.S. forces be?

Secretary MCELROY. Is this a figure that you would like to have us submit?

Mr. CARNAHAN. Yes; I would like to have a figure that could be quoted.

Secretary MCELROY. Let us work on this and we will prepare something for the record but before we put it in the record, may we discuss it with you and see whether it meets what you have had in mind?

Mr. ČARNAHAN. I should be happy to discuss it with you and then I would want to know also the percentage of the non-Communist world forces which are financed by the United States. You have given a figure for these forces here which would probably run 10 to 15 percent, I suspect.

Secretary MCELROY. Well, I would think this would probably be a good deal more than half but again I won't know until we have a

38361-59-pt. 1- -6

look at the figures and we will include some statement on that percentage.

(The following information was subsequently submitted for the record :)

The total active military strength of all services for the United States is 2.6 million, while the strength of nations alined with the United States in collective defense agreements is estimated at 7 million and the remainder of the free world is estimated at 1.9 million.

Mr. CARNAHAN. How do you account for the positions taken by many of our people that they go all out in support of our own military defense, which I certainly approve of, and at the same time they tend to be opposed to foreign aid which is a high percentage military?

Secretary MCELROY. It is something that has been something of a mystery to me, Mr. Carnahan. I think you have to say that we who have the responsibility for explaining this program to the people of the country have not done well. I plan personally to take on several speaking assignments which will be partly on the subject of our own defense, but which will be largely on the subject of mutual security because I think that I have some obligation to try to carry some part of this responsibility myself in view of my conviction about it.

If you are asking why I think there has been difficulty in explaining this, I would say, Mr. Carnahan, that I think not too many of our people have yet accepted and understood the dependence of our country on the strength of the entire free world. I think that to them, Vietnam is an extremely remote country, so is Taiwan and Korea, and it has just been difficult for our people generally to accept the fact that their own security is to a considerable extent dependent on the security of these other free world countries in the way in which General Twining and other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have stated. I believe this to be true.

Mr. CARNAHAN. Mr. Secretary, have you seen this report by the Citizens Foreign Aid Committee?

Secretary MCELROY. I have seen a digest of it; yes.

Mr. CARNAHAN. I see a statement here:

Thus our past and present foreign aid programs are consuming the equivalent of 20 percent of our personal income tax collections.

Is that a correct statement-20 percent of our personal income tax collection goes for the support of foreign aid?

Secretary McELROY. I would want to go to their books and see what they are saying. I suspect that there is some kind of a twist in the language there that I would want to examine; it obviously doesn't say 20 percent of our total Federal income. It doesn't say that. Mr. CARNAHAN. It says personal income tax collections.

Secretary MCELROY. The personal income tax, as I recall it, is some 50 percent of the total tax receipts. I am sorry to say, I don't know. Mr. CARNAHAN. Foreign aid isn't costing 20 percent of our Federal budget?

Secretary MCELROY. What percent of the Federal budget?

Mr. CARNAHAN. Foreign aid isn't costing 20 percent of our total Federal budget.

Secretary McELROY. Of course not.

Mr. CARNAHAN. The figure is often quoted that foreign aid costs slightly less than 5 percent. Is that perhaps correct?

Secretary MCELROY. That certainly is an arithmetical fact. I would suspect that this must have taken certain other figures and construed them as foreign aid. I think we would have to carefully examine that to know quite what they do mean but certainly the amounts that we specifically regard as the cost of the mutual security program are in the range of figures that have already been quoted by

you.

Mr. CARNAHAN. In other words, we are spending around $3.5 billion annually.

Secretary MCELROY. About 5 percent of the total Federal budget. Chairman MORGAN. The gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. Merrow.

Mr. MERROW. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I want to commend you on the response that you made to my colleague's question a moment ago and where you said you were going to do considerable speaking and try to present the facts of this program to the people. It has been difficult for me to see why there should be so much opposition to a program that requires relatively a small amount of money. I don't speak of billions lightly but we have requests for $40 billion for the Army, Navy, and Air Force and with it, $3.9 billion for mutual security for the coming fiscal year and if we take out the economic aid I think anybody would agree the military assistance in the mutual security program is small in comparison and yet we have a tremendous fight over this

sum.

I think the people have been sold short on this most worthwhile program. It has been my experience that once they understand it they support it so I am very happy that you are going to try to make the program clear.

Now, you have mentioned the $1.6 billion. I don't know whether you responded to this before I came in or not, but I notice that the Draper committee, if I read it correctly, recommends an increase of $400 million above that $1.6 billion. Is it the purpose and intent of the administration to include this in a later recommendation?

Secretary MCELROY. This is currently under active consideration. The committee report has been received so recently by the administration that a firm position has not yet been adopted.

I am sure there is considerable sympathy with the proposal to recommend some increase. Whether it will be this full increase, I can't say.

Mr. MERROW. I think perhaps you make the statement with reference to the $1.6 billion, but do you consider that an irreducible. minimum?

Secretary MCELROY. I do, sir. In fact, I feel as if that is an uncomfortably low figure.

Mr. MERROW. Then as to the question I was going to ask, whether or not, in your opinion, we should increase the figure, but if it is an uncomfortably low figure I assume that is how you feel."

Secretary MCELROY. To me this $1.6 billion, as I have previously said in this hearing, is an irreducible figure from the strict military standpoint.

Mr. MERROW. Now, in your statements this morning, on the mutual security program, I think you said you felt it is as essential as any

money spent in the Air Force, the Army, and the Navy-I think this is exceedingly important.

May I ask this: If we were not spending this money in this area, then it is certainly conceivable that taxes would have to be higher than they are now.

Secretary MCELROY. Unless we could really change our concept of remaining a world power, and decide to pull right back inside of America, it could only result in a substantial increase in demands not only on our financial resources but even less attractively on our resources of young men-general manpower.

Mr. MERROW. I was going to ask the second part of that-it would under those conditions necessitate a much greater increase in the draft.

Secretary MCELROY. I think it is doubtful whether we could supply the manpower, even with an all-out application of selective service. I just think there probably are not enough men and young women— because you would have to use both-in the United States to carry this worldwide responsibility on our own shoulders.

Mr. MERROW. And you consider the allies who have been getting this military assistance around the world reliable, effective and would be most helpful to the national security?

Secretary MCELROY. You would have to say there is some variation in the strength of these many allies that we have, but it is my opinion and the opinion of our Joint Chiefs that even taking some discount here and there on some weakness of one sort or another, that the program as a whole is extremely effective in our own security behalf.

Mr. MERROW. Now, is it too extravagant to say that if it were not for the program we would not be in the deterrent position we are in at the present time?

Secretary MCELROY. Were it not for the program I feel we would not be in the deterrent position from the standpoint of local conflict. I think we would continue to remain in a strong deterrent position as far as general conflict is concerned, but we certainly would be in a less favorable position even in that aspect of our military security. Chairman MORGAN. The gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. Burleson.

Mr. BURLESON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I am sure you would like a clarification with reference to the subcommittee reviewing the mutual security operation at this time.

Your statement on page 5 refers to the Subcommittee for Review of the Mutual Security Programs as rendering a constructive service by pointing out examples of deficiencies.

I trust the chairman and my colleagues on the subcommittee will agree that we are not just pointing out deficiencies. At least we think our purpose is objective.

Secretary MCELROY. Certainly.

Mr. BURLESON. We think our approach is objective. Although as one who has opposed this bill on several occasions, I think the subcommittee is trying to be helpful. Not only to the executive department but in the program generally. Like some other committees in the House of Representatives which I assume are looking for the deficiencies only, we are trying to look at both sides and to find deficien