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ton would be a peremptory refusal to accede to this modification of the boundary: a refusal which-even if matters here should then remain precisely as they had stood when I made the offer, and none of the highly probable changes in favor of the cause of peace should then have occurred-would at least be attended with the effect of conclusively satisfying them that the determination of our government, on this point, was unchangeable; an effect which, considering my long absence from Washington and all the circumstances of the case, could not possibly have resulted from any degree of inflexibility on my part; for this would naturally be ascribed to timidity about departing from instructions. I expected, secondly, that when this answer should be received from Washington, the state of things here would be infinitely more favorable to the conclusion of a treaty; and that Santa Anna, thus encouraged, would have recovered entirely from the agitation which had unmanned him, would have become restored to and confirmed in the determination which had produced his manifesto, and would adopt our projét.

This is what I expected, as the almost certain result of the acceptance of my offer. But, without believing my judgment infallible-and the weakness of my understanding does not go to any such extent-I could not feel absolutely certain that our government would give such refusal. My conviction in regard to the degree in which the restoration of peace was desired at home, by the country, by the government, by the democratic party especiallyon broad grounds and on narrow grounds; my convictions in regard to the degree in which the restoration of peace was desirable to our country-these convictions all came upon me in full force. I recollected, too, that the establishment of a "desert" boundary had once been a favorite idea with a portion, at least, of our statesmen. Influenced by these convictions and this recollection-independently of the positive advantage which the prolongation of the armistice offered, as has just been explained-I felt it to be my duty to afford to our government the opportunity of determining for itself, whether, under existing circumstances, it would or would not be advantageous to our country to accede to this modification of the boundary, rather than protract the war indefinitely. What would have been my feelings as a servant of the government, as a citizen, as a man; what would have been my feelings, had I, at such a crisis as this, opened anew the dread flood-gate of war, and afterwards discovered that the chance for the restoration of peace, thus destroyed by my cowardly and imbecile selfishness, would 'have been acceptable to our government?

With regard to the military consequences which would have attended the acceptance of my offer, these would not have deterred me from making it, even if the probability as to them had been, to a certain extent, unfavorable to us; that is to say, if it had seemed probable that the difficulty of taking the city would be greater at the expiration of the forty or forty-five days, than it then was. For, even in this case, I should have been governed by the consideration that the object for which our army had been sent here-the

object for which all the blood and treasure thus far poured out had been poured out-was peace. And bearing this in mind, as I have constantly done and as General Scott has constantly done, to his eternal honor, let it be repeated!-bearing this in mind, it struck me as absolutely incompatible with the motive for the expenditure of all that had been expended, that a good chance for peace, and for preventing all further effusion of blood, should be thrown away, rather than incur the mere risk of slightly increasing the difficulty of the next step in the prosecution of hostilities, should the necessity for their renewal occur.

This is the view of the subject by which I should have been governed, even on the supposition I have made. But that supposition is the reverse of the truth. The military consequences of the prolongation of the armistice would have been advantageous to us in a high degree. To say nothing of the chance of reinforcements, the effective strength of our army could not but increase by the recovery of the sick and wounded, who were now, under circumstances highly favorable to them, occupying positions far healthier than the city, at that season particularly. Towards the end of October the heat would have become far less, the dry season would have set in, and the roads would have become dry and firm, and the artificially flooded lands would, to a great extent, have become so likewise.

