join propositions, of which the one is a prima facie reason against the other. In the sentence, if the children be so badly brought up, they are not to be trusted, the bad bringing-up is the reason for their being unfit to be trusted; and, as far as the expression is concerned, is admitted to be so. The only uncertainty lies in the question as to the degree of the badness of the education. The inference from it is unequivocal. But if, instead of saying if, we say although, and omit the word not, so that the sentence run, although the children be so badly brought up they are to be trusted, we do two things: we indicate the general relation of cause and effect that exists between bad bringing-up and unfitness for being trusted, but we also, at the same time, take an exception to it in the particular instance before us. These remarks have been made for the sake of showing the extent to which words like though, &c., are conditional. It must be remembered, however, that conjunctions, like the ones lately quoted, do not govern subjunctive moods because they are conditional, but because, in the particular condition which they accompany, there is an element of uncertainty. § 535. This introduces a fresh question. Conditional conjunctions are of two sorts: 1. Those which express a condition as an actual fact, and one admitted as such by the speaker. 2. Those which express a condition as a possible fact, and one which the speaker either does not admit, or admits only in a qualified manner. Since the children are so badly brought up, &c.-This is an instance of the first construction. The speaker admits as an actual fact the bad bringing-up of the children. If the children be so badly brought-up, &c.-This is an instance of the second construction. The speaker admits as a possible fact the bad bringing-up of the children; but he does not adopt it as an indubitable one. § 536. Now, if every conjunction had a fixed unvariable meaning, there would be no difficulty in determining whether a condition was absolute and beyond doubt, or possible and liable to doubt. But such is not the case. Although may precede a proposition which is admitted as well as one which is doubted. a. Although the children are, &c. b. Although the children be, &c. If, too, may precede propositions wherein there is no doubt whatever implied: in other words, it may be used instead of since. In some languages this interchange goes further than in others; in the Greek, for instance, such is the case with ɛi, to a very great extent indeed. Hence we must look to the meaning of the sentence in general, rather than to the particular conjunction used. It is a philological fact (probably referable to the usus ethicus) that if may stand instead of since. It is also a philological fact that when it does so it should be followed by the indicative mood. This is written in the way of illustration. What applies to if applies to other conjunctions as well. § 537. As a point of practice, the following method of determining the amount of doubt expressed in a conditional proposition is useful : : Insert, immediately after the conjunction, one of the two following phrases,-(1.) as is the case; (2.) as may or may not be the case. By ascertaining which of these two supplements expresses the meaning of the speaker, we ascertain the mood of the verb which follows. When the first formula is the one required, there is no element of doubt, and the verb should be in the indicative mood. If (as is the case), he is gone, I must follow him. Here if since. When the second formula is the one required, there is an element of doubt, and the verb should be in the subjunctive mood. If (as may or may not be the case) he be gone, I must follow him. May and might are tenses which combined with an infinitive serve as equivalents to a true mood; just as the preposition of + a substantive = a case. § 538. The use of the word that in expressions like I eat that I may live, &c., is a modification of the subjunctive con struction, that is conveniently called potential. It denotes that one act is done for the sake of supplying the power or opportunity for the performance of another. In English the word that, so used, cannot be said to govern a mood, although generally followed by either may or might. It should rather be said to require a certain combination to follow it. The most important point connected with the powers of that is the so-called succession of tenses. § 539. The succession of tenses.