The social welfare legislation of the cities, such as pensions, leave, maternity care and the like, do not have exact equivalents in the countryside, though refugee accounts as well as Chinese reports indicate efforts to provide similar benefits. Provision of maternity care and emphasis upon the children as the coming generation is wholesale throughout China but in the countryside, the pregnant mother is more likely to have the child at home or in a modest medical clinic than in a hospital; leave is more likely to be without work points rather than with salary as in the labor insurance regulations of the factory worker. The nurseries and the child care facilities have long existed, but they are more often temporary, less formal, and reflect arrangements within the geographic living unit rather than the more well-established and higher standards of the city. Presumably the presence of the middle school graduates may eventually raise the level of services available.

WELFARE ADMINISTRATION IN THE COUNTRYSIDE

Welfare in the countryside of China is a local matter. It is carried out informally, is subject to the general standards of the commune itself and administered by part-time assignment. Though the Ministries in Peking develop methods and standards and the public health workers sent to the countryside in the pre-1965 days could provide some expertise, the economic realities of the day as well as the ideology of the Party precluded centralization. Since the Cultural Revolution, the emphasis has been upon the practical learning from the masses with peasants and workers to be intimately involved in all aspects of life. This ideological viewpoint coupled with the trend since 1949 to reduce to the lowest level possible resources diverted to so-called "non-productive" labor has made administration a part-time occupation.

Welfare in the countryside remains essentially in the hands of the commune committee for general direction and development of facilities. It is in the hands of the production teams for the ad hoc arrangement of temporary nurseries and the income maintenance programs. Furthermore, on the basis of refugee reports, the conservativism of the countryside and economic limits remain to make the family unit still an important part of welfare.

ECONOMISM AND UTOPIANISM-WELFARE IN CHINA AND THE SOVIET UNION

Bernice Madison in the concluding chapter of her book makes a series of extremely interesting observations on the development of social welfare in the Soviet Union. This analysis concludes by using seven of her points as indicators of important similarities and differences in the Chinese programs. As political scientists have noted in the years, since the Sino-Soviet dispute erupted, the clash between these two socialist countries is much more than the power struggle of two nations. The contrast in ideology is particularly striking in the values and directions represented in the Chinese welfare programs. Though Soviet advisors were instrumental in the early years though provisions of the basic labor insurance legislation, the child care programs, and similar developments all draw upon Russian advice, today twenty years after the establishment of the People's Republic of China, it is clear that the Chinese path to social protection has some basic differences with contemporary Soviet practice. China is still a revolutionary society. Though the success of that revolution is far from clear, the determination to adhere to differing values and to experiment with programs implementing these values cannot be denied.

Professor Madison begins by noting the following major advance:

(1) "Steadily broadening the category of those with a LEGAL (emphasis mine) right to comprehensive income assistance and firm establishment of public responsibility for income maintenance". The basic commitment to welfare is found in the general guarantees of the Constitution of the People's Republic of China and the various pieces of legislation adopted in the first five years of the People's Republic. Since that time, though there has been a steady attempt to broaden the scope of welfare and to raise the level of aid for various segments of society, these efforts have not been framed in legal terms. Instead, the betterment of life has been a feature of the slow developmental process of the country, continually contrasted with the difficulties of pre-1949 years. A reliance on "legalism" rather than the personalized leadership of Mao Tse-tung and the CCP falls within the crimes of opponents of Chairmen Mao. Welfare is an evolutionary process that naturally requires regulations for enforcement, determination of benefits and the like but is more properly understood as a communal effort of the society as a whole rather than the specific passage of legislation and the periodization that such legislation implies. The general responsibility of the state for welfare

has always been acknowledged, the limitations of current programs are not resolved by new legislation but rather by working together for higher national economic standards which will be translated into welfare

