Congressmen come from every walk of life, and necessarily from every section of the country. The thing about these men that has impressed me is their absolute honesty. Daily they are subjected to temptations, and yet of the 2,000 men with whom I have served I know of only two who were convicted of dishonest acts. These two were political accidents, elected in political landslides. But I can give you the comforting assurance that "political accidents" are seldom reelected to Congress.

Another criticism of the Congress is that it is subservient to the Executive because of the desire of Senators and Congressmen for patronage. The fact is that Members of Congress get few jobs in Washington for their constituents. Such few jobs as they do get may make a few of their constituents happy, but many more of their constituents are likely to be unhappy because their friends did not get those jobs. You can appoint any man, even an ex-Member of Congress, head of an executive department, and that individual, anxious to make a record for himself, will appoint in his department the persons he believes most competent. He takes little interest in the political welfare of the Members of Congress in the regular departments the selection of personnel is left to the chief of a personnel division who is a civil-service appointee. He will hold his job under Republican and Democratic administrators, and he has little interest in the legislative program of the administration and less interest in the political future of the Senators and Congressmen.

Since the postmaster and practically all other employees have been placed under civil service, the idea of patronage controlling the Congress is a myth.

Congress really legislates in committee rooms. When a Member of Congress drops a bill in a legislative hopper it has to clear many hurdles before it goes to the White House for approval. Committees, in most instances, hold the power of life or death over proposed laws. If a House committee, for instance, reports on a bill, it goes to the calendar. If there is no opposition, it can be passed. Otherwise, in practice, it cannot be considered unless the House Rules Committee reports a special rule, making it in order to consider it. Then the measure is debated on the House floor and voted on. If passed, the bill then goes to the Senate, and again is referred to a committee. If the committee favors the bill, it is reported to the Senate Calendar for consideration. If passed, the bill in most cases is amended, which sends it to conference to iron out differences. When both the House and Senate accept the conference report, the bill is engrossed and goes to the President for his signature. If it is vetoed, it requires a twothirds majority by both Houses for the legislation to become law.

During the present Congress approximately 9,289 bills and resolutions have been introduced, but only 867 have become law.

While legislation for the most part in written in committees, no one will seriously attempt to justify the number of committees in Senate and House. The Senate has 33 permanent committees. Some of them meet only once or twice in a session. Some Senators are on so many committees that they would not be able to name all of them.

The jurisdiction of the Senate committees is not clearly defined, nor is care taken to insure that the composition of the committees is such as to make them a fair cross section of the Senate. As a result, if a Senator has a bill in which he is particularly interested, when he in

troduces it he asks that it be referred to a committee of which he is a member. The rule of courtesy in the Senate is so adhered to that no Senator objects to this reference, even thought it is obvious it should be considered by some other committee.

The House has 45 committees. More rigid rules govern the reference of bills to committees in the House than in the Senate, but no greater care is taken to insure that the committees fairly represent the views of the House as a whole. As a consequence, even more in the House than in the Senate the fate of a bill may depend upon the particular composition of a particular committee.

The number of committees in each House could be reduced to 10certainly not more than 12. The jurisdiction of a committee should correspond to the jurisdiction of the executive departments. In the House, the Committees on Foreign Affairs and Agriculture should be continued with their present jurisdiction.

The Ways and Means Committee should have jurisdiction of bills now referred to the Banking and Currency Committee and the Committee on Coinage, Weights, and Measures.

A Committee on National Defense could combine the work of the Committees on Military and Naval Affairs, and consider bills now assigned to the Committees on Pensions, World War Legislation, Invalid Pensions, and War Claims, which should be abolished.

The Committee on Immigration and Naturalization and the Committee on the Revision of the Laws could be abolished and their functions conferred upon the Judiciary Committee.

A Committee on Commerce could assume jurisdiction of matters now referred to the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, the Merchant Marine Committee, the Patent Committee, and the Census Committee. A Committee on Labor and Public Welfare could well handle matters now referred to the Committee on Education and matters affecting social security, which are now considered by the Ways and Means Committee.

