hand it over and give title to any one to sue. Law v. Parnell, 7 C. B., N. S. 282; 29 L. J., C. P. 17; Ancona v. Marks, 7 H. & N. 686; 31 L. J., Ex. 163. But, there must be a delivery with intent to transfer the property, and, if the indorsed bill be delivered to an agent for a special purpose only, and he parts with it improperly, this will not be an indorsement except in the hands of a bona fide holder for value; Marston v. Allen, 8 M. & W. 503; Barber v. Richards, 6 Exch. 63; and therefore, where the bill was delivered by such agent to plaintiff when overdue without consideration, it was held no indorsement. Lloyd v. Howard, 15 Q. B. 995; 20 L. J., Q. B. 1.

An indorsement made in France of a bill drawn, accepted and made payable in England, is good, if made according to English law. Lebel v. Tucker, L. R., 3 Q. B. 77. But, the indorsement of a French promissory note must be made according to French law to enable the indorsee to sue in England; Trimbey v. Vignier, 1 N. C. 151; so, in the case of a French bill, even though accepted in England. Bradlaugh v. De Rin, L. R., 3 C. P. 538. This seems to have been assumed by the Ex. Ch. on appeal in this case, though they reversed the judgment on the ground that the C. P. had proceeded on an erroneous view of the law of France; and the court intimated that the judgment in Trimbey v. Vignier, supra, was wrong, on the same ground. L. R., 5 C. P. 473.

By sect. 54 (2), ante, p. 330, the acceptor is precluded from denying to a holder in due course the capacity of the payee to indorse, but not the genuineness or validity of his indorsement. Thus, where a bill is drawn by a partner in the name of his firm, his authority to indorse is not admitted by acceptance. Garland v. Jacomb, L. R., 8 Ex. 216, Ex. Ch. So, where a bill payable to the drawer's own order was drawn and indorsed by procuration by the same person, it was held that the acceptance only admitted the drawing by procuration and not the indorsing. Robinson v. Yarrow, 7 Taunt. 455. But, where the drawing and indorsement are both forgeries, and the acceptor, with knowledge of this, negotiates the bills, he cannot dispute the regularity of the indorsement. Beeman v. Duck, 11 M. & W. 251. It seems that under the C. L. P. Act, 1854, s. 27, ante, p. 132, an indorsement might be proved by comparing it with the drawer's signature, which the acceptor is estopped from denying; and that as an authority to draw bills is some evidence of an authority to indorse also, see Prescott v. Flinn, post, p. 339, the indorsement might be proved by comparison with the drawer's signature, even when both signatures are per procuration.

By sect. 7 (3), ante, p. 327, where the payee is a fictitious or non-existing person, the bill may be treated as payable to bearer.

Where there was no proof of the handwriting of one of the indorsers, but it appeared that the indorsement was upon the bill when the defendant accepted it, and that he promised to pay it, Ryder, C. J., left the case to the jury, who found for the plaintiff, and the court refused a new trial. Hankey v. Wilson, Sayer, 223. So, an offer made by the acceptor to pay a bill with certain names on it, is a sufficient admission of the plaintiff's title, so as to supersede the necessity of proof of each person's handwriting. Bosanquet v. Anderson, 6 Esp. 43. But, where the bill was shown to the defendant with the name of the payee indorsed upon it, and the defendant merely objected to the want of consideration, it was ruled that that did not supersede the necessity of proving the indorser's handwriting. Duncan v. Scott, 1 Camp. 101. An admission of his handwriting by the indorser, though evidence against himself, is not evidence of indorsement in an action against the acceptor. Hemings v. Robinson, Barnes, 436.

Indorsement by agent.] When the indorsement is by an agent, it is necessary to show that the person by whom the indorsement was written had the

