no substantial wrong or

evidence were struck out as miscarriage has been occasioned by the admission of the testimony objected to: Rule 311.

It was next objected that the plaintiff after having given evidence in disproof of the fraud pleaded by the defendants, was allowed also to give further evidence in reply, in support of his original case by way of repelling the evidence given on the part of the defendants to establish the fraud. The evidence shews the plaintiffs' counsel did not enter into the question of fraud upon his examination in chief. The defendants' counsel cross-examined the witness as to fraud, and the plaintiffs' counsel merely re-examined upon that cross-examination as he was obliged to do, otherwise he would have been compelled to recall the witness by way of reply for the mere purpose of explaining or clearing up the cross-examination, which would be highly inconvenient and confusing. The plaintiff did not anticipate the trial of the issue of fraud by going into evidence of it as part of his case, and the defendants cannot force him to do so by their cross-examination upon it, nor does the plaintiff by his re-examination upon the cross-examination of the defendants relating to the fraud, make the trial of that issue a part of his case. The plaintiffs' counsel was therefore quite right in calling his own witnesses in reply to disprove the charge of fraud.

The next objection I believe was that as the learned Judge decided to nonsuit the plaintiff because the agreement had not been sufficiently proved, he still allowed the case to go on for the trial of the issue of fraud by the jury, and for the assessment of damages, and that the trial from that time forward became a trial upon an issue, the proof of which rested upon the defendants, and therefore the reply should have been given to them.

We think there is no such rule of procedure as that. The case went on just as if a nonsuit had not been mentioned, excepting that after the findings of the jury were rendered, the nonsuit was to be entered, and nothing could

be more embarrasing than to decide the conduct of the trial in the manner contended for by the defendants.

The last objection was a complaint of the plaintiffs' counsel for the frequent interruptions, which it is said he made to the charge of the learned Judge to the jury.

We are not inclined to interfere with the general disposition of the case now before us for that cause. If the learned Judge himself complained of such conduct, or if we were satisfied, assuming the complaint to be well founded, that it had occasioned injustice to the opposite party by improperly influencing the jury, or otherwise so that by reason of it there had been a mis-trial, we do not doubt our power to correct the wrong done by ordering a new trial.

It would require a very clear case that injustice had been done to the party complaining to require or justify the interference of the Court, for the general conduct of the trial rests with and depends upon the Judge who presides at it. And I see no ground-still assuming the charge to be well founded-for interfering upon this occasion. Bradlaugh v. Edwards, 11 C. B. N. S. 377, shews how complaints of conduct at the trial will be considered by the Court.

Upon a consideration of the whole case, I agree the nonsuit should be set aside, and a verdict entered for the plaintiff for the damages which were awarded to him.

Judgment accordingly.

[COMMON PLEAS DIVISION.]

IN RE H. L. LEE.

Extradition Information alleging that prisoner is accused, &c.—Surplusage-32 & 33 Vic. ch. 30, sec. 11, D., ch. 29, sec. 27, D.-Plea to informations- necessity for-Depositions-Sufficiency of proof of—Corroboration.

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In extradition proceedings the information charged that the informant "hath just cause to suspect and believe, and doth suspect and believe that H. L. Lee," the prisoner, is accused of the crime of forgery," &c., "for that the said H. L. Lee," &c., did feloniously forge" some 78 orders for the payment of money. 1 he 79th charge was, that the said H. L. Lee, at the aforesaid several times, &c., did feloniously utter, knowing the same to be forged, the said several orders, &c.

Held, sufficient, for that the information charged that the prisoner "did feloniusly forge," &c.; and the allegation that the informant believed that the prisoner is accused," &c., might be treated as surplusage; but even if objectionable at common law, it was good under sec. 11 of 32 & 33 Vic. ch, 30, D., and 32 & 33 Vic, ch. 29, sec. 27, D.; and moreover the 79th charge was free from objection.

Held, also, that in these proceedings, a plea to the information is not required. Certain foreign depositions used were sworn to before E. G., a justice of the peace for Cincinnati township, Hamilton county, Ohio. A certificate was attached, commencing, "I, Daniel J. Dalton, clerk of the Court of Common Pleas for said Hamilton county," certifying as to the signature of E. G., and that he was a duly qualified justice of the peace for said county, and entitled to take depositions of witnesses, &c. ; and concluded. "In testimony whereof 1 have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said Court at Cincinnati," &c. D. J. Dalton, by Richard C. Rohner, Deputy. To this was attached the certificate of the Governor of the State of Ohio, under the great seal of the State, certifying that D. J. Dalton, whose genuine signature and seal are affixed to the annexed attestation, was at the date thereof clerk of the said Court," &c. ; that he is the proper person to make such attestation, which is in due form, and that his official acts are entitled to full faith and credit." The Court, without specially pronouncing on the question refused to allow an objection, which as a matter of fact was not taken, to the sufficiency of the depositions under 45 Vic. ch. 25, sec. 9, sub-sec, 2 (a) D., for the official seal of D. J. Dalton is attached, and the Governor certified that he was the proper person to make such attestation; and also there was viva voce evidence given in proof thereof, so that the "papers were authenticated by the oath of some witness" under sub sec. (b).