There could be a Committee on Interior and Public Works and it should absorb the jurisdiction of such committees as Public Lands, Mines and Mining, Irrigation, Indian Affairs, Insular Affairs, and Territories, all of which subjects are under the jurisdiction of the Interior Department. It should also have jurisdiction of Public Buildings and Grounds, Rivers and Harbors, and Flood Control.

The Post Office and Post Roads Committtee should take over the Committtee on Roads.

The Rules Committee should take control of such matters as are now considered by three election committees, the Committee on the Election of President, Vice President, and Representatives in Congress, and the Committee on Memorials. It could also assume the work of the Accounts Committee and the Committee on Enrolled Bills.

Such committees as Civil Service and the Committee on Disposition of Executive Papers could be abolished. The Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments should be abolished and the work performed by the Appropriations Committees and by the committees having charge of legislation for the various departments.

Instead of the two Houses of Congress having committees on the District of Columbia, there should be a joint committee, so that one city council would handle District legislation.

The Committee on Claims should be abolished. The Government is now doing business in so many fields, and so many departments are operating automobiles and trucks, that there is a great increase in the number of claims presented to Congress. Senators and Congressmen do not have time to consider them properly, and the Court of Claims should be empowered to consider all claims.

The committees of the Senate, of course, should be reorganized along the same lines.

This reduction of committees would concentrate responsibility. It would lessen competition between committees for control of bills. It would lessen the demands upon the time of busy officials in executive departments, who are constantly called to appear before committees. I recall in the spring of 1941, when General Marshall was building the great Army we now have and initiating the program for its equipment, one morning he attended the Senate Appropriations Committee. He informed me that as soon as he had answered the questions of various committee members he had to appear before two more committees that morning. He had arrived by plane from the west coast at 9:30 a. m., and it was certain he would not be able to reach his office before 1 p. m. This was not an unusual day for General Marshall.

It may be argued that in order to assign the entire membership of Congress to only 10 committees the committees would be large and unwieldy. However, the House Appropriations Committee has 43 members. It is better to have the entire membership on 10 committees that consider all legislation than to have, as at present, half the membership on 10 committees that consider important bills and the other half on 33 other committees that seldom get a chance at significant legislation.

In each House of Congress the majority party now has a steering committee to guide the course of legislation. These committees seldom meet and never steer. They should be abolished, and the 10 committee chairmen should constitute a steering committee which meets regularly with the majority leader.

In addition, the steering committees of the two Houses should meet with the President at least once a month. The President now has frequent conferences with the four congressional leaders. This is not enough. If at stated intervals the President met with this congressional cabinet, it should eliminate much of the friction between the legislative and executive branches of the Government. These meetings, however, should not prevent the President's continuing to invite members of both political parties on a committee to consult with him when an important matter is pending before that committee.

Much of the friction is due to lack of appreciation of problems. Not only does each committee go its own way, but each member of the committtee goes his own way. When the majority leader of either House expresses an opinion as to pending legislation, he realizes that it is binding only on as many of his colleagues as value his judgment. He does not assume to speak for all members of his party. This is equally true of the minority party.

The more responsibility is thus divided the farther we get away from the two-party system and the greater encouragement is given to groups and blocs. The agricultural bloc of the Senate within recent years has met more often than has the Democratic membership of the

Senate. Closer cooperation between the executive and the legislative branches would better enable the people to place responsibility for the Government's policies.

Much of the complaint of Executive domination of the Congress, as I have said, is unfounded. The Congress needs more, not less, leadership. In many cases the Executive is forced to assume leadership because congressional leadership is lacking. That does not mean that the Congress lacks individual leaders. There are many able leaders in both Houses, but neither House is so organized that its leaders can speak or act for the House as a whole. And until the Congress does so organize itself it is very unfair to the executive branch to put upon it all the blame for the lack of better cooperation between the two branches of Government.

In addition to the permanent standing committees the Senate has 10 special committees and the House has 7. If there is a reorganization of committees and competent staffs are provided, there is little excuse for continuing special committees.

