remained faithful to his cause. One of the chief reasons in accepting the Treaty of Fontainbleau was, that if an honourable asylum were afforded to Buonaparié, his marshals would give their assent to the arrangement, and with their assent, that of the whole army that was under their authority.

The next point upon which the noble marquis had dwelt was, that by a breach of the articles of that Treaty, the Allies had given Buonaparté a pretence, at least, to contravene it, and an excuse to his marshals to join him in his attempt to regain the throne of France. But what was the fact upon this subject? The noble marquis had offered a justification that never occurred to Buonaparté, for in none of his proclamations on landing did he attempt to set up the breach of the Treaty of Fontainbleau as the cause of his return. Buonaparte had never carried his hypocrisy to that extreme: on the contrary, he had distinctly averred that he landed in France to reclaim his crown, because he was summoned by the voice of the nation; and he had almost in terms admitted, that such had been his design from the very moment of the signature of the Treaty of Fontainbleau. But if there were, in fact, some stipulations that had not been to the letter performed, what answer had the noble marquis given to what he (lord Liverpool) had advanced on a former night, that Buonaparte had no right to act upon the neglect as a violation of the Treaty, but was bound to make his appeal to the Allies, to demand redress from them as parties to the engagement, This assertion had not been denied by any man, nor could the noble marquis produce an instance in which a supposed breach of faith was assigned as a cause for the desertion of the royal cause by any individual who had placed himself under the banners of Buonaparté. With regard to the fact of the Treaty having been disregarded, he was able to state to the House, that measures had been taken by the Allies, previous to the escape of Buonaparte, to fulfil the articles, not to the letter, but with a spirit of liberality that became the great Powers, for property had actually been assigned for the purpose of defraying the pecuniary charges imposed by the Treaty of Fontainbleau; and he could most positively state that it was the intention of France to have fulfilled the engagement with the utmost punctuality.

Much stress had been laid by the noble marquis upon the subject of the duchy of Parma: but the noble earl said, he could here equally assure the House that nothing had been done in derogation of those articles that respected this point; even if the fulfilment of them were a matter of public inconvenience, his lordship allowed that it could not for a moment be balanced against a positive engagement which the parties were bound to execute. He would not now enter into the question of the propriety or expediency of this arrangement regarding the territory belonging to another family; probably a fit opportu nity for such a discussion would be afforded, and whenever the question came properly before the House he should not shrink from justifying the decision of the Allies upon this topic, upon the principles of that great man to whose authority the noble marquis had alluded, though, as he (lord Liverpool) believed, under complete misapprehension. Upon the second point to which the proposed Address referred, namely, the information that ministers had obtained as to the design of Buonaparté to escape from Elba, he had no objection to state distinctly, that they had received no information of that grave and ostensible character that would have authorized the taking of any step upon the foundation that it supplied. The noble marquis had mistaken what he had said on a former night respecting the convul sions that might be looked for before Europe had settled into a state of permanent tranquillity: he did not mean to assert that there was a probability of revival and continuance of actual war; but that after twenty-five years of continued disorder, it was not unwise to think that there was some chance of a revulsion before ultimate peace was established-not that he had contemplated any such event, but he had thought it not impossible, or perhaps improbable. It was not to be denied, indeed it was known to all, that after the restoration of the Bourbons in France there would prevail among some parties discontents, and even bodies of discontent; such an effect was to be looked for: but assuredly it had never prevailed to the extent argued by the noble marquis, though it was augmented by the peculiar character of the people, and the military pursuits in which they had been so long engaged. There might even be large bodies of men who felt hostile to the royal government; but he could by no means +

admit that the class of men who were usually termed constitutionalists, were discontented under the authority of the fa. mily of Bourbon;-all those who were in favour of a limited monarchy, of a temperate administration, and who held in abhorrence the dreadful excesses of the revolution-in short, the great majority of the nation were in favour of the ancient and legitimate dynasty. They thought that the only chance of a free government was under the Bourbons, and that with the re-establishment of Buonaparté they must give up all the civil and political liberty that they would otherwise enjoy.

The first question, then, for the decision of the House was, whether the Allies were justified in allowing to Buonaparte his personal freedom; or whether, secondly, under the difficulties they had to encounter, and the bazards they had to run, they would have acted most prudently in insisting upon the actual possession of his person and the control of his liberty? Between these two extremes, the noble earl contended that there was no choice; and upon the whole view of the subject, he argued that the decision adopted in the Treaty of Fontainbleau was wise and prudent. When it had long since been brought into discussion, the noble lords opposite had not made any complaint against the generosity shown to Buonaparté. Whether they had acquired wisdom by subsequent events that they did not before possess, was a question which the motion of that night would decide.