authority of the person whose name is written. In such a case an authority to draw does not of itself import an authority to indorse bills; but it is a fact which ought to go to the jury as evidence. The clerk of the payees of a bill having been accustomed to draw cheques for them, and in one instance authorised to indorse a bill, and two other bills indorsed by him having been discounted at the payee's bankers, and the proceeds received by them, -these facts were held evidence that the clerk had a general authority to indorse. Prescott v. Flinn, 9 Bing. 19. A power to A. to indorse and negotiate bills remitted to G., will not authorise the indorsement of a bill remitted to G. for a special purpose, and which G. could not have applied to his own use without fraud; and though the indorsement by G. himself would have transferred a good title to a bona fide holder, the indorsement by A. in G.'s name does not. Fearn v. Filica, 7 M. & Gr. 513. Where a bill payable to the drawer's order is handed by him to another, for a good consideration, with the intention of transferring the property to him, but the drawer omits to indorse it, the transferee has no authority to indorse by procuration in the drawer's name. Harrop v. Fisher, 10 C. B., N. S. 196; 30 L. J., C. P. 283. A farm bailiff, accustomed to pay and receive all moneys for his employer, has no implied authority to draw or indorse bills in the name of his principal. Davidson v. Stanley, 2 M. & Gr. 721. Though a wife, who carries on business for her husband, may be presumed to have authority to indorse in his name, yet an indorsement in her own name by a feme covert of a bill payable to her order, formerly conveyed no interest if without her husband's consent; Barlow v. Bishop, 1 East, 432; aliter, if the indorsement be made with the husband's consent. Prestwick v. Marshall, 7 Bing. 565. But under the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, 45 & 46 Vict. c. 75, s. 1, a married woman can indorse a bill of exchange payable to her. If the maker promise to pay a note, with the indorsement of a married woman upon it, it may be presumed as against him that she had authority from her husband to indorse it in her own name; Cotes v. Davis, 1 Camp. 485; recognised in Prestwick v. Marshall, supra; Prince v. Brunatte, 1 Ñ. C. 435; and Lindus v. Bradwell, 5 C. B. 583; but, it is to be observed that, as she was the payee, the defendant, as maker, was estopped, without any promise, from disputing her capacity to indorse; see sect. 54 (2) (c), ante, p. 330. Where the wife, who managed all the money part of the business, had power to indorse in the husband's name, it may be left to the jury to say whether the power authorised an indorsement by her daughter, in her presence, and by her direction. Lord v. Hall, 8 C. B. 627. A power to A. to draw or indorse in B.'s name, may be exercised by a clerk of A. by his direction. Ex parte Sutton, 2 Cox, 84, cited per cur. in the last case. By sect. 32 (3), ante, p. 336, "where a bill is payable to the order of two or more payees or indorsees who are not partners, all must indorse, unless the one indorsing has authority to indorse for the others." A partner has no implied authority to indorse a bill in the name of the partnership as security for his private debt; and the acceptor is not estopped by his acceptance from showing this want of authority. Garland v. Jacomb, L. R., 8 Ex. 216, Ex. Ch. On the dissolution of a partnership, a power, given to one of the partners to receive and pay debts, does not authorise him to indorse a bill in the name of the partnership; and, the partnership being dissolved, he has no general authority to do so. Kilgour v. Finlyson, 1 H. Bl. 155, But, a retiring partner may orally give his late partners authority to indorse existing securities; and a statement by the ex-partner, that he has left the assets and securities in the hands of the continuing partners and that he has no objection to their using the partnership name, is evidence from which a jury may infer an authority to indorse. Smith v. Winter, 4 M. & W. 454.

Identity of the indorser.] Vide ante, pp. 118, 127.

Date of indorsement.] By sect. 36 (4), “ except where an indorsement bears date after the maturity of the bill, every negotiation is prima facie deemed to have been effected before the bill was overdue." A bill is presumed to be issued when dated. Anderson v. Weston, 6 N. C. 296. But the date of an indorsement cannot be inferred from the date of the drawing; and if it be material, plaintiff should be prepared to prove it, either directly or by inference from circumstances. Rose v. Rowcroft, 4 Camp. 245. See, however, Anderson v. Weston, 6 N. C. 296, post, p. 358.

Proof of mesne indorsements.] All the indorsements that have been stated, though unnecessarily, must (if traversed) be proved as against acceptor. Waynam v. Bend, 1 Camp. 175. But, an offer by the acceptor to the holder to give another bill was held by Ld. Ellenborough an admission of the holder's title, and of the defendant's liability, and so dispensed with proof of the mesne indorsements. Bosanquet v. Anderson, 6 Esp. 43. By sect. 8 (4), ante, p. 336, where a bill of exchange is not drawn payable to bearer, it now only becomes so when the last, or only indorsement is in blank; hence it is not, as it formerly was, sufficient to prove an indorsement in blank, if there is a subsequent special indorsement. See Smith v. Clarke, Peake, 225; Walker v. Macdonald, 2 Exch. 527. In an action by the indorsee of a bill against the acceptor, the first count stated all the indorsements; the second count an indorsement by the payee to the plaintiff; Abbott, C. J., said that all the indorsements must be proved or struck out, though not stated in the declaration; and this need not be done before the trial. Cocks v. Borrodale, Chitty on Bills, 9th ed. 642. Indorsements may be struck out even after the bill has been read in evidence and objected to on the ground of the omission to state them in the declaration. Mayer V. Jadis, I M. & Rob. 247. By striking out intermediate indorsements, the plaintiff loses the security of those indorsers.

