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level of distrust exists between Peking and Moscow. This conclusion is not based on the assumption that China has turned inward to nation-building. It is based on the belief that China has assigned the utmost priority to the acquisition of effective military and political deterrents vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. For both political and military reasons China simply has to relegate the United States to the role of a 'secondary enemy,'' at least for the time being. The central authorities of China, in my view, do not have the necessary degree of control or the necessary command of resources to do otherwise.
However, there is not only a potential direct threat in the future, but there is an indirect threat at present. The indirect threat lies in the possible misinterpretation by other countries of the policy, current capability, and internal strength of China and especially of United States policy toward China under the Nixon Doctrine. If other nations, especially but not only Japan, should believe that the United States is withdrawing its interest in Asia, conceding a sphere of influence to China, and this because of the deterioration of America's power vis-a-vis that of China, they most likely will seek other options for their own security than relying upon the United States. Some of these options may change the entire political, economic, and strategic environment for United States policy. Such an indirect present threat is quite real.
Finally, one should point out that the state of Sino-Soviet relations is a most important parameter, while assuming that Sino-Soviet distrust will continue for some time at a level sufficient to prevent the adoption, on a broad front, of parallel Chinese and Soviet policies adverse to the United States, one must nevertheless expect changes in Chinese leadership and possible changes in Chinese policy even without personnel shifts. Few people had predicted the breach of the close relations between Moscow and Peking before it actually occured. Few recognized the breach until quite some time after it had occurred. The risk of some mistaken perception of the future must be acknowledged by keeping available other options than the one currently being followed. It is important that the American public be mindful of these uncertainties.
Chairman PROXMIRE. Thank you very much.
STATEMENT OF JOYCE K. KALLGREN, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF
POLITICAL SCIENCE, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT DAVIS, AND DEPUTY DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR CHINESE STUDIES, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT BERKELEY
Mrs. KALLGREN. I think the Joint Economic Committee has performed an important service in commissioning and publishing the economic studies contained in the "People's Republic of China: An Economic Assessment," and I went to thank you for it.
I would like to offer a few brief comments. Speaking as a political scientist, I do this without criticism but, rather, to highlight some political aspects that are noted but I do not think highlighted in the report.
The first of my comments relates to the grave problem of providing reasonable well-being for China's enormous population.
The problem includes food, clothing, housing, health, and other basic amenities of an increasingly modern society. Its dimensions are indicated, though not defined, by the fact that various sources in this compendium of papers estimate China's population as ranging from a minimum of 750 million to a maximum of 875 million.
Any meaningful discussion of China's prospective ability to cope with this problem requires simultaneous appraisal of China's efforts toward population control, and this was made by John Aird's valuable paper, "Population Policy and Demographic Prospects in the People's Republic of China.” He points to evidence that the headway so far made in declining birth rates is being offset, or more than offset, by declining death rates. He concludes, essentially, that a lowered rate of population increase is not likely to be achieved until the 1980's.
This appraisal may well be correct. It is certainly true that the inertia, conservatism, and low literacy of rural societies have usually acted to limit effective birth control programs. The success of birth control in developing societies has seemed to have correlation with literacy and urbanization. I suggest, however, that China may not fit the normal pattern.
Through a remarkable mobilization of its citizens, China has achieved a degree and intensity of social and political change not found in other developing societies. Effective limits have been intentionally and effectively set to the urbanization that other developing nations have promoted or allowed in their quest for industrialization. Instead, there is taking place a high degree of dispersal of small-scale industrialization into the communes throughout the rural areas. Furthermore, the rural literacy rate has been greatly raised-by nearuniversal schooling and by the large-scale movement of urban high school graduates to the countryside on a permanent basis.
I suggest, therefore, that the success of family planning is not solely availability and propagation of birth control means, which is important; but in the Chinese case it is necessary to also consider the positive elements in the society that encourage personal compliance with such a policy and so contribute to family planning. These include career alternatives and social rewards and incentives.
The Chinese leadership has pursued policies designed to alter some features of family structure and authority and many of these are quite well known: the Marriage Reform Act; the basic changes in land tenure that have resulted in the development of the people communes; the basing of all personal incomes of commune members—both men and women-on their individual labor contribution; the systematic recruitment of women into the labor force in both city and countryside.
The formal and traditional authority of parents and grandparents has been reduced. The role of the state has been introduced and reinforced.
