« 이전계속 »
did, during the series of publicized armed clashes in 1969, take several occasions to chastise local PRC forces in well-planned and executed small encounters. As relations grew more tense, the Soviet Union played on China's fears. There was a rumor that Soviet diplomats were sounding those of other nations about how they might react to a pre-emptive nuclear strike against the PRC. Some of the Warsaw Pact countries seemed to toy with the idea of sending forces to Asia to support Russia. An authoritative military writer in Moscow wrote an article that ridiculed the idea of "People's War” as an adequate defense, pointing out to Peking that the victories they enjoyed over the Japanese twenty-five years ago meant nothing in terms of the powerful, mobile forces of the Soviet Army today. Proposals for collective security arrangements in Asia were seen by China as Soviet attempts to encircle her. Last year's treaty with India, and subsequent heavy and effective aid to India in the Bangla Desh War were further blows to Chinese prestige and to her sense of security. Underscoring all that had happened before, the Soviet Union has during the last year added 8 divisions to its forces along the SinoSoviet border, bringing the total now to 41. The Soviet forces also include the most modern aircraft and nuclear rocket units, and the Chinese may be sure that longer range strategic weapons are trained on metropolitan China. War is by no means inevitable, but the Chinese do not seem to be too sure of what the cost of avoidance may be and Moscow is making it clear that it can make the cost of conflict very high indeed. Putting aside consideration of the ancient animosities between them, and leaving the political and ideological content of the quarrel to others, the current military situation and balance between the two nations clearly constitutes the largest and most immediate threat to China.
The Vietnam war and the Taiwan situation identify the United States as a major foe of China. Nevertheless, the totality of the American threat to China must be seen from there as decreasing at a steady rate, almost phased with the increase in the Soviet menace. The general application of the Nixon Doctrine, the attempts to wind down the war in Indochina, and the major shift exemplified in the Presidential trip to China convey a tone, or temper, that strongly suggests a lessening of the likelihood of an American attack on China. There is by no means a warm trust and confidence in the relation. Peking reiterates her standard charges and complaints, but the physical situation can only be seen as one in which the US is not going to attack the PRC and, unless there is some radical deterioration in the relation, may be sympathetic to some of China's efforts to improve her condition.
There has been a cycle of complaint in Chinese propaganda over what is said to be a resurgence in Japanese militarism. On occasions Chou En-lai has described Chinese concern in the matter as being over future rather than present conditions. An examination of current plans for Japanese Self-Defense Forces and their equipment confirms their defensive character. The Japanese themselves have had a fierce parliamentary fight over the few items that might conceivably have some offensive capability. What then is the Chinese concern? It is not difficult to believe that the Chinese have a deep and abiding distrust of Japan, derived from three-quarters of a century of experience. In the current_setting there are a number of factors that would support the Chinese rationale. First, Japan, peaceful as she may be, has the resources to build formidable offensive forces (nuclear and conventional) in very short order. How such forces might be used is a question of legitimate concern. The Japanese alliance with the US is also seen as menacing. The Nixon Doctrine is interpreted as exploiting the alliance to develop the use of Japanese soldiers instead of Americans in the service of imperialism's aims in Asia. Finally, the incumbent Prime Minister is seen as too close to the US and too friendly to Taiwan. The improvement of relations with China has been set as a goal by some of Mr. Sato's opponents and this would surely take some of the menace out of Japan's likelihood of making herself a military force to be reckoned with.
