Opinion of the Court. Pacific Railroad Company, therefore, is real estate of corporeal quality, and the principles of such apply. One of these, and an elemental one, is that whatever is erected upon it becomes part of it. There are exceptions to the principle, but as we are not concerned with them, we need not state them. Applications of the principle to railroads are illustrated by the decisions of this court and by those of other courts. As to rails put down against him from whom purchased, Galveston Railroad v. Cowdrey, 11 Wall. 459; United States v. New Orleans Railroad, 12 Wall. 362; Thompson v. White Water Valley Railroad, 132 U. S. 68; even though the contract of purchase provided that the property should remain that of the vendor and he have a right to remove the same, Porter v. Pittsburg Bessemer Steel Co., 122 U. S. 267, and cases cited; in determining the relation of the rails to the right of way, Joy v. St. Louis, 138 U. S. 1. In this case Mr. Justice Blatchford said: "The track cannot be separated from the right of way, the right of way being the principal thing and the track merely an incident. A right of way is of no particular use to a railroad without a superstructure and rails; the track is a necessary incident to the enjoyment of the right of way." See also Palmer v. Forbes, 23 Illinois, 301; Hunt v. Bay State Iron Co., 97 Mass. 279; New Haven v. Fair Haven && Westville Railroad, 38 Conn. 422. The principle has also illustrations in cases of taxation. People v. Cassity, 46 N. Y. 46; Appeal Tax Court of Baltimore City v. The Baltimore Cemetery Co., 50 Maryland, 432; Osborne v. Humphrey, 7 Conn. 335; Parker v. Redfield, 10 Conn. 490; Lehigh Coal & Navigation Co. v. Northampton County, 8 W. & S. 334; Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway v. Crawford, 48 Wisconsin, 666; Richmond v. Richmond & Danville Railroad, 21 Gratt. 604; Mayor &c. of Baltimore v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, 6 Gill. 288; Osborn v. N. Y. & N. H. Railroad, 40 Conn. 491; Richmond & Danville Railroad v. Alabama, 84 N. C. 504; Worcester v. Western Railroad Corporation, 4 Met. 564. It is urged, however, that the rule of construction declared in Vicksburg, Shreveport & Pacific Railroad v. Dennis, 116 Syllabus. U. S. 665, and the cases there cited and approved, and repeated in Gazoo &c. Railroad v. Thomas, 132 U. S. 174; Wilmington & Weldon Railroad v. Alsbrook, 146 U. S. 279, 294; Keokuk & Western Railroad v. Missouri, 151 U. S. 301, 306; Norfolk & Western Railroad v. Pendleton, 156 U. S. 667, and Covington &c. Turnpike Co. v. Sandford, 164 U. S. 578, determines in favor of appellant's contention. That we do not think so is probably sufficiently indicated, but we cite the cases to preclude the thought that they have been overlooked, or that the rule announced by them is questioned. Indeed, we regard it as salutary, and not impaired by our decision which simply rests on the terms of the statute. The decree is Affirmed. THE TERRITORY OF NEW MEXICO V. THE UNITED STATES TRUST COMPANY OF NEW YORK et al. No. 169. SAME v. SAME. No. 170. Appeals from the Supreme Court of the Territory of New Mexico. MR. JUSTICE MCKENNA: On the authority of the foregoing opinion the decrees in these cases are Affirmed. THE ELFRIDA.1 CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT. No. 60. Argued November 10, 11, 1898. - Decided December 12, 1898. Where the stipulated compensation in a salvage contract is dependent upon success it may be made for a larger compensation than a quantum meruit and much more so when such success is to be achieved within a limited time; and such contract, after execution, will not be set aside simply because the compensation is excessive, unless shown to have been corruptly entered into, or made under fraudulent representations, a clear mistake or suppression of important facts, in immediate danger to the 1 The docket title of this case is "Charles Clarke and Robert P. Clarke, Petitioners, v. The Steamship Elfrida, Pyman, Bell & Co., Claimants." Statement of the Case. ship, or under other circumstances amounting to compulsion, or when its enforcement would be contrary to equity and good conscience. Many leading cases in this country and some in England, where salvage contracts have been set aside, and compensation awarded in proportion to the merits of the services, examined, and shown to establish.(1) That the courts of both countries are in entire accord in holding that a contract of salvage, which the master has been corruptly or recklessly induced to sign, will be wholly disregarded; (2) that some of the American courts have also laid down the rule that all salvage contracts are within the discretion of the court, and will be set aside in all cases where, after the service is performed, the stipulated compensation appears to be unreasonable, to which this court is unable to give its assent; (3) that while in England there has been some slight fluctuation of opinion, by the great weight of authority, and particularly of the more recent cases, it is held that if the contract has been fairly entered into, with eyes open to all the facts, and no fraud or compulsion exists, the mere fact that it is a hard bargain, or that the service was attended with greater or less difficulty than was anticipated, will not justify setting it aside. Where no circumstances exist