« 이전계속 »
labor power is necessarily an advantage. On the contrary it remains a problem. In fact, unlike the Soviet Union, even during the fifties when there was a tremendous emphasis on high tempo industrial development, one still had the phenomenon in China of people being sent back from the cities to the countryside. The new industry wasn't able to absorb them quickly enough.
Chairman PROXMIRE. Let's face it, compared to this country the Soviet Union is enormously backward. They have seven times as many people on the farms as we do and produce 20 percent less food. There is where our superiority is, right there in the agricultural sector.
Mr. Liv. It is not that you can produce all of a sudden so much from your land without investing so much in it.
Chairman PROXMIRE. An excellent point.
Professor Schwartz, the United States and China have at times shared the view that China should be unified and strong, and I think the majority leader this morning described them as dynamic, strong, and unified. Should we still share this view they should be? Is it in our interest that there should be a strong, unified, dynamic China?
Mr. SCHWARTZ. I am almost inclined to agree with Professor Liu, one should hesitate to predict more than 2 years in advance.
Chairman PROXMIRE. I am not asking you to predict at all. Forget the prediction. All I am asking, is it in our interest to have that?
Mr. SCHWARTZ. By and large, I would say yes, a strong China, but a China that has become enmeshed in whatever web of world order we now have, the more they become involved in the complexities of the world.
I think one of the major benefits of the mild rapprochement that we have had with China is not necessarily a benefit in terms of American-Chinese relations as in terms of bringing China into the world community as a whole. In other words, we are no longer blocking their entry onto the world scene; their increased involvement with the complexities of the world scene.
Chairman PROXMIRE. What do we do to achieve that: (1) China is now a member of the United Nations; (2) the President has visited China, which I would agree, although I am a Democrat and am critical of President Nixon on Vietnam and other areas, I think it has been an excellent action; it has been constructive and useful. The minority and majority leaders have both rejected the notion of mostfavored-nation treatment for China; I think it would be unrealistic to do that. I don't think we are going to have an aid program for China. What do you suggest we can do now that has not already been done, or is this a period when we will just have to wait for a few years and gradually move into some other possibility of enmeshing China, as you put it, into the responsibilities and interests of the world.
Mr. SCHWARTZ. Well, our disengagement from Vietnam-quite apart from all the other reasons for desiring it--would also help in this area. Beyond that, there is some merit in not doing certain things. As stated above, the fact that we have ceased obstructing their movement onto the world scene is itself a gain.
I would hope, although my hopes are not wildly optimistic on this score, that we will have some increase in cultural exchange between the two countries within the next few years.
Chairman PROXMIRE. Develop an interest in Ping-Pong as well as acupuncture?
Mr. SCHWARTZ. I don't think we should have wild expectations in this area because the Chinese do not want their society to become contaminated by what they regard as our bad values, so I think that cultural exchange probably will be limited. From the point of view of people who are interested in China, in a scholarly way, we are dreaming of times when it will be possible to go there and study in their archives. It still is not possible as of this moment. What we have brought about basically in shift in atmosphere. I know that Professor Reischauer has said at one point that all that has happened in our relationship with China is a change in atmospherics. I would say, yes, a change in atmospherics but at this point a change in atomospherics is extremely important.
Chairman PROXMIRE. Let me ask you, Professor Liu, China is a nation, as was said, four times the population of ours, with immense resources. If they are unified, dynamic, and strong, regardless of the historical friendly relationship, wouldn't this constitute a potential, enormous threat to us?
Mr. Liu. Well, Senator, I just don't know how one could really conceive of the Chinese mainland as united and strong. When Mr. Nixon visited Peking, it was a country without a constitution, not even on paper, without a chief of state.
Now, Lin Piao's former officers—Lin Piao was leader of the Fourth Field Army-for decades his officers scattered all over the country; who knows what were in their minds. So I think it is a bit too early for us to describe China, the Chinese mainland, as a strong and unified country.