India, Korea, and Taiwan all have some degree of military impact on the PRC. India is not likely to attack in any major sense, although some incursions in the interest of the ongoing boundary dispute cannot be ruled out. During the Bangla Desh War India maintained some six divisions in the high passes, so any Chinese idea of creating a diversion in the interest of Pakistan was inhibited. In a larger, long-term sense New Delhi is a political and ideological competitor with Peking and some military expression of this is necessary. Korea could become a military embarrassment to the PRC should either side openly attack the other. China last year signed a new military assistance agreement with North Korea, but its content is not known. Meantime, since 1965, the Soviet Union has carried out an impressive assistance program that has included such items as 90-odd Mig-21 air
craft and a good number of modern tanks. Both Peking and Moscow have recently stressed their desire to see a peaceful settlement in the Korean Peninsula. Their concern probably rises from the wish to avoid complicating further an already difficult situation. The geography of the border areas among the three nations would be significant in any conflict and if the ROK chose to act against the DPRK when the latter's sponsors were engaged with one another, a much wider conflict would become possible. Taiwan does not seem seriously to occupy Peking as a target for attack, the latter apparently being reasonably confident that ultimately they will prevail without war. How Taiwan might behave if the PRC were heavily occupied elsewhere is another problem. Taipei more than once has openly stated that it might take advantage of turmoil or difficulty on the mainland to reassert its claims by force. The balance of forces would under ordinary circumstances forbid such an attempt, but major conflict on the Sino-Soviet border would write a different scenario.
The concern over an attack from Taiwan while engaged elsewhere only particularizes a general problem seen by the PLA. A "two-front” (or multi-front) war would impose serious burdens on transport and the total logistics system, as well as on fighting resources of all kinds. Militarily, the provision of the forces necessary to face a major threat on two separate fronts is a problem of such magnitude that Peking simply cannot face it at this time. The alternative seems to lie in careful management of affairs to minimize the prospects of such a contingency. What useful measures might be available is beyond the scope of this study.
There is very little in the open record that permits precise or detailed conclusions about the Chinese view of their situation in a nuclear war. It is obvious that whatever sort of nuclear force emerges in China, it will be keyed to deterrence. Initially at least shorter range weapons will lead to a hostage strategy, similar to the first-stage Soviet posture in Europe in which allies of the US were the primary targets for retaliation should the US attack Russia. Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan are all vulnerable in such a case. Against Russia it would be logical to concentrate on the Maritime Province and industrial sites in Asian Russia. On the passive side, there have been many reports of extensive digging in Chinese cities and of the dispersion and duplication of key facilities. It is apparent that Peking does understand its vulnerability to nuclear attack from any quarter and is moving to forestall it and to minimize its effects should it come. At the same time, it would be useful to note the apparent absence of panic or undue haste in China's preparations.
SOME GENERAL QUESTIONS The foregoing description of China's military posture and discussion of that posture's “fit” with Chinese perceptions of threats to her security have been developed with a view to answering three general questions that arise from the picture of economic-military relations and conditions presented in the “Assess
1. Even with its recent economic successes, does China have the resources to mount a
major threat to U.S. interests in Asia or elsewhere?
A major military adventure in Asia could be undertaken, but it would arrest, or even reverse, the general flow of progress in the PRC. The resource cost of fielding and fighting a force of, say, 250 thousand men would probably absorb most of the gains made in primary industry since the end of the Cultural Revolution. This does not consider the costs of damage that might be suffered by plant and communications within China under air attack.
A reasonable answer to this question must therefore be a carefully qualified "yes.” Physically, China could undertake such a venture in mainland Asia. The costs are high and the outcome, in Chinese eyes, dangerously uncertain. It must be concluded that the risks and costs would be accepted only if China then saw military action as absolutely necessary to protect her own position. Alternatively, China might feel obliged to pay the price of intervention in Indochina if the complete destruction of the communist leadership and total loss of the war appeared to be the only reasonable outcome in a deteriorating situation. With the possible exception of action in behalf of Hanoi, the PRC would be looking over her shoulder at the Soviet Union if she became heavily engaged elsewhere. In summary, the PRC, at some significant sacrifice, probably could mount a major threat to some major US interest in Asia, but it is hard to visualize the conditions that would make the venture worthwhile, short of a clear and immediate threat to China's security or the imminent total defeat of Hanoi.
2. With the resources available, do China priorities dictate attention to their security
concerns over the Soviet border and the status of Taiwan, etc. rather than other ventures of concern to the United States?