The Marquis of Lansdowne said, that melancholy must be the prospect of this country, and deplorable the situation of Europe, if the opinion of the noble earl ought to be adopted by the House-that after the signal successes that had crowned the efforts of the Allies, and after the adoption of all means to establish the future liberties and happiness of Europe, Do better precautions could be resorted to, and no better securities obtained, than those which had been the subject of the panegyric of the noble earl. If the noble earl inquired whether events had given wisdom to one side of the House, the noble marquis said, that he would in his turn ask, whether the noble earl had now no more effectual wisdom to instruct the House and to guide the affairs of the nation, than that which dictated and approved the arrangement now before the House? Was there no hope that new successes, should they be obtained, would

be more effectual in securing the liberty and happiness of the world than those, however brilliant, which had now been rendered so abortive? If the noble earl could hold out no more favourable expectation, it was, indeed, one of the most serious objections he had ever heard against the renewal of a contest, from which the noble earl had endeavoured to show that we could obtain no benefit. The noble marquis said, he was not prepared, from the deficiency of information, to enter into the details of the relative situation of the Allies and Buonaparté, at the date of the Treaty of Fontainbleau; but thus much he must say, that many of the very circumstances stated by the noble earl, as forming the strength of Buonaparte, in his mind constituted his weakness. If marshal Soult had a large army in the South of France, was he not opposed by the duke of Wellington, with superior numbers and superior talents? Yet this fact the noble earl seemed to have entirely forgotten. It was argued, that Buonaparté then held the fortresses of Germany and Holland: but what were they but the causes of his weakness, by dissipating that power, that, concentrated, might have been effectual in overthrowing the Allies, especially if it were the fact, that the balance, even without the aid of Buonaparte's forces in garrison, was so nearly equal? What then, in truth, was the situation of Buonaparté? The noble marquis said, he believed on authority he could not doubt, that Buonaparte, at the time of the signature of the Treaty, had not more than 20,000 men under his command, while the Allies were in the immediate vicinity with 100,000 infantry, and 30,000 cavalry. He agreed with his noble friend who made the motion, that Buonaparté, if held in the light of a fallen enemy, ought to have been treated with the utmost generosity; but whether generosity were taken into the account, or the probability of future hostilities, there was but one plain and indispensable course to be pursued that of security-not security quoad France, but security quoad the person of Buonaparte, who was the chief source of the evils of which Europe complained, and the continuance or prevention of which rested upon the possession of the person who had been the main spring of the French government. The first consideration ought, therefore, to have been to secure the person of Buonaparté, or, if not, to provide as far as pos

sible for the future safety of that country, where his influence might be the most extensive and prejudicial. This brought his lordship to the point of the propriety of naming Elba as the place of residence for Buonaparte. The noble earl had asked, whether any other place could afford greater security? But the true mode of viewing this matter was, to take care to name no place for his residence which was not pre-eminently secure. The Allies might have given Buonaparté liberal revenues, ample territory, and generous provision for his family; but only on the condition that the situation where he was to reside was such as to extinguish and annihilate all chance of escape and future disturbance of the world. Was Elba such a situation, more especially with reference to France and Italy? The noble earl had vindicated this choice, by stating that it was rather to be expected that Buonaparté would have made his descent upon Italy; but surely it was a very curious mode of defending this determination, by showing that it was the most dangerous situation that could have been selected. The noble earl had maintained that it would have been impossible for our fleet to have interfered with the designs of Buonaparté without a special provision-if so, why was not this point made a matter of concert with the Allies? Why was it not made a part of the engagement, that if Buonaparté did attempt to escape he should be intercepted? It was rather a singular argument from the noble earl, that supposing the war with America had been concluded, no English ship could have interfered with the expedition of Buonaparté.

The Earl of Liverpool explained. He had said, that by the general law of nations, no British commander could interfere with the voyage of Buonaparté to France, unless the officer had obtained information that he was on board a par ticular ship.

The Marquis of Lansdowne apprehended, that it would have been the unquestionable right of a British ship to prevent the sailing of Buonaparté for France with arms and armed troops. Upon such a subject, however, precise instructions ought to have been given; and because ministers had failed in this duty, he thought sufficient grounds had been laid for the motion, which went to inquire into the force in the Mediterranean, and upon what service it was employed. The noble

marquis then proceeded to notice other parts of the speech of the earl of Liverpool, and particularly that in which he had asserted that Buonaparté had never justified his return to France on the ground that the articles of the Treaty of Fontainbleau had not been fulfilled. In opposition to this assertion, he quoted a passage from a proclamation of Buonaparté, dated from Bourgogne, the 8th of March, in which he expressly complained of a violation of the Treaty with respect to himself and his wife and son. Supposing, however, that this positive proof did not exist, still it did not follow that Buonaparté did not feel that he had a right to complain, although he did not think it prudent to notice that subject in his proclamations. He was there addressing the people of France, not appealing to the Allies; and Buonaparté at least deserved this credit for wisdom, that instead of insisting upon his own personal claims, he had placed in the front, the assertion that the Bourbons had not performed their part of the compact with the people of France, and consequently that the latter were released from their allegiance. He established his foundation upon that affection of his adherents and of the army, which lord Castlereagh had assigned as his reason for assenting to the Treaty of Fontainbleau: if the motive for consenting were so strong, the stronger ought to be the motive for adhering to the Treaty. The ground on which the noble mover had rested his motion, and on which he should give it his support, was, that with regard to the main point of the security of Europe, as connected with the person of Buonaparte, no proper precautions had been employed by the ministers of this country, or by the allies-that while communications were constantly made, assemblies convened, and treaties signed, with regard to the territories of the various powers, the distribution of the people of Germany, and the settlement of the government of France aud of other countries, nothing had been done, not a single step had been taken as to the security of the person of Buonaparté, by which all the regulations made by the Allies, all the determinations of the Congress, were to be permanent and effectual. Neither in the advance upon Paris, nor in any subsequent stage, did any contingency of the kind we had recently witnessed appear to have been contemplated. In the next place his lordship contended, that