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People's Congress, visit the United States, when the time is propitious, to engage in bilateral discussions. We believe that it is important to expose both systems to first-hand observation and that the People's Republic of China can derive as much benefit from that process as was derived from our view of China.

VI. DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS IN THE PRC

Peking's domestic priorities are now apparently shaped by three major questions: Will the new generation remain true to revolutionary values and thereby continue to build China into a Communist society? Will the Party and State institutions guide the course of transition successfully or fall prey to bureaucratic stagnation and "capitalist errors"? And, will China continue to be built into a powerful modern state capable of joining the front rank of the world's leaders?

We, like most visitors to China, were impressed by its preoccupation with the retention of revolutionary values which underlay the launching of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1969), the formation of the Red Guards (in 1966), and the recent campaigns to criticize Confucius and Lin Piao (1973-1975). However, failure to find fully satisfactory answers to the above questions has delayed final decisions on the educational system and sparked new ideological reform campaigns. Youth are enjoined daily to "serve the masses" and to reduce the "three major differences"-those between mental and manual labor, between town and country, and between workers and peasants. To get an idea of the magnitude of the number of youths involved, it should be remembered that in early 1975 there were 130,000,000 primary school students, 34,000,000 in high schools, and 400,000 in universities. The press constantly reminds cultural workers-the artists, writers, propagandists, playwrights, moviemakers, and performers— of their obligation to use literature and the arts as weapons to defeat "bourgeois enemies" and to preserve the purity of the revolutionary ideology. Politically, the preservation of revolutionary values is at the heart of selecting future leaders from the younger generation who will manage Chinese society and occupy the positions of power. Such an aim dominates the official approach to work, to careers, and to family life, and sets the tone that so distinguishes China in its current stage of development. Unity, collective persuasion, and service to China-these are the watchwords that appeared so often throughout our visit.

Political Developments. Since 1973, the Chinese have reconstructed their national Party and State institutions. It is this process that raises the second question about the future elite. The 28 million members of the Party (less than 4 per cent of the total population) are now enjoined to occupy all senior positions in official organs including the Army and the mass organizations, and at the local levels. The Party celebrated its 54th birthday on July 1 this year and could acclaim the fact that it had successfully weathered nine years of reorganizational campaigns and emerged with its national apparatus intact. Compared to some 15 years ago that apparatus is, according to the Chinese, much more streamlined and efficient and its members much more conscious of their mission in building China and setting the example for the populace. But all has not gone smoothly; we were surprised at how freely the Chinese speak about struggle and debate which presumably is reflected in party decision-making at various levels.

Whereas the new Constitution of the Party was adopted at its Tenth National Congress in August 1973, the new State Constitution (see Appendix C for the text) was approved at the Fourth National People's Congress (NPC) this past January. That approval was the final episode in a year-long discussion about the form of State institutions conducted in the course of the anti-Confucian and anti-Lin Piao campaign. A basic aim of the new institutional system is to ensure the orderly transition to a post-Mao leadership when the present top leaders pass from the scene. It is explicity designed to achieve the succession through collective leadership, but only time will tell whether that proves possible or not.

Organization of The State Council of The People's Republic of China

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As one of the first Congressional delegations to visit the PRC since January, we made a special effort to learn how the new Constitutional system works. As noted in the speeches by Premier Chou En-lai and Vice Premier Chang Ch'un-ch'iao at the NPC meeting this past January, the new State Constitution emphasizes Party leadership, centralized State power, planned transformation of the economy, and national strength and preparedness against war. The main theme to be studied in the Constitution, the Chinese are told, is the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Banners in each workshop we visited proclaimed that theme and called for greater efforts to achieve proletarian unity and to expose ideological opponents.

While in China we met several members of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress and a number of other delegates. We learned particularly about the role of the Standing Committee of the NPC. This 143-member Committee is responsible for both administration and for foreign affairs, but has no power in the area of military affairs. It is empowered to "interpret laws, enact decrees, dispatch and recall plenipotentiary representatives abroad, receive foreign diplomatic envoys, [and] ratify and denounce treaties." The Chinese state that these powers are more actively practiced by the Standing Committee than under the previous 1954 Constitution. In particular, its relative position vis-a-vis the ministries has been enhanced.

We were told that the Standing Committee meets once a month. The Vice Premiers of the State Council also meet, but not so regularly or so often. In foreign affairs the Standing Committee discusses new policies before they are sent to the Foreign Ministry for implementation. The Foreign Ministry carries out only established policies. We discussed the official collection of laws compiled in the 1950's and 1960's, and learned that many of these laws are no longer considered valid. The Standing Committee is currently compiling a new set of laws, which will be promulgated for mass discussion before they are officially enacted. In the final analysis, we were told, laws and courts to enforce them were far less important to the national order than the "discipline and persuasion of the masses"-i.e., social pressure and public education campaigns.

One official informed us that the Party's leadership role in the State and Army has now been stated explicitly in the new Constitution because Lin Piao had used the absence of any such reference to the Party in the previous Constitution to insist on a separation of Party and State. The NPC Standing Committee, whose powers have been increased under the new mandate, has direct relations with the Party, although there is no special section of the Party for liaison with the NPC. If the Standing Committee cannot decide on a matter of principle, then the issue is referred to the Party's leading organ, the 21member Political Bureau. It decides either in full Politburo session or may even send the matter on to Chairman Mao Tse-tung.

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In passing we were told that recent western press reports of strikes in various parts of China were exaggerated, although Article 28 of the Constitution guarantees the right. Strikes could occur, but only if the plant managers refuse to correct so-called "bureaucratic errors.' Such refusal, however, could call into question the managers' performance. Moreover, by having to submit a strike request to "persuasion" by officials, workers find it difficult to exercise the right to strike legitimately.

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