Title of the plaintiff as indorsee.] Sects. 21, 29 & 30, ante, pp. 321, 322, define the conditions necessary to entitle the plaintiff to sue as indorsee. When a bill is indorsed in blank, possession is sufficient prima facie title; and several plaintiffs, suing as indorsees, need not prove that they are in partnership, or, that the bill was indorsed to them jointly. Ord v. Portal, 3 Camp. 239; Rordasnz v. Leach, 1 Stark. 446; Attwood v. Rattenbury, 6 B. Moore, 579. But, where it is specially indorsed to a firm, the partnership must be proved to consist of the plaintiffs. 3 Camp. 240, n. Where the plaintiffs sue in a particular capacity, as trustees of a bankrupt, and allege an indorsement to them as such trustees, they must prove that the bills were indorsed to them in that capacity. Bernasconi v. Argyle, Dk. of, 3 C. & P. 29. On a traverse of the indorsement to the plaintiff, the defendant may show that the right to sue on it as indorsee is in other persons, and not in the plaintiff, though the indorsement is in blank. Machell v. Kinnear, 1 Stark. 499. In that case the plaintiffs were trustees of the estate of H., an insolvent; two of them were partners in the firm of L. & Co., but one was a stranger; the defendant sent the bill indorsed by him in blank to L. & Co., on account of H.'s estate: on objection being taken, Ld. Ellenborough held that, on these circumstances being shown, it was necessary for the plaintiffs to show that L. & Co. had transferred the bill to the plaintiffs, or had authorised them to sue. The defendant might also show that, though indorsed in blank, it was never delivered to the plaintiff as indorsee, but only as agent for another; Adams v. Jones, 12 Ad. & E. 455; or, had been delivered to the plaintiff on a condition which had not been complied with.

Drawer against Acceptor.

341

Bell v. Ingestre, Ld., 12 Q. B. 317. So, on a traverse of a previous indorsement by A. to B., it might have been shown that A. had delivered it to B. as agent only, and B. had indorsed it in fraud of the true owner, with the plaintiff's privity. Marston v. Allen, 8 M. & W. 494. Again, where the payee indorsed specially to M., and handed it to him to get discounted, and he endorsed it to plaintiff without value when overdue, it was held on a traverse of the indorsement from the payee to M., that the defendant_was entitled to the verdict. Lloyd v. Howard, 15 Q. B. 995; 20 L. J., Q. B. 1. But, in many of the above cases the defence must now be pleaded specially. See Rules, 1883, O. xix. r. 15, ante, p. 283. And, where the plaintiff was a bond fide holder for value, on a traverse of the indorsement by A., the payee, to a previous indorser, B., the defendant could not show that A. delivered the bill for a particular purpose, and B. fraudulently negotiated it. Hayes v. Caulfield, 5Q. B. 81. So, where E. indorsed a bill in blank, and delivered it to B. to get discounted, and he deposited it with T. for value received by himself, it was held that this proved an indorsement from E. to T.: Barber v. Richards, 6 Exch. 63; 20 L. J., Ex. 135; for, if the holder puts his name on the back of a bill, and delivers it to his agent for a particular purpose, and he delivers it to a third person for value, that is an indorsement from the holder to such third person: per Parke, B., Ibid. Nor, is it any answer, on a denial of the indorsement, that it was indorsed to the plaintiff by the directors of a company (intermediate indorsees), who had no authority to indorse; for, it is enough if the indorsement gives a title to the bill, though the company may not be bound by such indorsement. Smith v. Johnson, 3 H. & N. 222; 27 L. J., Ex. 363. See also Denton v. Peters, L. R., 5 Q. B. 477, 479. An indorsement in blank by the maker of a note, and a delivery by his executor to the plaintiff, is no indorsement to the plaintiff so as to give him a title to sue. Bromage v. Lloyd, 1 Exch. 32.