In recent years effective investigations by two or three special committees have resulted in remedial legislation. But there are many special committees that have contributed nothing in the way of legislative accomplishments. And that is the only object of an investigation.

One objection to a special committee is that frequently it is difficult to end the investigation. For example, a Senate Special Committee on Conservation of Wildlife Resources was created April 17, 1930, directed to ascertain facts upon which legislation might be based. It is still in existence. It has no authority to report a bill. A House special committee on the same subject was created in January 1934, and is still investigating. If there is need for a separate committee on the subject, it should be made a regular standing committee. If not, it should make a final report.

The special committees have been given the right to call on executive departments for assistants. When Congress adjourned in September there were detailed to congressional committees 105 employees of Government agencies, who were drawing salaries at the annual rate of $382,297. Congress should hire its own employees and stop a practice that is bad for many reasons.

You cannot expect an independent investigation of the executive departments to be made by employees who, when their job is done, must return to the executive branch of the Government. It prevents the Congress and the public from knowing what is the actual cost of the investigation. It gives to the executive departments from which the employees are taken, an argument to justify additional appropriations for clerical workers to replace those loaned to Congress.

It tends to place the legislators under obligation to officials of executive departments for the services of particular employees.

There are other objections. Some ambitious young lawyer in a department will seek the assignment to an investigating committee. He wants the opportunity to promote a cause dear to his heart. If, as counsel, he is given the power to cross-examine the citizens who are summoned as witnesses and to influence the thinking of Senators, he has all the power of a Senator, without any of his responsibility.

Only members of the committee should be allowed to interrogate witnesses. This would insure that committee members would keep posted as to the scope of the investigation.

Many of these objections could be avoided if the Congress had a permanent staff of career men selected for their qualifications.

Each House now has an Office of Legislative Counsel. No important bill is reported without a representative of this drafting service assisting the committee. The public has never complained about the cost of this splendid service.

In the Congressional Library the Congress now has a Legislative Reference Service with about 75 employees. It has a number of very efficient men engaged in research work, but this service is not used as much as it should be. It should have an office on each side of the Capitol so that the legislators would have opportunity to consult the most capable men on its staff. The personnel should be augmented and should include outstanding economists, career men, who would make studies of the subjects engaging the attention of a committee and be able to advise committee members.

The Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation employs a staff of tax experts. They confer with the tax experts of the Treasury, study the operation of the tax laws, and advise the Ways and Means Committee of the House and the Finance Committee of the Senate on necessary amendments to existing laws. This staff is doing a splendid job and the committees of both Houses are enthusiastic about its work. A similar staff of experts on appropriations should serve the Appropriations Committees of the House and Senate. The Appropriations Committees of the two Houses are divided into many subcommittees having charge of the appropriations for the various departments.

The House Appropriations Committee has as its chief clerk Mr. Marcellus C. Sheild. He has been with the committee for nearly 35 years. All Republicans and Democrats who have served in the House in recent years will agree he is the best-informed man at the Capitol as to the business of government. The Senate Appropriations Committe has, as its chief clerk, Mr. Everard Smith, second only to Mr. Sheild in knowledge of the Government's business.

These two men could organize one staff to serve the Appropriations Committees of House and Senate. If they were given the needed assistants, they could, during the year, check the manner in which the appropriations are expended. When the department officials came to justify their estimates for appropriation, the committees would be well-informed by this staff of experts as to the inside workings of the departments. This would be an effective way to control the purse strings.

The staff should be adequate so that when a bill passed the Congress the employee who had assisted with that bill could, during the rest of the year, keep in touch with the department concerned to watch how the money is being spent. He could also keep in touch with the official of the Budget Bureau charged with the preparation of the budget for that department, so that the following year, when the committee hearings were started, he would be able to advise the committee where appropriations could be reduced.

It is a mistake to believe that a careful investigation is not now made of appropriations. The hearings of the House Appropriations Committee on any one of the bills appropriating large amounts continue daily for many weeks.

Some years ago, when Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., had been Assistant Secretary of the Navy for some months, he attended the naval hearings