(2) "Creation of new social services, steadily extended to wider segments of the population and differentiated in accordance with individual need." This observation is accurate for both the Soviet and Chinese experience. The Chinese are distinguished from the Soviets by their early insistence upon raising the level of services available in the countryside, and positive attempts to limit and reduce the disparity between countryside and city. Where the Soviets emphasized the urban community, closely allied with their industrial development, the Chinese, though not neglecting industry, have for the past decade been particularly attentive to the needs of the countryside. It is true that the rate of progress has been slow. There is no question of the advanced levels of the Soviets, but the Chinese have not been willing in industrial development nor in welfare programs to continue the heavy urban emphasis of the first ten years. Furthermore, it has been a cardinal feature of welfare in China that individual need be demonstrated.

(3) In social welfare administration "all major social welfare functions have become part of the ongoing responsibility of state organs, are included in planning budgets and are allotted resources on a regular basis. Social welfare agencies have come to occupy a permanent place within the structure of government." The difference between the Chinese and Russians is again important. The Chinese emphasis, with some exceptions, is upon local organizations. Both rural dominance in terms of need, plus the ideological commitment to "learn from the masses" reinforces this tendency. That there are budgets in local units, however primitive, cannot be doubted. But whether considering the decisions of local production teams to award work points to the families of veterans or the establishment of worker nurseries, the emphasis is upon local initiative, and local financing. In the first decade, the central ministry's were more active than at present, but even in those early years, there is evidence of the importance of local enterprises, communes, and organizations. Professor Madison comments upon the characteristic of permanence in the Soviet Union. Naturally in China, there has never been a question of the firmness of the government's commitment to welfare, but the mechanisms for transmitting that help are always subject to reconsideration, within the ideological lines of the Party. Furthermore, there is no activity in China that can properly be called that of a "social worker". The social work profession is still seen as an imperialist effort to control China or at best, the work of perhaps well-intentioned people who did not perceive the relationship between the economic system and the individual needs of the citizen. Social work remains tied to charity in China and neither Chinese nationalism nor Chinese Communism will permit the evolution of such a profession.

(4) "There is no doubt that Soviet welfare effort has been strengthened and advanced by the guidance it has received from science and its decreasing reliance on improvisation." Implicit in this comment is a conflict between science and improvisation. The Chinese view would be to reverse the statement "There is no doubt that Chinese welfare effort has been strengthened and advanced by the guidance it has received from the masses and its increasing reliance on improvisation." In short, this is a welfare statement of the "Red and Expert" argument that has been a hallmark of the Chinese political scene. Particularly since the GPCR, the emphasis has been upon the masses and not upon the expert, the specialist. In all avenues of life, from acupuncture, to machine tools, to the schools, stress is upon the knowledge of the masses and its basic wisdom. In the field of welfare, the reliance upon science represents a dehumanization and a willingness to adopt foreign standards which often result in the hardship of Chinese people.

(5) "Tied to the scientific approach is an emphasis upon prevention," is the judgment of Professor Madison. Yet it is equally true that prevention represents the common sense attitude of the Chinese. In China, along with many other developing countries, there is the clear attempt to draw upon the simpler, less costly, methods for meeting needs and problems whether it be the use of historically popular drugs in the countryside or the development in children of the proper attitudes and experience for a life in the countryside. Certainly, much of present day knowledge about the control of public health hazards is drawn from the advancement of science, but it is equally true that the application of local remedies, or the study of their basic scientific value represents a lesser cost in such a poor country. In the Chinese view, with its assumption about the maleability of men, the establishment of mass organizations, and the proper outlook, many of the problems of society both industrial and agricultural are amenable to reduction or elimination.

It is true for both China and the Soviet Union that—(6) "social services by a responsible agency are not available at all for those confronted with certain kinds of social problems Welfare services are not uniformly available throughout the country.' ." The primary difference between the two countries though is based both upon the levels of industrial development and the perceptions of what constitute social problems. Limited as they are by the present industrial level and the overwhelming nature of contemporary problems, the Chinese welfare system does not consider the more sophisticated problems of an advanced industrial society.