It can hardly be expected that the effectiveness of these policies has been complete or uniform in geographical extent. But with the passage of time, the establishment of these goals, and their steady reinforcement through the expanding educational system, is likely to bring increasing popular awareness and support, and individual compliance.
These changes, essentially institutional, have been accompanied by social welfare policies and programs. Primarily urban, these have also been effective to a lesser extent in the country. Most importantly, these have included labor insurance, child-care facilities, medical facilities and more rational distribution of their services, modest programs of income supplement for families with insufficient resources. Access to these services has generally been through an organization-factory, school, army, commune production team. Impressive though the progress has been, it must be noted that many of these services are still unavailable to substantial portions of the population.
Furthermore, since 1949 and particularly since the beginning of the cultural revolution, there has been a change of emphasis in the development of careers, educational options and responsibilities for
individuals. The well-being of the Nation is translated into personal terms: the effect for the individual is to reward those who limit or delay marriage. Advanced education, for example, now follows a period of 2 or 3 years' work in factory or commune and requires the recommendation of the individual's unit.
Students now enter universities in their mid-twenties. Early marriage would seem to foreclose on one's hope of advanced education, and the career options that such education might offer.
Similarly, factory employment involves apprenticeship at a low salary but with the opportunity for advanced factory training.
Early marriage is difficult on the low initial salary scale. For cadresand the activists or ambitious who may seek to become cadresthe options may be even clearer. Success demands not only ideological compliance but positive personal commitment. Delayed marriages and small families are common. Thus some of the individual opportunities in China counterbalance traditional social pressures and enhance the desirability of birth control or delayed marriage. It would be an overstatement to claim that this sort of situation is universally effective, but it must be increasingly influential with the young people brought up in the new China and now in their early childbearing years.
In the early years of the Communist period, there was indecision and controversy over population control. After agreement on its necessity, much of the efforts during the 1960's toward birth control and family planning have been low key and without the more common trappings of a high pressure mass campaign. Recent visitors to China have reported, however, that these efforts have been widespread and effectively understood. They are also closely tied to the recent emphasis on the development of rural medical care.
The real issue for success is whether there will be adequate opportunities for school graduates who can be expected to be disposed toward family planning but are also subject—even in a diminishing degree—to traditional family ties and wishes.
As Professor Salaff of the University of Toronto has pointed out, the key is the provision of incentive reinforcement and career alternatives for men and women. Will the new rural industries develop to offer career alternatives that involve tasks normally associated with urban life? Will the education efforts succeed in raising the cultural level in the rural areas as has been done in the cities?
With the emphasis being put on balanced urban/rural development, it seems reasonable to assume that increasingly large numbers of young men and women will be unwilling to abandon or jeopardize their chances for important and satisfying careers and, consequently, will be willing to delay marriage and/or to limit their families.
In sum, the success of birth-control efforts is intimately linked to party-directed social change that goes beyond experience elsewhere which has relied heavily on urbanization. Therefore, in my judgment, it makes the Taiwan experience somewhat questionable in applicability.
Though both societies share a cultural heritage, the degree of politicization that characterizes the People's Republic of China, and the intimate relationship between the state and society, give a uniqueness to the People's Republic. The priorities and values of these two areas are vastly different and also the means at hand to achieve their goals. Unless the capacity for social change in a large agricultural population is recognized, we cannot account for achievements in the past; and, we also run the risk of misreading the likely prospects for the future.
Given the magnitude of China's population and its relative youth, a second question seems to deserve comment. This is the dilemma of resources-consumer welfare versus national security.
I do not intend to comment here on the security issue occasioned by present or potential conflicts in Vietnam, Taiwan, and border areas. Obviously the committee has interest in this and perhaps we can discuss it.
My interest is in the increase of consumer welfare demands although I recognize it is difficult to quantify.
As used in this compendium, the term "consumer welfare" seems to lay stress on tangible consumer goods of a possibly luxury nature, such as radios, for example. It appears to exclude a range of items and services closely related to the quality of life that has been continuously emphasized by refugees, by the Chinese press, and by recent visitors to China. It thus unduly narrows our concern.
The social welfare programs of China are discussed in the supplementary statement I have submitted to the committee. These are highly valued and are consistently viewed as achievements of the present leadership. They are designed to enrich the quality of life. But they are linked to social groups rather than to the individual consumer. One's judgment about the record of the Chinese since 1949 is determined largely by whether the individual or the group is regarded as most important.