Per WILSON, C. J.-In these preceedings, the evidence of interested parties need not be corroborated.

THE prisoner was committed by the Judge of the County Court of the County of York, for extradition, for forgery committed at Cincinnati, in the State of Ohio.

A writ of habeas corpus was issued returnable before the Divisional Court of the Common Pleas Division; and a writ of certiorari was also issued to bring up all the papers and proceedings before the said Court.

On the return of the writs, the writs and the return thereto were filed, and the discharge of the prisoner moved for.

Murphy supported the motion. The first objection is that the information before the County Judge does not state a charge against the prisoner sufficient to justify his arrest or imprisonment. The information charges that the informant has just cause to suspect and believe, and doth suspect and believe that the prisoner is accused of forgery. The information should have been, not that the informant believed that the prisoner is accused, but that the deponent suspected and believed that the prisoner had committed the crime of which he was charged. The next objection is, that the prisoner did not plead to the indictment, but refused to do so; and the learned Judge did not enter a plea for him, and without a plea the charge could not be entered into. The next objection is, that the documentary evidence is not properly certified as required by the 48 Vic. ch. 25, sec. 9, D. It is not authenticated by the oath or affirmation of some witness, or by being sealed with the official seal of the Minister of Justice, or some other Minister of the Foreign State. The depositions objected to are certified by D. J. Dalton, the Clerk of the Court of Common Pleas of Hamilton county, &c., by Richard C. Rohner as the Deputy of Dalton, and there is no certificate of the Governor that Rohner is such deputy; and in any event the clerk of the Court of Common Pleas is not a Minister of State within the statute. The copy produced of Woodrough & McParlen's account in the ledger of the bank was not admissible. The bank book itself should have been produced. The copy would clearly be inadmissible at Nisi Prius or Oyer and Terminer. Assuming that the documentary evidence should be excluded, the only evidence of the forgery is that of members of the firm who suffered by the forgery, and the evidence being that of interested parties, it should, under 32 & 33 Vic. ch. 19, sec. 54, D., have been corroborated, and there is no sufficient corroboratory evidence.

Fenton, County Crown Attorney, for the authorities of Ohio, contra. The words, "is accused," in the information, are a mere recital under sec. 21 of the Extradition Act of

1877, 40 Vic. ch. 25, D, introduced to make the information conform to the operative words used in the forms in schedules to said Act, and is also in accordance with the form given by schedule T. to the Criminal Act of 1869, 32 & 33 Vic. ch. 31, D.; but the words may be rejected as surplusage, and the information still contains the formal charge of forgery. Besides 32 & 33 Vic. ch. 30, sec. 11, D., expressly declares that no objection to the information shall be allowed. See also sec. 27 of the 32 & 33 Vic. ch. 29, D. As to the second objection, the depositions are certified in exact conformity to the Extradition Act, 1877, sec. 9; Regina v. Matthew, 7 P. R. 199; Re Counhaye, L. R. 8 Q. B. 410. As to the third objection, the copy of the prosecutor's account in the bank ledger is admissible. The ledger being a public document the entries may be proved by an examined copy: 1 Taylor on Evidence, 7th ed., p. 396; Roscoe's Nisi Prius Evidence, 8th ed., 12; Boyle v. Wiseman, 10 Ex. 649. Besides the ledger is deposited in a foreign country, and cannot be produced. The bank refuses to permit its removal to Canada, therefore a copy of the entries may be proved: 1 Taylor on Evidence, 7th ed., 395-7. As to the fourth objection, the 54th section of the Forgery Act applies only to proof at the trial, and does not apply to mere preliminary investigation prior to trial such as this. Regina v. Bunnerman, 43 U. C. R. 549, shews that there is abundant corroboration. Corroboration is not needed in extradition investigations. The evidence of accomplices alone is sufficient to justify extradition: Re Caldwell, 5 P. R. 217. Besides, the Coun Judge is of opinion that the evidence is sufficient to justify his being put on trial for the offence, and this Court is not a Court of Appeal from his decision, the case being within his jurisdiction, and there being some evidence to support his decision: Ex parte Huguet, 29 L. T. N. S. 41.

March 10, 1884. WILSON, C. J.-On the argument of this case several objections were taken by Mr. Murphy, the counsel for the prisoner. In point of order they are 74-VOL. V O.R.

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