The basic difference between the two countries is well summarized in the comment (7) "The Soviets have failed in their struggle to deal with 'social anomalies' Why the same conditions of life affect people differently and are perceived differently the recognition that more is required to return some people to a productive life than recourse to the rational elements in behaviour, as expressed in the educational value of work, socialization, group pressure, and self-control." Here is the nub of the difference between the two systems. China remains today a revolutionary society. The differences between people are still explainable in the ideology of the revolution, on the remnants of past economic classes, and the subversion and betrayals of leaders. The possibility of utopia is still real in Chinese ideology, and in its name, the leadership and the Party direct, draw upon, and interpret the contributions of the masses. Rejecting "economism" that is the emphasis upon rewards, the Chinese stress the internal development of the Chinese man and reduce the economic symbols and privileges upon which much of the Soviet welfare program is based. Though the pensions and certain aspects of welfare in China still rest upon wages, though the ability to distribute "according to need" and not "production" has not yet been achieved, it is in this direction that the Chinese leadership would move. Professor Madison notes that the Russians have not yet dealt with the full implications of the theoretical Marxist requirement of "to each according to his need" and wonders if the industrialized Soviet Union will finally seek to actively implement this theorem. In light of this experience, the prospects for the People's Republic remain equivocal. Up to now, there has been a common sense combination of theory and practice, melding individual responsibility and societal concern. But the realities of scarce resources remain, the emphasis upon egalitarianism is not total and it is still not certain that "to each according to his need" is compatible with success in building an industrial state.

Chairman PROXMIRE. Thank you very much.

You bring a very rare combination of qualifications to the committee as a witness, Professor Wu. You are a Chinese scholar; you are an eminent economist; you have a knowledge of the military problems, expecially of the military problems with respect to Asia; and you have made a fascinating analysis here.

Making the most favorable assumptions possible for the Chinese economy in terms of growth, in terms of population stability, in terms of consumption, is it conceivable that the Chinese could build an air force, a navy, with nuclear power capable of threatening any nation except those that share a contiguous border with China, such as Southeast Asian countries, possibly Korea, possibly India and Pakistan? Mr. Wu. I think the Chinese for the time being at any rate are not aimed at using their

Chairman PROXMIRE. Wait a minute. I am not talking about what they may be aimed at; I am talking about making all the assumptions we want to make; I want to state my thesis very clearly: I have become convinced in these hearings and the hearings we had before that given every possible break and given the most militant kind of Chinese government, and we don't know what kind they are going to have with Mao very ill and with a change impending, that they still simply don't have the economic muscle, they don't have the capacity, to constitute a threat. They can't take Quemoy and Matsu that are 2 miles off their shore; they don't have a navy that could possibly

challenge the 7th Fleet or any part of our Navy or any of the navies of the world. They have a rudimentary air force; they have a beginning nuclear power but far from developing anything that would not be dwarfed overwhelmingly by the Soviet Union and the United States and, consequently, I have felt that this has been a myth, that we have spent billions and billions of dollars on the notion we have to combat some kind of threat China can mount, and there are no assumptions on when she can develop it.

Now, knock that down for me.

Mr. Wu. I think if you are talking about capability rather than intention

Chairman PROXMIRE. I am talking about capability now.

Mr. Wu (continuing). And especially in the neighboring areasChairman PROXMIRE. Well, now, I say she could constitute a threat obviously in Korea and she did, especially there, possibly in Southeast Asia, possibly to her west, in Pakistan and India, but that is it; isn't it? Mr. Wu. But you are thinking also, Senator, of the Taiwan Straits, for instance, are you, or of the United States?

Chairman PROXMIRE. Yes, she has to have a navy to do it. She has to have the capability of a naval air force to support surface ships and she has to build it; and she has to have a steel industry and the fundamental economic strength that any nation has to have to build that that kind of military muscle, doesn't she?