The provision of a relatively secure though modest lifestyle may be a satisfying experience for the individual Chinese but may not necessarily generate the demands on the national economy that are implicit in the term "consumer welfare” as we understand it. The Communist effort to create a new Chinese idea of citizenship has drawn not only upon Marxist values but also the importance of Chinese national strength. In this, it has had a large degree of success in substituting the group for the individual as the recipient of benefits. There is the distinct possibility, from what we can see, that egalitarianism has been largely satisfying to most segments of the nation. While such a situation does not deny the wish of each individual to improve his own life, it certainly implies a lower level of insistent material demand and a different set of priorities.
There remains, however, the problem of financing. Schools cost money, as do watches. In the 1966 committee hearings, Prof. Audrey Donnithorne, speaking to the question of provincial versus center relations, emphasized the responsibilities of the provinces. The current publication of this committee notes that the Chinese, through thick and thin, have tried to disperse industry and develop additional industrial regions. Since the cultural revolution there has been considerable talk about local products, from aspirin to tiles, from school buildings to the payment of schoolteachers. The emphasis is on local provision and local payment. Unless there is a decision to reestablish economic and political centralization, broad areas of welfare remain for local control and financing and hence dependent upon local capabilities.
1 See supplementary statement, p. 73.
While this reliance on local resources relieves the central authorities of some of the burdens of financing welfare efforts it leaves unresolved how poorer areas can effectively meet these needs. The Chinese have recognized and visitors to China have commented—that there are differing economic levels in various economic regions. In the absence of external investment and help, the poorer areas may not share proportionately in the slowly rising standard of living available in more favored communities.
In sum, through the 20 years of Communist China, the rhetoric of Chinese announcements and the radical character of some proposals have engendered outside skepticism over achievement. Over the long term, however, the Chinese have shown an ability to revise and adapt policies to the special requirements of time and circumstances. What successes have been achieved are due, in a large degree, to the social mobilization of Chinese society with its emphasis on egalitarian values. I would expect this mobilization and these values to be relevant to the social policies that promote family planning and contribute to the quality of life.
(The supplementary statement of Mrs. Kallgren, referred to in her oral statement, follows:)
SUPPLEMENTARY STATEMENT OF JOYCE K. KALLGREN ON CHINESE WELFARE
Social welfare in China means considerably more than income maintenance programs that are frequently implied when one speaks of welfare in the United States. Robert Osborn's chapter on the Soviet welfare concept (Soviet Social Policies, Welfare Equality, and Community) is useful in considering the Chinese experience. In speaking of the question of social wage” he says:
Soviet authorities have long stressed the importance of forms of income which Soviet citizens receive in addition to money earnings. . . . Few of the individual features of the Soviet wage are unique to the Soviet Union or even to the Communist world. Socialized medicine is not a monopoly of the Communist world nor are comprehensive pension systems and doubtless an international survey would turn up numerous national programs subsidizing day care centers and summer camps for children. (p. 31)1 The problem is particularly meaningful in the Chinese setting. If one reads or listens to Chinese citizens describe the ways in which their lives have improved since 1949, the services now available to them or their families, one realizes that the carefully drawn distinction of the social scientist between welfare, “public assistance,” might well force the exclusion of services perceived as important by the Chinese and ignore improvements necessarily undertaken in a poor, rural, developing country. Welfare, and specifically social welfare, involves therefore a broad range of programs and services in addition to income maintenance programs.
There is a second aspect to the discussion of "social wage” in China which is especially important, namely the problem of distribution. How are the goods and services which are available in the cities or countryside distributed, on what basis are decisions made? In general, the goods and services may accrue by virtue of salary, status, affiliation, or they may be distributed without regard to the productive contribution of the individual. In some cases, both principles are operative; for example, the use of medical clinics and schools. The need for schools and clinics is related to family status, age, health, to mention only a few considerations. Since there was a desperate shortage of both educational and health facilities, one achievement of any government would have been the widespread construction of hospitals and schools. It is clear, however, that actual use of these facilities, particularly the medical facilities, involves both the availability of clinics and the ability to pay. Where social insurance programs are available to a worker and his family, his ability to use the facility is guaranteed. Employment in a city gives him the opportunity to make use of the services—also more available in a city.
1 Osborn, Robert Soviet Social Policies; Welfare, Equality, and Community New York, 1970