The only evils in the opposite scale, mentioned in the President's criticism upon the proposed prolongation of the armistice, are, that it would "have afforded the Mexicans an opportunity to recover from their panic, to embody their scattered forces and prepare for further resistance." These evils had, I confess, very little weight with me. This opportunity had, to a far greater extent, and under circumstances immeasurably more advantageous to its being used effectively, been afforded them by General Scott's forced detention at Puebla, through his numbers there being kept down below onehalf of the force which, according to his plan of campaign, was necessary to insure its success, and which it had been promised that he should have. And yet, what had been the result? Let Contreras, and the events which followed on the same day, give the an swer. These had certainly not been of a nature to diminish the mental impressions made by Cerro Gordo; and they served also to prove of what great worth it was to them to recover from their panic, even supposing such recovery to take place whilst they were in the immediate presence of the terrible men whose utter recklessness of life-for this was their own way of talking of them -they had just had such a specimen of. As to the embodiment of their scattered forces, this had already taken place, as far as it was possible that it should happen. There were no more troops anywhere to embody. Upon this point there was no difference of opinion among the most intelligent and best informed foreigners in the country; a class of men who are receiving every day letters from every point of the compass, which keep them constantly informed of every thing that is going on, civil, political, or military for such is for reasons that are perfectly obvious the natural and

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regular complexing of even commercial correspondence in a country so constantly convulsed as this.

With respect to what else might come under the general head, prepare for further resistence," this limits itself to the strengthening of fortifications; and these were already so strong that they could not be made stronger; so perfect and complete everywhere, that, save a trifling finishing off here and there, nothing could be done to them, except to carry them, as no one doubted that our troops would do the first time they undertook it, although, for the reasons above stated, it would have been a somewhat easier and a far more comfortable and less dirty job-in the way of mud and water I mean-late in October, than early in September, notwith- ́ standing the fact that we were favored by the weather to a degree which the oldest inhabitants would have pronounced impossible. The detention of our army at Puebla had left the Mexicans nothing to desire in the way of time. On the contrary, time was now a burden to them, owing to the daily increasing difficulty of commanding means to subsist the troops collected here. This was to them a most serious evil, and a cause of constant disquietude. I have omitted to mention it among the military advantages which would have resulted to us from their acceptance of my offer, because, although it would have been a real advantage in this point of view, it would have been a most serious evil with reference to the object for which I made that offer-peace. In this regard there was nothing which gave me more, or even so much uneasiness as the prospect of the army's disbanding itself, and of Santa Anna's being thus left without the kind of support on which alone he could ever rely for any purpose, and the continuance of which was absolutely indispensable to his making that treaty of peace which constituted the object for which our army had invaded Mexico, and now found itself at the gates of her capital; and which, at that time, no human being here considered as being possible, except at his hands.

On the question as to the value of the prolongation of the armistice to the Mexican side, Santa Anna may be admitted to be a tolerably good judge. He knew better than any one else his bitterest enemies would readily admit this-what use could be made of forty or fifty additional days, whether in the way of curing his officers and men of the panic disease, or in the way of embodying troops, or in any other way of preparing for further resistance. And what did he think on the subject? He thought that the measure would be attended with military advantages to us, so important and so perfectly obvious that he at once pronounced my offer to be, not a diplomatic trick on my part, but a military trick, originating with General Scott; and so barefaced a one too, that he was incensed at the insult to his understanding, and to the military qualifications on which he prides himself, and which, in the way of preparation at least, are certainly great; for in this line he has truly accomplished wonders. This notion took such complete possession of him that it was of no use to combat it; and it sensibly increased the bitter personal animosity-strongly contrasting

with the feelings he evinces towards General Taylor-which he has conceived towards General Scott. He would not hear of my offer. The question upon which his mind vascillated was not the adoption or rejection of that offer, but the adoption of the ultimatum of our projét, that is to say, the giving of a carte blanche to the commissioners who had in full cabinet council-although it is due to them to say that nothing of the sort was ever intimated to me-declared themselves in its favor.

The contents of the despatch from the department, devoted to the subject of this offer, may be comprised under two heads: first, the reasons which would have determined the President's mind. against acceding to the proposed modification of the boundary; secondly, "his profound regret" that I should have made the offer; and his opinion" that the prolongation of the armistice, as contemplated by me, "would have been truly unfortunate."