Mr. Wu. If you are thinking of a threat to the United States, Senator

Chairman PROXMIRE. I am thinking of a threat to anybody; I am thinking of a threat to Indonesia and to the Philippines, any place out of the area I have defined.

Mr. Wu. I would think that Chinese capability could be much larger than we had assumed. I don't know how large an air force or how large a navy they could build within a certain time frame but I think we may, under all these assumptions, be underestimating their potential in that respect.

Chairman PROXMIRE. Well, those are generalities. You are a scholar; you have given us some excellent specific analysis here, making assumptions with respect to their growth. Assume they grow not at 2.3 or 3 percent or 4 percent; assume they grow at 5 percent, aren't they so far behind? They do have a GNP less than Italy's; they have a GNP one-eighth of ours. They have a fantastically huge population to feed, to clothe, to house.

Now, where do they have the margin that is going to enable them to develop any kind of a military threat?

Mr. Wu. My point is that maybe the weapons' cost isn't as large as it may appear to be otherwise. Maybe we are going about it, estimating it, in the wrong way.

Chairman PROXMIRE. Well, I think we learned in Korea they are an enormously dedicated, powerful force when we fight them in a land war in Asia.

What I am saying is in this modern world don't you have to have a great deal more than just people no matter how many tens of millions or hundreds of millions you have to constitute a threat over the ocean, overseas, outside of their borders?

Mr. Wu. But you can't really separate this entirely from the way they would use such weapons. If they aim only at developing up to a

point of deterring other countries from using certain weapons in which they are inferior, then they could pose a conventional threat-and I think they may be able to reach that deterrent stage when they feel they have sufficient deterrence-more easily and more rapidly than we give them credit for, expecially if we make the favorable assumptions.

Chairman PROXMIRE. Well, if you would want to expand on that when you correct your remarks, I would be happy for you to do so, because this is a question we have to raise with respect to our own policy.

One of the reasons why we have expended enormous sums is to defend against what William Randolph Hearst developed as a threat of China back in the early part of this century and which has persisted, in my view, as a myth.

Mrs. Kallgren, you make an excellent analysis, the best I have seen, I think, of the reasons why China may be getting its population under control.

In your view, do you conclude that they can work a permanent— develop a population zero situation and are they aiming at that in in your view?

Mrs. KALLGREN. You know, that is a very fair question but it is impossible to answer. I am making here the positive case. I think that Mr. Wu, quite properly, points out the problems in that article.

I should say that ZPG-I think that is the term used for it—is not in the foreseeable future at all. The real issue, is whether or not the Chinese can come to terms with their population increase in terms of increasing the well-being of its citizens, and I am impressed with the degree to which they have done it and the degree to which they have done it in a way that is outside-I am not a demographer-but in a way that is outside the normal patterns that have been done elsewhere.

Chairman PROXMIRE. We had a witness yesterday, a very distinguished economist from Cornell, who told us that the Chinese, since 1957, have suffered because of the increase in their population, an actual per capita drop in caloric consumption; that is, in food consumption-No. 1. No. 2, they have less clothing available, less cotton fibers available, which is the heart of their clothing problem, so they have not advanced; they have retrogressed. Do you disagree with that view?

Mrs. KALLGREN. I am afraid I do. I know the professor to whom you refer and he is a very able man and I speak as a political scientist: But it seems to me, if you are going to take the argument and say, the Chinese are not as well off as they were before and I am not talking about the situation of those originally poor, but in the middle and late 1960's-it seems to me that if the Chinese were worse off you would have some pretty clear evidence of it. The fact is that I have done interviewing in Hong Kong and in Taiwan, and you would think that people who had left China for political reasons or to better themselves economically would report this kind of fact.

There is no question that in 1961-62, things were grim indeed. But it seems to me that all the evidence since then indicates a very substantial increase in the general quality of living in China. The standard of living still has a long way to go and I don't doubt that some people have suffered in the course of this process. I don't think progress is always even-I don't think it is distributed equally in China.