Evidence under money claims.] Although an acceptance has been said to be evidence of money had and received by the acceptor to the use of the holder (Bayley on Bills, 6th ed., 363), yet, on principle, it can be available upon the money claims only where there is privity; as, where the parties on the record are immediate parties on the bill, or, there has been a promise to pay, an account actually stated, or, acknowledgment of liability; and, the later authorities are to that effect. Waynam v. Bend, 1 Camp. 175; Eales v. Dicker, M. & M. 324; and the cases cited, ante, p. 335.

Drawer against Acceptor.

When a bill, though not payable to the drawer's own order, has been dishonoured by the acceptor, and taken up by the drawer, he may sue the acceptor; Simmonds v. Parminter, 1 Wils. 185; and in such action may be obliged by proper defences to prove, 1. The acceptance, as to proof of which see ante, pp. 328, et seq.; 2. The presentment to the defendant, as to proof of which see post, pp. 342, et seq., and his refusal to pay, which may be done by calling the person who presented the bill, or by proving a promise by the defendant to pay, which dispenses with proof of the presentment; and 3. The return of the bill to, and payment thereof by, the plaintiff. To prove the latter fact, it has been held not sufficient to produce the bill with a general receipt on the back of it from the then holder; for the receipt prima facie imports that the bill was paid by the acceptor. Scholey v. Walsby, Peake, 25. But, the legitimacy of this last presumption is doubtful; per cur in Phillips v. Warren, 14 M. & W. 379.

Payee or Indorsee against Drawer.

In an action by the payee or indorsee against the drawer, the plaintiff may have to prove, 1. The drawing of the bill; 2. Presentment to the drawee for acceptance or to acceptor for payment; 3. His default; 4. Due notice to the defendant of the default or dishonour; and 5, in the case of an indorsee, the indorsements, as to proof of which see ante, pp. 336, et seq.

Drawing-Statute.] By Sect. 55, "(1.) The drawer of a bill by drawing it-(a.) Engages that on due presentment it shall be accepted and paid according to its tenor, and that if it be dishonoured he will compensate the holder or any indorser who is compelled to pay it, provided that the requisite proceedings on dishonour be duly taken;"

Sect. 16. "The drawer of a bill, and any indorser, may insert therein an express stipulation

(1.) Negativing or limiting his own liability to the holder":

(2.) Waiving as regards himself some or all of the holder's duties."

By sect. 72 (1), ante, p. 323, when a bill is payable abroad, the obligations of the acceptor, and therefore of the drawer and indorsers, are regulated by lex loci of performance of contract.

Proof of the drawing.] The drawing of the bill, when traversed, must be proved by evidence of the drawer's handwriting; or, if drawn by the agent, by proving the authority of the agent and his handwriting. A farm bailiff, intrusted to pay and receive money, has not any implied authority to bind his principal by drawing bills; Davidson v. Stanley, 2 M. & Gr. 721; and see further as to authority of agent, ante, pp. 333, 338. If drawn in the name of a partnership, the partnership must be proved, and the handwriting of the partner who drew the bill. See further, Proof of acceptance of partners, ante, p. 331. As to proof of partnership, see post, Action for goods sold; delivery to partner.

Presentment to drawee for acceptance-Statute.] Sect. 39. "(1.) Where a bill is payable after sight, presentment for acceptance is necessary in order to fix the maturity of the instrument."

"(2.) Where a bill expressly stipulates that it shall be presented for acceptance, or where a bill is drawn payable elsewhere than at the residence or place of business of the drawee it must be presented for acceptance before it can be presented for payment."

"(3.) In no other case is presentment for acceptance necessary in order to render liable any party to the bill."

"(4.) Where the holder of a bill, drawn payable elsewhere than at the place of business or residence of the drawee, has not time, with the exercise of reasonable diligence, to present the bill for acceptance before presenting it for payment on the day that it falls due, the delay caused by presenting the bill for acceptance before presenting it for payment is excused, and does not discharge the drawer and indorsers."

Sect. 40. "(1.) Subject to the provisions of this Act," vide sect. 41 (2), post, p. 343, "when a bill payable after sight is negotiated, the holder must either present it for acceptance or negotiate it within a reasonable time."

'(2.) If he do not do so, the drawer and all indorsers prior to that holder are discharged."

"(3.) In determining what is a reasonable time within the meaning of this