-Whenever the conjunction that expresses intention, and consequently connects two verbs, the second of which denotes an action which takes place after the action denoted by the first, the verbs in question must be in the same tense. I do this that I may gain by it. I did this that I might gain by it. In the Greek language this is expressed by a difference of mood; the subjunctive giving the construction equivalent to may, the optative to might. A little consideration will show that this rule is absolute. For a man to be doing one action (in present time) in order that some other action may follow it (in past time) is to reverse the order of cause and effect. To do anything in A.D. 1851, that something may result from it in 1850 is a contradiction; and so it is to say I do this that I might gain by it. The reasons against the converse construction are nearly, if not equally, cogent. To have done anything at any previous time in order that a present effect may follow, is, ipso facto, to convert a past act into a present one, or, to speak in the language of the grammarian, to convert an aorist into a perfect. To say I did this that I may gain by it is to make, by the very effect of the expression, either may equivalent to might, or did equivalent to have done. I did this that I might gain. I have done this that I may gain. A clear perception of the logical necessity of the law of the succession of tenses, is necessary for understanding the nature of several anomalous passages in the classical writers. In the following, an aorist is followed not by an optative, but by a subjunctive. Οὐκ ἀγαθὸν πολυκοιρανίη· εἷς κοίρανος ἔστω, Εἷς βασιλεὺς, ὦ ἔδωκε Κρόνου παῖς ἀγκυλομήτεω Σκῆπτρόν τ' ἠδὲ θέμιστας, ἵνα σφίσιν ἐμβασιλεύῃ. Here it is necessary to construe dwкɛ, has given and continues to allow, which is to construe it like a perfect tense. Upon similar passages Mathiæ writes, "but frequently the conjunctive is used, although the preceding word be in the time past, viz. when the verb which depends upon the conjunction shows an action continued to the present time." That means when the verb is really a perfect. I may see. In Latin, when the same form is both aorist and perfect, the succession of tenses is a means of determining which of the two meanings it conveys. Veni ut videam I have come that Veni ut viderem = I came that I might see. Arnold states, from Krüger and Zumpt, that even where the præterite was clearly a perfect (i.e. to have with the participle), the Roman ear was so accustomed to the imperfect subjunctive, that it preferred such an expression as diu dubitavi num melius esset to diu dubitavi num melius sit. The latter part of the statement is sure enough; but it is by no means so sure that dubitavi, and similar forms in similar constructions are perfects. There is no reason for considering this to be the case in the present instance. It seems to be so, because it is connected with diu; but an action may last a long * Unless another view be taken of the construction, and it be argued that dwкe is, etymologically speaking, no aorist but a perfect. In form it is almost as much one tense as another. If it wants the reduplication of the perfect, it has the perfect characteristic, to the exclusion of the aorist ; and thus far the evidence is equal. The persons, however, are more aorist than perfect. For one of Mathiæ's aorists (μeñкe) a still better case might be made, showing it to be, even in etymology, more perfect than aorist. Κτείνει με χρυσοῦ, τὸν ταλαίπωρον, χάριν Μεθῆχ ̓, ἵν ̓ αὐτὸς χρυσὸν ἐν δόμοις ἔχῃ. EUR. Hec. time, and yet not last up to the time of speaking. Diu dubitavi probably expresses, I doubted a long time, and leaves it to be inferred that now I do not doubt. $540. It has been stated above that whilst the Latin and English have a succession of tenses, the Greek language exhibits what may be called a succession of moods. This suggests inquiry. Is the difference real? If so, how is it explained? If not, which of the two grammatical systems is right? the English and Latin on the one side, or the Greek on the other? Should TUTTO be reduced to a past tense, or verberarem be considered an optative mood? The present writer has no hesitation in stating his belief, that all the phænomena explicable by the assumption of an optative mood are equally explicable by an expansion of the subjunctive, and a different distribution of its tenses. 1. Let rúw be considered a subjunctive future instead of a subjunctive aorist. 2. Let rúπτo be considered an imperfect subjunctive. 3. Let rɛrúpoiμ be considered a pluperfect subjunctive. 4. Let Tervayu be considered an aorist subjunctive. Against this view there are two reasons: 1. The double forms τύψαιμι and τύψοιμι, one of which would remain unplaced. 2. The use of the optative and conjunctive in simple propositions, as ὦ παῖ, γένοιο πατρὸς εὐτυχέστερος. The first reason I am not prepared to impugn. Valeat quantum, &c. The second indicates a class of expressions which tense will not explain, and which mood will. Yet this is not conclusive. Would that thou wert is thoroughly optative: yet it is expressed by a tense. The form of the so-called optatives proves nothing. Neither the subjunctive nor the optative has any signs of mood at all, except the negative one of the absence of the augment. Their signs are the signs of tense. In favour of the view are the following reasons:— 1. The analogy of other languages. The imperfect has a subjunctive in Latin. So has the future. |