The statute referred to in the first count of the indictment is 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109, s. 17, and is as follows: REQ. v. O'CONNOR AND 1881 And be it enacted that every person who shall, by any fraud, or unlawful device, or ill-practice in playing at or with cards, dice, tables, or other game, or in bearing a part in the stakes, wagers, or adventures, or in betting on the sides or hands of them that do play, or in wagering on the event of any game, sport, pastime, or exercise, win from any other person to himself, or any other or others, any sum of money or Wager on tossvaluable thing, shall be deemed guilty of obtaining such money or valuable thing from ing for money such other person by a false pretence with intent to cheat or defraud such person of -Gaming Act, the same, and, being convicted thereof, shall be punished accordingly. 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109, s. 17. It was proved in evidence, on the part of the prosecutor, that on the day named in the indictment the prosecutor Henry Chambers was accosted in the street at Spalding by the prisoner Brown as if they knew each other, which knowledge the prosecutor denied; the prisoner Brown then said to the prosecutor he had met him at Peterborough, which the prosecutor also denied. The prosecutor was then induced by Brown to go with him to a public-house to have a glass of beer with him. Afterwards the prisoner O'Connor came into the room, and, after some conversation and beer-drinking, challenged Brown to toss with coins for different wagers, and ultimately the prisoners both induced the prosecutor to stake his watch, chain, and the appendages upon the result of a particular toss of a coin between the prisoners. It had been agreed between Brown and O'Conner that they should have five tosses, and the last of the five to win. The prisoner Brown had won the first four tosses, and then bet O'Connor 31., which he increased to 5l., that he (Brown) would win the fifth toss, whereupon both Brown and O'Connor persuaded the prosecutor to stake his watch, chain, and appendages against O'Connor's 51. that the prisoner Brown would win the fifth toss. The result was that O'Connor won, and the 51. and the watch, chain, and appendages were handed to him by the prisoner Brown. At the conclusion of the evidence adduced by the prosecution, counsel on behalf of the prisoner Brown submitted that tossing with coins was not a game within the meaning of the statute 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109, s. 17, whereupon, at the request of counsel for the prisoner Brown, I consented to submit to the decision of the Court of Crown Cases Reserved this question: "Whether the prisoners were or were not lawfully convicted upon the aforesaid indictment." If the Court should be of opinion that the indictment is good, the conviction to stand; otherwise to be quashed. The prisoners were respectively sentenced to six calendar months' imprisonment in Her Majesty's prison at Spalding, bail being allowed pending the decision of the Court; but, bail not being forthcoming, the prisoners are detained in custody, the sentence being respited until the opinion of the court is given. J. RUSSELL JACKSON, REG. V. O'CONNOR AND 8 & 9 Vict. c. J. W. Cooper for the prisoner.-The only question raised on behalf of the prisoner was, "Is tossing with halfpence a game within the meaning of the statute 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109, s. 17?" Tossing with coins is not mentioned in the statute, nor is it 1881 ejusdem generis with the words "cards, dice, tables, or other Wager on toss- game." [STEPHEN, J.-Is not tossing with coins substantially ing for money the same as throwing dice? They bear a strong resemblance. -Gaming Act, In the one case you throw up a coin and see which side turns up, 109, s. 17. and in the other you throw the dice and see what number turns up.] In Reg v. Hudson (Bell's C. C. 263; 8 Cox C. C. 305), the indictment charged A., B., and C. in the first count, that they by fraud, unlawful device, and ill-practice in playing at a certain game or sport, to wit, in and by a wager with R., unlawfully and fraudulently obtained money from R. And there were also two counts for conspiracy. The evidence was that A., B., C., and the prosecutor were drinking in a public-house, and that A. left a pencase on a table and quitted the room to get writing paper, B. then took up the pencase, took out the pen and put a pin in the place of it, then put the pen under the prosecutor's drinking glass, and suggested to the prosecutor to bet the prisoner when he returned that there was no pen in the pencase. The prosecutor was induced by B. and C. to do so. The pencase was then turned up, and another pen with the pin fell into his hand, and the prisoners then took the money. Upon the same objection being taken as in this case, Pollock, C.B. told counsel that he might confine his argument to the count for conspiracy, and this point was not decided, but the Recorder, who tried the case, thought the point was a good one. In Watson v. Martin (34 L. J. 50, M. C.; 10 Cox C. C. 56) it was held that playing at pitch and toss with halfpence was not playing with an instrument of gaming. [HAWKINS, J.-That was a decision upon the Vagrant Act (a). This indictment charges that by fraud, unlawful device, and ill-practice in playing at a certain game or sport, to wit, in and by wagering on the event of a certain game or sport. Was not this a game or sport? STEPHEN, J.-The words of the statute are "game, sport, pastime, or exercise." Surely this was a pastime.] This was not a game, sport, pastime, or exercise within the meaning of the statute. [Lord COLERIDGE, C.J.-What do you call it then if two persons spent an hour in pitch and toss?] It is simply a waste of time. Lord COLERIDGE, C.J.-Should you not say it was a way of passing time? Tunnard-Moore, for the prosecution, was not called upon. Lord COLERIDGE, C.J.