China can only view her present situation as precarious. The immediate menace of the US has clearly been reduced. The Taiwan question, although not yet solved to her satisfaction, is certainly not generating any great physical danger. Japan, at least for the time being, is frozen in a military posture of little threat. Three potential adversaries, while not disarmed, seem disinclined to aggressionbut no matter what gains may have been registered elsewhere, the Soviet Union remains. Moscow seems willing and able to inflict terrible punishment on the PRC. Whatever gains China can make in her military capabilities must be added to the balance sheet with Russia. It is along
the northern border, and only there, that a major and immediate danger exists. Some observers hold that the Soviet Union would find it very difficult to fight a war in Asia and that China would do much damage to Soviet Far Eastern territory. This may be so, but it is equally true that most of China's hard-worn industrial base and infrastructure would vanish in the process. Given the level of resources that Peking is apparently willing to assign to military use, and looking at the Soviet forces now physically present in the Far East, it must be concluded that China has, at the moment, one overriding defense priority and that she is working very hard (and effectively) to avoid the diversion of military resources to any other tasks. One possible exception is the demonstrated willingness to maintain military assistance to some clients who are politically important. 3. Are economic growth, consumer welfare and other domestic priorities likely to
override security programs in Chinese development?
The “Assessment” gives a very clear picture of progress on a broad front within a closely-controlled economy. The ability to produce weapons and military equipment grows in step with other activities. The types and, where we know them, the numbers of things being produced for the PLA testify that there has been careful thought and consensus in relating resource allocation and use to strategy. Whatever the differences between rival groups and factions may be, it nevertheless appears that there is some central and controlling view of defense and its necessities. The economy does, however, face some uncertainties. While arms supply requirements will probably not make any concessions to consumer welfare, there could arise conditions in which changing perceptions of the threat produced increasing demands for more sophisticated weapons which, added to the normally growing costs of military production, would produce real strains on the system. Under such conditions there could again be serious internal debate over security policy and priorities, but probably not at the level of intensity that has characterized some earlier controversies in the political-military life of China. Considering the changed external environment, questions of the reality of the threat and the sources of assistance or support would no longer occupy the foreground. Without a radical change in Soviet attitudes and actions, it does not seem very likely that general economic progress or consumer interests could override security programs, even if there should be some increase in the military budget's claim on the GNP.
The “Assessement” presents a picture of relations between the economy and defense production that argues convincingly for the idea that internal problems have not had critical effect on the development of forces to support a consistent and rational strategy and that the economy has interposed no significant barriers to military programs. The future, while it has some uncertainties, seems generally to promise continued progress. The quality of research and economic analysis reflected in the "Assessment” helps refine understanding of what it is that this mysterious and secretive nation is aiming at.
Chairman PROXMIRE. Thank you, all of you gentlemen, very much.
Gentlemen, in reading your prepared statements, I have been struck by the situation as it must look to China vis-a-vis the United States.
In a sense, we have encircled China. We have, on the one hand, Korea where we have a very massive, expensive military assistance program. We have withdrawn some troops; we are going to withdraw more; but we have had a military operation up there now for more
than 20 years.
To go a little further down, you have Japan which is, it is true, demilitarized but has a fantastic economic potential for military development, thanks largely to American efforts, and Japan does seem to be our ally versus China.
Formosa—which is the beneficiary of another massive military assistance program by the United States.
Southeast Asia where we are pouring in literally billions and billions of dollars to help South Vietnam and Cambodia, Laos, in opposition not to China but to North Vietnam and China just once removed.
Pakistan and India-where we still have a program of military assistance.
Now, I am chairman of the Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, and 80 percent of our military assistance—that is, of the $6 billion of military assistance, most of which is not, incidentally, under my jurisdiction but under defense appropriation jurisdiction-but about 80 percent of it is in this area involved in encircling China.
All of this is to defend against some kind of a threat which China, in my view, mythically represents.