Upon what comes under the first head, I will remark, that even if those reasons had constituted objections, which, from the very nature of things were absolutely insuperable; and if, from my knowing myself to possess an absolute infallibility of judgment, I had known with absolute certainty that they were insuperable; still, even on this supposition, they would have constituted no reason whatever against my making that offer. Viewed with reference to the considerations which governed me in making it, those objections, and all possible objections which would be brought into the same array, are seen at a glance to be absolutely irrelevant to the question whether that offer was a proper and a wise step on, my part, or the reverse.

I will remark, further, that strong as they are, and although they might and probably would have exercised a decisive influence upon my own mind, as a citizen and voter of our country, on the question of acceding or not acceding to the proposed modification of boundary; still, those objections do not present to my mind the least semblance of being absolutely insuperable from the very nature of things. On the contrary, there is not one of them which I cannot conceive of as being readily surmounted, obviated, and cleared away, without the violation of a single principle, and without wrong to a single human being; and consequently, as being very properly cleared away, if the welfare of our country required it. No one, certainly-unless he pretend to know all things, future as well as present-can assert the absolute impossibility of a combination of circumstances, under which-even in regard to an antagonist so entirely at our mercy as Mexico is the importance of peace to our country might be so great as to justify sacrifices even greater than any that would have been involved in. foregoing every advantage and removing every difficulty referred to in your despatch. And whether the state of things in which our country did find herself at that precise moment was or was not of this character, was a question which-independently of the other considerations which actuated me in the course I took-I deemed it my duty to secure to her government the opportunity of deciding for her. In the course of the observations which I have referred to this

head, the country between the Nueces and the Bravo is spoken of as if it constituted absolutely and irrevocably a part of Texas. This point, as I have before said, is altogether irrelevant to the question whether I acted right or wrong in making the offer I did. Nevertheless, I will bestow upon it the passing remark, that if there be any correctness in this view of that matter, then am I altogether incapable of understanding any of the great principles, which lay at the foundation of international law. According to the notions, such as they are, which I have acquired, consent-mutual consent-is, from the very nature of things, the only possible ground of a perfect right to any boundary; and, by the very terms of her admission into our Union, the right of Texas to the Rio Bravo, as a part of her boundary, was made to depend altogether upon such consent as might thereafter take place on the subject between the United States and Mexico, as, previously to her admission, that same right bad depended upon consent between Texas and Mexico. Whether Texas does truly possess "the same sovereign rights over it (the country between the Nueces and the Bravo) as over any other portion of her territory," is a question which depends entirely and exclusively upon consent between parties, of which Texas has ceased to be one. It is a question to which no possible acts of Texas, no possible acts of the Congress of the United States, can be otherwise than entirely irrevelant, except through that consent; that is to say, except as constituting reasons and motives by which the precise character of that consent enght to be determined.

In this connexion, it may be remarked that the proposition which I offered to transmit to my government, if it should be made to me, cannot with accuracy be said to have been a proposition that the United States should "surrender that portion of the State of Texas," &c. Even if it had contemplated that the country in question should be recognized as Mexican territory, it could at most have been said to be a proposition that the United States should restore possession of that portion of the territory claimed by the State of Texas; for, by the very terms of the act admitting her into the Union, as well as by the principles of international law, the possession thereof is all that she can be said to have, until her boundaries shall have been ascertained in the manner which that act requires. But the proposition referred to did not contemplate even that the possession of that country should be restored. It contemplated that Mexico, as well as the United States, should be precluded from occupying it.

Passing to the second head, I will, in the first place, point out the logical error, and the injustice involved therein, of characterizing my offer as going "far beyond the carefully considered ultimatum to which [I was] limited by [my] instructions." This phrase, connected as it is with an expression of the President's profound regret," is expressive of strong censure on the part of my country, through her proper organ; whilst the idea which it conveys of the ground for that censure is both very indistinct and, so fas it is at all tangible, totally inaccurate.