Chairman PROXMIRE. Professor Liu, let me just interrupt at this point, and maybe Professor Schwartz would like to comment on that point, too. I am astonished at that reaction because with many weaknesses China has, and with my many vehement disagreements with Chairman Mao, of course, it seems the one thing they do have is an absolute iron grip on their people, just an enormous discipline of a kind that rarely has been seen in human history in any country of any size; as Senator Scott testified, they seem to be accepting a lower standard of living and liking it; no significant evidence of much revolution or protest; an iron grip by the central government, whether they have a constitution or not, there is no question who is the head of state; it is Mao. He is the god; isn't that correct?
Mr. Liu. Well, both Hitler and Mussolini had their peoples very strongly in their hands. Would you call them unified, really willingly?
Chairman ProXMIRE. I didn't say willingly. Whether it is willing or not, Stalin is another one. But he had a unified, strong, dynamic Russia, and I think that Hitler had a unified, strong, dynamic Germany, vicious, cruel, sadistic--you could apply almost any adjective that is adverse to it; certainly we were absolutely right to fight to the death against it, but nevertheless I don't know how you could describe Nazi Germany as not dynamic, unified, and strong. Yes, I would say both of those were unified. Yes, sir.
Mr. SCHWARTZ. Could I comment? This is a question with which I have been wrestling. I am not sure I have found the satisfactory answer. As of the present, one gets two quite different pictures of China. There is the China of the travelers who all come back with a picture of immense cohesion, of vast collective purpose. Yet if one reads the materials which we receive from China, one has a feeling there is a considerable lack of political stabilization, a considerable flux in the political side. There is a considerable amount of uncertainty about where things are going.
Now, can one reconcile these two pictures? I would put it this way. The impression of cohesion is not due to the fact Mao has "brainwashed” all the Chinese. Nor does the uniformity of opinion mean that there may not be millions of people who are quite discontent with many aspects of things in China.
I would say, however, that probably sufficient numbers of Chinese people have accepted the basic legitimacy of the People's Republic to make it a going concern even with all this instability. There is a kind of will to unity, as it were, from below.
I might illustrate this: A few years ago during the cultural revolution when the center seemed to be disintegrating and power was drifting into the hands of local military commanders, there were many in the West who were predicting a return to the warlordism of the past; China would fall apart and one would simply have a new regional warlordism.
Why didn't this happen? I would assume that even these local military commanders had a kind of a will to maintain the unity of China, that they were not going to allow this to happen, and that they maintained enough lateral unity among themselves to prevent this from happening. So I really do think—and I use the phrase while mistrusting it—that there is a kind of basic underlying will to unity, a will to maintain the unity of the republic.
There is also, I think, a general acceptance of certain of the accomplishments of the regime. Thus, when we talk of growth, we sometimes ignore the morale building factor involved in making an effective and relatively effective distribution of whatever wealth one has. They have, on the whole, been quite successful in this.
One might say one of the strengths of the regime has been evidenced by its ability to survive all these political crises.
I think Professor Liu is quite right. Even now the political system has not jelled into any kind of crystallized constitutional order, and yet I do think there is some kind of common will to keep the concern a going concern. Still, I think that traveler should be somewhat mistrustful that everybody says the same thing. I think they can say the same thing to foreigners, and still have debates among themselves about where China is going in the future.
I don't think I have answered the question.
Chairman PROXMIRE. I think you have, and maybe Professor Liu might have misunderstood me. I didn't mean to indicate any approval; quite the contrary.
Mr. Liu. You said willingness.
Chairman PROXMIRE. I am willing to recognize this is a totalitarian, Communist country that has told us again and again how they are opposed to us. Perhaps they have ameliorated that a little bit in the visit by the President, but by and large they have been vehemently opposed to us. I don't mean any appraisal of China as a country that
is going to be humanitarian and so forth; but I do say that with all that they could—they can be strong, they can be unified; they can be dynamic; and the evidence is that they do have serious economic weaknesses; you have documented that and I am inclined to appreciate your position, and I think that Senator Mansfield had to admit that your analysis seemed to be sound.
Nevertheless, they do have a discipline and an authority over their people which I think is very, very hard not to recognize. Yes, sir?
Mr. Liv. Coercion, I think, is the word that might be used.
Now, I think the Chinese people are no more and no less intelligent than other peoples. Now, if we were told one day that Lin Piao is the most loyal comrade we have, the next day we were told he is the worst criminal in the world there is, I cannot help think that the Chinese would have some doubt about the political system that rules the country.