My question is, in view of the action on our part to provide military assistance, in view of the deployment of the world's largest navy in the Southeastern Asia area right now, the world's most powerful air force in that area, isn't there some understandable basis for China's feeling that we have been their adversary and that we constitute an encircling threat?
Let's start with Mr. Dorrill and move across.
Mr. DORRILL. Senator, as I indicated in my testimony, I think that this has been an influence but, after all, if we go back in history, in a sense we have also been reacting to the Chinese. The relatively hardlined chinese foreign policy stance announced immediately after the People's Republic was established in
Chairman PROXMIRE. No question their rhetoric has been at a higher level than ours, period. Is there anything except rhetoric we have been reacting to? Do they have a Chinese soldier in Vietnam? Of course, they put some equipment in.
Mr. DORRILL. We did fight a war prior to the Vietnam war
Mr. DORRILL. The Korean war was the largest scale military combat we had engaged in after World War II, and we have to remember that this was happening in a very different world from the world after the Sino-Soviet rift. In a very real sense there was a Sino-Soviet bloc up to the mid-1950's.
Chairman PROXMIRE. It was a war fought virtually on their border and thousands of miles away from us and separated by the blue Pacific with a massive American Navy and virtually no Chinese Navy, no threat to us, perhaps a threat to them.
Mr. DORRILL. I would like to make another point that I tried to bring out at the very end. Rightly or wrongly, and consciously or unconsciously, I think we were trying to build a collective security system. I think that the lesson of Korea was that you don't march across international boundaries with impunity.
Chairman ProXMIRE. That is a good point; that's right.
Mr. DORRILL. Now, I think where we have faltered in applying this concept
Chairman PROXMIRE. We had the United Nations in Korea to back up that in a significant way.
Mr. DORRILL. Where we faltered was in dealing with a subtle, indirect kind of aggression, and I use the term with some trepidation because it is so hard to define and get a consensus on a definition of the term "aggression.
In other words, what we are trying to evolve and what both sides in a way are groping for is a system in which we can compete politicallywe have very different political and social systems—and, at the same time, maintain some degree of stability.
How can we achieve peace and order without at the same time imposing a static, nondynamic, nonmodernizing society in the Third World. It is a terribly difficult problem.
I think that where we got off the track was in our involvement in Vietnam, because we had to go beyond that. Instead of "assisting,” by 1965 we had begun to carry the whole burden.
Chairman PROXMIRE. Yes, but you see the thrust of my question is, and I didn't make this very clear, I am afraid, with the assumption we get out of Vietnam, does it make sense for us to try to hold the lines and against a theoretically aggressive China elsewhere at enormous cost and expense to our taxpayers and drain on our resources at a time when we have massive domestic problems that require more attention here?
Mr. DORRILL. I don't even think the Chinese would like to see us withdraw in great haste from places like Korea, Japan, and even Southeast Asia.
On the other hand, the assumptions have changed, and I think that with the announcement of the Nixon doctrine and its implementation to reduce our military profile, I think U.S. policy is moving in the right direction.
Chairman PROXMIRE. Well, the Nixon doctrine, as the administration insists on explanining it to us, is withdrawing our troops and making up for that with weapons, advisers, in the same area.
Mr. DORRILL. But the burden is on the local government.
Chairman PROXMIRE. That's right; but it is still a posture of military hostility, of encirclement with respect to China.
I am wondering in view of the fact- I want to get on with you other gentlemen, too-in view of the limitations of the Chinese economy, we can talk about how the gross national product is not a fairProfessor Hinton does—reflection of the quality of life or their ability to achieve certain socialist values or humanitarian values, but it is a good, hard, tough measure, it seems to me, a rough measure of their military potential.
This is a country with a gross national product-let's face it-of less than Italy's. They have 800 million people to feed and clothe with that pitifully small gross national product compared to ours. It is true, as Colonel Fraser has so ably and in the best detail I have heard yet explained they do have a military force, very powerful in defending China, Mainland China, period. They don't have the steel industry; they don't have the internal transportation system; they don't have the military, economic military potential to constitute any kind of a