which amount to a moral compulsion, such a contract should not be held bad simply because the price agreed to be paid turned out to be much greater than the services were actually worth. On the continent of Europe the courts appear to exercise a wider discretion, and to treat such contracts as of no effect if made when the vessel is in danger, but this court cannot accept this as expressing the true rule on the subject. The facts relating to the making of the contract which is in dispute in this case, as detailed in the opinion of the court, show that few cases are presented showing a contract entered into with more care and prudence than this, and the court is clear in its opinion that it should be sustained. THIS was a libel in rem by the firm of Charles Clarke & Co., of Galveston, Texas, against the British steamship Elfrida, to recover the sum of $22,000, with interest and costs, claimed to be due them for services rendered in the performance of a salvage contract with the master, to release the Elfrida, then stranded near the mouth of the Brazos River. The principal averments of the answer were, in substance, that the agreement was signed by the master under a mutual mistake of fact, or by mistake on his part, which libellants took advantage of, as to the danger in which the vessel was, and that it was improvidently made for an excessive com Statement of the Case. pensation without a proper understanding by him of the vessel's alleged freedom from danger; that the master had been prevented from carrying out his instructions to accept a tender made, if lower impossible, by information of the cable being conveyed to the salvors before the master saw it; that the parties were not upon an equal footing; that libellants made an unreasonable bargain with the master because of the stress of the situation and that of his vessel, and acted collusively with other salvors in obtaining from him the agreement. On Friday, October 5, 1894, the Elfrida, a steel steamship of 1454 tons register, 290 feet long, 38 feet in width, and drawing 11 feet 10 inches, bound for the port of Velasco, Texas, in ballast, grounded on the bar between the jetties which extend from either bank of the river, about a mile into the Gulf, the outer end of these jetties for a distance of a thousand feet or more being submerged. The heel of the ship touched, there being but five inches between the bottom and the bar, and an easterly wind swung her bow against the west jetty. The captain ran out a kedge from the starboard bow, hove taut with the windlass, put the engine full speed astern, but could not move the ship. The wind and sea increased during the afternoon and evening, while the ship was straining and bumping heavily. The weather moderated somewhat on the following day, and the same efforts were continued unsuccessfully until the evening, when the sea rose, carrying her over the submerged outer end of the jetty, and some distance farther shoreward on the beach. She brought up that night about a cable's length to the west of the west jetty. That part of the jetty which was above high water projected seaward beyond her stern and sheltered her from easterly winds. She lay parallel with the jetty about four or five hundred feet from the beach, head on, and about one thousand feet from water of sufficient depth to float her. The shore at this point is very flat, the bottom consisting of a layer of quicksand about ten feet deep. The steamer settled in the quicksand to her normal draft, rocking and moving in it whenever there was a high Statement of the Case. sea. She lay in nine feet of water at high tide. The weather continued generally favorable from the 7th to the 17th, with occasional gales and high seas. The ship drifted somewhat further on the beach, but efforts to relieve her by her own. resources seem to have been practically abandoned. On Tuesday, October 9, the master sent the following letter to the libellants: "Capt. Chas. Clarke, re S.S. Elfrida. "VELASCO, Oct. 9, 1894. "DEAR SIR: Please tender for to float and place in a place of safety, say Galveston, where her bottom can be examined, furnishing diver and his apparatus. Also to furnish all material and labor in floating said steamship Elfrida, also time required. Reply at your earliest convenience under seal to Jas. Sorely, Lloyds agent, or myself. "No cure, no pay. "Yours truly, By B. BURGESS, Master. "P.S.-A convenient time to be laid to get the ship off, and if at the expiration of the time the vessel is still aground, all claim on this contract to cease and to be null and void. "B. BURGESS, Master." In reply to this, libellants submitted a tender, offering to perform the service for the sum of $22,000, which was accepted by the advice of Lloyds' agent, who was on board the vessel at the time, and with the consent of Pyman, Bell & Co., of Newcastle-on-Tyne, owners of the Elfrida. The following contract, which forms the basis of the present suit, was thereupon entered into: "THE STATE OF TEXAS, COUNTY OF BRAZORIA. "This agreement, made and entered into this 15th day of October, 1894, between the steamship Elfrida, and the owners thereof, represented herein by B. Burgess, master of said steamship, as party of the first part, and Charles Clarke & Co., of Galveston, Texas, as party of the second part, Witnesseth, that for and in consideration of the covenants |