-The case is clearly within the words of the statute. This was undoubtedly a pastime or exercise, if not a game, within the meaning of the statute. The rest of the Court concurred. Conviction affirmed. (a) 5 Geo. 4, c. 83, s. 4: "Every person playing or betting in the street, road, highway, or other open and public place, at or with any table or instrument of gaming, at any game or pretended game of chance." MIDLAND CIRCUIT. DERBY WINTER ASSIZES, FEBRUARY, 1882. (Before Mr. Justice HAWKINS.) REG. v. GODDARD. (a) Evidence-Dying declaration-Consciousness of impending dissolution. The deceased, shortly after the occurrence which resulted in her death, was seen standing at the door of a neighbour's house in a fainting condition, and apparently dying. She said, “I am dying; look to my children;" and she then made a statement as to the cause of her injuries. Held, by Hawkins, J., after consulting Baggallay, L.J., that the statement then made was admissible in evidence as a dying declaration. WILLIAM GODDARD was indicted for the wilful murder of his wife, Sarah Goddard, at Chesterfield. Merewether, Q.C. and Arnold Morley prosecuted. ones. The prisoner resided with his wife and family at a house in Station-street, in the town of Chesterfield. On Saturday night, the 28th of January, the deceased was at home; the prisoner was seen to come home about 11 p.m., and almost immediately the next-door neighbours heard a noise as of the furniture being knocked about; then two persons were heard to run upstairs, the noise being as of light steps going first, followed by heavier A woman's scream was heard proceeding from the upper part of the house; then two persons were heard to run quickly down again, followed immediately by a series of piercing screams. One of the neighbours, Mrs. Sharman, came out into the yard of her house, found the deceased standing in the yard in a pool of blood and took her into her house, fetching, at the deceased's request, another neighbour, Mrs. Worrall. When Mrs. Worrall arrived, which was some ten minutes after the screams had been heard, the deceased was standing at Mrs. Sharman's door. Two witnesses testified that she then looked pale and was in a fainting condition, and had the appearance of dying, and she then made a statement as to the cause of her injuries, which the prosecution proposed to put in as part of the res gestoe, but it was objected to and disallowed by the learned judge. In reply to questions put by the judge, the witness Worrall said that when she first saw the deceased she said, "I'm dying; (a) Reported by GILBERT G. KENNEDY, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. REG. v. GODDARD. 1882. look to my children," she then made the statement as to the cause of her injuries. The deceased woman died in the course of the night. The medical evidence established that a terrible injury had been inflicted on her from which she had bled to death. A violent Dying decura- kick from a heavy pair of boots such as the prisoner wore, was proved to be a most likely cause of injury. Evidence tion. W. Merewether submitted that the statement made by the deceased woman to Mrs. Worrall was admissible as a dying declaration. Buszard, Q.C. objected that the mere fact that the woman had received a serious injury, and said, "I am dying" was not sufficient evidence of an actual belief of impending dissolution. HAWKINS, J., after consulting Baggallay, L.J., said: It is a question of fact for me to decide whether I am satisfied that the woman believed her dissolution to be impending at the time she made this statement. There is no doubt she had received an injury which speedily occasioned her death. I am satisfied she was conscious of the serious nature of her injuries, and believed that her dissolution was impending. My brother Baggallay agrees with me thoroughly, and I hold the statement to be admissible in evidence. The statement admitted was as follows: "Oh, dear! Mrs. Worrall, my husband has kicked me, and I shall die; do look to my children; is'nt it hard that he should do like this when I have given him no cause ?" The prisoner was eventually found guilty of manslaughter, and sentenced to twenty years' penal servitude. Solicitor for the prosecution, Gee, of Chesterfield. Solicitors for the defence, Jones and Middleton, of Chesterfield. MIDLAND CIRCUIT. WINTER ASSIZES, JANUARY, 1882. (Before Lord Justice BAGGALLAY. REG. v. TAYLOR. (a) Practice-Postponement of case-Danger to public-Infectious witnesses. Postponement of a case on the ground that infection might be conveyed to the public by the attendance of the witnesses. THE HE prisoner was committed for trial at the Northampton Winter Assizes, 1882, on charges of burglary and housebreaking committed at the Union Workhouse at Stamford in (a) Reported by GILBERT G. KENNEDY, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. REG v. TAYLOR 1882. July and November, 1881. The witnesses on the depositions to prove the alleged crimes were the master, porter, and other inmates of the workhouse. Since the committal of the prisoner, smallpox had broken out in the workhouse, and, though the witnesses were not themselves "unable to travel" within 11 & 12 Vict. c. 42, s. 17, the medical officer was of opinion that their trial-Ground attendance at the assizes would be dangerous to the public, as for. they might carry infection. At Bedford, the assize town preceding Northampton, Etherington Smith, for the prosecution, made an application to Baggallay, L.J., the judge before whom the case would in ordinary course be tried, for directions as to the course to be pursued on the above state of facts. His LORDSHIP stated that he should require an affidavit from the medical officer to the above effect, to be produced before him at Northampton. On production of the affidavit at Northampton, Baggallay, L.J. did not require any bill to be sent up before the grand jury, but postponed the case to the next assizes. The prisoner, who since the committal had been in custody, was brought before the judge, and, after having been told the result of the above application, was admitted to bail on his own recognisances to appear at the next assizes. Solicitor for the prosecution, English, of Stamford. Postponing HOUSE OF LORDS. Nov. 8, 11, and 24, 1881. (Before Lords PENZANCE, BLACKBURN, and WATSON.) MULLINS V. THE TREASURER OF THE COUNTY OF SURREY. (a) ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEAL IN ENGLAND. Prisons Act, 1877 (40 & 41 Vict. c. 21), ss. 4, 57, 61-Expenses The Prisons Act, 1877 (40 & 41 Vict. c. 21), enacts as follows: (a) Reported by C. E. MALDEN, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. |