Mr. SCHWARTZ. May I say something?
Mr. SCHWARTZ. I think that that side of the picture must be stressed. It is a strange historic phenomenon here. I do think China may change quite drastically in the next few years, particularly after Mao's death. It is very difficult to tell in exactly which direction it will go and yet I don't think that this picture that visitors get of a kind of a determination to hold together is wholly a case of Potemkin's Village or simply a case of coercion. It is something that probably goes beyond political structures. There is a desire to hold together. I believe there is a deep desire to maintain China as a strong nation. I sense, however, that behind your question was another questionwhat if China does remain unified will it be a menace to the world?
Chairman PROXMIRE. That is the question that I was basically asking.
Mr. SCHWARTZ. Yes. Let us assume for the moment-putting aside the doubts—that it will remain unified. Here I would point to the constraints placed on China by the world environment in which it finds itself. I think it is always wrong to say that any society is inherently and eternally "aggressive" or "nonaggressive.” Any society given a certain turn in history may be aggressive at times and nonaggressive at others. Thus I wouldn't want to make any blanket assertions concerning the distant future.
I would just submit that China is in a world where it confronts other formidable nuclear powers, where it has all kinds of external constraints on it. Unless one assumes a leadership that is wildly irrational-and, of course, that may happen-I would doubt that even a China of 800 million (and 800 million people are as much a problem as an asset) and even a China that is strongly united can easily conquer the world. With a rational leadership I would think that they would realize they were in a world where formidable power continues to reside elsewliere.
Chairman PROXMIRE. Yes, sir.
Mr. Liv. Mr. Chairman, I don't think any regime can really unify the Chinese mainland without being humanistic, without paying proper respect to the better part of the Chinese long civilization; in other words, this is a fairly theoretical question, whether the Communist system as such can ever unite a country.
Chairman PROXMIRE. A very interesting observation.
Chairman PROXMIRE. Let me think of that a little bit, because I think it is a fascinating observation. You say only a humanistic government can unify the Chinese people. I wonder if a humanistic government can ever really unify any people; humanism being the kind of thing which seems to me allows difference and dissent and for a considerable degree of divergence, and so forth.
Mr. Liv. Well, there have been many changes in the Chinese history, of course, many dynasties. The most successful one was the Tank dynasty. Of course, in the first few years it had to fight but after that it followed very humanistic sort of policies and it was still the best, one of the very best dynasties we had so that is a concrete example.
Chairman PROXMIRE. Best in terms of its kindness and decency and so forth?
Mr. Liu. Yes.
Chairman PROXMIRE. Was it effective in unifying that vast and divergent land?
Mr. Liu. Well, because it is humanistic and because it is kind, it therefore_succeeded in unifying the country. The famous emperior is Tank Tai Tsung whose policies were really quite benevolent.
Mr. Schwartz. I would add after Tank Tai Tsung had come to power
in a sea of blood. I think that this is not a simple question. We talk of a "Communist system" and assume that we are discussing a clear and unchanging entity. I would certainly be prepared to call the present system in China a Communist system; China is still totalitarian but, as I mentioned before, China is in flux. What we now call communism in China is already different in many of its aspects (although the differences may not be attractive to many of us) from the Soviet Union. When we used the term a “Communist system" in the 1940's, what we meant was Stalinist Russia with its specific political organization and its specific economic organization.
As I have tried to indicate in my statement, in the economics sphere—the Chinese leadership has departed most drastically from the Soviet way of doing things. Their political structure remains in flux.
I think there is even hope of their moving in the direction of a somewhat greater relaxation and flexibility in the cultural and educational spheres.
In other words, the "system” may have within it the potentialities for change over time.
Chairman PROXMIRE. Thank you very, very much for your exchanges and responses. They have been very helpful.
The committee will stand in recess until tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock when we will have as our witnesses Owen Lattimore, director, department of Chinese studies, Leeds University; Prof. Joyce Kallgren, deputy director, center for Chinese studies, University of California at Berkeley; and Prof. Yuan-li Wu, University of San Francisco and Hoover Institute.
(Whereupon, at 12:45 p.m., the committee was recessed, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Wednesday, June 14, 1972.)